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J. K. Newman, *Editor*

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# ILLINOIS CLASSICAL STUDIES

VOLUME XI

1986

J. K. Newman, *Editor*

— *Patet omnibus veritas; nondum est occupata;  
multum ex illa etiam futuris relictum est.*  
Sen. Epp. 33. 11

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Problems of Greek Philosophy

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## Preface

The theologian and philosopher Friedrich Schleiermacher was not only the founder of modern Platonic scholarship, but also acknowledged as his master by August Boeckh, who in his turn ranks with Gottfried Hermann as one of the twin founders of modern classical scholarship in general. In a striking passage of his *Aesthetik*, he remarks about the need to ground the appreciation of a work of art in its historical context:

So ist also eigentlich ein Kunstwerk auch eingewurzelt in seinen Grund und Boden, in seine Umgebung. Es verliert schon seine Bedeutung, wenn es aus dieser Umgebung herausgerissen wird und in den Verkehr übergeht. Es ist wie etwas, das aus dem Feuer gerettet ist und nun Brandflecken trägt.

Really and truly then a work of art is also rooted in its native soil, its ambience. It loses its significance, if it is wrenched out of this ambience and put into circulation. It is like something rescued from the fire, still bearing the marks of its burning.

This does not mean that the work of art does not possess absolute value. But its origins can never be neglected.

G. W. F. Hegel, who lectured in the 1820s on aesthetics alternately with Schleiermacher at Berlin, was to repeat this insistence. Even though in the last analysis the identity of particular characters and particular historical details taken up into the work of art may no longer be important, we must check their credentials before they disappear.

Nowadays a student in a typical department of philosophy would probably scan the lecture lists for a course on aesthetics in vain. But both Hegel and Schleiermacher were philosophers, and the striking feature of their aesthetic theories is that they do not wish to exclude philosophy—artistically presented philosophy, as Greek philosophy is—from them. The form is part of the content and, in the Greek world, the form raised certain expectations in its audience. A philosophical poem, for example, was not simply a prose discourse coated with literary, and on the whole rather regrettable, sugar. That is not true even of the Lucretius who uses this image. Nor is a dialogue

merely a convenient pedagogic means of setting out simply views which otherwise might tax or fatigue the amateur reader with his limited attention span. All ancient literary forms are grounded in and structured by pre-literary, and certainly pre-philosophical, usages. They presuppose at least one interlocutor: many of them presuppose in that role the whole polis, even the pan-Hellenic community. A polis might well offer a more motley and less schooled audience than that of the university lecture. Yet the authors who present themselves before it will be alert to their listeners' diversity. Schleiermacher was a Prussian clergyman, but he understood amazingly well that literary art cannot always be taken *au grand sérieux* :

Die Kunst beweist daher ihre Freiheit durch die spielende und lösere Seite, und ihre innere Notwendigkeit durch die symbolische und höhere. (Die größten Künstler zeigen uns dieses Zusammengehören oft in einer sehr leicht mißverständlichen Unmittelbarkeit . . .).

Art therefore shows its freedom through the playful, less trammelled side, and its inner necessity through its symbolic, higher side. (The greatest artists show us this relation quite often with a very easily misunderstood directness.)

Among the examples of this he cites Shakespeare, whose puns are defended, and Plato.

Wilamowitz used to speak of the disaster that overtook German education in the nineteenth century. It has taken a long time for the modern interpreter of Plato or Aristotle to rise to Schleiermacher's insight, that a Greek philosophical work is essentially an act of dialogue. Schleiermacher added to the statement of his *Aesthetik* a whole hermeneutic doctrine. It had a twofold import. The interpreter must concern himself carefully with the elucidation of the meaningful connections within language. He must also seek for the formation of language and its thought-content within the creative individuality of the speaker or author.

This sanctions in the event both grammatical and psychological explanation. Grammar will naturally concern itself not only with the details of linguistic forms, but also with the entire context of language and its spiritual content. Psychology will seek the origin of language in the creative spiritual processes within the author's individuality. The original creative process led from psychology—what Schleiermacher calls the *Keimentschluss* or seminal decision—to grammar. Understanding the author leads from grammar to psychology.

Yet, although every student of Wilamowitz or his pupil Eduard Fraenkel on the poets will recognize these scholars as in Schleiermacher's tradition, the literary or pre-philosophical approach to

philosophers has often seemed arbitrary and irrelevant, as irrelevant as talk about "spirit." Gottlob Frege said that logical explanation in his day was "psychologisch verseucht," "sick to death with psychology." If a man is concerned with truth, why trouble about his cast of mind? And if he says what he means, in a close, naked, natural way of speaking, do style and convention matter?

But the notion that we have access to the truth (whatever that may mean) through abstractions, which really means in an inhuman way, is an illusion. What is accessible is thought, and thought is clothed in language. Hence the philosopher and the philologist do in fact meet in a common quest.

The student of Greek philosophy then must know Greek. But more than this. He must study the prejudices and expectations about etiquette of a society often tantalizingly different from our own. There is an etiquette even of the intellect. We have been taught to crave the absolute, and wars have been fought by those who were convinced they had this privileged key to reality. The Greeks certainly fought enough wars. But their civilization in its best moments was based on the recognition of compromise. There is no absolute right in the *Iliad*, and the *Odyssey's* right is only that of a man to his wife and family and home. The delicate reserve that pervades the Greek of Plato and Menander, philosopher and poet, with its play of particles, its optatives, its modal verbs, is a noble Athenian contribution to this national insight.

Compromise is the basis of political life, and the dinner party was peculiarly the place where such compromises were evident. Again, already Homer knew this, when in the *Odyssey* he condemned the Centaurs, and this is the symbolism of the meal at which Priam and Achilles learn to accept death at the end of the *Iliad*. Xenophanes shows that the religious and philosophical meal persisted, as it does in the *Symposia* of both Plato and Xenophon.

But to accept this ambience and this language is already to place limitations on the kind of truth at which such inquiries may arrive, since who is very clear next day about what seemed so plausible the night before? Who has not yielded a point for the sake of his table companions and his host which more privately he might have cherished to the death? What is important about these occasions is not so much the absolute claims of whatever truth was agreed, since even agreement may only be an agreement to differ, but our impressions about the character of our fellow guests. And there we may well set more store by the man who was able to lighten a heavy moment with a well-timed anecdote that raised a laugh than by the professor who set out to summarize the views of Kant for his glassy-eyed listeners.

These are the kinds of boundaries between which Plato so often moves, even when he abandons the formal setting of the dinner party while retaining the essential dialogue (the “feast of words”). The vexatious imprecision of his arguments is rightly pinpointed by scholars. Paradoxically, it has never affected his status as one of the greatest luminaries of our civilization. This is because everyone recognizes that *ἀπορία* may sometimes be the right strategy in certain kinds of discourse, in company, certainly, but also in encounter with the numinous. St. Augustine’s *omnia exeunt in mysterium* is simply another way of putting this. Both sorts of discourse coalesce at a locus with which, as the instance of Xenophanes already mentioned proves, pagan antiquity was perfectly well acquainted, the sacred meal.

We need not go as far back as Augustine. The end of Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is familiar. Increasingly nowadays, when we are seeking to do justice to the oeuvre, Wittgenstein’s life and character also enter into evidence; his quixotic village schoolmastering, his service as a hospital porter. Coming from the British empirical tradition, Sir Frederick Ayer in the 1930s took the Viennese Circle to which Wittgenstein belonged to be saying that metaphysical assertions, since they could not be empirically validated, were worthless. What they were really saying is that they were nonsense. But nonsense has its rights too, and this is also part of one kind of British, or English, tradition. It is curious that anyone from the same University and College as Lewis Carroll, the mathematician Charles Dodgson, should not have understood this. In the face of the mystery constituted by the universe (“alles, was der Fall ist”) perplexity is a proper reaction, and statements in and about the presence of mystery may well be technically nonsensical. There is no *techne* to deal with them, and this is seen exactly at the moment in any civilization when technical knowledge is promising its best fruits and is becoming best understood. But since this means that the claim to reduce the universe to a matter of technical expertise is fraught with uncharted difficulties, absolute knowledge of the truth (to be totally *sophos*) is *hybris* for all men. All that is left is *philo-sophia*, and the *philo-sophos* must exhibit *sophrosyne*, not simply as a demonstration of disinterested morals, but as the proof of his fitness for his profession. Pythagoras, another mathematician, was the first to speak of the *philosophos*. It is part of the same mentality that he also was a religious leader.

This is why Plato, mathematician and mystic, is so concerned with the moral stance of his participants in dialogue. Whatever the vagueness and ambiguities of their conclusions, which may be regarded as inevitable, the important question, after all, is whether they are



living out their lives honorably, authentically, or not. That is a question that may not be avoided.



The essays printed in this volume are offered as examples of the modern approach to Greek philosophy. Already that philosophy is more than a synchronous dialogue. When Plato makes Socrates interrogate Parmenides, he is paying homage to the diachronic possibly of a "dialogue des absents," even a "dialogue des morts." In his turn, Socrates himself spoke ambiguously to posterity, and this posthumous conversation between old and new has continued down the ages with all the philosophers of antiquity just as much as it has continued with the poets.

Greek philosophy began on the fringes of its world, and perhaps in a too little explored dialogue with non-Greek world-views already old. Asia Minor in particular had its own contribution to make whether to religion or art. It is right that we should give pride of place to an examination of the first fragment of Heraclitus of Ephesus, since the influence of Heraclitus on Plato—and on Marx—is immeasurable. But that is why the comparison of Aristotle and Descartes on the soul is also profoundly relevant to our inquiry. In the intervening perspective, one of our most exciting pieces shows that a civilization too long silent in this inherited discourse, the Arab, is now beginning to be heard. If the conclusions drawn there are correct, how much the modern exegete will have to learn about the reliability of his texts! Elsewhere, a Christian apologist is shown to be a repository of Platonic and Stoic doctrine. What another Christian made of the tradition in Byzantium is now revealed in a poem published for the first time.

In elucidating the Greek thinkers, we have of course to listen very carefully to the idioms and patterns of a language not our own. Some of our most distinguished contributors excel in precisely this sensitivity. There is no way round this. Translations simply will not do. As the study of Greek diminishes and vanishes in the educational reforms of our time, we are both cheating our children, and impoverishing the understanding of our civilization, in a frightening way. Since the end of antiquity, Europe has always striven towards Greek. This is true even of the Middle Ages, so wrongly disparaged by the Greekless Petrarch. Thomas Aquinas had William of Moerbeke to help him, and Dante, whose poem has after all a Greek title, paraded what bits he thought he knew. We will not return to Chartres by ignoring

Greek, but to a remote barbarism unknown since the second millennium before Christ.

How the Greek philosophers organized their work in genres is another basic inquiry. Plato is a supreme literary artist glittering with kaleidoscopic contradictions, and a number of our papers focus on different facets of his iridescent genius, including his awareness that there are different types of time (Bergson). Is there a genre that will accommodate all these discrepancies, and is it perhaps what Plato always said it was, dialectic?

His dramatic qualities are clearly an outgrowth of his dialectic, and they commit him to a particular approach to truth, as the irresolutions of the Attic dramas still attest. We are told that he was an avid student of the mimes of Sophron, and this perhaps explains some of his irony, which may be diagnosed as attenuated laughter. But in failing to resolve his problems more decidedly or logically, in using faulty and imprecise methods, was he perhaps also more in debt to the Sophists than his language prepares us to believe? Were they much more influential as thinkers than we are commonly led to suppose, and was the ambiguity of Plato's attitude to them the result of the shock to the dialogic and musical principle they upheld administered first by Aristophanes, and culminating, as he perceived it, in the hemlock? How interesting, in any case, that he should have sought to come to final terms with Aristophanes in a *Symposium*, almost a Last Supper.

Aristotle, *il maestro di color che sanno*, "the master of those that know" according to Dante, has enjoyed a chequered career in the history of European thought. His universal brilliance is beyond question. Is it heresy to suggest that he might have been less criticized at certain periods if his literary dialogues with their *aureum flumen orationis* had survived? What we have is still dialogic, one side of a telephone conversation whose other end we cannot hear. But his laconic and staccato manner is heard too easily as dogma. This is unfair to the teacher of Alexander the Great, and to the staggering statement at the beginning of the *Metaphysics* that all men by nature stretch out for knowledge, one of the most gloriously optimistic remarks in history. Perhaps it is the proof that he was too much the product of his own people, with their prejudices as well as their strengths. Or perhaps again we have simply been in the habit of distinguishing too sharply between the Greek and Hebrew meanings of "know." Clearly Homer uses *εἰδώς* in more than an intellectual sense, and when on the façade of the Library of Celsus at Ephesus we find the four allegorical statues of Sophia, Arete, Ennoia and

Episteme we see that even in the age of Hadrian the intellectual and moral were not separated.

Marx once asserted that he was no Marxist, and Aristotelians have not always been faithful to their master's many-sided genius. Our volume pleads for a continuation of dialogue, with him, with the other thinkers discussed in it and, more largely, with all the indispensable founders of our civilization who first asked the kinds of questions that turned out to be best discussed "after physics"—after physics and after dinner.



The Editor and Editorial Committee are grateful to the School of Humanities, and its Director, Professor Nina Baym, for continued interest and support.

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Once again, I must thank Mrs. Mary Ellen Fryer for her labors in putting on line some of our contributors' texts. Mr. Carl Kibler of the Printing Services Office, University of Illinois, supervised the PENTA side of our operations with his usual common sense and perseverance.

Frances Stickney Newman's unceasing toil made the whole thing possible.

J. K. Newman



# Problems of Greek Philosophy

πάντα γὰρ οὐπω  
ἐκ Διὸς ἄνθρωποι γινώσκουσιν, ἀλλ' ἔτι πολλὰ  
κέκρυπται. . . .

Aratus, *Phaenomena* 768–70





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# 1

## The First Fragment of Heraclitus

LEONARDO TARÁN

The interpretation of Heraclitus will always remain controversial. The main reasons are his peculiar mode of expression, the fragmentary character of the evidence, and the very way ancient authors quoted his sayings. If progress is still to be made, it is necessary to discuss the arguments given in support of one or another interpretation in order to determine in each case what is probable, what is merely possible, and what is unlikely or impossible. Such a discussion should contribute to clarify the points on which scholarly opinion is likely to differ and to eliminate poor and irrelevant arguments. The following analysis of Heraclitus' first fragment has been prompted, among other things, by the preceding considerations. The fragments will be cited according to the numbers in the B section of chapter 22 of Diels-Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*.<sup>1</sup> For the sake of brevity my discussion takes its starting point from, and presupposes knowledge of, the commentaries of Kirk<sup>2</sup> and of Marcovich.<sup>3</sup> This explains the prominent character of my disagreements with these

<sup>1</sup> I refer to the 6th edition, 3 vols., Berlin 1951-52. The alleged later editions are mere reprints. This work is referred to as *FVS*.

<sup>2</sup> G. S. Kirk, *Heraclitus. The Cosmic Fragments* (Cambridge 1954; reprinted, with corrections, 1962; my references are to the latter). Hereafter = Kirk.

<sup>3</sup> M. Marcovich, *Heraclitus. Greek Text with a Short Commentary* (Mérida, Venezuela 1967) and *Eraclito. Frammenti*. Introduzione, e commento (Florence 1978). Hereafter these books are referred to as Marcovich<sup>1</sup> and Marcovich<sup>2</sup>, respectively.

The following publications will be cited by their authors' names alone: E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung* I, ii<sup>6</sup> (Leipzig 1920). Herausgegeben von W. Nestle; J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*<sup>4</sup> (London 1930); K. Reinhardt, *Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie* (Bonn 1916); O. Gigon, *Untersuchungen zu Heraklit* (Leipzig 1935); R. Walzer, *Eraclito*. Raccolta dei frammenti e traduzione italiana (Florence 1939). Other references will be self-explanatory.

two scholars. For the reader's convenience I print the text with a short critical apparatus in which purely orthographical variants have been disregarded.

τοῦ λόγον τοῦδ' ὄντος αἰεὶ<sup>4</sup> ἀξύνεται γίνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκούσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον· γινομένων γὰρ πάντων<sup>5</sup> κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε ἀπείρουν εἰκόσι πειρώμενοι καὶ ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων τοιούτων ὁκοίων ἐγὼ διηγέῃμαι κατὰ<sup>6</sup> φύσιν διαιρέων ἕκαστον<sup>7</sup> καὶ φράζων ὅπως ἔχει· τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λαμβάνει ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ποιῶσιν ὅκωσπερ ὁκόσα εὐδόντες ἐπιλανθάνονται.

"τοῦ Aristotle, Clement: τοῦ δὲ Hippolytus: om. Sextus 'αἰεὶ Aristotle, Clement, Hippolytus: om. Sextus 'πάντων Hippolytus: om. Sextus 'κατὰ . . . ἕκαστον Sextus: διερέων κατὰ φύσιν Hippolytus (omitting ἕκαστον).

The entire fragment is cited by Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. Math.* VII. 132) only. It is possible that the omission of τοῦ or τοῦ δέ (see *infra*), of αἰεὶ, and of πάντων are due neither to him nor to his source but to one or more scribes. Hippolytus (*Ref. Omn. Haeres.* IX. 9. 3 [pp. 241–42 Wendland]) gives the passage up to ἔχει, omitting the final comparison (τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους . . . ἐπιλανθάνονται). Clement (*Strom.* V. 111. 7 [II, pp. 401–02 Stählin]) has the first sentence only, from τοῦ to πρῶτον, and Eusebius (*Praeparatio Evangelica* XIII. 13. 39 [II, p. 214 Mras]) himself quotes this passage of Clement's. Finally, also Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1407 B 16–17) cites the first sentence, but only from τοῦ to ἄνθρωποι γίνονται (in this order).

Both Aristotle and Sextus tell us that this text occurred at the beginning of Heraclitus' book. However, neither the former's ἐν ἀρχῇ αὐτοῦ<sup>4</sup> τοῦ συγγράμματος nor the latter's ἐναρχόμενος (sc. Ἡράκλειτος) . . . τῶν περὶ φύσεως necessarily implies that those in our fragment were the very first words of Heraclitus' treatise.<sup>5</sup> This topic has been usually discussed in connection with whether at the beginning of our text one should read τοῦ λόγου or τοῦ δὲ λόγου. A majority of recent scholars, including Kirk and Marcovich,<sup>6</sup> has adopted the latter reading, though it is transmitted by Hippolytus only. The reason given is that advanced by Zeller<sup>7</sup> long ago: it is easy to see that δέ

<sup>4</sup> This is the reading of the MSS. Ross and Kassel in their respective editions of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Marcovich, and others have adopted Richard's emendation αὐτῇ. To my mind the emendation is not at all necessary; but even if it is adopted, it would really not affect the point at issue here, since even ἐν ἀρχῇ αὐτῇ τοῦ συγγράμματος would leave open the possibility that some words preceded 22 B 1 in the Heraclitean original.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. F. Susemihl, *Jahrb. f. Class. Philol.* 107 (1873), 146, followed by Nestle in Zeller–Nestle I, ii<sup>6</sup>, p. 793, note; W. Capelle, *Hermes* 59 (1924), 202; W. J. Verdenius, *Mnemosyne*, III ser., 13 (1947), 271; Kirk, p. 35.

<sup>6</sup> Kirk, pp. 33 and 36; Marcovich<sup>1</sup>, p. 2 = Marcovich<sup>2</sup>, p. 4.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Zeller in Zeller–Nestle, I, ii<sup>6</sup>, p. 792, note.



was omitted by our other sources because for their purposes it was superfluous and stylistically disturbing, whereas it is difficult to explain why any one should have added it if it was not present in his source. Yet the matter is not so easily disposed of. For one thing, such connectives are sometimes added for no reason at all. Moreover, in this case, the variant may be due to a scribal mistake. For it is possible that the first *τουδε* in *ΤΟΥΔΕΛΟΓΟΥΤΟΥΔΕΟΝΤΟΣ* was caused by dittography. On the other hand, *δέ* is omitted both by Aristotle and by Clement, who does not depend on Aristotle,<sup>8</sup> and there is no reason to think that they both purposely omitted this word. Such an omission would more probably be due to scribes. Consequently, it seems to be just as likely that Heraclitus wrote *τοῦ δὲ λόγου* as that he wrote *τοῦ λόγου*. If I have printed the latter reading, it is only to call attention to the fact that the prevailing opinion is not as certainly right as its proponents believe it to be. And hereafter whenever I cite *τοῦ λόγου* as the reading at the beginning of our text, it is with the understanding that Heraclitus may well have written *τοῦ δὲ λόγου*.

If *τοῦ δὲ λόγου* is the correct reading, then *δέ* is either connective or inceptive. The latter possibility is that preferred by most recent scholars.<sup>9</sup> However, even now there are some who believe that *δέ* is connective and that in what preceded frag. 1 Heraclitus must have given a hint as to what he meant by *this* Logos.<sup>10</sup> This last contention seems to me more than doubtful,<sup>11</sup> and even if the *δέ* is connective, it is likely, given the statements of Aristotle and of Sextus cited above, that not much preceded our text.<sup>12</sup> On the other hand, if Heraclitus wrote *τοῦ λόγου*, it is likely that those words came at the very beginning of his treatise, and the same is true if *δέ* is the right reading and is inceptive.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>8</sup> This ought to be obvious, since Clement's citation is longer than Aristotle's.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. e.g. Gigon, p. 1, Verdenius, *op. cit.* (note 5 *supra*), pp. 274–75; Kirk, p. 36.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. e.g. M. L. West, *Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient* (Oxford 1971), pp. 114–15.

<sup>11</sup> West (cf. note 10 *supra*) cites with approval Diels' suggestion that something like 'Ἡράκλειτος Ἐφέσιος τάδε λέγει preceded frag. 1. But he does so on the assumption, shared by others (cf. e.g. Burnet, p. 133 with n. 1), that *ὁ λόγος δδε* refers to Heraclitus' own discourse. Yet it was because of this that Reinhardt, p. 217, n. 1 rejected the *δέ*, for there are strong reasons for thinking that in frag. 1 Logos cannot primarily mean Heraclitus' discourse or doctrine (cf. the concluding remarks of this paper). However, Reinhardt did not consider the possibility that the *δέ* may be merely inceptive.

<sup>12</sup> It is hardly likely that either Aristotle or Sextus' source, who knew the relative collocations of the present fragments 1 and 2 (cf. note 37 *infra*), would have said that what they cite of frag. 1 came at the beginning of Heraclitus' book if a long and/or important statement had preceded.

<sup>13</sup> For inceptive *δέ* cf. Ion of Chios 36 B 1 ἀρχὴ δέ μοι τοῦ λόγου and Kirk, p. 36.

A more fundamental question is the construction of αἰεί. Aristotle cited the first words of our fragment precisely to illustrate his point that it is difficult to "punctuate" (διαστίξαι) the text of Heraclitus, since it is unclear (ἄδηλον) whether αἰεί goes with what precedes or with what follows it.<sup>14</sup> Modern scholars are not agreed on this: some take αἰεί with ἔοντος, while others attach it to ἀξύνετοι. Prominent among the latter are Reinhardt, Snell, Kranz, Kirk, and Marcovich.<sup>15</sup> Their main argument is (i) that αἰεί leading up to καὶ . . . καί is an archaic figure typical of Heraclitus' style. To this Marcovich has added two arguments: (ii) In αἰεί ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι—in contrast to the rhythmical unit τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ' ἔοντος—there is an intentional alliteration *a-a-g-a*; (iii) The construction of αἰεί with ἔοντος is a *lectio facilior* prompted by the influence of the epic formula αἰὲν ἔοντες (Homer, *Il.* I. 290, etc.). Now the second argument may be dismissed with the remark that it begs the question, since it simply assumes that Heraclitus meant αἰεί to go with ἀξύνετοι. Moreover, the alliteration alleged by Marcovich is of no significance as it is vowel alliteration only. The third argument implies a misuse of the notion of *lectio facilior*, but I postpone its discussion for later. As for the first argument, it is anything but decisive. αἰεί followed and taken up by καὶ . . . καί is a normal construction in archaic and in later Greek, but so is also the use of καὶ . . . καί in the sense "both . . . and," even without a preceding αἰεί. The essential point that must still be established is whether *here* Heraclitus intended αἰεί to be taken up by καὶ . . . καί. I submit that there are strong reasons for thinking that he did not.

However, before we go into this question, it is convenient to determine what would be the likely meaning of τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ' ἔοντος, if αἰεί goes with ἀξύνετοι. For, given Aristotle's statement mentioned above, one must acknowledge that the construction of αἰεί with what follows it must be possible, and hence that the construction τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ' ἔοντος must also be so. Of those who take αἰεί with what follows, Kranz, Kirk, and others<sup>16</sup> take τοῦδ' as predicative: "The Logos being this." But in that case one would have expected τοιοῦδ' instead of τοῦδ', or, at the very least, the τοῦδ' to come after and not before ἔοντος. Kirk argues that the fact that in the next sentence τόνδε is not predicative in κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε "does not tell against its predicative

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1407 B 14–15 and 17–18.

<sup>15</sup> Reinhardt, pp. 217–18; A. Busse, *Rheinisches Museum* 75 (1926), 206–07; B. Snell, *Hermes* 61 (1926). 366 = *Gesammelte Schriften* (Göttingen, 1966), p. 139, n. 3; Kranz, *FVS*<sup>6</sup> I, p. 150, note; Kirk, p. 34; Marcovich<sup>1</sup>, p. 9 = Marcovich<sup>2</sup>, p. 10.

<sup>16</sup> Kranz, *FVS*<sup>6</sup>, I, p. 150; Kirk, p. 35; J. Bollack and H. Wismann, *Héraclite ou la séparation* (Paris 1972), p. 61.

use earlier.”<sup>17</sup> But the question is whether any reader who was not defending an interpretation would detach τοῦδ’ from the rest of the phrase in τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ’. Moreover, the passage from ὁ λόγος to ὁ λόγος ὅδε in the next sentence would at least be unnecessary. The probability then is that τοῦδ’ is attributive, and it is so interpreted by Marcovich and others.<sup>18</sup> In that case, one must take ἔοντος existentially and probably having concessive force: “This Logos, existent, or real though it is.”<sup>19</sup> This meaning gives a reasonable sense, but it considerably weakens the force of the whole first sentence of the fragment, especially when it is compared to the sense yielded by that sentence when αἰεί is construed with ἔοντος.

One of the main objections against taking αἰεί with ἀξύνετοι is that the former word, prominently emphatic here, and important for Heraclitus, as frag. B 30 shows (ἦν αἰεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται),<sup>20</sup> would be almost otiose. Its omission would not at all affect what he is saying, since καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκούσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον would suffice to convey the notion that men fail to understand the Logos both before and after they have heard it. There would be only slightly more emphasis if αἰεί were taken up by καὶ . . . καί. Kirk himself unwittingly betrays the weakness of taking αἰεί with what follows when he states that αἰεί with ἔοντος makes sense “and expresses something that Heraclitus believed” but that “it is to be rejected only on the ground that αἰεί goes rather with ἀξύνετοι.”<sup>21</sup> Moreover, since Heraclitus says that men are uncomprehending both before they have heard the Logos and after they have heard it, it makes better sense to take αἰεί with ἔοντος. For, unless the assertion is made that *this* Logos exists always, that *it* is always present in the universe, that is, also before men have heard it<sup>22</sup> from Heraclitus, it would be pointless to reproach

<sup>17</sup> Kirk, p. 35.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. P. Tannery, *Pour l'histoire de la science hellène*<sup>2</sup> (Paris 1930), p. 198; Reinhardt, p. 217, Snell, *Hermes* 61 (1926), 365–66 = *Gesammelte Schriften*, pp. 139–40; Marcovich<sup>1</sup>, p. 9 = Marcovich<sup>2</sup>, p. 9.

<sup>19</sup> The meanings “existent” and “real” are frequently connected with each other and with the meaning “true.” In the present case the last mentioned meaning is also possible, if by “true” we understand what is the case in the sense of what is real; but the meaning “true” as the opposite of “false” is, I believe, impossible. Cf. Busse (above, note 15), pp. 205–06.

<sup>20</sup> In 22 B 30 one must punctuate with a colon after ἔσται, cf. Kirk, p. 310 with references.

<sup>21</sup> Kirk, p. 35.

<sup>22</sup> This to my mind is a decisive reason for rejecting those interpretations which, like West’s (*op. cit.* in note 10 *supra*, pp. 115 and 116), take ὁ λόγος ὅδε to mean “This discourse of mine.” If that were Heraclitus’ meaning, then he would be blaming men only for not understanding the Logos after they have heard it. But the fragment as

them for not knowing it even before they had so heard it.<sup>23</sup> Finally, with *έόντος αἰεί* Heraclitus in all probability meant his readers and/or hearers to recall the epic formula *αἰὲν έόντος* used of the traditional gods,<sup>24</sup> and the similar use of *αἰεί* by Pherecydes (7 B 1 Ζὰς μὲν καὶ Χρόνος ἦσαν αἰεὶ καὶ Χθονίη) and perhaps by other authors of cosmogonies. Marcovich contends that (in Heraclitus) to take *αἰεί* with *έόντος* is a *lectio facilior*;<sup>25</sup> but this is really a misapplication of a valid principle of textual criticism. There a variant reading is considered to be a *lectio facilior* when it can be explained as an intentional change from a reading that is more difficult to understand. In the present case, however, it is most improbable that Heraclitus placed *αἰεί* next to *έόντος* without intending his readers and/or hearers to recall the formula of immortality applied to the gods of traditional Greek mythology.<sup>26</sup> And if he intended to allude to this formula, it was in order to suggest that it is the impersonal Logos, in accordance with which all things happen in the universe, that is eternal and not the traditional, anthropomorphic gods. And there is other evidence of Heraclitus' hostility to anthropomorphism and to traditional Greek mythological thought.<sup>27</sup>

The preceding are, I submit, valid reasons for thinking that Heraclitus meant *αἰεί* to go with *έόντος*. If this is so, it is surely noteworthy that, with the exception of Aristotle, the extant ancient authors who in citing or alluding to this part of the fragment make it clear how they construe *αἰεί*, all took this word with *έόντος*. They are Clement, Amelius, Hippolytus, and perhaps Cleanthes.<sup>28</sup> It must

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a whole and other relevant evidence (cf. e.g. 22 B 2, 17, 34, 50, etc.) show that Heraclitus supposed that men could understand the universe by themselves, since he blames them for not doing so.

<sup>23</sup> This second argument has been rightly emphasized by Gigon, p. 6; Verdenius, *op. cit.* (note 5 *supra*), p. 279; H. Cherniss, *Selected Papers* (Leiden, 1977), p. 16, n. 13.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Homer, *Il.* I. 290, 494, XXIV. 99; *Odyssey* I. 263; Hesiod, *Theog.* 21, 33; *Op.* 718.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Marcovich<sup>1</sup>, p. 9 = Marcovich<sup>2</sup>, p. 10.

<sup>26</sup> The notion that *αἰεί* can go both with *έόντος* and with *άξύνεται* (cf. e.g. Gigon, p. 2) must be rejected. Such an *ἀπὸ κοινοῦ* construction is impossible here, since in reading the text we would have to make a pause either after *έόντος* or after *αἰεί*. This is precisely the point Aristotle makes when he cites the first few words of our fragment. His testimony is incompatible with Gigon's suggestion.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. 22 B 5, 15, 30, 40, 42, 53, 56, 57, 62, 67, 104, etc.

<sup>28</sup> That Clement took *αἰεί* with *έόντος* is clear from the way he cites the fragment (*Strom.* V. 111, 7 [II, pp. 401–02 Stählin]): *ἀντικρυς δὲ ὁ μὲν Ἡράκλειτος "τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ' έόντος αἰεί," φησίν, "άξύνεται κτλ."* Hippolytus for his part precedes the citation of B 1 with the words (*Ref.* IX. 9. 3 [p. 241, Wendland]) *ὅτι δὲ λόγος έστίν αἰεὶ τὸ πᾶν καὶ διὰ παντὸς ὤν, οὕτως λέγει.* Amelius, cited by Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* XI. 19. 1 (II,



also be said that, contrary to what is sometimes asserted,<sup>29</sup> Aristotle does not state, nor necessarily imply, either, that the ambiguity of αἰεί is incurable. For Aristotle was not concerned with analyzing the part of Heraclitus' statement he quotes. He was merely trying to find an example of ambiguity in "punctuation"<sup>30</sup> in connection with the general rule "that a written composition should be easy to read and therefore easy to deliver; for it is the same thing."<sup>31</sup> But this rule is violated when there are many connectives, "or where the punctuation is difficult, as in the writings of Heraclitus."<sup>32</sup> He claims, after citing the beginning of Heraclitus' first fragment, that it is unclear (ἄδηλον) whether αἰεί goes with what precedes or with what follows it.<sup>33</sup> Hence for Aristotle the very fact that two constructions of αἰεί are possible suffices to make the construction ἄδηλον and therefore difficult to read and to deliver, for we would have to stop and think and give arguments in favor or against one or the other construction.<sup>34</sup> However, that something is ἄδηλον means simply that it is not self-evident or obvious; it does not necessarily follow that Aristotle himself, if that had been his purpose, would not have been able to decide in favor of one of the two possibilities he mentions. In other words, Aristotle is recommending that we write in such a way as to avoid all possible ambiguity, a rule he himself not infrequently violated.

The next point is to decide how the initial genitive should be construed. Those who take αἰεί with what follows, however they construe the words τοῦδ' ἔοντος, take τοῦ λόγου as an objective genitive depending on ἀξύνετοι. Even some of those who take αἰεί with ἔοντος also take the initial genitive to depend upon ἀξύνετοι, while taking ἔοντος αἰεί as modifying τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ'.<sup>35</sup> However, if one takes αἰεί with ἔοντος, there are good reasons for taking τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ' ἔοντος

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p. 45 [Mras]), says: καὶ οὗτος ἄρα ἦν ὁ λόγος καθ' ὃν αἰεὶ ὄντα τὰ γινόμενα ἐγένετο, ὡς ἂν καὶ ὁ Ἡράκλειτος ἀξιόσπειε κτλ. As for Cleanthes, if in line 21 of his *Hymn to Zeus* we read ὥσθ' ἕνα γίγμεσθαι πάντων λόγον αἰὲν ἔοντα (cf. G. Zuntz, *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 63 [1958], p. 303), it is likely that he there had Heraclitus in mind and that he read αἰεὶ with ἔοντος in 22 B 1.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. e.g. Calogero, *Gior. Crit. della Filos. Ital.* 17 (1936), 196.

<sup>30</sup> Given the context, with διαστίξαι Aristotle seems to mean some sort of dot or stop to be made at appropriate places of a text in order to facilitate the reading of it. Cf. also note 26 *supra*.

<sup>31</sup> Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1407 B 11–12.

<sup>32</sup> Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1407 B 12–14. It is noteworthy that Aristotle says, not that it is impossible to punctuate Heraclitus' written statements, but that it is difficult to do so: τὰ γὰρ Ἡρακλείτου διαστίξαι ἔργον κτλ.

<sup>33</sup> Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1407 B 17–18.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. notes 26 and 30 *supra*.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. e.g. West, *op. cit.* (note 10 *supra*), p. 117.

αἰεί as a genitive absolute, having concessive force: "Though this Logos exists always men are uncomprehending both before they have heard it and once they have heard it." In the first place, the assertion of the perpetual existence of the Logos acquires emphasis from the beginning, and greater prominence is given to the state of ignorance in which men live. Secondly, the word ἀξύνετοι, which for Heraclitus, as Kirk himself says,<sup>36</sup> has a positive meaning and which he employs in another fragment (B 34) in a similar way ("ignoramus"), would be used here too in an absolute, derogatory, and not merely negative sense.

According to the testimony of Sextus, the second fragment of Heraclitus in Diels' edition came soon after the first.<sup>37</sup> If in the latter αἰεί was meant to be taken with ἔοντος, and if the whole initial genitive is absolute, then there is a striking parallel between τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ' ἔοντος αἰεί and τοῦ λόγου δ' ἔοντος ξυνοῦ in 22 B 2, which is certainly a genitive absolute.<sup>38</sup> It is in fact possible, perhaps even likely, that the first part of Heraclitus' book contained a series of predicates of the Logos, in the genitive absolute, followed by contrasting statements in which men's failure to understand was emphasized.<sup>39</sup>

Two additional questions concerning the first sentence are the meaning of the present γίνονται and of τὸ πρῶτον. To begin with the latter, in all probability here it means "once" rather than "for the first time."<sup>40</sup> For it is Heraclitus' point that men are uncomprehending both before they have heard the Logos and also after they have heard it, not merely that they fail to understand it when they hear it for the first time. This latter meaning would leave open the possibility of men's understanding the Logos when they hear it for the second or third time, etc., and such a meaning is precluded by the rest of this fragment as well as by the rest of the related evidence.<sup>41</sup>

As for γίνονται, it is taken by Verdenius, who in this is followed by Kirk,<sup>42</sup> as implying result: "men's coming across the Logos results in incomprehension." This meaning is possible but not necessary, and I doubt that it was here intended by Heraclitus. He thought that all

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Kirk, p. 34.

<sup>37</sup> Sextus (*Adv. Math.* VII. 133), having cited B 1 and having commented on it, says: ὀλίγα προσδιεθῶν ἐπιφέρει, and then quotes B 2.

<sup>38</sup> I should like to emphasize that I do not base my interpretation of B 1 on the parallelism between B 1 and B 2, as some scholars do (cf. e.g. Gigon, p. 3).

<sup>39</sup> Cf. 22 B 2.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Kirk, p. 34 with his reference to LSJ, s.v. IIIe.

<sup>41</sup> Both in this fragment and elsewhere (cf. e.g. 22 B 2, 17, 34, etc.) Heraclitus speaks of men's failure to understand as characteristic of the human condition.

<sup>42</sup> Verdenius, *op. cit.* (note 5 *supra*), pp. 279–80; Kirk, p. 40.



men live in a common world, but that they fail to see the common law and system of the universe (cf. 22 B 1 14, 2, 30, 89<sup>43</sup>); that is, they fail to see how things are related to one another and, hence, do not apprehend the Logos. Therefore, I think it preferable to take ἀξύνετοι γίνονται to denote the state of ignorance in which men live despite the fact that the Logos is always there and that Heraclitus explains it to them. Like the above mentioned scholars, I see no contrast between εἶναι and γίγνεσθαι implied in this fragment, as Gigon thinks there is.<sup>44</sup>

The purpose of the fragment's second sentence is not so much to explain the state of ignorance in which men live as to justify Heraclitus' assertion to that effect. It begins with a concessive genitive absolute, which tells us that "though all things happen according to this Logos," men are like people of no experience (ἀπείροισιν), i.e. they are ignorant. I believe the next participle, πειρώμενοι, is temporal-concessive rather than purely concessive,<sup>45</sup> and not frequentative, as Diels and Marcovich, among others, take it.<sup>46</sup> It is not the case that men are like the inexperienced each time they experience words and deeds such as Heraclitus explains. Rather, though all things happen according to this Logos, men are like the inexperienced even when they experience (i.e. are acquainted with) words and deeds such as Heraclitus explains. In other words, that men are ignorant before they have heard the discourse of Heraclitus is bad enough; but it is much worse that they continue to live in ignorance and fail to understand even when they become acquainted with Heraclitus' doctrine, for in this last case they had the opportunity to compare Heraclitus' statements with the facts, as all things happen according to this Logos.

The word-play ἀπείροισιν-πειρώμενοι is most probably intentional, as are the similar ones in 22 B 2, 28, 48, 114, etc. According to Kirk, "in the present case it is simply a stylistic trick and can imply no underlying connexion of sense between the similar word-forms, for the connexion is quite obvious."<sup>47</sup> Yet it is difficult to agree that because a connection is quite obvious the word-play must be simply a stylistic trick and nothing more than that. The word-play here does convey the implication that men, though acquainted not only with

<sup>43</sup> In B 89, at least the first part is, *pace* Kirk, authentic, cf. Vlastos, *American Journal of Philology* 76 (1955), 344 ff.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Kirk, pp. 40–41 against Gigon, p. 3.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. also Kirk, pp. 33 and 41.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Diels in earlier versions of *FVS*, an interpretation adopted also by Kranz in the 6th edition. Marcovich<sup>1</sup>, p. 9 = Marcovich<sup>2</sup>, p. 10.

<sup>47</sup> Kirk, p. 41.

the facts but also with Heraclitus' doctrine, nevertheless are like the inexperienced in that they fail to understand. Other fragments, too, stress men's characteristic inability to understand;<sup>48</sup> but here, in 22 B 1, the point is made that if one fails to understand the Logos, then one cannot really possess any true experience, which among other things requires repetition and memory, memory of the connection between the things that constitute a single experience.<sup>49</sup> Similarly, men may become acquainted (πειρώμενοι) with Heraclitus' doctrine more than once but they still fail to understand, and so are like the inexperienced. To my mind this is the reason why in this context the word ἄπειρος was used for "ignorant." In fact, this fragment, not mentioned by Liddell-Scott-Jones, s.v. ἄπειρος (A), is evidence of the connection between the literal meaning "without trial or experience" and the absolute sense "inexperienced," "ignorant."

The words ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων were probably meant to recall the epic formula ἔπος καὶ ἔργον. Kirk says that in Heraclitus "the words are the means of explanation, the deeds or events are the things which are explained."<sup>50</sup> This is true, but only up to a point. For there is here an implication that men could see the Logos in language itself even apart from their hearing it from Heraclitus. Now Heraclitus believes that his doctrine is instantiated in human speech (cf. for example the connection made between βίος and βίος in 22 B 48 and that between ξὺν νόφ and ξυνός in B 114), and so I suggest that he meant that men by themselves could see the Logos there as well as in the facts of experience. If this is so, then it is likely that he used ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων as a polar expression for "the whole of human experience," as Reinhardt and others have thought.<sup>51</sup>

The verb διηγεῖν has received little attention on the part of interpreters, even though there has been a lot of discussion as to whether Heraclitus' book was a collection of aphorisms or a continuous exposition.<sup>52</sup> I agree with Walzer (p. 42, note 7) that διηγείσθαι indicates, not a collection of aphorisms but rather a descriptive writing, i.e. a treatise. The first fragment of Heraclitus supports such an interpretation and so do, among others, 22 B 114, 30, etc. It is

<sup>48</sup> Cf. note 41 *supra*.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Aristotle's words in *Metaphysics* 980 B 28 – 981 A 1: γίγνεται δ' ἐκ τῆς μνήμης ἐμπειρία τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· αἱ γὰρ πολλὰ μνήμαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος μᾶς ἐμπειρίας δύναμιν ἀποτελοῦσιν.

<sup>50</sup> Kirk, p. 41.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Reinhardt, p. 218, Marcovich<sup>1</sup>, p. 9 = Marcovich<sup>2</sup>, p. 10.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. Zeller in Zeller-Nestle, I, ii<sup>6</sup>, p. 788, n. 1 and the references given by Mondolfo in Zeller-Mondolfo, *La filosofia dei Greci nel suo sviluppo storico* (Florence 1961), pp. 13–15.

therefore likely that the aphoristic character of other fragments is due to the way they have been transmitted to us and not to Heraclitus himself. But even if some of Heraclitus' utterances were aphorisms, it is unlikely that the whole book was merely a collection of such utterances. It is noteworthy that *ὁκοίων ἐγὼ διηγέσθαι κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων ἕκαστον καὶ φράζων ὅπως ἔχει* must refer to the whole or to most of Heraclitus' treatise and not merely to its first part.

The two participial phrases, *(διηγέσθαι) κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων ἕκαστον καὶ φράζων ὅπως ἔχει*, have given rise to several different interpretations. First of all one must decide what is here meant by *διαίρειν*. Marcovich takes it in the literal meaning "to divide," in the sense of "taking apart." As examples he gives the bow in 22 B 51 (it consists of two arms and of the unifying string) and the analysis of a word, as in 22 B 48 ("the name and the function are the two constituent parts of every given thing").<sup>53</sup> However, even apart from the fact that his interpretation of B 51 is questionable and that the implication he sees in B 48 is too far-reaching,<sup>54</sup> it is doubtful, in the light of our evidence, that Heraclitus devoted the essential part of his treatise to the type of analysis Marcovich describes.<sup>55</sup> But I think Marcovich is right in his attempt to relate the two participial phrases to the rest of Heraclitus' statements. However, if we are to take *διαίρειν ἕκαστον* in the sense "to divide each thing," I believe that Heraclitus was thinking of his predecessors' procedure of dividing their main "material substances"<sup>56</sup> into contraries. Thus, for example, Anaximenes asserted (using the mechanism of condensation and rarefaction) that all was air and then proceeded to divide this body into contraries: hot and cold, humid and dry, etc.<sup>57</sup> It is this procedure on the part of his predecessors that Parmenides illustrates when he describes the opinions of mortals.<sup>58</sup> If this is what Heraclitus meant by *διαίρειν ἕκαστον*, then we must think of his doctrine of identity-in-difference, of the unity of contraries, etc., which presupposes not only some sort of classification of things into contraries but also contrariety in the

<sup>53</sup> Marcovich<sup>1</sup>, p. 10 = Marcovich<sup>2</sup>, pp. 10–11.

<sup>54</sup> Even in B 48 itself I cannot see that Heraclitus implies that the name and the function of the bow are its two constituent parts.

<sup>55</sup> Heraclitus seems to place more emphasis on the bringing of things together rather than on "taking them apart." The unity of things, i.e. of contraries, seems to be what he claims as his most original contribution. Cf. 22 b 2, 10, 30, 41, 51, 54, 57, etc.

<sup>56</sup> By this expression I mean to refer simply to the most widely distributed bodies in the universe mentioned by the Presocratics, e.g. water, fire, etc.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Anaximenes 13 A 1, A 4, A 5, A 7, B 1, B 2, etc.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Parmenides 28 B 8, 55–59 with L. Tarán, *Parmenides* (Princeton 1965), p. 225.

things themselves. This procedure could be illustrated by fragments such as B 12 ποταμοῖσιν τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ἐμβαίνουσιν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα ἐπὶρρεῖ, B 36 ψυχῇσιν θάνατος ὕδωρ γενέσθαι, ὕδατι δὲ θάνατος γῇ γενέσθαι, B 48 τῷ τόξῳ ὄνομα βίος, ἔργον δὲ θάνατος, B 61 θάλασσα ὕδωρ καθαρώτατον καὶ μιαρώτατον, ἰχθύσι μὲν πότιμον καὶ σωτήριον, ἀνθρώποις δὲ ἄποτον καὶ ὀλέθριον, etc. However, it is also possible that we must take διαίρειν here in the more general sense "to distinguish," as Kirk<sup>59</sup> among others does, for Heraclitus may have meant merely to say that each thing<sup>60</sup> is described by him κατὰ φύσιν. But I cannot agree with Kirk that διαίρων here is (merely) the process of analysis that leads up to a judgment. It seems to be rather the process by which a thing is described and thereby is differentiated from anything else, though of course in Heraclitus that very differentiation will show it to be related to everything else. As for κατὰ φύσιν, I should prefer to take it not as "according to each thing's origin," nor as "according to each thing's nature," nor as "according to each thing's real constitution," but in its true adverbial meaning "properly," "as it ought to be (sc. described)."<sup>61</sup> One objection common to the rejected interpretations is that at this stage in his book it is not likely that Heraclitus would have written κατὰ φύσιν διαίρων if he had meant to ascribe to φύσις a technical meaning. I agree with Verdenius and Kirk<sup>62</sup> that ὅπως ἔχει is not a different process from κατὰ φύσιν διαίρων, but that the two are related. Heraclitus proposes to describe each thing correctly and so to be able to state how it is.

In the third and final part of the fragment, Heraclitus proceeds to describe the kind of life the rest of men (τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους) lead because of their ignorance of the Logos, in strong contrast with Heraclitus' own condition (ἐγὼ διηγέμεναι κτλ.). Kirk and Marcovich, among others, take the final part of the fragment to mean that the rest of men fail to understand what they do once they are awake (taking ἐγερθέντες as an ingressive aorist participle), just as they forget what they do when they are asleep: "But the rest of men fail to notice what they do after they wake up just as they forget what they do when asleep" (Kirk's translation). Before discussing this interpretation it may be well to indicate a point of agreement: ποιοῦσιν, which must also be supplied with the second clause, should not be interpreted too literally. ποιεῖν here refers not only to what men actually *do* but

<sup>59</sup> Kirk, pp. 33 and 41–42.

<sup>60</sup> In any interpretation of the words in question ἕκαστον is a rhetorical exaggeration.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. J. W. Beardslee, Jr., *The Use of φύσις in Fifth-Century Greek Literature* (diss., Chicago 1918), p. 47.

<sup>62</sup> Verdenius, *op. cit.* (note 5 *supra*), p. 273; Kirk, pp. 42–43.



also to their mental and emotional life. Moreover, the second clause refers to our dreams when we are asleep; it certainly does not refer primarily to the motions or gesticulations we may perform while we are asleep.<sup>63</sup>

The difficulties of the interpretation they have adopted have not escaped Kirk and Marcovich themselves, and are indeed formidable. If we take ἐπιλανθάνονται to mean "they forget," then Heraclitus would be saying that men once they are awake fail to recognize, to see the ever-present truth just as they, on waking, forget what they did in sleep, that is, they forget their dreams. However, in the first place, it is not the case that men always forget their dreams; quite frequently they do not forget them. And so we would have a first important inconcinnity. Heraclitus would be comparing the perpetual failure of ignorant men to understand the truth with something that happens to men sometimes only. And there is evidence in Heraclitus himself that he did not think that we always forget our dreams.<sup>64</sup> Secondly, and even more important, even if men did forget their dreams, it is hard to see the propriety of comparing men's customary failure to know the truth with the fact that once they are awake they forget their dreams. This difficulty should not be dismissed with Kirk's remark that "slight inconsistencies in complex images are not uncommon in the archaic style."<sup>65</sup> The comparison would not be slightly inconsistent but rather a *non sequitur*. Marcovich for his part betrays the weakness of the interpretation to which he subscribes when he states that "the sentence would be complete in itself even without ἐπιλανθάνονται, (which cannot mean the same as λανθάνει): possibly Heraclitus added this word for the sake of balance or of the word-play."<sup>66</sup> For we would have to suppose that for the sake of balance or of word-play Heraclitus added a word, ἐπιλανθάνονται, and ruined the whole point of the comparison, as without it the statement would yield a good sense: "But it escapes the rest of men what they do once they are awake, just as it escapes them what they do while they are asleep." I agree with Marcovich that ἐπιλανθάνονται does not mean the same as the preceding λανθάνει, but to decide what Heraclitus had in mind it is necessary to see first what he meant by the comparison in general.

One must note two points. First, that to the man who knows the Logos, specifically Heraclitus himself (ἐγώ), the nescience of the rest

<sup>63</sup> Contrast West, *op. cit.* (note 10 *supra*), p. 116, who thinks that the reference is to bodily movements which men make while asleep.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. 22 B 21 with B 26; B 75; B 89.

<sup>65</sup> Kirk, p. 44.

<sup>66</sup> Marcovich<sup>1</sup>, p. 10 = Marcovich<sup>2</sup>, p. 11.

of humanity in wakefulness is strongly contrasted. Secondly, Heraclitus must have meant to compare men's failure to apprehend the Logos when they are awake with what happens to them when they are asleep and dreaming. In other words, he is comparing two states, and we must keep in mind that to sleep and dream is for Heraclitus, as Kirk himself says, "a real if diminished form of activity."<sup>67</sup> Now ἐπιλανθάνομαι literally means "to let something which one previously knew escape one's notice";<sup>68</sup> here, used of what happens to men while they are dreaming, it must refer to this: the successive images we see in our dreams escape our notice in such a way that we do not understand—because we are not conscious of—the nature of what we do in our sleep. This is in fact the way in which some interpreters have understood ἐπιλανθάνονται in this fragment.<sup>69</sup> To Kirk's and Marcovich's objection that there is no parallel to such a meaning, one must answer that it is the context that is crucial for deciding what a word means. Moreover, the middle ἐπιλανθάνομαι or ἐπιλήθομαι frequently bears the meaning "to forget" in the sense of "not being conscious of." Thus, for example, when at the beginning of Plato's *Apology* (17 A 2–3) Socrates says ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἑμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην, he surely means to say that the effect of his accusers' speeches was such that he almost "forgot himself" in the sense of "not being conscious of who he really was." If this interpretation is right, then the comparison makes sense: "(in contrast to Heraclitus who knows the Logos) it escapes the rest of men what they do once they are awake, just as when they are asleep they are unconscious of (i.e. do not understand) what they do." Heraclitus does not mean to say that the rest of men when awake have no knowledge at all of what they do but only that the true significance of it escapes them. For example, they see day and they see night, but they do not understand that night and day are a single thing (cf. 22 B 57). The interpretation of the final comparison given here makes better sense of ἐγερθέντες as an ingressive aorist than that of Kirk and Marcovich does. In their interpretation the comparison would be between two things that happen when men are awake: they fail to understand the Logos just as they forget their dreams. In my interpretation, men, once they are awake, fail to understand the Logos just as when they were asleep they did not understand their

<sup>67</sup> Kirk, p. 44.

<sup>68</sup> Kirk, p. 44.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. e.g. Gigon, p. 6; Kranz *FVS*<sup>6</sup> I, p. 150; Walzer, p. 41; H. Fränkel, *American Journal of Philology* 59 (1938), 318 with n. 18.



dreams. The implication is that the waking life of the ignorant majority has a dreamlike quality.

This fragment, then, implies the geometrical proportion-pattern "the man who knows the Logos is to men awake who fail to understand it as the latter are to those who are asleep and dreaming."<sup>70</sup> The pattern A:B::B:C was used by Heraclitus in other connections also,<sup>71</sup> and the specific one implied in the first fragment is also to be reconstructed with good probability from other texts.<sup>72</sup>

This is not the place to discuss the meaning of Logos in Heraclitus, since several other fragments would have to be taken into account. Nevertheless, something can be gathered even from this fragment itself, and belongs to the present discussion because it affects the interpretation of our text. The main point is that the Logos cannot be simply Heraclitus' discourse,<sup>73</sup> nor can it even refer principally to it.<sup>74</sup> For it is clearly implied here that men could have known the Logos even before they heard it from Heraclitus.<sup>75</sup> All things happen according to the Logos, yet men are like the inexperienced even when they experience such words and deeds as Heraclitus describes; it follows that the Logos is always there but men fail to understand it because they fail to see the connection that exists between all the facts with which they are acquainted. In short, the Logos must be a formula or pattern in accordance with which all things happen in the universe. The discourse of Heraclitus expounds and explains this Logos, but the Logos' existence is independent of it. The discourse of Heraclitus "is" the Logos only in the sense that it describes the formula according to which all things happen in the universe; but the two are not identical, and they are clearly differentiated in frag. B 50: οὐκ ἐμοῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας κτλ.

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<sup>70</sup> I do not mean to say that this geometrical pattern was the main purpose of this part of the fragment, but that it is implied there.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. especially H. Fränkel, "A Thought Pattern in Heraclitus," *American Journal of Philology* 59 (1938), 309–37, though there is no need to follow him in all his interpretations of individual fragments.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. 22 B 89 with B 72 and Cherniss, *Selected Papers*, p. 39 with n. 13.

<sup>73</sup> As e.g. West, *op. cit.* (note 10 *supra*), pp. 115 and 117 would have it.

<sup>74</sup> As Burnet, p. 133 and n. 1, suggests.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. note 22 *supra*.



## 2

### Anaxagoras and Infinite Divisibility

BRAD INWOOD

In 1957 John Raven announced that no one ever disputed the claim that "Anaxagoras really believed in the infinite divisibility of matter."<sup>1</sup> No doubt he was right about that, and Raven like all his predecessors and most of his successors proceeded to interpret Anaxagoras' complex and vaguely expressed theory of matter on the assumption that one central feature of it was the infinite divisibility of particles of matter.

But times change, and we live in a more skeptical age. Malcolm Schofield<sup>2</sup> has recently challenged the claim that Anaxagoras used a notion of infinite divisibility in his theory of matter. Unfortunately, Schofield's skepticism is uncharacteristically timid here, and he never provides a clear statement of his reasons for questioning the traditional view, nor attempts a demonstration of its weakness or a sketch of what the theory of matter would look like without this venerable fixed point. Schofield restricts himself to redescribing it as "unlimited smallness"<sup>3</sup> and pointing out that "infinite divisibility" is not an expression which represents ideas in which Anaxagoras shows an interest.

Jonathan Barnes' recent discussion of Anaxagorean physics<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> P. 377 in G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers*; first edition, Cambridge 1957. In the second edition (1983, with additional material by Malcolm Schofield), this claim is not altered (p. 367).

<sup>2</sup> *An Essay on Anaxagoras* (Cambridge 1980).

<sup>3</sup> P. 79. But infinite divisibility returns on p. 81.

<sup>4</sup> In *The Presocratic Philosophers*, vol. 2 (London 1979). There is little change in the second edition (in one volume, 1982).

fills some of the gaps. For he argues that a central element in the traditional view, the claim that Anaxagoras believed that matter had particulate structure, is false. This, I think, is correct. For as Schofield emphasizes, division of matter is not a prominent theoretical concept in Anaxagoras' fragments;<sup>5</sup> in its place we find mixture and separation, which need not refer to particles of matter at all, but are equally suited to the idea that matter exists in the form of non-particulate stuffs which can be blended—as pastes or liquids are combined, perhaps, rather than as grainy substances like salt and flour which are sifted together.

I shall take as given, then, the view that Anaxagoras' notion of the structure of matter does not include the belief that it is particulate. On the traditional view, one reason why Anaxagoras believed in infinite divisibility was that it was necessary to make the claim of universal mixture (all is in all) consistent with the idea of particulate matter. As William Mann points out in a recent article, abandoning particles thus removes a powerful motivation for adopting a theory of infinite divisibility.<sup>6</sup> Mann, unfortunately, fails to ask the obvious question: did Anaxagoras, then, believe in infinite divisibility? He tamely accepts the received dogma.

Further probing is still needed, and I want to do a bit of that work in this paper. I will first buttress the view that there is no need to posit infinite divisibility for Anaxagoras by outlining the reasons for finding it *prima facie* implausible that he would believe in infinite divisibility, and I shall suggest very briefly one reason why Anaxagoras has been interpreted so often in the traditional way. This should keep the burden of proof squarely on the shoulders of the supporters of the traditional view. Here I shall principally use observations made by others. Second, I shall try out some ideas about what will replace infinite divisibility in Anaxagoras' theory of matter. For Barnes has seen that if particles, infinitely divisible, are banished, then a new understanding of "indefinite smallness" is needed. He offers such an interpretation himself; but I think that one can do better. Moreover,

<sup>5</sup> For a different view, see D. Sider, *The Fragments of Anaxagoras* (Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain 1981 = *Beiträge für Klassische Philologie* 118), pp. 56–57, which I find unconvincing. Professor Woodbury suggests that Anaxagoras' term *μοῖρα* contains a reference to division. But this is not a necessary implication of the term. The reference to cutting with an axe in fragment B 8 is a metaphor for separation, not a literal reference to the division of matter.

<sup>6</sup> "Anaxagoras and the *Homoiomere*," *Phronesis* 25 (1980), 246.

as Mann properly stresses, "indefinite largeness" is as important to Anaxagoras as is smallness. Any story about the former should work, *mutatis mutandis*, for the latter. I hope that one merit of my own interpretation over Barnes' is that it will account for the use of largeness and other quantity terms, as well as smallness. The key point, however, is that giving up infinite divisibility creates a need for fresh hypotheses about smallness and largeness in the fragments of Anaxagoras; the field for new speculation here is still wide open.

The idea that matter is infinitely divisible, however familiar it may now be or may have been to Aristotle, is not an intuitively obvious one, nor is it a natural one. One would not expect any given philosopher to employ it without a definite motivation, either in the work of someone else or in his own. The possibility that Anaxagoras developed the notion as a result of the theoretical demands of his own analysis of matter cannot be dismissed out of hand. But recent observations have, as we have seen, removed the familiar theory about how such a doctrine arose from Anaxagoras' own problems and positions. Most scholars until recently (I think particularly of Cornford, Raven, and Guthrie) have seen the external stimulus in the works of Zeno of Elea. Zeno did develop several dialectical arguments against the possibility of motion and plurality which turned on the infinite divisibility of matter and space, and it is often thought that Anaxagoras was reacting critically to these in putting forth his own theory of the infinite divisibility of matter. But there are problems in this traditional view, both philosophical and chronological.

First, as David Furley, Malcolm Schofield, and Jonathan Barnes have argued,<sup>7</sup> the "response" of Anaxagoras to Zeno, if that is what it is, is feeble indeed. Their observations need not be repeated in detail. Anaxagoras, if he is responding to Zeno, is indulging in mere counterassertion and not employing arguments against him. Furley, in fact, points out that the similarities indicate, if anything, a response by Zeno to Anaxagoras.<sup>8</sup>

And it is just as well that we need not view Anaxagoras as reacting to Zeno, since recent work has indicated that Anaxagoras' writings were probably produced earlier in the fifth century than used to be assumed.<sup>9</sup> The most powerful case on this point is made by Wood-

<sup>7</sup> Barnes, p. 35, Schofield, pp. 80–82, David Furley, "Anaxagoras in Response to Parmenides," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Supp. Vol. 2 (1976), 76–80.

<sup>8</sup> *Op. cit.* (above, note 7), p. 78.

<sup>9</sup> J. Mansfeld, "The Chronology of Anaxagoras' Athenian Period and the Date of his Trial," *Mnemosyne* 32 (1979), 39–60; 33 (1980), 17–95, is the major exception among recent authors. For discussion see L. E. Woodbury, "Anaxagoras and Athens," *Phoenix* 35 (1981), p. 306, n. 28.

bury,<sup>10</sup> who argues that Anaxagoras' philosophical impact began in the 470s and that his activity at Athens was over by, at the latest, 450. It is noteworthy, Woodbury reminds us, that Plato represents Socrates as having access only to Anaxagoras' book. By the time Socrates was a young man the book of which we have fragments was written and Anaxagoras was gone. Zeno, according to Plato, would still have been able to talk with the young Socrates.<sup>11</sup> Nothing in Plato's picture of Athenian intellectual life in Socrates' youth encourages us to see Anaxagoras as replying to Zeno.<sup>12</sup>

As to the absolute dates of Zeno's and Anaxagoras' books little can be *known*. Both Schofield and Furley<sup>13</sup> point out the weakness in the traditional argument that Anaxagoras wrote after 467 B.C., on the grounds that his theory that the heavenly bodies are glowing stones must have been influenced by the fall of the meteorite at Aigospotamoi in that year. It is more likely that he wrote *before* the meteorite fell, since he is credited with predicting its fall. This is closer to the truth if the meteorite confirmed the theory rather than suggesting it.

Furley and Barnes properly emphasize that all of the philosophical characteristics of Anaxagoras are adequately accounted for if we see him as reacting only to Parmenides. Schofield's book-length study led him to similar views, and he sees Anaxagoras as an "archaic sage," rather than as an up-to-date dialectician engaged in the sophisticated debate of the mid-fifth century. O'Brien's detailed examination of the relative dates of Empedocles and Anaxagoras confirms this.<sup>14</sup> Anaxagoras is the earlier thinker according to all of the external evidence. Particular weight must be put on the evidence of Alcidas,<sup>15</sup> who made Zeno and Empedocles contemporaries and pointed out that Anaxagoras had influenced Empedocles.

I conclude, then, that unless the best recent work on the subject is all in error, there is no reason to suspect that Zeno influenced Anaxagoras at all, and some to suggest that he in fact wrote *after* Anaxagoras. At all events, we may take it that Anaxagoras wrote

<sup>10</sup> See previous note. Note also Sven-Tage Teodorsson, *Anaxagoras' Theory of Matter*, Göteborg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1982, pp. 8-9.

<sup>11</sup> Although his book in defense of Parmenides is described as a product of Zeno's younger days (*Parmenides* 128d-e).

<sup>12</sup> Teodorsson, pp. 70-71, supposes that Anaxagoras reacted not only to Zeno but also to Leucippus.

<sup>13</sup> Schofield, p. 34, Furley, p. 77.

<sup>14</sup> D. O'Brien, "The Relation of Anaxagoras and Empedocles," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 88 (1968), 93-113.

<sup>15</sup> Diogenes Laërtius 8. 56.



independently of Zenonian influence. The external motivation for Anaxagoras to develop a theory of the infinite divisibility of matter is also gone.

Why, then, have so many scholars and philosophers been so willing to see Anaxagoras in this light? In addition to the chronological error with relation to Zeno, we may point to a feature of the Aristotelian and Epicurean<sup>16</sup> doxographical traditions. I refer to the tendency of Aristotle and his commentators (especially Simplicius)<sup>17</sup> to group Anaxagoras with the atomists because of certain alleged similarities in their views about the ἀρχαί. In the Peripatetic scheme, Anaxagoras and Leucippus and Democritus all held that the ἀρχαί were ἄπειροι. This is a tidy grouping, even though Aristotle correctly supposed that the ἄπειροι ἀρχαί would be quite different in significance in the two systems. Anaxagoras, on Aristotle's view,<sup>18</sup> held that the ἀρχαί were an indefinite number of kinds of stuffs, while the atomists believed in a literally infinite number of atoms. But the tendency to see Anaxagoras as a believer in an infinite number of particles, which, however, were not ἄτομοι, was so strong that Aëtius, repeating perhaps Theophrastus,<sup>19</sup> describes him in atomistic terms as believing in λόγῳ θεωρητὰ μόρια. So Anaxagoras becomes a non-atomistic particle theorist, like Leucippus except that his particles are not ἄτομοι. This doxographical tradition is also prominent in Lucretius' famous account of Anaxagorean physics,<sup>20</sup> in which bones, for example, come to be from "tiny and minute bits of bone" and flesh from "tiny and minute bits of flesh," and so forth.

But this association with and alleged similarity to Leucippian atomism is unsupported by Anaxagoras' own words. For there particles are never mentioned.<sup>21</sup> It is the doxographical habit of grouping Anaxagoras with the atomists which introduces particles. And of course, once particles are introduced into his system, it is inevitable that they be interpreted as infinitely divisible, in order to account

<sup>16</sup> See Teodorsson, pp. 20–21, who properly emphasizes both doxographic errors throughout his short book.

<sup>17</sup> Simplicius, *In Phys.*, p. 453. 1–3, 458. 26 ff., 461. 9 ff., 461. 30 – 462. 3, 1069. 20–25, 1120. 20–24, 1254. 20 ff., 1266. 33–36.

<sup>18</sup> A 43.

<sup>19</sup> A 46; cf. Barnes p. 22. It is also possible that the Epicurean tradition is at work here, since the terminology used is otherwise best attested for that school. Julia Annas pointed out that at Sextus Pyrrh. *hypot.* 1. 147 ὁμοιομερῆ are mentioned alongside atoms and ἐλάχιστα as candidates for being τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα. This too suggests the doxographical tendency of the Epicurean school.

<sup>20</sup> A 44 = *On the Nature of Things* 1. 833–879.

<sup>21</sup> The term μῶρα is as close as one can get to an Anaxagorean term for particle. See note 5 above.

for what he does say about the structure of matter, in particular to maintain consistency with the claim that there is a portion of everything in everything.<sup>22</sup>

My own hypothesis about Anaxagoras' theory of matter can best be tested by applying it to the preserved fragments in detail; it proposes new and rather special interpretations for Anaxagoras' key theoretical terms referring to quantities. I concede at the outset that some of these suggested interpretations are strange; but there has yet to be an interpretation of his theory which did not have some strange and perhaps incredible feature, and I doubt that there ever will be. It is obvious, to me at any rate, that some of the difficulty of Anaxagoras' fragments derives from his attempt to say quite new and difficult things with the limited resources of ordinary Greek, without coining new technical terms. This would have made his book difficult for his contemporaries too and helps to explain why it was so easy for his theories to be misunderstood by later doxographers. Some re-evaluation of his words is essential if any progress is to be made in understanding his theory. So I ask the reader to ponder the suggested meanings for familiar terms as an hypothesis, and to consider the economy and efficiency of this hypothesis in accounting for Anaxagoras' fragments in the context of fifth-century intellectual history.

The reasons for the various suggestions I make about the meaning of quantity terms in Anaxagoras will be clear in the course of the discussion. But it will be helpful if I state at the outset the proposals I am making. I intend to interpret the following Greek terms thus:

πλήθος: amount, the total quantity of any stuff found in the universe.

μέγεθος: largeness, the characteristic of being separated out and so distinguishable from other stuffs.

σμικρότης: smallness, the characteristic of being mixed and so not distinguishable from other stuffs.

These suggested definitions have emerged from a reading of the

<sup>22</sup> Aristotle follows out this line of reasoning in *Physics* 1. 4. Teodorsson, oddly enough (pp. 74 ff.), argues that Anaxagoras employed the concept of infinite divisibility but not that of particle. I should also emphasize at this point that although Aristotle's discussions are the source of the particulate interpretation of Anaxagoras' theory (note for example ὅγκοι at *Physics* 1. 4, 187a37) Aristotle himself seems never to attribute to Anaxagoras the idea of infinite divisibility. In *Physics* 1. 4 he pursues a line of thought based on his own reflections about Anaxagoras, and in the course of this (187b7-188a18) introduces the idea in question. But in his actual accounts of what Anaxagoras believed the suspect notion is not to be found.

fragments themselves, with no prior assumptions about the meaning of these terms, which are obviously central to Anaxagoras' theory.<sup>23</sup> The interpretation I propose is not the only one possible; in effect, it competes with Barnes' view. I claim that it is more plausible and compatible with the fragments than that interpretation. But if it seems to be at least a serious contender, then my present aim will have been accomplished. Now to the most important of the fragments. Fragment one:

All things\*<sup>24</sup> were together, indefinite both in amount and in smallness. For the small too was indefinite. And since all things were together, nothing was distinct because of smallness. For air and aither covered all things, both of them being indefinite—for these things are greatest among the totality both in amount and in greatness.

The first observation to make is about the word *πλῆθος*, which I render "amount." As others have seen,<sup>25</sup> there is no need to translate it as "number" with its implications of countable units, at least not in fifth-century Ionic prose.<sup>26</sup> But even if it is translated in that way, it does not follow that particles are meant; it could, as Aristotle seems

<sup>23</sup> The unusual interpretation I propose for *μέγεθος* and *σμικρότης* is not without support of a sort from another philosopher, Empedocles, who is also trying to grapple with Parmenides' legacy of argument. His "roots" are always the same in total amount. Yet they dwindle (*φθίνει*) into each other when they are mixed together (by love) and grow (*αύξεται*) when separated (by strife): B 26.2. Surely "dwindling" suggests becoming "smaller" and "growing" suggests becoming "larger" in much the same sense which I propose for Anaxagoras. Of course, the One of Empedocles also "grows" as the elements shrink (B 17.1, 17.16). But the One is not a permanent thing meeting Parmenidean standards, as the roots and Anaxagoras' *χρήματα* are. It is not clear whether mixing and separation in Empedocles involve particles of matter. This is perhaps suggested by Aristotle at *De Sensu* 441a3 ff., where he seems to be assimilating Empedocles to an atomistic theory, and at *Metaphysics* A, 984a9–11: *ταῦτα γὰρ αἰεὶ διαμένειν καὶ οὐ γίγνεσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ πλεῖν καὶ ὀλιγότερον*. But the way in which the mixture occurs does not affect my point here. Quite possibly Empedocles did not explicitly address the question whether his theory involved particles, just as he seems not to have thought through the question whether his theory of pores should commit him to a belief in the existence of void.

<sup>24</sup> When marked with an asterisk, "things" is a direct translation of *χρήματα*.

<sup>25</sup> E.g. Barnes, p. 16; D. Lanza, *Anaxagora: Testimonianze e Frammenti*, Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1966, *ad loc.*

<sup>26</sup> Herodotus uses *πλῆθος* for "amount" in this way; see 1.204.1 for a parallel to Anaxagoras' phrase "indefinite in amount." *πολύς*, in the singular, means simply "much," and *πλῆθος* is the corresponding noun for this sense as well as for the sense "many" which is expressed by the plural *πολλά*. In addition, Henry Mendell points out that Plato uses *πλῆθος* to govern mass nouns as well as count nouns, confirming that such a use is quite respectable even in classical Attic prose. Examples (many more could be found): *Phaedrus* 279c, *Theaetetus* 158d, *Politicus* 269b. Sider's interpretation of *πλῆθος* (pp. 45, 58–60) is complex and, in my opinion, implausible.

to have seen, refer to the number of kinds of basic stuffs found in the original mixture and now in the world we observe. Still, I prefer the interpretation of it as referring to the total amount of each stuff, for reasons which will become apparent.

Second, what is meant by "smallness" when it is applied to the ἀρχαί, the ἄδηλα χρήματα of the mixture? We are told that "since all things were together, nothing was distinct [ἐνδελον] because of smallness." Traditionally this is taken to mean that the particles are simply too small to be seen—just like atoms. On the other hand, Barnes, focussing on fragments 3 and 6, understands smallness differently. It is not particles which are "small," according to Barnes, but portions or shares in mixed substances.<sup>27</sup> But this, while *perhaps* making sense in fragments 3 and 6, is clearly out of place in fragment 1. It is preferable to develop a view of large and small which will apply to all the fragments and which will have it refer to the χρήματα themselves, rather than to portions or shares of them. For that is how Anaxagoras speaks in fragment 1; Anaxagoras nowhere refers, not even in fragment 6, to small and large *portions*, as Barnes' view demands, but always to portions of what is itself large or small.

Consequently we look elsewhere for an interpretation of smallness; and we have an explanation drawn from Anaxagoras' own fragments which points in a different and more satisfactory direction. In fragment 4b we read, "before these things were separated off [sc. from the mixture], when because all things were together no color [or surface, χροιή] was distinct either; for the commingling of all things prevented this." The χρήματα meant are then specified:<sup>28</sup> they are the pairs of opposites, wet-dry, hot-cold, etc. In fragment 1 "smallness" was responsible for the indistinctness; here the mixture is responsible for the same feature. Therefore I would hypothesize that smallness, for the χρήματα, is simply the condition of being thoroughly distributed in the mixture. There need be no reference to the size of discrete particles, as the traditional theory requires, nor even, as Barnes' view would have it, to the quantity of a portion expressible numerically or at any rate algebraically. Similarly, "largeness," to which reference is made presently, will on this hypothesis be the condition of being separated off and so distinguishable; not bigness of the particles or of the portions of a stuff. Barnes' interpretation, in fact, introduces the idea of numerically expressible fractional shares and apparently does so *only* to give sense to the idea of large and

<sup>27</sup> The idea of small portions first appears on p. 33.

<sup>28</sup> Earth and the σπέρματα seem to be distinguished from the opposites—because, I think, they are reducible to them; earth, seeds, etc. are derivative. See below.



small shares of a stuff. But not only is the idea of fractional shares not even hinted at in the fragments; the concepts which Barnes uses it to explain—"small" and "large" portions or shares—are also not Anaxagorean.

Fragment 1 itself says something about the reason for the lack of distinctness of things. It is because air and aither cover or dominate the mixture. Here I must take a position on a contentious issue.<sup>29</sup> I do not think that air and aither are *identifiable* components of the mixture; i.e. they are not *χρήματα* in the sense that the opposites are. Rather, like earth and the seeds mentioned in fragment 4b, they are only "virtually" present in the mixture, by which I mean that the opposites needed to make them up are present. After all, fragment 2 tells us that air and aither have to be separated off from the mixture

<sup>29</sup> Barnes retains the view that real stuffs (*ἔντα χρήματα*) include many ordinary macroscopic stuffs, such as air, bread, and cheese. As far as I can see, Anaxagoras never says this. Aristotle does, but I think that he misunderstands Anaxagoras. My own view, that the *ἔντα χρήματα* (i.e. the elemental entities which alone obey Parmenidean rules of permanence) are only the opposites and that everything else including the seeds, the so-called Empedoclean elements, and flesh, bone, etc. is derivative and disobedient to Parmenidean rules of permanence, is close to Vlastos' position ("The Physical Theory of Anaxagoras," pp. 323–53 in R. E. Allen and D. J. Furley ed., *Studies in Presocratic Philosophy*, vol.2, London 1975). For he holds that the seeds, flesh, earth, etc. are just the opposites; his account of the relation of seeds etc. and powers on pp. 337–38 is attractive and, I believe, correct, although I suspect that it is inconsistent with other statements he makes about the status of seeds etc. But because he accepts the authenticity of fragment 10 (now put in some doubt by Schofield, *op. cit.*, pp. 135 ff. and "Doxographica Anaxagorea" *Hermes* 103 [1975], 1–24), Vlastos presents his own position in a manner which I find unclear if not contradictory. For while denying that the flesh or the seeds of flesh, e.g., are anything over and above the powers, he still maintains that they are just as "primordial" and "elemental." This would be redundant and to my mind implausible. It seems to be a result of three factors: (1) the continued acceptance of the authenticity of fragment 10; (2) a degree of reliance on the doxographical tradition, which I believe distorts Anaxagoras' theory on just this point; (3) a failure to see that the term *χρήμα* should be restricted to the opposites in all but a very few cases where it is loosely used to refer to perceptible objects too. My own view is that Anaxagoras held that all macroscopic phenomenal entities are derivative and do not obey Parmenidean canons, that they are mere *φαινόμενα* to be explained by reference to the underlying *ἀδύλα* which compose them—i.e. that they are epiphenomena of true *ἄντα*. This interpretation of Anaxagoras would give point to Aristotle's claim (*De Caelo* 302a28–b5, *Gen. Corr.* 314a 24–30) that the "Empedoclean" elements are treated as derivative (*σύνθετα*) by Anaxagoras. It would also help to explain the interest of Sextus (fragments 21, 21a, A 97; cf. Cicero, *Academica* 1. 44, 2. 100) in him as a believer in the unreliability of sense perception in grasping the truth about the physical world. Less important, perhaps, but still not negligible is the fact that Aëtius mentions *μόρια αἵματος γεννητικά* in A 46, which shows that one branch of the dubious doxographical tradition preserved an awareness that the *ἀρχαί* were not meant to be the same stuffs as the macroscopic objects made up of them.

too (here referred to as the surrounding "muchness" — τὸ πολὺ τὸ περιέχον); and fragment 15 describes how earth emerges from the separating off and moving together of the dense, wet, cold, and dark, and how aither emerges by the same process from the rare, hot, and dry. Fragment 16 has similar implications.

Fragment 15:

The dense and wet and cold and the dark gathered here, where earth now is, but the rare and the hot and dry moved out to the forward part of the aither.

Fragment 16:

From these things being separated off earth is compounded. For water is separated off from the clouds and earth from the water and from the earth stones are compounded by the cold and these [i.e. the stones] move out more than water.<sup>30</sup>

Earth, air, etc. are in the mixture only in the sense that the opposites (i.e. the *χρήματα*) sufficient, when separated, to make them up are in the mixture. These non-elemental stuffs (i.e. the opposites which constitute them) can be separated off, and then earth, etc., will appear. "Seeds" are probably of similar status; i.e. they are the presence in the mixture of the opposites sufficient to produce, when separated, the observable object of which it is said to be the seed. The term "seeds" need not, as Barnes stresses,<sup>31</sup> suggest a discrete particle, although there must be something special about the seed. Perhaps observable objects (like men and trees) which are individuated and countable come from seeds, while stuffs like earth, air, etc. are said to come directly from the "earth" which is in the mixture in the form of the appropriate opposites.<sup>32</sup> To say that earth is in the mixture means only that there is enough dense, wet, cold, and dark in it to produce what we see as earth; to say that the seed of x is in it is to say that there is enough of each of the needed opposites in it to produce x.

The reason why the virtual presence of air and aither helps to

<sup>30</sup> Barnes (n. 18, pp. 295–96) denies that these two fragments imply the non-elemental character of earth, aither, etc., following on this point Michael Stokes ("On Anaxagoras," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 47 [1965], 218–21, 16–19). But Stokes and Barnes, like Lanza and everyone else who relied on Diels' edition of Simplicius, believed that <ῆ γῆ> in fragment 15 was an emendation; thus they could dismiss it. Sider however (*op. cit.*, p. 115) points out that γῆ is in fact found in every manuscript of Simplicius; the words of Anaxagoras pretty clearly do imply that the opposites are elemental and earth etc. are not.

<sup>31</sup> P. 21.

<sup>32</sup> Perhaps, as Schofield suggests (pp. 126 ff.), only living things grow from seeds.

make the mixture indistinct is presumably that the qualities which make up these visible manifestations are in themselves more indeterminate to perception than others. The dominance of them in the mixture, therefore, tends to account for the indistinctness of the evenly mixed whole. The last sentence of fragment 1, then, supports the claim that these things are indefinite in amount and it does so by appealing to observable facts about the present, separated state of the world. For now (note the change in tense) “these *are* the greatest among the totality of things, both in amount [ $\pi\lambda\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$ ] and in greatness [ $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\theta\omicron\varsigma$ ].” Thus fragment 1 shows the inadequacy of interpreting  $\pi\lambda\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$  as number; air and aither may be the largest visible masses, but they are not the most numerous. Moreover, on the proposed interpretation the contrast between  $\pi\lambda\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$  and  $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\theta\omicron\varsigma$  is meaningful. These two things are both the greatest in total amount ( $\pi\lambda\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$ ) and now the most separated (greatest in  $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\theta\omicron\varsigma$ ).

Of course, only when the separation has occurred, *now* rather than *then*, can one refer to greatness or largeness. For the separation has produced discernible, countable bodies. The revolution which causes the separation is to be envisaged as beginning in the center of what is now the cosmos and expanding outwards.<sup>33</sup> The surrounding remainder, therefore, is still in the primordial state of mixture; and this mass is indefinite in amount, as fragment 2 tells us.

For both air and aither are separated off from the “much” which surrounds; and what surrounds is, itself, indefinite in amount.

This is a very old picture of the cosmogonic process—going back at least to Anaximander—and Anaxagoras’ acceptance of it hardly singles him out as a revolutionary thinker. The terms  $\pi\omicron\lambda\upsilon$  and  $\pi\lambda\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$  here may thus be translated in accordance with our hypothesis, giving them no reference to countable bits or shares.

So far I have said nothing about the central oddity of Anaxagoras’ system, his claim that in some sense the total mixture of all the  $\chi\rho\eta\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$  or basic elements in his system is still a feature of our present world of separated and differentiated objects, of “large” objects as I am interpreting the term. This claim, of course, is the key move in Anaxagoras’ attempt to deal with Parmenides’ demonstration that nothing could come to be from what is not or vanish into what is not. There could be no “coming into being” or “being destroyed” of any thing, be it substance or attribute (to use anachronistic terms). So these apparent phenomena had to be reduced to a derivative status, by interpreting them as the “mixing together” and

<sup>33</sup> See fragment 12.



"distinguishing" of the *χρήματα* which truly exist and meet Parmenidean standards of permanence. Fragment 17 summarizes the position Anaxagoras' theory is meant to support:

On coming to be and being destroyed the Greeks do not hold correct opinions. For no thing\* comes to be nor is destroyed, but is mixed together and distinguished from existing things\*. And thus they would correctly call "coming to be" being mixed and "being destroyed" being distinguished.

Since there can be no radical, genuine change and since observation tells us that virtually anything can emerge from anything else even now, as a spark from flint, water from stones (in dripping caves), air from water and flesh from food, Anaxagoras concluded that it must still be the case that everything is in everything. This is perhaps an unnecessarily sweeping generalization, since there are some emergences which do not occur, but it is in keeping with Anaxagoras' bold speculative temperament. Besides, as Simplicius pointed out (A 45), if you follow a chain of emergences through serially it may perhaps turn out that all things do emerge from all things indirectly. But whether even this is true is an empirical question which neither Anaxagoras nor Simplicius (nor I) had the patience to try to answer.

It is this requirement, imposed by the defense of change in a Parmenidean framework, that all things *still* be in all things which gives Anaxagoras' system its unique character and his interpreters the greatest need for ingenuity. Here we must look closely at fragments 3, 5, and 6. These fragments present the quantity terms we have been examining in a new light and will put any hypothesis about the meaning of smallness, bigness, and "muchness" to its most severe test.

Let us look first at fragment 3, which Simplicius explicitly says is about the *ἀρχαί*, i.e. the *έόντα χρήματα*.

Nor is there something which is itself the least of the small, but it [the small] is always lesser (for what is cannot not be); but also, there is always a greater than the great. And it [the great] is equal in amount to the small, but each is, with respect to itself, both great and small.

Let me point out first that this is one of the fragments which has been thought to represent Anaxagoras' response to Zeno. Indeed, Zeller inserted an explicit reference to division into the fragment by emending the admittedly difficult *τὸ μὴ* in *τὸ γὰρ ἐὼν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ μὴ οὐκ εἶναι* to *τομῇ*: what is cannot not be by division. This emendation is widely rejected on the textual level, although Diels-Kranz persevere

by saying that the idea of division is easily supplied from the context. But is this so?<sup>34</sup>

"Nor is there something which is itself the least of the small." On my hypothesis this states that there is no limit to how thoroughly things can be mixed (while for Barnes it states that there is no limit to how small a portion can be taken for consideration; but this raises many problems, including one about how one could individuate, count, or measure, such portions or shares; no such measurement is needed on my interpretation). "The small" is what is well distributed in a mixture; the term applies to *χρήματα*, not to portions or shares (*μοῖραι*). And if everything is to come from everything, even on the observable level, then there must be a bit of each *χρήμα* in each thing. And if the hot, for example, is to be in ice,<sup>35</sup> then there will be very little of it indeed: it must be very well mixed. To allow for all possible cases, we must set no limit to the thoroughness of the mixture. The point of the explanatory parenthesis ("for what is cannot not be") will be that unless this kind of mixture is possible, everything cannot be in everything, which would mean that anything could not emerge from anything, which would mean that some cases of change would entail radical coming into being or destruction (i.e. what is would not be). But this is impossible, according to Parmenides; so this kind of mixture must be possible. Thus on my reading the observation that "what is cannot not be" is apposite here—it is not the "simple truism" innocent of Eleaticism which it turns into on Barnes' view.<sup>36</sup>

The statement that there is always a greater than the great follows. For the great (or the big) is what is separated off, and if there is always more of *x* in *y*, then you can in principle separate more of it off, producing a "bigger" product. The statement that the big is equal to the small in amount also follows. For if it is *always* possible to get more *x* out of *y*, the separated and the unseparated *x* must both be indefinite (*ἄπειρον*). As such they are "equal" in amount. For it is reasonable to suppose that two amounts, both being indefinite, are "equal" even if one does not give this a sophisticated arithmetical

<sup>34</sup> If emendation is needed, Schofield's excision (pp. 156–57, n. 15) of *τὸ* is by far the preferable attempt. Teodorsson's (p. 72) and Sider's (pp. 54–57) revival of *τομῇ μὴ οὐκ εἶναι* is a superfluous intrusion into the text until we have independent reasons for crediting Anaxagoras with the idea of infinite divisibility.

<sup>35</sup> Or in the cold—I do not think that it matters much whether the slogan "all in all" uses the word "all" univocally or applies it first to *χρήματα* and second to observable entities. In so far as the latter are derivative, as I think that they are, the distinction is not significant.

<sup>36</sup> P. 34.

precision. Here again *πλήθος* can refer to a non-countable amount, not to a countable plurality of particles (which are infinitely divisible), nor to a plurality of portions or shares expressible in numbers or algebraic symbols, as Barnes' view would hold.<sup>37</sup>

The fragment concludes,<sup>38</sup> "with respect to itself each thing is both great and small." The difficulty here is to decide what "each" refers to. Is it "each *χρῆμα*" i.e. each of the *ἀρχαί*? This is what the context might suggest. Or is it "each thing" in the sense of macroscopic objects? Or "each of the big and small"? The latter is less likely in that one would expect *ἐκάτερον*, although it would give the word a referent in the immediate context, which neither of the other options provides. On balance the question may not be too important, as the sense of the fragment is underdetermined anyway. Still, I prefer the first interpretation, if only because Simplicius tells us that this fragment is about the *ἀρχαί*.<sup>39</sup>

With respect to itself, one might say, each thing is large insofar as it is separated off into identifiable objects, and small insofar as it is not, being mixed either in the *περιέχον* or with all the other *χρήματα*. This would be the result of taking "each" to refer to the *χρήματα* and adopting my hypothesis. The hot, in its totality, is both large and small simply because some of it is separated off and some of it is not. On this interpretation, therefore, fragment 3 will be referring to a time after the cosmogonic separation has begun; for otherwise there would be nothing "large" in the postulated sense. But this already follows from my interpretation of the rest of the fragment.

Fragment 5 also deals with this stage: "These things having been distinguished thus," it begins. It goes on to deal with what is true of all the *χρήματα*, presumably taken distributively.

These things having been distinguished thus, one must recognize that all are in no way lesser or more (for it is impossible [lit. unmanageable] for there to be more than all) but all are always equal.

Each one is always equal to itself, being neither less nor greater than it is. It is better to see this as repeating the main point of fragment 3, that each *χρῆμα* has equal bigness and smallness, rather than to

<sup>37</sup> On both of these views Anaxagoras comes out as holding a suspiciously sophisticated, although approximately correct, view about the equality of all infinite sets—see, for example, Barnes, p. 35; Vlastos, pt. III and n. 75, and C. Strang, "The Physical Theory of Anaxagoras," pp. 361–80 in Allen and Furley (above, note 29). Such a modern insight is hard to attribute to our "archaic sage," who mentions neither particles, nor small and large portions/shares, nor sets of such entities.

<sup>38</sup> See Sider, p. 61.

<sup>39</sup> This is Barnes' preference too.

take it as merely saying tautologically that there are as many kinds of *χρήματα* as there are.

Fragment 6 continues the exploration of the characteristics of matter when separation has begun. In particular, it deals with an important corollary of the thesis that total mixture is always a fact about the *χρήματα* despite separation, viz. the claim that nothing is totally isolated (*χωρισθῆναι*) from other things. Thus it provides the groundwork for fragment 8 and, less obviously, for fragment 7 which says that one does not know the amount of things separated off either in word or in fact. This ignorance is inevitable if one cannot isolate and count discrete bits of matter or even distinguishable portions.

But to return to fragment 6:

(A) And since there are shares of the great and the small equal in amount, in this way too all would be in all. Nor can it/they/something<sup>40</sup> be isolated, but all have a share of each. (B) Since the least cannot exist, it/they/something could not be isolated nor come to be by itself, but just as in the beginning, so now, all are together.

The first point (A) Anaxagoras is making is that the equality of shares (*μοῖραι*) or portions of the big and small (i.e. the distinguished or separated and the unseparated parts of each *χρῆμα* or stuff) is a reason for holding the thesis of total mixture. Since on the present interpretation the equality in amount of big and small is a statement of the perpetual possibility of further separation, this really *is* a ground for holding the thesis of total mixture. For total mixture is made necessary, among other reasons, by Anaxagoras' belief in the perpetual possibility of further separation. Without such a belief, a central reason for believing that total mixture still is the case, after separation as well as before, would disappear.

The second point made (B) is that the fact that there is no least (as asserted in fragment 3) is a reason for holding that the total isolation of a *χρῆμα* is impossible. It is because "there is no least," i.e. on my interpretation because there is no limit to how well something can be blended, that we believe that isolation is impossible and so that total mixture is still the case. Since the blending of one *χρῆμα* into another cannot be limited, isolation or separation of a *χρῆμα* cannot be completed.

Here we may claim an advance over the traditional interpretation of fragment 6, which Schofield follows,<sup>41</sup> and over Barnes.<sup>42</sup> For on these readings the possibility of indefinite or infinite smallness of

<sup>40</sup> It is unclear what the subject of the verb is or whether it might be impersonal.

<sup>41</sup> Pp. 91–93.

<sup>42</sup> P. 36.



countable particles or portions must be taken, not as a reason for holding the non-isolation thesis, but as asserting a facilitating condition, as stating that one reason for *not* holding it does *not* obtain. For on the traditional understanding of smallness (to which Barnes seems to revert in despair), a limit to it, i.e. a form of atomism, would make it impossible to accept total mixture. On such an interpretation Anaxagoras is only entitled to conclude "it could be the case that it is not isolated," not the stronger "it could not be the case that it is isolated." On the present interpretation the stronger reading, which is wanted here, *is* justified.

The final sentence of fragment 6 is difficult on all interpretations; indeed Barnes<sup>43</sup> trivializes it. "And many things are present in all, and [these things are] equal in amount in the greater and lesser of the things separated off." I would expand it thus: in all things there are many *χρήματα* (an understatement) and these *χρήματα* are equal in amount in both the greater and the lesser of the objects separated off. The equality in amount of *χρήματα* in *anything* follows well enough, but the terms *greater* and *lesser* must, I fear, be interpreted differently here than they are when used in reference to *χρήματα*. For now they are used of the macroscopic distinct objects, not of the *χρήματα* themselves, and therefore they must have the ordinary sense of big and small. This ambiguity of quantity terms, depending on whether they are applied to macroscopic objects or to *χρήματα* is an annoying feature of Anaxagoras' style;<sup>44</sup> but it is not unparalleled. For even the term *χρήμα* is occasionally used of objects on the macroscopic level,<sup>45</sup> although usually it refers to the stuffs or *ἀρχαί* which are subject to total mixture and are the genuine, fully real entities (*εἶντα χρήματα*) which obey Parmenidean rules of permanence.

Here I must conclude. Although the fragments have not been exhaustively reviewed, I have touched on the most difficult texts, the ones which provide the most rigorous test for my theory about the meaning of "small" and "large" in Anaxagoras. I believe that the rest of the fragments can be readily fitted into the framework provided. I should briefly review what I think are the strengths of this interpretation. Anaxagoras himself never speaks of division, infinite or otherwise (except for the figurative reference in fragment 8) and it is historically implausible that he should have conceived of

<sup>43</sup> P. 36.

<sup>44</sup> Also found in fragment 12, p. 38. 4–5 DK. See also *μέγιστα* in fragment 1, used in the ordinary sense.

<sup>45</sup> As in fragment 9 (where *νῦν* signals the atypical usage) and *possibly* in fragment 17, p. 40. 21 DK.

infinite divisibility. His central concepts are mixture and separation, producing distinctness or indistinguishability of basic stuffs such as hot and cold. He gives one clear hint himself in the surviving fragments about how the quantity terms "small" and "large" are to be interpreted when they refer to the basic stuffs, and this hint involves only the mechanisms of separation and mixture. I have tried to show that this hint can be followed out consistently in the interpretation of the fragments. If I am correct, there are no references to small and large countable particles of matter in the fragments, or even to numerically expressible smaller and larger portions of stuffs. This, I think, is more what we should expect of an Ionian physicist who responded first to Parmenides' challenge to the concept of change, without reference to the work of Zeno or Leucippus. The resulting theory is strange; but Anaxagoras will be that on any interpretation. The theory has a good chance of being closer to the truth, I suggest, than other currently held theories about Anaxagoras, if only because its strangeness goes further toward providing an interpretation of his work which is internally consistent and compatible with his position in the historical development of Greek thought.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> I wish to thank J. Annas, H. Mendell, J. M. Rist, M. Schofield, and L. Woodbury for reading an earlier version of this essay and offering me their critical reactions. Another version was read to the annual meeting of the Classical Association of Canada in Vancouver, June 1983.





### 3

## Proclus and the Forty Logoi of Zeno\*

JOHN DILLON

At a number of places in his *Commentary on the Parmenides*, Proclus seems to show knowledge of a treatise of Zeno of Elea's which is not derivable from the text of the *Parmenides*, and the inference seems possible that he has access to a document, whether genuine or otherwise, purporting to be the original book of Zeno.

I propose in this article, first, to present all the references which Proclus makes to Zeno's treatise, to see how many of them are susceptible to such an interpretation, and then to draw some general conclusions.

(1) At 619.30–620.3 Cousin, Proclus introduces us to Zeno's treatise:

Ὁ δὴ τοῦ Παρμενίδου μαθητῆς Ζήνων αὐτόθεν μὲν πως τῷ τοῦ διδασκάλου δόγματι συνηγορεῖν οὐ βουλόμενος, ὥς οὐδὲν τοῦ δόγματος δεομένου πίστεως ἄλλης, βοήθειαν δέ τινα πορίζειν κεκρυμμένην ἐπιχειρῶν, γράφει τι βιβλίον, ἐν ᾧ δαιμονίως ἐδείκνυν οὐκ ἐλάττω ἐπόμενα δυσχερῇ τοῖς πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα τιθεμένοις ἢ ὅσα τοῖς ἐν τῷ ὄν εἰρηκόσιν ἔδοξεν ἀπαντᾶν· καὶ γὰρ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον ταῦτόν ἐδείκνυ καὶ ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον ἐσόμενον, καὶ πᾶσαν ἀπλῶς ἀναίρεσιν τῆς τάξεως τῶν ὄντων καὶ πάντων ἐσομένην σύγχυσιν πλημμελῇ.

Now Zeno, Parmenides' disciple, did not care to plead directly for his master's doctrine, since he thought it needed no additional confirmation, but attempted to give it secret aid by writing a book in which he ingeniously showed that those who suppose that beings are many encountered no fewer difficulties than were alleged against those who say Being is one. For he showed that the same thing will be both like and unlike, both equal and unequal, and in general that there will

\*I am most grateful to Jonathan Barnes for various helpful comments.

result the abolition of all order in the world, and that everything will be thrown into confusion.

Everything that Proclus states here is derivable from Plato's *Parmenides*, 127d–128e, except the statement at the end that Zeno showed that the same thing will be, not only “like and unlike,” but “equal and unequal” (ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον). One might say that this is an easy extrapolation from “like and unlike” (and that the final remark about “the abolition of all order in the world” is likewise a natural deduction from the text); but it need not be, and I think it may be regarded as a straw in the wind.

(2) At 684.21–26, Proclus refers to Zeno's treatise as follows:

Τοιοῦτος ὁ Ζήνων ἴσως μὲν καὶ τῷ σώματι “χαρίεις καὶ εὐμήκης,” πολλῷ δὲ πλεον κατὰ τοὺς λόγους· ὅσα γὰρ ὁ Παρμενίδης ἀγκύλως καὶ συνεσπειραμένως ἀπεφθέγγετο, ταῦτα ἀνελίττων οὗτος καὶ εἰς παμμήκεις λόγους ἐκτείνων παρεῖδου.

Such was Zeno, perhaps, in bodily appearance, “handsome and tall,” but far more so in respect of his discourse (λόγοι). For what Parmenides had uttered in an intricate and terse style, Zeno unfolds and transmits in a rather extended discourse (εἰς παμμήκεις λόγους ἐκτείνων).

There is nothing here, certainly, that could not be derived from the text, though the adjective παμμήκης is quite emphatic.

(3) The next substantive reference occurs at 694. 23 ff. (= 29A15 D–K), in connection with Socrates' questioning of Zeno:

Πολλῶν δ' εἰρημένων ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος λόγων, καὶ τετταράκοντα τῶν πάντων, . . .

Zeno had put forth many arguments, *forty in all*.<sup>1</sup>

He then reports the first one, in terms entirely derivable from the text of the dialogue. Further down, however, he makes some remarks which would seem more natural if he had a text of Zeno in front of him. At 696.8–11 he says

Πάνν καὶ συνηρημένως καὶ σαφῶς ἐξέθετο τὸν ὅλον λόγον τὸν πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, τὴν πρώτην ὑπόθεσιν ἀκριβῶς κατανοήσας καὶ θεασάμενος τί τὸ τέλος ἐστὶ τοῦ παντὸς λόγου. . . .

Socrates has set forth the whole argument quite succinctly and clearly,

<sup>1</sup> Noted by Diels–Kranz (19A2), and by H. D. P. Lee in his collection of the fragments, *Zeno of Elea* (Cambridge 1936), p. 7, but neither of these authorities appears to have probed any further into the *Parmenides Commentary*.

having accurately identified the first hypothesis, and seen the purpose of the argument as a whole;

and then at 696.16–18:

καὶ παρὰ μὲν τῷ Ζήνωνι τούτων ἑκάστον εἴρηται διὰ πολλῶν, . . .

Zeno has developed each of these parts *at length* (διὰ πολλῶν).

Both of the latter remarks could, certainly, be deductions from the text of the dialogue (e.g. 128b2), but they are more naturally, I think, taken as the statements of someone who is comparing one text with another. As for the detail that the *logoi* amounted to *forty*, Proclus here is our earliest authority for this. Our only other authority, the sixth-century commentator Elias (also 29A15 D–K) gives no indication of deriving his information from Proclus, and may thus be regarded as an independent source.

(4) At 696.28 f. we have a reference to

. . . διὰ τε τούτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοῦ Ζήνωνος λόγων

this and Zeno's other arguments,

which seems to indicate Proclus' acquaintance with a series of them.

(5) More substantially, in Book II.725.22–39, we find a passage where an argument of Zeno's against plurality is given which could not be derived from the text. In Plato's text we simply have the statement that, if things are many, they must be both like and unlike. We have no indication how Zeno argued for this conclusion, or what he meant by it. Proclus explains this as follows (29–39):

Εἰ ἄρα πολλά ἐστὶν ἐνὸς ἀμέτοχα, καθ' ἑν δὴ τοῦτο, τὴν ἀμεθεξίαν λέγω τοῦ ἐνὸς, καὶ ὅμοια ἔσται καὶ ἀνόμοια, ὥς μὲν κοινὸν αὐτὸ ἔχοντα ὅμοια, ὥς δὲ μὴ ἔχοντα ἀνόμοια· διότι μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πέπονθε τὸ ἐνὸς μὴ μετέχειν, ἀνόμοιά ἐστι· διότι δὲ κοινὸν αὐτοῖς τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν κοινὸν, ὅμοιά ἐστιν, ὥστε τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοιά ἐστιν· ὅλως γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν κοινὸν, αὐτὸ κοινὸν ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς, ὥστε αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ὁ λόγος ἀνῆρηκε. . . .

[*In essence*] If things are many, they will be *unlike* one another, since they will have no share in unity or sameness; but they will also be *like*, in that they will possess the common characteristic of not participating in any "one" (characteristic).

The terminology which Proclus employs here is certainly not primitive (talk of "participation" is hardly Zenonian), but the basic argument surely is. Indeed, using "like and unlike" as if they described attributes of a subject would be absurdly primitive at any time after logic had been developed in the Academy and Peripatos (unless we are dealing with a very sophisticated forger). The argument can only

be effective at a time before the logic of predication was understood. I would suggest, therefore, that Proclus had before him a document which, however reworked, is of Zenonian origin.

(6) At 760.25–761.3, *à propos* of 129b6–8, we find the following:

Μετὰ τοὺς περὶ ὁμοιότητος καὶ ἀνομοιότητος λόγους ἐπὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος μεταβέβηκε πάλιν, καὶ ταῦτα ἀπὸ τῶν Ζήνωνος λόγων λαβών. ἐκείνος δὴ γὰρ καθάπερ τὸ αὐτὸ δεικνύς ὁμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον διήλεγχε τοὺς τὰ πολλὰ χωρίζοντας τοῦ ἐνός, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνός καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ πλῆθους ἐπιχειρῶν διηγωνίζετο πρὸς αὐτοὺς, ἀποφαίνων ὅτι <κατὰ> τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πλῆθος ἔσται καὶ ἐν τὰ πολλὰ χωρὶς τοῦ ἐνός· τὰ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχοντα πλῆθη κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν ἐνάδος καὶ πολλὰ ἔστι· . . . τὸ γὰρ κοινὸν τινος μετεिल्χὸς ἐν ἔστι κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ κοινόν, ὥστε εἰ κοινὸν αὐτοῖς τὸ οὐχ ἐν, ἔσται ἐν τὰ πολλὰ κατὰ τὸ οὐχ ἐν· καὶ πάλιν τὸ οὐχ ἐν ὡσαύτως ἐν τῷ ἐν πᾶσιν εἶναι ταῦτόν.

After the words about likeness and unlikeness, he shifts back to unity and plurality, drawing upon Zeno's own discourse (καὶ ταῦτα ἀπὸ τῶν Ζήνωνος λόγων λαβών). For just as Zeno had refuted those who separate the Many from the One by showing that Likeness and Unlikeness become the same, so likewise he argues against them by starting from the One and from Plurality, and shows that apart from the One the same thing will be many and the many one. For a Plurality apart from the One is a many by the very fact that it does not partake of unity, for what is not controlled by unity is many. And since they have in common their not being one, they will be one by this very fact, for things that share a character in common are one by virtue of this common character. So that if not being one is common to them, the many will be one by virtue of not being one; and inversely their not being one will be one because it is present in them all.

Once again, Proclus professes to be checking the course of the argument in Plato's dialogue off against the sequence of arguments in Zeno's original work. The argument presented is similar to the one presented above about like and unlike, and presupposes a similar level of logical primitiveness, when one has abstracted the later (Procline?) terminology of participation.<sup>2</sup>

(7) At 769.22–770.1, *à propos* of Socrates' mention of Rest and Motion at 129e1, we find the following:<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The manuscript tradition, by the way, both Greek and Latin (Moerbeke's translation) becomes confused at 761.2–3 Cousin, as is perceived by Chaignet in his translation (p. 218). For καὶ πάλιν τὸ οὐχ ἐν ὡσαύτως ἐν τῷ ἐν πᾶσιν [οὐκ] εἶναι ταῦτόν/et omne quod non unum eodem modo in eo quod unum omnibus inest idem (rendering καὶ πᾶν τὸ οὐχ ἐν ὡσαύτως ἐν τῷ ἐν πᾶσιν ἐν εἶναι ταῦτόν?), we should read καὶ πάλιν τὸ οὐχ ἐν ὡσαύτως ἐν, τῷ ἐν πᾶσιν εἶναι ταῦτόν, since what we need is "and inversely their not being one will be one, because it is present in them all."

<sup>3</sup> This passage I have discussed already in *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 58 (1976), 221–22.

προσέθηκε γὰρ δὴ ταῦτα ταῖς εἰρημέναις συζυγίαις· ἐπεὶ κἂν ὁ Ζήνων, οὐ μόνον ἐξ ἐκείνων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῆς τούτων ἀκολουθίας ἀπήλεγχε τὴν ἀτοπίαν τῶν τὰ πολλὰ τοῦ ἐνὸς χωρίζοντων· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου καὶ ἀνομοίου ἐπεποίητο τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν, οὐδὲ αὖ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ τοῦ πλήθους, ἀλλ' ἤδη καὶ ἀπὸ στάσεως καὶ κινήσεως. Τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἰστάμενον καὶ κινούμενον ἀπέφηεν, εἰ τὰ πολλὰ μὴ μετέχοι τοῦ ἐνός· πᾶν τὸ ἰστάμενον ἐν τινί ἐστιν ἐνί, καὶ πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον ἐξίσταται τοῦ ἐνός, ὥστε τὰ πολλὰ εἰ μὴ μετέχοι τινὸς ἐνὸς ἄστατά ἐστι· καὶ πάλιν εἰ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἔχοι κοινὸν τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τινός, ἐν τινι ἔσται· αὕτη οὖν πάλιν ἀκίνητα· τὰ αὐτὰ ἄρα καὶ κινούμενα ἔσται καὶ ἐστῶτα· οὐκ ἄρα πολλὰ ἐστὶν ἔρημα πάντα τοῦ ἐνός. Ἄλλ' ὁ μὲν Ζήνωνος λόγος καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοιοῦτος· . . .

These last two (sc. Rest and Motion) he has added to the pair previously mentioned, since Zeno also had used them as well as the former pairs to prove the absurdity of separating the Many from the One. Zeno's refutation has been based not only on Likeness and Unlikeness, Unity and Plurality, but also on Rest and Motion. He showed that if the Many does not participate in Unity, it follows that the same thing in the same respect will be both at rest and in motion. For everything at rest is in a one something (*ἐν τινί ἐστιν ἐνί*), and everything that is in motion is departing from some one (position); so that if the Many do not share in a Unity, they will be unresting; and again, if they have in common the character of not sharing in some Unity, they will be in some one (state); hence again will be unmoving. The same things, therefore, will be moving and at rest; so that the Many are not altogether devoid of Unity. Such was Zeno's argument.

This argument uses the ambiguity of the expression *ἐν ἐνί*, which can be taken to mean "in a place," "in a state," or "in a position," to construct an argument of similar form to the previous ones.

(8) At 862.26–34, while commenting on Socrates' attempted analogy of the daylight (131b3) Proclus says:

καὶ ὅτι μὲν ἐκ τοῦ Ζήνωνος λόγου τὸ παράδειγμα εἰληφε, δῆλον· ἐκείνος γὰρ δηλώσαι βουλόμενος ὅπως τὰ πολλὰ μετέχει τινὸς ἐνός, . . . κἂν εἰ διειστήκει πορρωτάτω ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, εἶπεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ μίαν οὖσαν τὴν λευκότητα παρῆναι καὶ ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἀντίποσιν οὕτως, ὡς τὴν εὐφρόνην καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν.

It is clear that he has taken his example from the discourse of Zeno; for Zeno, in his endeavor to show that the Many participate in some One, and are not devoid of One, even though greatly separated from each other, has said in his discourse that whiteness, which is one, is present both to us and to the antipodes, just as night and day are.

This passage has a number of interesting aspects, which I have discussed in an earlier article,<sup>4</sup> but which may be repeated now. The

<sup>4</sup> "New Evidence on Zeno of Elea," *AGPh* 56 (1974), 127–31.



point of the argument was presumably that "white" is taken to be "one thing," and yet the many say that there are many white things, so that, "if there are many," "white," which is *one*, would have to be in various different places at once. The Antipodes are brought in, I assume, as being the most remote people from us, but they are a strange and notable feature, since, if Zeno really mentioned them, this would be their earliest attested occurrence. Certainly, the form of the argument, with its ignorance of predication, is primitive enough to be Presocratic.

(9) In Book V, 1024.12 f. Proclus tells us that Zeno used to call some of his arguments "true" and others "tactical," or "useful for the purpose at hand" (*χρειώδεις*). This detail seems to be recorded nowhere else, but on the other hand it is hardly the sort of thing that Zeno would admit in the course of presenting his Forty Logoi, so I would not wish to claim it as a further testimonium to that work.

This seems to complete the references to Zeno's work which are not clearly derivable from the text of Plato. What are we to make of them? And how is this work that Proclus talks of to be related to that which was available later to Simplicius? I see no reason that the arguments should not come from the same work as was available to Simplicius, at least in respect of the arguments he quotes against Plurality (there seems to have been a separate treatise against the possibility of motion, cf. Zeno A15 D-K). If these seem puerile in comparison to those, then we may perhaps take refuge in Zeno's own reported distinction, just mentioned above, between Logoi that are *ἀληθείς* and those that are *χρειώδεις*. To quote Jonathan Barnes:

Many modern interpreters of Zeno have argued that such and such an account of a paradox is wrong because it attributes such a silly fallacy to a profound mind. Zeno was not profound: he was clever. Some profundities fall from his pen; but so too did some trifling fallacies. And that is what we should expect from an eristic disputant. If we meet a deep argument, we may rejoice; if we are dazzled by a superficial glitter, we are not bound to search for a nugget of philosophical gold. Fair metal and base, in roughly equal proportions, make the Zenonian alloy.<sup>5</sup>

I quote this eloquent passage with a certain relish, since Barnes does not accept the genuineness of (7) and (8) above.<sup>6</sup> He may be right, but he is also right to suggest that philosophical naiveté need not be a bar to genuineness. Furthermore, all Greek thinkers were

<sup>5</sup> *The Presocratic Philosophers* I (London 1979), pp. 236-37.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 236, note 8.

prepared to throw bad arguments as well as good at a thesis in the hope that something would stick. It did not necessarily mean that they were persuaded by the arguments themselves.

Barnes states just below: "We do not know how Zeno argues for the proposition (a) 'If *P*, then everything is alike, and (b) if *P*, then everything is unlike'."<sup>7</sup> I suggest that we do, and that it is contained in passage (5) above.

My conclusion is that Proclus certainly had a document in his possession called the *Forty Logoi of Zeno*, or something such—probably, though not certainly, the same document that was available to Simplicius a century later—and it seems possible to me that it at least contained genuine material, though perhaps worked over at a later date, or even incorporated from another, genuine source, into a pseudepigraphic work.

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<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 237.



## Protagoras, Gorgias and the Dialogic Principle

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When Protagoras published the *Ἀλήθεια ἢ Καταβάλλοντες* [Λόγοι], his title looked like a gesture of the most blatant cynicism.<sup>1</sup> This was not the only evidence to support such an accusation. He was also the author of the *Ἀντιλογίαι*, and the theme of the two books of this treatise, we are told, was that, on any given question, arguments of equally compelling logic could be advanced both for and against. In that case, "truth" as something objective—a concept familiar even to such a non-philosopher as Pindar<sup>2</sup>—appears to be completely destroyed. It is in this sense that a passage in Euripides' *Bacchae* (200–03) is often interpreted, where we learn that long established things are not overthrown by any *logos*:

<sup>1</sup> Indispensable older treatments of the Sophists remain: M. Untersteiner, *The Sophists*, tr. K. Freeman (Oxford 1954); W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* III (Cambridge 1969). More recent work includes: F. Solmsen, *Intellectual Experiments of the Greek Enlightenment* (Princeton, New Jersey 1975); C. J. Classen ed., *Sophistik, Wege der Forschung* 187 (Darmstadt 1976, with full bibliography); G. B. Kerferd, *The Sophistic Movement* (Cambridge 1981); idem ed., *The Sophists and Their Legacy*, *Hermes Einzelschriften* 44 (Wiesbaden 1981): cf. especially Professor Kerferd's introduction (pp. 1–6), "The Future Direction of Sophistic Studies." The great merit of Professor Solmsen's book is to handseil the topic of the history of ideas in the fifth century. Obviously a *Geistesgeschichte des 5. Jahrhunderts* (in English!) is sorely needed. This study will heal the quarrel to which Plato refers (*Rep.* X. 607b), for in it the poets and particularly Pindar, so often dismissed as no thinker, will play an essential role.

<sup>2</sup> *Ἀλάθεια* was first made a goddess by Pindar, according to M. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion* I (2nd ed., Munich 1955), p. 748: cf. U. Hölscher, "Pindar und die Wahrheit," in *Wandlungen: Studien zur antiken und neueren Kunst* (Munich 1975), pp. 90 ff.

οὐδὲν σοφίζομεσθα τοῖσι δαίμοσιν.

πατρίους παραδοχάς, ἅς θ' ὁμήλικας χρόνῳ  
κεκτήμεθ', οὐδείς αὐτὰ καταβάλλει λόγος,  
οὐδ' εἰ δι' ἄκρων τὸ σοφὸν ἤϋρηται φρενῶν.<sup>3</sup>

The artistic point—again familiar from Pindar—is that Truth is unveiled by Time,<sup>4</sup> and that if something is long established it must therefore have enhanced—even unchallengeable—claims to be true. Comforting though this doctrine might be to poets who professed to eternize, and to their patrons, it was evidently denied by the apparently new and outrageous implication that everything remained always an open question (*δισσοὶ λόγοι*).

Although the charge of “ethical relativism” and of a general assault on received values is so often brought both against Protagoras and the Sophists as a whole, it is of course too simple to believe that the thinkers and teachers who descended on the heart of the Greek world from its periphery in the later years of the fifth century were nothing but iconoclasts. Both Protagoras and Gorgias had quite respectable philosophical credentials. Sicily, the forcing-ground for new ideas, had inherited the problems of the well established Italian Eleatic school of philosophical skepticism about claims to know. Zeno of Elea was credited by Aristotle (fr. 65 Rose) with being the founder of dialectic. In Protagoras’ native city of Abdera, Democritus too was an Eleatic. It was in this tradition and in reaction to Parmenides that Gorgias had begun as a philosopher before he turned to the study of rhetoric, and thereby forfeited, according to E. R. Dodds, his claims to be a “Sophist” at all.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Murray’s text seems superior on the whole to that printed, for example, by Jeanne Roux, *Euripide, Les Bacchantes* (Paris 1970), although I have accepted her *καταβάλλει* in line 202, already weighed by Dodds *ad loc.* In considering the style of Euripides, Aristotle’s remarks (*Rhet.* III. 1404b24–25) can hardly be over-emphasized. In line 200 *σοφίζομαι* is constructed with a following dative, by a bold extension, as if it were *μάχομαι*: cf. the motif of *θεομαχέω* in the play (vv. 45, 325, 1255). The asyndeton at 201 marks the speaker’s emotion as he utters his solemn declaration of faith. There is nothing inadmissible in colloquial style about the resumptive *αὐτὰ* at 201. It is not merely *καταβάλλει* which encourages one to think about Protagoras here, but that verb allied with *σοφίζομαι* before it and *σοφόν* following.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Ol.* 10. 53–55. The long history of this motif is discussed by F. Saxl, “Veritas filia temporis,” *Essays Presented to E. Cassirer* (Oxford 1936), pp. 197–222; E. Panofsky, *Studies in Iconology* (repr. New York 1972), pp. 73 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Plato, *Gorgias*, ed. E. R. Dodds (Oxford 1959), pp. 6–7. Contrast Kerferd, *The Sophistic Movement*, p. 45 and note.

Aristotle was unsympathetic to history, as the ninth chapter of the *Poetics* shows. Is it perhaps the reading of Aristotle which convinces the modern student of ancient philosophy that "style" in his discipline has nothing to do with content? Obviously, no one could derive this opinion from reading Plato! And, even in the case of his disciple Aristotle, everyone understands at least notionally that what we have from him is only part of the record, lacking the *aureum flumen orationis*. How much one would give, for example, to read the *Περὶ Ποιητῶν*! But, if Albin Lesky is right in suggesting that Thucydides deliberately echoes Protagoras<sup>6</sup> in introducing the first pair of contrasting orations in his History, that between the Corinthian and Corcyrean ambassadors at Athens, what has to be admitted is that a "Sophist" and alleged skeptic about the truth handed to the greatest of ancient historians, one who claimed that his work would be an everlasting treasure precisely because it offered access to the truth (I. 20–22), a basic tool of historical analysis, the speech and counter-speech. Is not this already a philosophical achievement of the highest order, and one that makes a refreshing contrast with the *Poetics*? And the *form* of these speeches is moreover in debt to Gorgias!<sup>7</sup>

Obviously twin speeches occurring in real life called for the judgment of an audience. Set now in the record, thesis and antithesis have to be synthesized by the reader for himself. But this evidently lends another interpretation to Protagoras' doctrine of ἀλήθεια. It was not after all blatant cynicism, but an emphasis on the dialogic principle which his work proclaimed, however much it may have been misinterpreted by Euripides (as Euripides was misinterpreted himself, for example by Aristophanes<sup>8</sup>).

The dialogic principle states that all dogmatic and would-be final formulations are betrayals, and hence the importance to it of the term ἀπορία already found in Pindar (*Nem.* 7. 105: cf. Eur., *Bacchae* 800), and another proof of the modernity of the world in which he moved. There is only, for the seeker after truth, the ἀγών, which may take various forms, and eventually becomes the presentation of a particular point of view by a speaker aware of its partiality, and the courteous wait for an opponent to develop his reply (but not, of course, his refutation). In Thucydides, by what the Formalists would call a *dénudation du procédé*, this technique (which explains why his speakers echo one another's phrases) is eventually manifested in the

<sup>6</sup> Ἀντιλογία, 31. 4: cf. Lesky, *History of Greek Literature*, Eng. tr. (London 1966), p. 476.

<sup>7</sup> See especially Solmsen, pp. 83 ff.

<sup>8</sup> *Hippolytus* 612: cf. *Thesm.* 275, Arist., *Rhet.* III. 1416a29–35.



so-called "Melian Dialogue," otherwise such an anomaly in the structure of the History.<sup>9</sup>

This pre-Platonic, historical use of dialogue form by Thucydides shows certain typical features. The "courteous wait" to which allusion has just been made is evident at V. 86: ἡ μὲν ἐπιείκεια τοῦ διδάσκειν καθ' ἡσυχίαν ἀλλήλους; the concern with truth at 89: τὰ δυνατὰ δ' ἐξ ὧν ἐκάτεροι ἀληθῶς φρονοῦμεν διαπράσσεσθαι; the seriousness of the topic at 101: ἀγῶν . . . περὶ . . . σωτηρίας. Clearly we are confronted with a "threshold" situation, quite literally a matter of life and death, which deploys for judgment an argument about a religious and ethical question: do the gods protect the just but weak cause, or is might right? The resemblance of the Athenian case to positions attributed to Thrasymachus in the first book of Plato's *Republic* is clear.

It is part of the genre (as old in fact as the Book of Job) that no satisfactory answer is stated. The Athenians behave exactly as they intended all along. The Melians are defeated, the men murdered, the women and children enslaved. If the story of the Sicilian Expedition which begins the next book is the proof that the gods do after all avenge the right, that is small consolation for the Melians, and in any case a conclusion that we must draw for ourselves. All we can observe here and now is the character of the participants.

Sophistic elements have been noted in the Hippocratean corpus.<sup>10</sup> The dialogic form used here by Thucydides quite independently of Plato is also illustrated in the novel of Hippocrates, the first epistolary novel of European literature,<sup>11</sup> the first with an ideologue as its hero (Democritus, the "laughing philosopher"<sup>12</sup>), and interestingly, an exploration of madness. The dialogic form could be used then as heuristic and empirical, a tool to grasp at rather than fix an elusive truth. Democritus symbolizes the absence of "seriousness" in this quest, which does not make it frivolous, since seriousness may be

<sup>9</sup> Yet subtly integrated by W. Robert Connor, *Thucydides* (Princeton, New Jersey 1984), pp. 147–57. Thucydides shows such familiarity with the idioms of the dialogic style that a careful examination of his *History* for more hidden ("estranged") features of it would clearly be rewarding.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Kerferd, *op. cit.*, pp. 57–58.

<sup>11</sup> For an indication of its contents, see Diels–Kranz, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (repr. Berlin 1974), II, pp. 225–26. It should obviously be taken much more seriously as a literary and philosophical phenomenon than the commentary implies. Its alleged lateness, for which linguistic evidence is a very uncertain guide, is no proof of its unimportance, and it is glossed by Maloney and Frohn (see below, note 13) with the rest of the corpus.

<sup>12</sup> Cicero, *De Orat.* II. §235, is especially relevant. Cf. Diels–Kranz II, p. 28, no. 81.

inapposite to the last things. Perhaps all one can do at the end is laugh.

Democritus, with Leucippus the author of the atomic theory, was like Protagoras a native of Abdera, and like Gorgias an Eleatic. Abdera was normally thought of as the city of fools, and yet his laughter evidently was compatible with the most committed interest in philosophical truth. Whatever the date of the Hippocratic Novel, it has symptomatic value. It shows that ultimately it was plausible to credit the Abderite Democritus with having inspired in the medical science of his day both a method and a literary form—but for exploring foolishness, madness.

It is tempting to suppose that the Abderite Protagoras did the same thing for history, for the madness which was the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides was certainly interested in abnormal states of mind. Cleon symbolized the negation of the Periclean ideal of wise statesmanship, and his “mad promise” to capture the Spartans on Sphacteria is described by a Hippocratic word (IV. 39, *μανιώδης*).<sup>13</sup> Naturally, in spite of the epic thrust of his narrative, and of the many battles he describes, the rationalist Thucydides avoids the *μαίνομαι* which is so common for “blood lust” in Homer’s *ἀριστεύειν*. But at this juncture in his narrative, when rationality appears to have failed, he tellingly uses on a unique occasion about Pericles’ ape Cleon (he echoes Periclean language, as has been often noted: cf. II. 63. 2 and III. 40. 4, *ἀνδραγαθίζεσθαι*) a piece of medical terminology, of which there are five examples in Hippocrates.

The historian’s interest in *σύνεσις* may also be seen in this context. Themistocles is praised for his possession of it (I. 138. 2), but it is a quality which cannot save Phrynichus (VIII. 27. 5). It plays a great role in Diodotus’ answer to Cleon (III. 42). *Συνετός* occurs four times in Hippocrates, and *σύνεσις* fourteen. *Ἀσύνητος* is both a Heraclitean (I and 34, Diels-Kranz) and a Hippocratic word.

This complex of ideas also explains *τὸ ἄφρων* at V. 105. 3, an accusation brought by the Athenians against the Melians, and a token of topsy-turvy values in a context showing Sophistic influence.<sup>14</sup> There are ten examples of *ἄφρων* in Hippocrates.

*Ἄνοια*, of which there are two examples in Hippocrates, is another important concept. Democritus had already condemned it as a civic

<sup>13</sup> The examination of Hippocratic vocabulary here has been greatly facilitated by the five volumes of the *Concordance des Oeuvres Hippocratiques* by Gilles Maloney and Winnie Frohn (Montreal 1984).

<sup>14</sup> Kerferd notes (p. 112) the anticipation of Plato’s *Gorgias* 483e3 at Thucydides V. 105. 2.

vice, and praised its opposite.<sup>15</sup> At II. 61 (πολλὴ ἄνοια πολεμῆσαι) Pericles uses the word in this Democritean way to suggest that, though normally war is folly, it is the only course now open to the Athenians. Later, Diodotus in the speech already mentioned uses it to dissuade the Athenians from following Cleon's advice about the Mytilenians (III. 42 and 48. 2). Both these arguments are reasonable enough. But in V. 111. 3 the Athenians warn the Melians against the ἄνοια of rejecting their proposals, and in Book VI, Alcibiades both uses ἄνοια about himself (16. 3; 17. 1) with a kind of boastful bravado, and later at Sparta describes the Athenian democracy as ὁμολογουμένη ἄνοια (VI. 89. 6). Cleon has won, in spite of Diodotus. In Alcibiades' parody of the Funeral Oration of Pericles, the world of moral discourse has been turned upside down. We can see both the terrible decline from the earlier part of the story, and the paradoxical proof of the rightness of this description of the modern democracy in Alcibiades' own career.

The debt to Abdera and Protagoras suggested by this internal dialogue culminates in Book VIII, where the complete absence of speeches has long been noted. But this silence is a profoundly significant gesture. As madness deepens, the dialogic principle is totally denied. How little this is understood by those who insist on dividing form from philosophy, and philosophy from historical analysis, and all three from the Sophists.

Thucydides' family owed its wealth to Thracian goldmines, and his acquaintance with Abdera may easily have been gained firsthand. His interest in medical terminology is well attested. But it looks as if he found in Ionian medicine not just terminology but a method of diagnosis. In fact, the Abderite and Protagorean dialogic form evinces a primitive principle of thought deeply embedded in the most elementary Greek way of approaching the world, as the national fondness for μέν and δέ clauses shows. At the level of action, it shows itself in the preoccupation with what J. Burckhardt calls "das Agonale," but in the Greek case, never the solitary wrestle of Jacob with the angel in the wilderness, but the witnessed rivalry of champions for a prize. The Games channelled these rivalries into a stylized alternative to (not preparation for!) war, and of course competitors wanted to win. Yet it is not the winning which the vase-painters, for example, typically show us, but the contest.

The Games also provided a rich source of imagery for literature. Even here there was mutual interaction between λόγος and ἔργον. Pindar, as concerned as Thucydides and Plato after him with character,

<sup>15</sup> Fr. 282, Diels-Kranz II, p. 204.

explains the role of the poet in holding up a mirror to the deed, in seeing, in providing witness.<sup>16</sup> It is not surprising then that they became also the venue for pamphleteers and publicists, for a war of words. And should not as much attention be given to those words as athletes gave to their bodies? Gorgias, who had noted that his countrymen found poetry immensely persuasive, sought to lend the same poetic persuasiveness to prose, and with this, prose too entered the realm of the *ἀγών*. But this agonistic prose itself bore the marks of its intent. Even its insistence on antithesis, *pariosis* and *homoeoteleuton* may now be seen, not as decoration for its own sake, but as yet further underscoring of the dialogic principle.<sup>17</sup>

One of the great strengths of the Greek genius is that its flowers never lost contact with its roots. A recent study for the non-specialist remarks of the history of Greek philosophy in general:

Two lessons can be drawn from this example [Epicurean physics], which are crucial to the interpretation of Greek philosophy. First, its dialectical character: Greek philosophy is primarily a dialogue or argumentative encounter, not only between contemporaries, but also and perhaps more interestingly, with thinkers of the immediately preceding generation. The questions which a philosopher tries to answer are typically raised by his dissatisfaction with theories that are currently on offer. Aristotle's philosophy is in large measure a critical response to some of Plato's most ambitious theories. In order to assess the interest of Aristotle's ethics or metaphysics, we need to consider both his arguments and the dialectical context in which they are placed. Aristotle himself makes this very plain, but it is a point that applies no less strongly to other Greek philosophers whose work is less well preserved. As summarized in ancient or modern handbooks the cut and thrust of philosophical argument, responding to real or imaginary opponents, too easily turns into a catalogue of doctrines. . . .<sup>18</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Ἑσοπτρον, *Nem.* 7. 14. This is also St. Paul's word: NT 1 Cor. 13:12. This religious concept demands a separate monograph. Μάρτυς too is a religious idea, also found in the seventh *Nemean* (49). We already noted ἀπορία in this densely textured ode (105). It was the reaction of Herod to his conversations with John the Baptist: ἡπώρα, NT Mark 6:20. But they were nevertheless enjoyable (ἡδέως, *loc. cit.*). In the concept of the "Zuschauer" Greek vases (see K. Schefold, *Götter- und Heldensagen der Griechen in der spätarchaischen Kunst* [Munich 1978], p. 272) and Pindar come together: cf. *Pyth.* 9. 26 ff. and, in general, J. K. Newman, *The Classical Epic Tradition* (Madison 1986), pp. 233–34.

<sup>17</sup> And his insistence on composing encomia of the most trivial or challenging objects shows that he had not forgotten (any more than Erasmus did later) the element of make-believe and fun which that genre implies.

<sup>18</sup> A. A. Long in *The Greek World*, ed. Robert Browning (London 1985), pp. 102–03.



The dialogic principle persisted into the most sophisticated philosophical explanations of cosmology. Parmenides' motionless universe of Being and Not-Being was differentiated and paradoxically reconciled by Heraclitus' "Love" and "Strife," and by Empedocles' *ρίζωματα* ("roots" or elements). "Dialectical materialism," itself a reaction to Hegel, has made our century familiar with these notions in a way far from theoretical. But they have in fact certain implications for philosophical form, since the primitive consciousness could not by definition handle abstracts. This is already shown for Western Greek thinkers like Parmenides and Empedocles by their choice of medium: not the prose of Ionia, although even there Eduard Norden noted in Heraclitus certain strivings towards artistic polish, but the hexameter of Homer and Hesiod. Empedocles indeed, although the intent of his work puzzled Aristotle, merits from him the highest praise as an artist, and passed as the "founder of rhetoric" (Diog. Laert. VIII. 57). At the same time, Empedocles was a mystagogue and wizard ("shaman") of a primitive and extraordinary kind, provoking hostility as well as admiration, as the opposite reactions to him of Lucretius and Horace still attest.<sup>19</sup>

Some of these formal implications may be listed here:

1. Time is not apprehended in the dialogic complex as a sequential series, but as a dimension of space ("vertical time"). There is only *now*, and everything, past and future, is available in the present. This primitive concept, when driven to extremes, explains Parmenides' insistence on the impossibility of change.
2. Yet primitive man is all too aware of change. He solves his problem by his practical observation of nature. The child is father of the man, the acorn is already under the woodman's gaze an oak. At an elementary level, this means that metamorphosis is a valid and even dominant conceptual mode.<sup>20</sup> Everything carries with it the map of its own past and future, and this map may be scanned now by the discerning eye of the wise.<sup>21</sup>

These modes persist into more abstract formulations. Empedocles answered Parmenides by his doctrine of four roots moved by Love and Strife. Aristotle followed this ultimately biological model, when he argued that the *δύναμις* is present to the entelechy to govern its development.

<sup>19</sup> *De Rer. Nat.* I. 729-33; *Ars Poetica* 463-67.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. J. Burckhardt, *Griechische Kulturgeschichte* (4th ed., Berlin-Stuttgart 1902), pp. 5-18, "Die Metamorphosen." The Pythagorean metempsychosis and Empedocles' various avatars (fr. 117, Diels-Kranz) attest the same concept.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Empedocles, fr. 129, Diels-Kranz I, p. 364.



3. Primitive societies like to assist the not so discerning eye however by the wearing of masks.<sup>22</sup> The mask de-individualizes the particular, and emphasizes, though not of course intellectually, the universal. The mask, and the mime or ritual action in which masks or disguises of some sort are deployed, are important tools of primitive thought, and evidently for the Greeks led on to comedy and then to developed drama of the kind we know in Athens. But Athens was not the only center of some kind of performances, and we are told that, sophisticated thinker though he was, Plato was a devotee of the mimes of the Sicilian poet Sophron to such an extent that he slept with them under his pillow. The mime, like all dramatic performances, finds the truth *between* its characters. It also finds the truth laughable, and this idea too, the ancestor of both Democritus' Eleatic skepticism (and Abderite foolery) and the Socratic irony, is important for Plato.
4. A certain kind of suspended time is privileged, because this mentality has no interest in the time of the (as yet non-existent) mechanical clock (Bergson). These are the times which signal change, momentarily caught as it were in the act; festivals of various kinds connected with the harvest, with the enhancement of the tribe that comes from eating, drinking, sex: in more refined parlance, the symposium; the funeral ("wake"), and its annual commemoration at the grave; the wedding and the acceptance of new members into the clan.
5. We saw under (3) already in the case of the mime that a certain kind of reaction to the perception of change is privileged, and that is laughter. This happens even in the face of what to the refined sensibility looks like "tragedy," since tragedy, at least in its purest form, is the transitory invention of quite advanced urban societies like fifth-century Athens and seventeenth-century France (and even in fifth-century Athens the tragic trilogy was normally followed by a "satyr" play to redress the balance). Laughter, which may be stylized in that special type of ritual known as the game, must be understood as anything but dismissive. What is laughed at is meant to be preserved and saved. This is easily seen from Aristophanes' gibes at the society of his native Athens, or the Roman satirist's gibes at Roman life and manners. In this sense, the inconclusive ending of the game of words ("dialogue") is part

<sup>22</sup> The rich material assembled by Katerina J. Kakouri, *Προϊστορία τοῦ Θεάτρου* (Athens 1974), deserves the closest study.

of its very essence.<sup>23</sup> Only the man with no sense of time wins, or rather thinks he has won.

6. Certain kinds of space are privileged, in particular, the public square or circle, often situated before the door or threshold, because that is the space through which access is available to the numinous. This is why games and feasts have often been held at tombs, or in churchyards, and why the theatre has such close connections with religion, even in its physical form. Later, as religious awareness fades, the numinous degenerates into merely the unknown. But perhaps even the unknown may best be approached through the game, and in this context the student of literature must remember Huizinga's remark that every verse form is a form of play.
7. Truth (in so far as it is legitimate to introduce such an abstract into this discourse) is polysemous, and is grasped musically (Pythagoras) or polyphonically. "Sophist" meets us for the first time in Greek with the meaning "musician," "lyric poet" (Pindar, *Isth.* 5. 28), in an ode which also emphasizes the value of λόγος. Herodotus calls Pythagoras a sophist (IV. 95), and in view of later developments it is interesting that we are told elsewhere (Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* V. 8-10) that Pythagoras abandoned the claim to be wise, and instituted instead the claim merely to "love wisdom," i.e. to approximate, but asymptotically, to the desired goal. It is not the correspondence of some statement with "reality" which determines whether an utterance is true or not, since reality is too fluid a concept to be immobilized in this way. Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, itself a rediscovery of a Heraclitean and Platonic position,<sup>24</sup> would in any case rob any reality so immobilized of its objectivity. Rather, the *coherence* theory decides what is true. This is another way of saying that Time decides. Does the allegedly true statement fit the experience of the tribe, fit the contours of a four-dimensional *now*? This primitive adherence to the established truth explains the reaction of the astronomers who refused to look through Galileo's telescope. Of course they were obscurantists. But perhaps they were also conscious of how much that was important would have to be surrendered in order to gain the trivial knowledge that Jupiter had moons. How often did even the greatest of the Greeks fail to look through that telescope! If the

<sup>23</sup> Beautifully caught by Tacitus, *Dialogus* 44, *cum adrisissent, discessimus*.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Werner Heisenberg, *The Physicist's Conception of Nature* (London 1958), p. 60.

truth is what "cannot lie hidden" (a-leth-eia),<sup>25</sup> it is not we but the nature of the historical process itself that best produces reliable knowledge ("science"). Such an attitude is by no means hostile to experiment, but it mistrusts the experiments devised in any laboratory except that of the witnessed, public *ἄγων*.<sup>26</sup>

Although Plato so often signalled his hostility to the concept of a mobile and shifting truth, paradoxically it is now possible to understand certain formal features of his work, including both his use of verbal repetition, already, as we noted, evident in Thucydides (it is another form of vertical time), and the "dramatic" element (which is simply another version of the dialogic). The *Republic* is said in fact to have been contained almost in its entirety in Protagoras' *Antilogica*.<sup>27</sup> In that case, how interesting that the first book, for example, contains a number of details commonly regarded at best as picturesque, and at worst as utterly irrelevant to the serious business in hand—"philosophy," interpreted however by an understandable but inexcusable modern dogmatism as if it were *sophia*.<sup>28</sup> It may now be seen that these details are essential clues to the intended meaning.

The first of them is the occasion, the feast of the Thracian (!) goddess Bendis, held at the port of Piraeus, as it were the "gateway" to Athens. The celebrations will resume in the evening with an equestrian *ἄμιλλα* symbolizing the game of life,<sup>29</sup> but they are suspended for the moment, while Socrates and his friends seek respite at old Cephalus' house. This is a waiting ("threshold") situation.

<sup>25</sup> "... dans certaines conceptions philosophiques ἀλήθεια est opposé à Λήθη 'oubli' ... " (P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque* III (Paris 1968), p. 618).

<sup>26</sup> See *Reflexivity: The Post-Modern Predicament* (London 1985) by Hilary Lawson and his important article in *The Listener*, vol. 115, no. 2948 (20 February 1986), pp. 12–13, "The Fallacy of Scientific Objectivity," with reference to the work of Simon Schaffer. The conference chaired by Mr. Lawson at the Institute of Contemporary Arts, London, in March 1986 was entitled "Dismantling Truth: Objectivity and Science." The resemblance to Protagoras' 'Ἀλήθεια ἢ Καταβάλλοντες is striking. But of course the aim of the conference at least was to establish new insights into scientific method. Heisenberg's treatise (above, note 24) continues to be relevant.

<sup>27</sup> Diog. Laert. III. 37 and 57. Cf. Kerferd, p. 139.

<sup>28</sup> Julia Annas, for example, *An Introduction to Plato's Republic* (Oxford 1981), sees only a picture of "complacency" (pp. 16 ff.). But this is to misunderstand the genuinely religious nature of Cephalus' remarks about ἀγαθὴ ἐλπίς (on which F. Cumont, *Lux Perpetua* [Paris 1949], has a whole appendix, pp. 401 ff.) and his quotation from Pindar at 331a. He echoes in fact themes of *Ol.* 2. 53 ff. If Polemarchus had been judicially murdered when Plato was writing, had not also Socrates? This theme serves to emphasize the "threshold" nature of the *mise-en-scène*, its fragility and at the same time its privileged access to the truth rather than its complacency.

<sup>29</sup> *Quasi cursores vitae lampada tradunt*, Lucr. II. 79.

Cephalus is a metic (one who has "changed his home"), he lives at a harbor, with its constant comings and goings, and he talks about his imminent death, describing himself as "on the threshold of old age." He is only in conversation with Socrates from the threshold of another activity, since he must be off to perform certain religious duties. He evokes in his remarks a well-attested complex of traditional religious ideas.

Plato has then already hedged his dialogue about with certain quite clearly indicated limitations, tokens of its "transitory" nature. Into this dialogue eventually intrudes the figure of Thrasymachus, who betrays his ineptitude by his failure to understand dialogic conventions. He abuses Socrates as a child, instead of recognizing the privileged status which the child enjoys in the primitive community (the "divine child"; Heraclitus had understood this concept when he represented Time as a playing child, Diels-Kranz I, p. 162. 5). He insists on delivering a long monologue, which is meant to establish an incontrovertible, and therefore unavailable, truth. Of course, he must in his turn be shown up as a clown, and that is why Plato permits himself to poke a certain fun at his red face and sweaty embarrassment (350d).

The most important use of dialogic symbolism however is reserved for the end (354). We are carefully reminded that it is still the *Bendidia*. Plato makes Socrates compare the previous conversation to a meal at which he has snatched up this dish and that, without however being able to say that he has satisfied his appetite. But this unsatisfactoriness, this self-uncrowning by the hero, for which he has been so often scolded, is the essence both of Socrates' "irony" and of the open, dialogic manner. We cannot expect any final resolutions in the nature of things. It is precisely the imagery of the meal which is used by the philosophers to encourage us to face death (Lucretius, Horace, Seneca).<sup>30</sup> But death is the most unsatisfactory of all our arguments, because we can never win it, and yet eating is our only approximation to victory. This is why Priam and Achilles learn an accommodation with death over a meal, and why the *Iliad* ends with a funeral feast. The presence of the dead at the annual celebration of their deaths with the *rinfrasco* is another part of the same skein of ideas.

In the case of the ending of the first book of the *Republic* the

<sup>30</sup> Lucretius III. 938 (cf. E. J. Kenney in his edition of this book [Cambridge 1971], pp. 212 ff.); Horace, *Satires* I. 1. 118-19 (where see Kiessling-Heinze's note), *Epp.* II. 2. 214; Seneca, *Epp.* 61. 4: in general, B. P. Wallach, *Lucretius and the Diatribe against the Fear of Death*, Mnem. Supp. 40 (1976), pp. 64-65. Horace's *rideat* is telling: *Epp.* II. 2. 216.



argument (conducted of course by the now dead Socrates) is not so much at a banquet as identified with it. Like all these dinner debates, it remains unsettled. In another sense, we may think of Thrasymachus and Socrates as two contestants in a duel (and of course sometimes that element was bodied forth in other circumstances and societies in an actual combat before the assembled guests, even at the doors of the tomb). But none of these occasions can ever end finally. In spite of the duel between Thrasymachus and Socrates, a vital question is "left on the table." How are we to live our lives? Only the post-mortem "journey of a thousand years" can answer: and how revealing it is for Plato's cast of thought that, when the good man has won out at the end of that endurance test, he goes around collecting his prizes like a victor in the Games.<sup>31</sup>

It is the business of the intervening books of the *Republic* to make this dimension actual, so that we can *now*, as we pick up the text, hold the answer quite literally in our hands.

There is then nothing discreditable about the first book of the *Republic*, if we will attend to its form rather than merely to its arguments. The ultimate challenge is not logical at all, but *ethical*, which (to recall an earlier part of our argument) is another way of saying that not the correspondence but the coherence theory of truth determines the result ("time will tell": it is the demand shortly to be put at the beginning of Book II). This is why the *character* of Socrates is so important to Plato. No one acquires his character overnight, yet precisely such a telescoped embodiment ("incarnation") of the truth is required by this style. It would have been invidious for Plato to advance himself as some sort of ideal fusion of wisdom and life in his own work. But he can advance such a fusion in the person of a revered master, and this is the symbolism of the inheritance of the argument from old Cephalus by those whom he leaves to carry on the discussion, and of Socrates' role in articulating their doubts and puzzles. At the same time, by concealing himself behind the mask of that master, Plato is able to shrug off any responsibility for the ultimate truth of what is dialogically said. This "shrugging off" (most visible at the start of the *Phaedo* (59b), a "threshold" dialogue *par excellence*) is a kind of laughter (irony), laughter at the seriousness of the claim to the absolute.

It is now possible to understand why Aristophanes' comedy the *Ecclesiazusae* shows such extraordinary resemblances to certain arguments of the *Republic*. Usually, Aristophanes and Socrates are taken as opposites, and the one is sometimes thought to have contributed

<sup>31</sup> X. 621d; cf. J. Adam's note on V. 465d.



to the end of the other. That can only have been because the Athenian state had lost its sense of proportion, and of what an Aristophanic comedy means. Part of the purpose of Plato's *Symposium*, at which both Socrates and Aristophanes are guests, is to remind forgetful Athenians of their dialogic good manners, and, because this reminder is already too late for the feast, that contributes immensely to the dialogue's tragedy-in-comedy, emphasized by Plato at the end. But Utopia is a regular comic theme (borrowed also by the Sophists), the double of our present society held up like a mirror to magnify and mock our shortcomings. When Plato held up the same mirror as Aristophanes, he had the same comic or satirical intent. Which of them spoke first in this dialogue matters much less than realizing that Plato too is deploying a comic ("ironic") apparatus.

Aristophanes shows that an essential and primitive part of comedy is the assault on other literary men ("false prophets"), which is why literary satire is such an enduring genre. It is part of the *Republic* too. But we have to understand that, in Plato, the mixture of prose and verse is not just the technique of the scholarly article, quoting a source in order to comment. The motley look of the last pages of Book II and early pages of Book III of the *Republic* is already a heuristic device, a way of giving utterance to two voices that anticipates the Menippean satire, or Boethius' *De Consolatione Philosophiae*. Homer or Aeschylus is not after all silenced in this court. As in the case of Thucydides' pairs of speeches, the argument must be settled by the jury, and the jury is the individual reader.

In Book X of the *Republic* Homer comes under attack because he both imitates what is bad, and because imitation is bad anyway. Here (596d), the image of the mirror used by Pindar proudly about his own komic art, and boldly adapted by Alcidamas to defend the *Odyssey* (Aristotle, *Rhet.* III. 1406b12), is interpreted *in malam partem*. But the paradox by which a master imitator condemns imitation must not escape notice. It too is part of the denial of ultimate truth, or better, of human access to ultimate truth in words.<sup>32</sup> Can Gorgias' youthful declaration of the incommunicability of knowledge be so far away?

Plato was not stopped by this inaccessibility any more than Gorgias from exploring what transrational language could do to break out of the philosophical impasse. He argues in the *Republic* that what we think of as reality is really a shadow world, a flickering copy of the hidden truth. In another striking image, he recalls Glaucus from the sea, encrusted with weed and shells, to picture for us the soul

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Letter VII, 341c; *Phaedrus* 275e ff.

overgrown with this life's desires and pleasures, and utterly transformed from its real nature. This poetry condemns our perceptions of normality as corruptions or metamorphoses of a second and superior world, precisely therefore a distorting mirror of the true thing. It is only because the poet's mirror of this mirror is bigger and more insistent than our lazy, routine looking that at long last we begin to notice something is wrong.

This is the essence of the comedian's art. It is appropriate in an essay so much influenced by M. Bakhtin to draw an example from Russian literature. Both in *Dead Souls* and *The Inspector General*, N. V. Gogol does exactly the same thing as Plato, and the motto of the latter masterpiece is the Russian proverb "Don't blame the mirror if your face is crooked." Gogol was the literary ancestor of Dostoevsky. But, if he helps us to understand in what sense Plato's mimic and comic art absorbs and outdoes the schematic dialectic of Protagoras, he also secures recognition for Gorgias, and recovers for Gorgias his claim to be a Sophist. The Russian writer was famous for his recitals of his own works, and for that attention to word-play and euphony which we associate with the Gorgianic tradition, in this case mediated to Russian literature through Byzantium. But the profound desire of the author of *Selected Passages from Correspondence with Friends* (1847) to influence through his art the morals of his countrymen cannot be disputed.

We spoke earlier of Gorgias' philosophical beginnings. His early work in this mode advanced three propositions: that nothing exists; that, even if something did exist it could not be known; that, even if it could be known, this knowledge could not be communicated to others.<sup>33</sup> On the normal calculus, Gorgias' subsequent turning to rhetoric looks like an abandonment of these positions, or even worse, another motive for cynical exploitation of ethical relativism. If knowledge is impossible, why should not the prize go to the best guesser? Why not, if guesswork is all we mortals can manage?

Plato rebelled against this, even though Isocrates defended it as, in politics at least, nothing but common sense. Interestingly, Isocrates was, after Thucydides, Gorgias' most impressive disciple, and his influence in practical politics is attested by Cicero (*De Or.* II. 94). Once again, we have the same paradox as with Protagoras. His *Ἀντιλογίαι* possibly inspired the Novel of Hippocrates, but they certainly, or so at least it appears, handed Thucydides an extremely sharp tool of historical analysis. And Gorgias' apparently empty

<sup>33</sup> Sextus Emp., *Adv. Math.* 7. 65-87.

preoccupation with mechanical figures,<sup>34</sup> what the Formalists call "sound gesture," and abandonment of the claim to absolute knowledge gave rise, through Isocrates, to a school of practical politicians and men of action. How could such barrenness bear such progeny?

The answer is that, if truth is unknowable and incommunicable, human society is not left entirely resourceless, and least of all Greek society. Truth indeed is lost to abstract methods of recovery, yet it is interesting that the statement that truth is unknowable only seems matter for despair to an audience which has lost, or is beginning to lose, its roots. To the religious and primitive man it is a commonplace, accounting for the importance in his mentality of mystery, and for the essential obscurity or masked nature of myth. It is only in late antiquity that handbooks of mythology appear. The truth that is unknowable may nevertheless be approached through indirection, by what theologians call "apophatic" definition, and "apophasis" may explain the paradoxical nature of Gorgias' own philosophical statements, as well as the poetic nature of his stylized prose. There was a way to approach the unknowable, and that was through the irrational spell exerted by poetic discourse. This is why Gorgias developed his theory of artistic prose after all as a *philosophical* gesture.

In primitive societies, truth may be approached through myth, and that myth may be remembered in some sort of ritual discourse, eventually in poetry. This is not a second best. What is second best is the bloodless abstraction. Primitive realities are too important to be disembodied in this way.

We can already see here a reason for Parmenides to write in verse. Although he dismisses Not-Being as inappropriate to or ineligible for rational discourse, verse enables such discourse to hint even at the transrational, and therefore to establish a dialogue with what otherwise would be unsayable:

τῶι πάντ' ὄνομ(α) ἔσται,  
ὅσσα βροτοῖ κατέθεντο πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ,  
γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ ὄλλυσθαι, εἶναι τε καὶ οὐχί,  
καὶ τόπον ἀλλάσσειν διὰ τε χροά φανὸν ἀμείβειν.

<sup>34</sup> However it should be noted that the Gorgias of the phrase *σχήματα Γοργία* was probably the teacher of Cicero's son in Athens (*Ad Fam.* XVI. 21. 6), who wrote a book on the *σχήματα*, partially preserved in Latin translation. See especially Quintilian IX. 2. 102; the article by Münscher in *RE* VII. 2, cols. 1604-19; and Schanz-Hosius, *Römische Literaturgeschichte* II, pp. 741-43. The expression is not definitely attested before his time. In this sense the opening pages (15-16) of E. Norden's *Antike Kunstprosa* need refinement, since the activity of the younger man, who was nothing but a rhetorician, has obscured the understanding of the Sophist, who was far more.

But does not this magnificent passage (Diels-Kranz I, p. 238, fr. 8, vv. 38-41) already say something about nothing? And is that legitimate simply because we have to understand that verse has special rights? And must we not understand this also of Plato's prose poems?

Empedocles answered Parmenides in verse because a prose answer to the verse of the master would have been unsatisfactory, empty. The intended level of dialogue is too primitive and too profound for prose, especially in the mouth of a mystic. His two poems "On Nature" and the "Purifications" may be thought of as antithetical presentations of two sides to the description of the world. In one sense, it is possible to set out the truth in a form accessible (but not too accessible, as we see from Aristotle's remarks about Empedocles in the *Poetics*) to everyone. In another, such a truth is useless to the impure and unprepared.

Yet Parmenides was said by Speusippus to have established laws for his fellow citizens<sup>35</sup> and, on top of his shamanism, Empedocles was also a politician, an enemy of the Emmenid tyranny at Acragas. He cannot have supposed then that his wisdom was of a purely abstract kind, in spite of its formal, hieratic, beauty, which might in fact have secured him an attentive audience, had he been unconcerned with practical consequences, from a monarch like Theron, for whom Pindar wrote the second and third *Olympians*. Earlier, the disciples of Pythagoras, the mathematician and musician, were credited with the political takeover of certain communities. It seems therefore that Athenian public opinion was right. When the Sophists, particularly Gorgias, with his Western Greek tradition, but also Protagoras, who was to draw up a constitution for Pericles' colony at Thurii, arrived in Athens, they did have the intention of doing more than deliver a course of lectures and leaving. They were the heirs of the Pythagoreans, of the Eleatics, of Empedocles, and they meant to impinge on political ideas, and this is why the young and ambitious flocked to them: but impinge on these ideas through what should not so much be called rhetorical as dialectical training, which would have to be content with guesswork, *στοχαστική, δοξαστική, εἰκασία*.<sup>36</sup> Pindar praises the trainers to whom his young victors owed their successes, and here were new trainers for new *ἀγῶνες*. Their immediate conversion of no less a historian than Thucydides not just to a style but to a theory of truth proves the impression they made.

Attic vases give evidence of the social world in which young

<sup>35</sup> Diels-Kranz I, p. 218, 18-19: cf. p. 220, 20-23.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Thuc. I. 138 (and Cicero, *Ad Att.* X. 8. 7); Isocr. *Or.* XIII. 17; Plato, *Gorgias* 463a.



aristocrats, the destined targets of this *Kulturkampf*, felt at home: the *komos*, the drinking party, athletics, horsemanship, *eros*. The *Symposium* of Xenophon unites some of these themes, and it is interesting that the company is entertained there both by the γελωτοποιός Philip, and by a troupe of dancers, who present an erotic mime. Yet the dinnertable conversation is concerned with ethics, and nothing incongruous is perceived about this combination.<sup>37</sup> Xenophon was concerned to present a portrait of the dialogic Socrates in action, in exactly the kind of milieu which the Sophists frequented.

Precisely the same is true of Plato in his *Symposium*. Certain comic features of the two dialogues are in fact shared. Like Philip, Socrates arrives late. So does Alcibiades. At the end, so does a group of κωμασταί. There are threshold ("at the door") situations, mixed emotions. Both dialogues resort to myth.

Plato also indulges in literary satire, significantly at Gorgias' expense.<sup>38</sup> In the philosophical effort to grasp the nature of Eros, eloquence naturally takes wing. What is there here with which Empedocles could have quarrelled? But we can perhaps see the whole nature of Plato's war with the Sophists as an effort to beat them at their own game, and that is why they must so often be represented as bad characters bad at dialogue, unfairly, because dialogue was their mission. The common man, as Aristophanes' *Clouds* shows, viewed Socrates himself as a Sophist. His effort to differentiate himself was in the first place, at least as Plato presents it, an effort to prove that they had not understood their own epistemology.

A truer account of the Sophists would, in giving them credit for their public and political interests, also praise them for their attention to the word, the faculty which, according to Isocrates, distinguishes man from the animals.<sup>39</sup> But the Sophists were not just interested in their own word. In the verbal ἀγών no one side can claim to be wholly in the right. An ideal dialogue evidently depends on the acknowledgment of this moderation. Aristophanes' nerve failed even before the Peace of Nicias, and this is why the *Clouds* ends with such an ugly parody of dialogue, for which the poet invents a special verb.<sup>40</sup> After the defeat in the Peloponnesian War, the sophistic

<sup>37</sup> *Ridentem dicere verum / Quid vetat?* Hor. Sat. I. 1. 24–25.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. R. G. Bury's introduction in his edition (Cambridge 1932<sup>2</sup>), pp. xxxv–vi on Agathon's speech. See also the pun at 185c.

<sup>39</sup> *Antidosis* (Or. XV) §§293–94. The theme echoes in Dante, *De Vulgari Eloquentia* I. 2, and was then modified by Petrarch.

<sup>40</sup> Διαλεπτολογούμαι, 1496. This is Strepsiades' brutal perversion of the dialogic principle. Whether Protagoras' books were burned at Athens or not, book burnings were known both to the Greek (NT Act. Apost. 19:19) and Roman worlds (Tac. Ann. XIV. 50), but this attack on learning is more sinister, since it is done in full knowledge and contradiction of the civilized alternative. This is what seems to have shocked Plato so much.



hesitation and lack of commitment to the truths of the city seemed to the Athenians in general to have been harmful and untimely. It is telling that the common man took his revenge by executing for this clouding of the obvious—Socrates. Without the partial advocacy of Plato, would we be so sure that the common man, by his own lights, was wrong? This was already a position defended by Kierkegaard.

The paradox is that Plato, who felt the unfairness of this death so personally, sought to dispel that same hesitation by using some of the Sophists' weapons. Like Thucydides, he borrowed from Protagoras' and Gorgias' armory, for only that supposition explains the resemblance between his art and that of the Melian Dialogue. He was just as interested as Gorgias in the transrational scope of language in the face of the incommunicable, just as interested as Protagoras in the possibilities of myth. Just as much as Pindar or the Christian evangelist, he knew that *ἀπορία* is a positive and religious concept.<sup>41</sup>

But, whatever the intended irresolutions of some of his own dialogues, he had little mercy on the new masters of philosophical discourse, of the game of words among the young and influential, for they stood in the way of a "proper" presentation of Socrates, and ultimately by their lack of commitment threatened a second defeat when the city was under attack from outside. In this regard, his dialogue with Aristophanes has led to major misunderstandings of the dialogic principle, since his satire of the Sophists has been interpreted as what it could never be, final truth. At this distance, we must be chary of blaming him for the aura of infallibility his view has acquired. Perhaps he could never have imagined that he would be read in a society where dialogue and its conventions were attenuated or forgotten, drowned by the univocal blare of the radio loudspeaker, the mechanized and deadly laughter of the sitcom.

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<sup>41</sup> See note 16, above.



# 5

## Plato's *Lysis*: The Structural Problem

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The *Lysis* is one of five short Platonic dialogues which address themselves entirely to a question of definition. Besides the *Lysis* these dialogues are the *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Hippias Major* and *Euthyphro*; all of these ask a question of the type "What is x?" and make this question their sole concern (unlike one or two longer dialogues in which a question of this type appears in conjunction with other questions of a different type). All these five dialogues were put by Ritter on the grounds of style into the earliest of his three groups of Plato's works; Ritter's establishment of these three groups<sup>1</sup> can be followed with reasonable confidence, and his placing of these five dialogues may be taken to be confirmed by Xenophon's and Aristotle's statements that Socrates had been interested in problems of definition. Plato in writing these dialogues each consisting solely of a search for a definition was no doubt following up the interest of his master. This is not to say that either the substance or the method of the argument in these dialogues is directly derived from Socrates himself; that is something we shall never know.

We shall never know either whether Plato wrote these five dialogues deliberately as a group. Were they meant to complement each other and provide a continuous study of methods of definition? Or was the attack on certain concepts by means of a direct search for their definitions simply a device which Plato returned to on separate occasions when one or other of these concepts aroused his attention

<sup>1</sup> C. Ritter, *Platon* (Munich 1910), Vol. 1, pp. 236-37.

for its own sake? The truth I think must lie somewhere between these alternatives; Plato was both genuinely anxious to investigate these concepts for their own sakes by discovering their definitions, and also at the same time consciously experimenting with methods of approaching satisfactory definitions. For this reason each of these dialogues would be best studied not only in conjunction with other places where Plato discusses the same concept, but also in conjunction with the other definition-seeking dialogues.

It seems possible that some traces of a development in Plato's conscious conception of definition might be discovered; if this were possible it would provide some alternative to Ritter's later "stylistic" attempt to subdivide his previously established first group of dialogues.<sup>2</sup> Ritter himself was very tentative about this further attempt; and it is certainly not as trustworthy as his broader division. But I remain very tentative too<sup>3</sup>—the task of taking each dialogue strictly on its own and estimating precisely how much it says for itself is necessarily prior to any possibility of comparing dialogues.

The most obvious similarity of general structure between these dialogues is that, though each attempts to discover a definition of a particular concept, none of them succeeds; each of them after asking "what is x?" concludes with the admission "But we have not been able to find out what x is." The regularity with which this conclusion, or lack of conclusion, is reached and frankly announced makes it hard to believe that Plato quite simply viewed his attempts at definition as one after another dogged by failure. Plato is therefore charged with the crime of Socrates; he is held to have been ironical, and to have withheld from us his real thoughts. Those whom Socrates refuted assumed that Socrates himself knew the right answer but would not reveal it. Readers of the "aporetic" dialogues assume that Plato was not sincere in saying that he had failed to obtain a particular definition, that he must have had in mind a satisfactory definition which for one reason or another he does not state. Now those who accused Socrates of irony were wrong; Socrates in his earnest search

<sup>2</sup> C. Ritter, "Unterabteilungen innerhalb der zeitlich ersten Gruppe Platonischer Schriften," *Hermes* 70 (1935), pp. 1-30.

<sup>3</sup> Two points might be made: (1) Despite their final *aporiai*, *Lys.*, *Lach.* and *Charm.* seem more seriously concerned to offer positive suggestions towards defining their subjects—friendship, courage and self-knowledge—than *Euthyphro* and *Hippias Major* towards theirs; the latter pair seem to make negative points their main business throughout; (2) *Lysis* contains no methodological remarks other than 213d1-2 and the final sentence. The other dialogues are all richer in this respect, and *Euth.* and *Hippias Major* admit terminology such as *ἰδέα*, *παράδειγμα*, *οὐσία* and *πάθος*. This disinclines me to follow those who put the *Lysis* late in the first period; viewed purely as a definition-dialogue it might rather be the earliest of the five.

for the truth was passionately sincere in asserting his own ignorance. Socrates of course was not a skeptic, but Socratic ignorance was as conscious and as thorough-going a philosophical attitude as Cartesian "doubt." Socrates was fully able to face the possibility that every suggestion he had so far heard was open to serious difficulty. Are we then perhaps also wrong in assuming that Plato's negative conclusions are due to irony on his part? It is perfectly possible that the Platonic dialogues ending in *aporia* ought to be taken by the letter to mean what they say, namely that though a number of definitions may be suggested, serious objections stand in the way of all of them. Plato wrote much more positive-seeming dialogues at some periods later in his life; but that is no reason why his early *aporiai* may not have been genuine. Estimating the degree of irony in Plato's works is of course a well-known and very wide-ranging problem. I merely restate it here because I suspect that for these five dialogues a contribution to solving it might be obtained from the examination I have already asked for of Plato's theory of definition. I suspect it would be found that Plato set standards for acceptable definitions which made them genuinely difficult to discover, and that the negative conclusions were due not to irony but to the rigor of Plato's demands.

This however may seem to promise more than I have to offer. I shall concentrate in this paper on the *Lysis* alone, which asks τί ἐστὶν τὸ φίλον; General conclusions will have to be preceded by detailed discussion of how Plato attacks this particular concept. To plunge then *in medias res* —

For a few moments we must be lexicographers and attend quite simply to the meaning of the words φιλεῖν, φίλος and φιλία as they occur in Greek outside Plato and especially outside the *Lysis*.<sup>4</sup>

Let us start with the verb φιλεῖν. In the first of its normal senses this is a fairly usual word for "liking" persons. It can denote quite strong affection, but it is clearly weaker than ἐρᾶν (Xen. *Hiero* 2, ὥστε οὐ μόνον φιλοῖο ἄν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐρῶ), and is without any suggestion of sexual attraction. On the other hand it may be quite weak and mean only to be politically "on the side of."

The second main sense is rather different; φιλεῖν can be the word for being fond of, practising or pursuing certain activities; being fond of (and indulging in) banqueting and song; or rather differently, making a practice of certain kinds of behavior — αἰσχροκέρδεια, for instance.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> A fuller lexicography of φίλος will be provided elsewhere.

<sup>5</sup> E.g. Homer, *Od.* XIV. 83; Theognis 67, 385, 739; Sappho 58. 25; Pindar, *Pyth.* 9. 9; Soph., *Ant.* 312, 1056, 1059. Note here and below that to parallel some of Plato's uses of φιλεῖν and φίλος one has to turn to poetic usage.



Nearly all cases of φιλεῖν are covered by these two senses; but rather rarely φιλεῖν can denote general approval of types or classes of people and things. Archilochus says οὐ φιλέω μέγαν στρατηγόν—"I don't like a tall general." Simonides couples φιλέω with ἐπαίνημι: τοὺς δ' ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω, ἐκὼν ὅστις ἔρδῃ μηδὲν αἰσχρόν.<sup>6</sup>

The rather surprising gap among the normal uses of φιλεῖν is that it does not seem ever to mean "to like" *individual*, particular *objects*. In English one says "I like that picture" of the particular picture on the wall; this in Greek could not be φιλῶ τήνδε τὴν γραφήν, unless perhaps the picture was of a beloved person. φιλεῖν is certainly not the word for commonplace "liking" of things. This might perhaps rather be ἀρέσκει μοι.

Now to turn to the adjective φίλος. Here we have to deal not only with a range of varying meanings and applications, but also with three logically distinct senses marking active, passive and symmetrical (or reciprocal) relationships. Let us take the passive sense first.

φίλος in its passive sense could often be paraphrased by the passive participle from φιλεῖν, that is to say φιλούμενος. Its first meaning in its passive sense is of people, where it means "dear" or "beloved," "regarded with" varying degrees of "affection." In Plato's *Symposium* Socrates begins a speech by addressing Agathon as ὦ φίλε Ἀγάθων (199c3) and ends with ὦ φιλούμενε Ἀγάθων (201c8). The second meaning of the passive sense of φίλος is as applied to types of activity or pursuit, δαίς, ἔρις—much the same as the second meaning of φιλεῖν.<sup>7</sup> Thirdly, what is approved or valued for general reasons can be called φίλον: the Muses at the wedding of Peleus and Thetis sang ὅττι καλόν, φίλον ἐστίν, τὸ δ' οὐ καλὸν οὐ φίλον ἐστίν (Theognis 17). At various places in tragedy τὸ ὄσιον, τὸ δίκαιον, νεότης and ἀλκή are called φίλα—general qualities valued for various reasons.<sup>8</sup> Once τὸ φίλον is a noun; the aged Oedipus is warned by the chorus not to trespass in the grove at Colonus but τὸ φίλον σέβεισθαι, to respect the wishes, in fact the religious scruples, of his hosts the Athenians.<sup>9</sup> This application to general characteristics meeting with approval is close to the third use noted before of the verb φιλεῖν.

The parallelism between the uses of φιλεῖν and φίλος-passive continues in that φίλος-passive is in the same way unusual in application to *particular* impersonal objects. It is not infrequently found of impersonal objects in tragedy, but always denotes a strong emotional

<sup>6</sup> Archilochus 114 (West); Simonides 542. 27–28 (Page).

<sup>7</sup> *Od.* VIII. 248–49; *Il.* V. 891, I. 107.

<sup>8</sup> *Eur., El.* 1351–52, *Her.* 637–38, *Ion* 481–82.

<sup>9</sup> *Soph., O. C.* 184–87.

bond with or valuing of the object: *φίλη πατρίς*, *φίλον δῶμα* are common; Hecuba can call Hector's shield *φίλον*, Philoctetes refers to his *τόξον φίλον*.<sup>10</sup> But *φίλον* is not the word for any ordinary object that one happens to like. People one likes, activities one pursues, qualities one approves of, special objects one values emotionally, are *φίλα*, but not ordinary objects one has a moderate liking for.

Let us turn now to a sense of *φίλος* which must be marked off as logically distinct from the passive sense. This is the common meaning which we translate as "a friend." Xenophon says *πάντων κτημάτων κράτιστον . . . φίλος σαφὴς καὶ ἀγαθός* (*Mem.* II. 4). This cannot be the passive sense of *φίλος*. Xenophon does not mean "the best of all possessions is a man one likes who is unfailing and good." We value an unfailing friend not merely because we like him but also because he will be prepared to help us. Under "friend" the Oxford Dictionary adopts Johnson's definition "One joined to another in *mutual* benevolence and intimacy." Johnson derived this from Hobbes and Hobbes from Aristotle on *φιλία* in *Rhetoric* II (1381a1-2), but it remains the standard English definition of "a friend," and it emphasizes a vital part of the meaning of the term. Friendship is necessarily mutual and constitutes a logically symmetrical relationship: if A and B are friends then A is B's friend and B is A's friend; if A is a friend of B then it follows that B is a friend of A. This is true of friendship in Greek also, and in the sense in which it means "a friend" *φίλος* is a logically symmetrical term, separate from both the active and the passive senses. Now if friendship is thought to be based on any active feeling or service felt by one party for another, then it must be remembered that there will only be a *friendship* proper if the feeling or service of the one party is reciprocated by the other. One-sided relationships do not amount to friendship. This is a matter of fact which is reflected in the meaning of the words "friend" and *φίλος*. Xenophon in his chapters on friendship in *Memorabilia* II often mentions reciprocity as a characteristic of friendly services: *πολλάκις ἂν πρὸ αὐτοῦ τις οὐ διήνυσσε, ταῦτα ὁ φίλος πρὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐξήρκεσεν* (II. 4. 7). I might add here that the ordinary Greek, including Xenophon, thought in terms more of mutual service than of mutual affection as the basis of friendship. Xenophon never uses the verb *φιλεῖν* in discussing the relationship between friends (the one occurrence is in a matter of homosexual attraction<sup>11</sup>); the ordinary Greek word for the attitude of mind of one *φίλος* to another is *εὖνοια*; this is stated

<sup>10</sup> Eur., *Tro.* 458, *I. A.* 1229, *Tro.* 1222; Soph., *Phil.* 1004, 1128.

<sup>11</sup> This doubtless means that Xenophon reserved *φιλεῖν* for fairly strong affection, but still not the same as *ἔρως*.

by Aristotle and confirmed by usage (including a place in Menander's *Dyskolos*).<sup>12</sup> So the apparent etymological link between φιλεῖν and φίλος has disappeared in usage as regards φίλος in its symmetrical sense. It is also worth saying that the symmetrical sense of φίλος in the meaning of "a friend" is naturally unusual in the neuter, since only persons can be friends; but it can arise in certain idioms (see below).

The active sense of φίλος may perhaps have been derived from the sense we have just discussed. The title of "friend" is often conferred or denied according to whether the "friend" gives active assistance as he should, and this leads to relatively frequent occurrences of the word φίλος where the emphasis is on active manifestations of friendship. From this kind of emphasis in what are uses of φίλος in its reciprocal sense, there does seem to be derived a separate sense of φίλος which is exclusively active. This must be the explanation of cases which resemble Eur. *Tro.* 789 ἀναιδέϊα φίλος, which must mean φιλῶν ἀναιδείαν, "making a practice of shamelessness" (cf. *Hel.* 1263). Some apparent cases can be explained as cases of φίλος meaning "friend" but carrying an emphasis on the active display of friendly service or affection. Others are genuinely "active" uses.<sup>13</sup>

On the noun φιλία we can be very brief. What must be remembered is that it is the noun from φίλος = "a friend," and not from the verb φιλεῖν. φιλία is always used of mutual relationships of friendship or alliance. If it is followed by what looks like an objective genitive, it in fact means "friendship with," not "liking for"; Democritus fr. 98, ἐνὸς φιλίῃ ξυνητοῦ κρέσσων ἀξυνέτων πάντων, says that friendship with one wise man is better than friendship with all stupid men, not (as Liddell and Scott suggest) that it is better to like one wise man than to like all stupid men. One exception (outside the *Lysis*) is Plato, *Rep.* 581a, where φιλία τοῦ κέρδους, "love of gain," is attributed to the part of the soul which is φιλοκερδής; this is an abnormal use dragged in for the etymological play.<sup>14</sup>

I have spent a lot of time on this purely philological inquiry for two reasons; firstly, the main discussion in the *Lysis* is done almost entirely by the use of the word φίλος, now in one sense, now in another. Let me give an example of the difficulties this can create

<sup>12</sup> Aristotle, *E. N.* 1155b32; Eur., *Ion* 730-32; Plato, *Prot.* 337b1; Men., *Dysk.* 720.

<sup>13</sup> Examine *Il.* XXIV. 775; Eur., *Or.* 424, *Hipp.* 91-93, *El.* 265. Occasional attempts to deny this sense are largely misled by the inadequacy of *LSJ*. It is of course perfectly obviously present in the *Lysis* itself.

<sup>14</sup> In Homer φιλότης was a euphemism for sexual relations, but this disappeared later, except in the Lesbian poets (see Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus* [Oxford 1955], p. 10) and Pindar. It has gone from tragic lyric.

for the reader; at *Lysis* 219b we meet the formula φίλον τοῦ φίλου τὸ φίλον γέγονεν. This could mean either “the friend is the friend of the friend” or “the liking likes the liked” or “the liked is liked by the liking” (what is liked is liked by what likes). In any given context in the *Lysis* the reader has to decide for himself what is the appropriate sense in which to take the present occurrences of φίλος. This he can only do by observation of the examples which are cited of the relationship at present under discussion. This might seem to be mainly a linguistic problem of dealing with the Greek text; but the second problem raised by the ambiguity of the word φίλος is of greater philosophical importance. Plato’s main philosophical question in the *Lysis* is τί ἐστιν τὸ φίλον; He is trying to define the concept of τὸ φίλον. But which is the sense of τὸ φίλον in which he is trying to define it? Probably at least two concepts could be suggested to a Greek by the expression τὸ φίλον; firstly taking φίλον in sense I, the passive sense, the general notion of “what is valued or pursued or approved”—remember ὅτι καλὸν φίλον ἐστί. Secondly (since the neuter may also be used in Greek to express the concept named by an adjective which itself only occurs in the masculine or feminine), τὸ φίλον could be derived from φίλος in sense II and denote the concept of “friendship.” Which concept is Plato trying to define: “that which is the object of value or pursuit” or “friendship”? Again, the reader can only answer this by careful observation of the discussion Plato provides, and especially of the examples he describes.

The dramatic setting of the dialogue itself is a meeting of Socrates with some young men at a gymnasium, one of whom, Hippothales, wants to show off to Socrates his boy-favorite. Now this setting has led many interpreters into thinking the dialogue is primarily about pederasty; but this it certainly is not. The discussion starts with a little homily delivered by Socrates to “humble” Hippothales’ beloved Lysis, who has been “puffed up” because Hippothales has been singing his praises. This little homily is of the well-known Socratic tone, recommending Lysis to learn his lessons well and acquire as much knowledge as possible, since this is the way to make everybody his friends;<sup>15</sup> the implication I think is that Lysis has been used to

<sup>15</sup> It is as erroneous to believe that Socrates really thought that Lysis’ parents did not love him, insofar as he was useless, as to believe that the Persian king would ever have trusted him with his empire. Gregory Vlastos, in *Platonic Studies* (Princeton 1973), pp. 6–9, failed to allow for the exaggerations of this little homily—though his main argument, as he saw, could be supported elsewhere in the *Lysis*, e.g. at 215b and 217a sq. The problem remains acute. Plato clearly *knew* of unselfish affection, but failed to account for it in his theory. See the final sections of this paper. D. K. Glidden in *Classical Quarterly* 31 (1981), 39–59, is even more misled by this passage.



acquiring "friends" too easily by his beauty alone. At this point Lysis is rejoined by his boy-comrade Menexenus. The pair have already declared to Socrates that they are friends, which they obviously are in a quite different sense from any in which Hippothales and Lysis are "friends." This perfectly genuine example of friendship between the two boys is the real starting point of the main discussion. Socrates appeals to them, since each has the other as a firm friend, to explain to him how one man becomes the friend of another. (There is no difficulty in seeing that so far *φίλος* means "friend" throughout.)

At this point, 212a–213d, there follows a rather puzzling discussion which many interpreters have explained away as a parody of contemporary sophistry. These interpreters may I think be partly correct in guessing Plato's intention; but the argument is worth examination for its own sake. Socrates starts by asking Menexenus "When one man *φιλεῖ* another, which of them becomes the other's *φίλος*; is the one who *φιλεῖ* the *φίλος* of the *φιλούμενος*, or is the *φιλούμενος* the *φίλος* of the one who *φιλεῖ*; or doesn't it make any difference?" After our examination of the word *φίλος* it will be clear what kind of logic-chopping can be made to arise from questions like this. What happens is roughly as follows. Menexenus allows Socrates to interpret him as believing that if one man *φιλεῖ* another, then both are *φίλοι*. Menexenus in fact is thinking of friends as always coming in pairs. But isn't it possible, says Socrates, that one man may like another without being liked in return? Ah well, they aren't friends (*φίλοι*) in that case, says Menexenus. So unless they both like each other, says Socrates, neither is a *φίλος*. But what about men who are *φίλιπποι* or *φίλοινοι* or *φιλόσοφοι*, asks Socrates. They like all these things—horses, wine, wisdom—without the liking being returned; but surely all these things are *φίλα* to them (that is to say "valued by them"). Oh yes, says Menexenus. So to become a *φίλος* all you have to do is to be liked, become *φιλούμενος*. But in that case if I am liked by a man I myself hate, he becomes my enemy just by being hated by me, and I become his friend by being liked by him even though he is my enemy. But being friends with one's enemy is absurd and impossible. The only remaining alternative then is that one becomes a *φίλος* not by being liked but by liking; and this leads to the same absurdity: I might like someone who hated me, and that would not make us friends. So now what can we say? Men are not *φίλοι* because they

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It is quite different arguing that a twelve year old may not want what is best for him from arguing (Stoic fashion? or not even that) that *τὸ οἰκέειν* is an adult's unconscious purpose. Much that Glidden proposes is suggestive, but not to be found in the *Lysis*, and perhaps not in Glidden's form elsewhere in Plato either.



like other men, nor because they are liked by them, nor because they both like and are liked. This is a swift but I think accurate summary of this bewildering passage. Many interpreters have alluded to the play on the active and passive senses of φίλος; von Arnim<sup>16</sup> quite rightly pointed out that there is also play on the reciprocal sense, or some of the statements would not be at all puzzling. Some more recent interpreters have said that there is in fact no proof that those who both like and are liked are not φίλοι, and have argued that the whole passage is designed to prove that reciprocity is necessary in friendship. But Plato does refute this too by showing that objects or persons can be φίλοι, meaning "liked," even if they do not return liking. What in fact happens is that Plato first rejects an explanation of the reciprocal sense of φίλος by pointing out that there is a passive sense, then dismisses the passive sense by playing on the reciprocal sense, and finally dismisses the active sense by the same play on the reciprocal sense. Now this is "antilogical" with a vengeance; but it is really a very adroit piece of logical manipulation of the ambiguity of the word φίλος, so adroit that it is certainly a temptation to suspect that Plato here at least must have had his tongue in his cheek. It could doubtless be argued that construction of paradoxes to exhibit ambiguities was a method invented by Zeno (though this is unlikely to be true, in my opinion). It could be suggested that in the absence of any technical terminology of logic, this kind of paradox-construction was the only way open to Plato of displaying such a notion as that of symmetrical relationship. It might be, then, that we have here a deliberate analysis of the meaning of the word φίλος constructed by Plato himself by offering paraphrases of each sense of φίλος in terms of the participles from the verb φιλεῖν. When Plato says (213c5) εἰ μήτε οἱ φιλοῦντες φίλοι ἔσονται μήτε οἱ φιλούμενοι μήτε οἱ φιλοῦντές τε καὶ φιλούμενοι, what we are to take him to mean is roughly the opposite, namely that φίλοι can mean *either* φιλοῦντες *or* φιλούμενοι *or* φιλοῦντές τε καὶ φιλούμενοι.<sup>17</sup> This would be quite a workable schematic analysis of the three logically distinct senses of φίλος.

It will be better if I say now that I do not myself believe that Plato did mean this passage to be read in this way. If Plato was fully aware of all the ambiguities latent in the word φίλος we would expect him to keep clear of them himself and steer the reader clear of them in the rest of the dialogue. Whether he does so or not we must discover by examining the succeeding discussion, and only then can we return

<sup>16</sup> H. von Arnim, *Platos Jugenddialoge* (Leipzig and Berlin 1914), pp. 42–44.

<sup>17</sup> I. M. Crombie draws back from adopting this view: *An Examination of Plato's Doctrines* (London 1962), Vol. 1, p. 20.

to decide upon this first section. All I want to add now on this passage is this; there is one point of view from which Plato's rejection of all his paraphrases of *φίλος* is justified. Each paraphrase could stand for *φίλος* in *one* of its senses; none of them is the equivalent of *φίλος* in *all* its senses. Now this is the point on which the construction of the passage hangs, even if it is meant ironically. Each paraphrase is rejected because another sense of *φίλος* can be produced which this paraphrase does not represent. The only reason for this can be an assumption that *φίλος* has some one basic meaning. If one is setting oneself the aim of obtaining one single equivalent of *φίλος* in all its senses, then none of these suggestions will do and a negative conclusion is justified. This is certainly Plato's ostensible aim here; and I think it may also be his real aim. However, we must proceed to the rest of the dialogue, which for a short time is less bewildering.

I shall summarize most of the argument fairly briefly, and omit discussion of several interesting but incidental problems. First Plato deals with two suggestions he derives from earlier writers, poets as well as philosophers, about the nature of friendship. For the most part it is clear enough that the section from 213d to 216b tackles *τί ἐστιν τὸ φίλον* as a problem about mutual friendship between men. First of all we must see whether men who are like each other—*ὅμοιοι*—become friends. But clearly bad men cannot be friends with each other; so the suggestion seems only to be half true. But it may have been meant that only good men were *ὅμοιοι* because only good men are consistent in their behavior. But good men cannot be friends *because* of their likeness to each other (I cannot find any way of acquitting Plato of shifting uses of *ὅμοιος* hereabouts), since a man who is like another will not be able to do anything for the other which the other cannot do for himself. So perhaps good men are friends not because of their likeness to each other but precisely because of their goodness. But goodness implies self-sufficiency, and the self-sufficient man will not need friends, so even good men will not be friends with each other.

So Socrates tries the other approach, and inquires (215c–216b) whether men who are unlike each other are friends. Hesiod said potter quarrelled with potter, and cosmologists have suggested that opposites attract each other. But friends and enemies are opposites, among others, say the *ἀντιλογικοί*; and the just man cannot be friends with the unjust man, or the temperate man with the licentious man, or the good man with the bad man. (This only shows that not all opposites are friends, and not that all friends may not be opposites, but Plato rejects "oppositeness" so presumably he was looking for a single sufficient cause of friendship.)

So far Plato has shown that neither good men nor bad men are friends among themselves, nor can a good man and a bad man be friends. Precisely these same paradoxical conclusions about friendship are put into the mouth of Critobulus by Xenophon in *Memorabilia* II; but in Xenophon the arguments used to establish these conclusions are quite different from Plato's. What to infer from that I cannot discuss for the moment.<sup>18</sup> The most important arguments to remember out of those put forward by Plato so far are those showing that good men cannot be friends; firstly, that is, because in so far as they are alike they cannot do each other any service, and secondly because being self-sufficient they have no *need* of any help.

Now if there were *only* good men and bad men in the world, the conclusions so far reached would have exhausted all the possibilities, and friendship would be completely impossible. Socrates is now made to put forward a hunch of his own (216d ff.). He suggests that there are three *γένη*, kinds, the good, the bad, and the neither-good-nor-bad (this last I shall call the "intermediate" for short, though Plato usually uses the full formula). The bad by its nature excludes itself from all relationships; so we must look to relationships between the good and the intermediate. Instances of these are as follows. Whereas the healthy body does not need medicine, the body, which in itself is neither good nor bad, needs medicine, which is good, when it is threatened by disease, which is bad. Similarly—and this is a very famous Platonic tenet—the wise man does not need wisdom so does not philosophize, any more than the man who is completely sunk in ignorance. But the man who is neither already wise nor completely ignorant but can still recognize his own ignorance is the man who pursues wisdom.

These are examples of relationships between the intermediate and the good. These relationships are still described by Plato by use of the word *φίλον*; and at 218b7 Socrates is made to exclaim *νὺν ἄρα . . . παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐξηυρήκαμεν ὃ ἔστιν τὸ φίλον καὶ οὐ*. But there are beginning to be points which should make the cautious reader pause. The example of the sick man's need of help at first suggests that he will strike up a friendship with a doctor, but quite soon it is no longer the doctor who is described as *φίλος* in this example but the art of medicine which is described as *φίλον*. At 217a it is further established that *υγίεια*, health, is *φίλον*. This is not a way of saying a

<sup>18</sup> It would be pleasant to be able to believe that Plato and Xenophon were recording direct reminiscences of a discussion with Socrates, but this paradox may have been or become fairly commonplace. It is equally unsafe to conclude that Xenophon had read the *Lysis*, though of course he may very well have done. We have no evidence for the relative dates.

sick man needs to become the friend of a healthy man. This would do him no good at all. What he needs is health itself. Now one cannot be "friends with" health because only persons can be friends and health is not a person. This should be enough to warn us that though Plato is still discussing relationships which can be described in terms of the word *φίλος*, he is no longer describing relationships which are themselves friendships even if it is thought to be implied that they lead to friendships. Two points confirm this. Throughout the discussion as far as 221d-e all the relationships discussed are what may be called "one-sided." Socrates' whole suggestion of a relationship between the good and the intermediate is based on the premise that the good attracts the intermediate. There is nowhere any suggestion that the intermediate exercises a reciprocal attraction on the good; so we may suspect that the relationship Socrates is thinking of is not reciprocal. Finally, perhaps the most startling point of all is that though *οἱ ἀγαθοί* have earlier been shown not to be *φίλοι*, not to be friends, in this section first of all various *ἀγαθά* such as medicine and health are called *φίλα*, and then at 220b7 the suggestion is resumed (in some sense) that *τὸ ἀγαθόν* is *φίλον*. This can only avoid being flatly inconsistent with the earlier conclusion if *φίλον* is now being used in a different sense.

There is an excusable temptation at this point to abandon the *Lysis* altogether as a riotous muddle. But the situation is perhaps less desperate than it may seem. From 216c to 221d the discussion is perfectly clear and unconfused so long as it is read as an attempt to answer the question *τί ἔστιν τὸ φίλον*; taking *φίλον* in its passive sense. This is an inquiry into what objects are *φίλα* in the sense of being valued or pursued or approved. I shall translate the question *τί ἔστιν τὸ φίλον*; in this sense as "what is the object of pursuit," since this I think suits most of the examples Plato mentions. I hope to make sense, then, of the rest of the dialogue by treating it as discussing for most of the time no longer "what is friendship"? but "what is the object of pursuit"? Even though the terminology seems unchanged, the examples discussed force us to read it in this way. I shall return later to the problem of why Plato gives us no warning of his change of topic.

The passage from 218d to 220b is one of considerable interest which I shall have to leave without detailed discussion. Plato suggests that anything that is pursued must be pursued *ἐνεκά του καὶ διὰ τι*—for the sake of something and because of something; that is to say for some further end and on account of some prior cause. This introduces the means/end distinction, and Plato argues that there cannot be an infinite regress of objects pursued as means, but that



some object of pursuit must ultimately be in view as an end. He then attempts a rather alarming linguistic revision by claiming that only the object pursued as an end is *really* "an object of pursuit," whereas the objects said to be pursued as means to an end are only "objects of pursuit" *ῥήματι*, in a manner of speaking. There is however a close parallel to this in the passage at *Gorgias* 467–68, where it is claimed *à propos* of the concept of *βούλεσθαι*, "to want," that we do not *really* want what we only want as a means; we only *really* want what we want as ends and since the only things that are ends are *ἀγαθά*, the only things we can really want are *ἀγαθά*. Plato in the *Lysis* up to 220b develops his notion of the "object really pursued as an end" without telling us what this object is, but then at 220b7 seems to suggest it might be *τὸ ἀγαθόν*. Now various particular *ἀγαθά* have been ruled out because they were only pursued as means (this is *not* the same as in the *Gorgias*), so if some *ἀγαθά* are *not φίλα* but *τὸ ἀγαθόν* is *φίλον* perhaps we have to take *τὸ ἀγαθόν* here to mean the quality of goodness itself as opposed to the good things in which it is present.<sup>19</sup> The only further remark I want to make now about this passage is that Plato states no reason why he should think, as he apparently does, that there is only one object really pursued; his regress argument proves not that there is *only one* end but that there must be *at least one* end.<sup>20</sup>

The last sections of the dialogue, from 221b to the end, become alarmingly condensed; again I shall have to omit discussion of many of the difficulties. *τὸ ἀγαθόν* is shown not to be the object of pursuit by the device of imagining a world in which there was no evil. In such a world there would be no need to pursue the good; but there would still be objects which were pursued, such as food and drink,

<sup>19</sup> I leave this remark for the time being as it stands. I never intended to follow those who find a fully developed Theory of Forms here. G. Vlastos (*Platonic Studies*, pp. 35–37) has disposed of this view. Terence Irwin, on the other hand (in *Plato's Moral Theory* [Oxford 1977], pp. 92–100), appears to believe that not only a *πρώτον φίλον* but also a *πρώτον ἀγαθόν* is implied. That in itself is perhaps plausible, though it is not the case, *contra* Irwin, that Plato in the *Lysis* says that e.g. health is not *good* in itself. But in view of Plato's approach in *Meno* 87d–89a, *Euthydemus* 278e–281e and *Republic* II. 357b–58a, it seems more plausible that for Plato the *πρώτον ἀγαθόν* would have been *ἐπιστήμη* rather than *εὐδαιμονία*. The difference of *Rep.* 357–358 from Aristotle, *E. N.* I. vii has often been observed. Even *Gorgias* fails to show Plato calling *εὐδαιμονία* the *πρώτον ἀγαθόν*. Plato perhaps recoiled from using *ἀγαθόν* in a sense in which it was manifestly incompatible with *ὠφέλιμον*. I have argued this in a paper still to be revised. I apologize for brevity here.

<sup>20</sup> Aristotle is accused of this same error in *E. N.* I. i and *E. E.* I. vii. In *E. N.* he may be protected by various other arguments, e.g. that for a single science of *πολιτική*.



the desires for which can sometimes be neither good nor bad.<sup>21</sup> So the real cause of pursuit must be ἐπιθυμία, desire; now desire is for what one lacks; one lacks what has been taken away from one; what has been taken away from one is one's own, οἰκέιον, so what one desires and therefore what one pursues is that which is one's own, τὸ οἰκέιον. At this point Plato suddenly applies this conclusion to the dramatic context and observes that since Menexenus and Lysis are φίλοι they must be οἰκέιοι. This new turn must rest upon the move from "τὸ φίλον is τὸ οἰκέιον" to "οἱ φίλοι are οἰκέιοι"; strict consistency would require us to translate this move as that from "what is pursued is what is one's own" to "people pursued are one's own (possessions)" or perhaps "people who pursue each other belong to each other" (strictly speaking, "as possessions"). But in fact of course οἱ φίλοι εἰσὶν οἰκέιοι would be a normal Greek expression for "friends have some affinity to each other," probably implying some congeniality or matching of temperament. Now Plato no doubt meant this to be his conclusion; certainly he goes on to suggest that οἰκειότης was such that if one person was attracted to another by οἰκειότης, then since οἰκειότης is necessarily symmetrical the attraction must be mutual. But the method by which Plato drags in this conclusion seems to be no better than a step from "τὸ φίλον is οἰκέιον" to "οἱ φίλοι are οἰκέιοι" in which he changes not only the gender but also the sense of both the words φίλος and οἰκέιος. In particular the sense of οἰκέιος in which a possession which has been taken away from one is οἰκέιον = "one's own," is not normally a symmetrical sense: my possessions belong to me but I do not belong to them. So this part of the argument really looks like a not strictly logical attempt by Plato to return from the discussion of pursuit, during which the notion of τὸ οἰκέιον has entered in, to the discussion of friendship, where τὸ οἰκέιον will provide an attractive solution if taken in a different sense.<sup>22</sup> I shall return to discuss this second change of topic. For the moment let us finish the summary of the dialogue: the suggestion that οἰκέιοι are friends is tried out in two ways, firstly by equating οἰκέιοι with ὅμοιοι; but we already know that ὅμοιοι cannot be friends; then οἰκέιοι are equated with ἀγαθοί; but we thought we had proved that ἀγαθοί could not be friends either.<sup>23</sup> So, says Socrates, here we are, three

<sup>21</sup> And sometimes (presumably) not waiting to be caused by the bad.

<sup>22</sup> Stoic theories of οἰκείωσις seem to trade on more than one sense of οἰκέιος, probably varying between symmetrical and non-symmetrical.

<sup>23</sup> There is very possibly also a rapid suggestion, not formally refuted, that the good is οἰκέιον to the intermediate. But if Plato took this seriously, he would have been left with the continuing problem about reciprocity if he wished to apply this sense of οἰκειότης to the explanation of friendship. C. O. Brink, "Plato on the Natural" (*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 63 [1958], pp. 193–98) and Glidden fail to see

friends, and we don't know what a friend is. οὐπω δὲ ὅτι ἔστιν ὁ φίλος οἷοί τε ἐγενόμεθα ἐξευρεῖν. This is the regular conclusion to this set of dialogues. Here the only softening of the failure is what may be a hint that Plato thought something more could be done, where Socrates says "I intended to bring one of the older people present into the discussion" (223a1). But I am not inclined to believe that Plato is hinting that any adult reader can find an easy solution to all the problems of the dialogue. Plato has left himself and us with real problems.

In examining the course of the argument from 213d to the end I have suggested that Plato is discussing two distinct topics: firstly mutual friendship between men, and secondly, the pursuit by men of things such as wisdom and health, or later, of food and drink. Plato never gives any explicit indication that he thinks of himself as changing at any point from one topic to another. He starts quite clearly with friendship, but only the examples given at 217a–b and 218a reveal that he has moved to the topic of "pursuit"; and the final return to the topic of friendship is extremely abrupt. This is confusing for the English reader; and I am not sure that it was any easier for a contemporary Greek reader, who could not clear things up by translating the various senses of φίλος into different English words. But if we grant that Plato may have expected his readers to follow all this, did Plato see a connection between his two topics? Is "pursuit" meant to be closely relevant to friendship, or is this just an informal chat which casually crosses from one topic to another without insisting on logical relevance? I fancy it would be more pleasing to find a unity of aim throughout the dialogue.

Here it will be helpful to turn to Aristotle. Aristotle in *E. E.* VII and *E. N.* VIII and IX discusses friendship with a wealth of sociological and psychological observation which is on a completely different level from anything Plato was aiming at in the short compass of the *Lysis*. But throughout his discussions Aristotle works rigorously within the framework of a logical analysis which he presents at the beginning of each of the versions. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* this framework is stated at 1155b17–1156a6. Aristotle observes briskly τάχα δ' ἂν γένοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν . . . φανερόν γινωρισθέντος τοῦ φιλητοῦ: the problems about friendship might be cleared up if we discovered what it is that is φιλητόν, what it is that is liked or approved. The qualities which attract liking, φίλησις, are τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ ἡδύ and τὸ χρήσιμον. But τὸ χρήσιμον is only a means to one of the other two qualities, so it is

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that Plato usually *rejects* the view that τὸ οἰκείον is ἀγαθόν (though not, perhaps, the view that τὸ ἀγαθόν is in some sense οἰκείον).

the good and pleasant which attract liking as ends in themselves—φιλητὰ ἂν εἴη τὰγαθὸν τε καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς τέλη. Then, to borrow a sentence from the Eudemian version, “just as in the case of inanimate objects we can like a thing for each of these qualities, so we can like a man for each of these qualities” (1236a10–12). Aristotle is comparing our φίλησις of impersonal objects with our φίλησις of men; τὸ φιλητόν, what attracts liking, includes the same qualities both in things and in men.<sup>24</sup> Then, returning to the Nicomachean version, “there being these three qualities which cause men to like what they like, one does not talk about friendship in the case of liking inanimate objects, because there is no returned liking. . . . It is where good will (εὔνοια) of person to person is mutual that there is friendship” (εὔνοιαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι φιλίαν εἶναι, 1155a38). Aristotle thus has the following account of friendship; we like men for the same reason that we like things, because they have certain qualities. But things cannot return our liking for them, whereas it is precisely this mutual and returned “liking” which constitutes friendship between men. So to explain the way in which friendships can spring up and be maintained we must always investigate separately what reason causes each one individually of a pair of friends to like the other. Explaining why one man alone likes another does not show grounds for talking of a friendship, unless the second also has a reason for liking the first. There must always be φίλησις on both sides; each party separately must be φιλητός to the other.

This analysis of Aristotle’s will give us a helpful means of assessing Plato’s discussion. Aristotle investigated τὸ φιλητόν in both persons and things before going on to concentrate on friendships between persons: he believed in fact that φίλοι, friends, were pairs of φιλητοί. Now τὸ φιλητόν is in fact Aristotle’s equivalent for Plato’s τὸ φίλον-passive. Aristotle (in *E. N.*, though not yet in *E. E.*) has used, and perhaps indeed coined, an unambiguously passive verbal adjective from φιλεῖν, and he has explained carefully the connection between τὸ φιλητόν and φίλοι in the sense of “friends.” Plato has not explained any logical connections and has employed shifting senses of the same word φίλον; but if we apply Aristotle’s logical analysis to the *Lysis*, we can begin to see what may have been in Plato’s mind in discussing τὸ φίλον-passive. Aristotle thought φίλοι (friends) were φιλητοί; Plato may have thought similarly that φίλοι (friends) were φίλοι in the passive sense. So perhaps Plato made a general investigation of τὸ φίλον (passive) because he had in mind the same comparison as Aristotle used between things that were φίλα and men who were

<sup>24</sup> *E. E.* does not yet have the helpful, because clearly passive, form φιλητόν.

φίλοι (passive). This would explain why so much of the *Lysis* is about the pursuit of things that are φίλα (passive).

But here we must remember that Aristotle did not identify φίλοι as φιλητοί without qualification; φίλοι are pairs of men of whom each has a quality which makes him φιλητός to the other. Is this point in Aristotle's analysis also present in Plato's mind? The answer I think here must be no. The suggestion Plato sets out at the greatest length about what might be φίλον (passive) is the theory that the good will be φίλον-passive to the intermediate; he mentions this as applied to things. Perhaps by Aristotle's comparison this could be applied to men, so that an intermediate man would be attracted to a good man. But Aristotle would have asked: very well, and how is the good man attracted to the intermediate man? To which Plato would have no answer, since on the one hand only goodness is attractive, and on the other the man who is already good is self-sufficient. Plato has not, in his suggestion that τὸ ἀγαθόν is φίλον to the intermediate, made any provision which would allow this one-way attraction to become an element in a mutual friendship.

Now it may be that Plato was not after all investigating τὸ φίλον (passive) with a view to explaining τὸ φίλον = friendship; but this destroys the unity of purpose which we are trying to find in the dialogue. It seems more likely that Plato does have part of Aristotle's later framework in mind, that is to say he thought of φίλοι "friends" as φίλοι (passive), but that he did not keep in mind, as Aristotle did, that friendship had to be based on mutual attraction and reciprocated liking.

It looks very much as though Plato had not seen that this further provision of Aristotle's was necessary because he had not attended to the fact that φίλος = "a friend" was a different notion and a different sense of φίλος from φίλος-passive. He rested on the assumption that "friends" were φίλοι in exactly the same sense as objects could be φίλα, and that nothing more was needed for the explanation of one sense of φίλος than for the other. In view of the fact that the word is the same in Greek, and also in view of the absence of any recognition of the real dangers of ambiguity anywhere in Greek thought before the *Sophist*, this is perhaps not too surprising. So insofar as I have suggested Plato was making Aristotle's assumption that friends were φιλητοί, or for Plato φίλοι-passive, he was doing this unconsciously because he had never seen the distinction, not as Aristotle did, in order consciously to link friendship with the attraction denoted by the verb of φιλεῖν.

At this point we must recall one problem that was left hanging in the air. We must return to the question raised about the initial section



of the discussion at 212b–213d. It might perhaps be argued that this initial discussion is a deliberate analysis by Plato of the distinct senses of the word φίλος, and that this was meant to act as a clue to the reader by which he might follow the changes of topic and the interrelations between the arguments in the rest of the dialogue. It might be maintained that in suggesting one identification of φίλοι as φιλοῦντές τε καὶ φιλούμενοι Plato was showing himself fully conscious of the symmetrical sense of φίλος and the reciprocity of friendship. The rest of the dialogue would then be intended for the careful reader to sort out for himself; the value of the various suggestions in application to different topics would be clear after brief thought.

In answer to this it can be said that the only reader to have used the dialogue in this way appears to have been Aristotle. If these were Plato's intentions, many learned commentators have missed the point completely; only a few<sup>25</sup> have realized the full extent of the ambiguity of φίλος, and none, even if they saw some of the elements of ambiguity illuminated in 212b–213d, have applied what they learned there to distinguishing the topics of the rest of the dialogue. Those scholars who have succeeded in discovering the different senses of φίλος underlying the discussion have very largely been following Aristotle. If Plato did intend the Aristotelian framework to be discovered by his readers out of his "ironical" construction of a casual conversation, then surely (to apply R. Robinson's comment on this kind of view of Plato's early dialogues) "the degree of irony thus attributed to him is superhuman."<sup>26</sup> If this was irony it took an Aristotle to see behind it. If it is argued that a contemporary Greek reader would have been much more sensitive to Plato's usage of φίλος than a modern interpreter can be, against that must be weighed the advantage to a modern interpreter of being forced to face the difficulties of translating φίλος into different words in his own language corresponding to its various senses; furthermore modern interpreters should be in general much more conscious than the Greeks were of the existence of dangers to language and philosophy lying in ambiguity. The difficulties of disentangling the strands of the *Lysis* might very well have been greater to the average Greek reader than to us today, even supposing the average Greek reader was likely in the first place to think of words as able to have more than one sense. Finally, if Plato was being ironical in first distinguishing the senses of φίλος and

<sup>25</sup> Notably von Arnim (above, note 16).

<sup>26</sup> R. Robinson, "Plato's Consciousness of Fallacy," *Mind* 51 (1942), pp. 97 ff. = *Essays in Greek Philosophy* (Oxford 1969), p. 32. My arguments here owe much to his. Other views are, I think, implausible, however disappointing this may be. But there are degrees of difference between unconscious transitions and radical confusions.



then leaving it to the reader to follow the thread of the dialogue without further signposting, it must be said that he constructed a highly teasing maze for the purpose of this exercise. In ordinary non-philosophical Greek contexts anything so elaborately puzzling as the *Lysis* must have been rare.

The alternative interpretation of the connection between 212b–213d and the rest of the dialogue is that Plato genuinely thought his first attempt puzzling and unhelpful, and rejected all the suggestions contained in it; he then proceeded to discuss the question *τί ἐστιν τὸ φίλον*; with more attention to the facts of the matter and less to what he suspected were purely verbal quirks. Even if Plato had seen that 212b–213d was a sound analysis of the ambiguity of the word *φίλος*, he might have thought it of no importance. In the *Euthydemus*, when the ambiguity of *μανθάνω* has first been played upon by the two sophists and then explained by Socrates, Socrates goes on to observe (278b2) *ταῦτα δὴ τῶν μαθημάτων* (scil. *περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος* (277e4) *παιδιά ἐστιν . . . παιδιὰν δὲ λέγω διὰ ταῦτα, ὅτι εἰ καὶ πολλά τις ἢ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μάθοι, τὰ μὲν πράγματα οὐδὲν ἂν μᾶλλον εἰδέη πῇ ἔχει, προσπαίξειν δὲ οἷός τ' ἂν εἴη τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διὰ τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων διαφορὰν ὑποσκελίζων καὶ ἀνατρέπων*. Discussion of the application of words is merely an entertainment, *παιδιά*, and does not show us *τὰ πράγματα πῇ ἔχει*, how things are. Plato may similarly in the *Lysis* too have ruled out the possibility of getting any help from verbal inquiry, and proceeded at 213e to the serious task of finding out *τί ἐστιν τὸ φίλον*; in the sense of discovering as a matter of empirical fact what the phenomenon of friendship consists in. 212b–213d, quite apart from the unsatisfactoriness of its “antilogical” results, was only an attempt at purely verbal definition, at attaching the name *φίλος* to one or other of three already recognized classes of men. Plato may well have thought the real task was not to bother about the application of labels to phenomena already distinguished, but to pursue the “real” definition of the factors which in practice create friendships. If he discriminated between 212b–213d and the rest of the dialogue in this way, it is possible to understand how he may completely have disregarded the genuinely important results of the first inquiry in his attack on the second.

In rejecting his first attempt at definition as purely verbal and unimportant, Plato missed what might have shown him that there were two separate phenomena to be investigated in his subsequent inquiry, which could either be completely separated or given a systematic relation to each other, but could not be completely assimilated. One-way pursuit may be taken as a basic element in friendship, but is not in itself a sufficient description of friendship, and in some

cases may be of a kind which does not lead to friendship at all. In his search for the one basic element making anything *φίλον*, Plato's earnest desire to be satisfied with no mere partial explanation led him to miss a difference which exists in the phenomena as well as in the words. As a consequence of this difference no one simple explanation will be found, but either two separate explanations or one complex explanation such as Aristotle's are necessary.

Now I might perhaps restate my view that Plato's aporetic dialogues are not aporetic purely as a device of irony, but as a result of real difficulties Plato got into over definition. His difficulties, as I hope has emerged, are in the *Lysis* at least due to his not realizing the dangers of ambiguity in his *definiendum*. I suspect this is also one source of his difficulties over τὸ σῶφρον in *Charmides*, τὸ ὅσιον in the *Euthyphro* and over τὸ καλόν in *Hippias Major*.<sup>27</sup> I would suggest that Plato on the best philosophical grounds actually led himself away from any chance of recognizing ambiguity by his own admirable insistence on not accepting partial definitions. It is true that a definition covering only a few cases of a general concept is inadequate; Plato therefore was anxious to obtain comprehensive definitions in terms of a single necessary and sufficient condition expressed by a statement of equivalence. His explicit statement of this requirement of his methodology in the early dialogues is found at *Euthyphro* 6d-7a, where Socrates insists that all ὅσια must have something in common; μὴ ἰδέα . . . τὰ ὅσια ὅσια, and accepts Euthyphro's suggestion that this ἰδέα is τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς προσφιλές only if this gives an equivalence such that ὅσιον ≡ τοῖς θεοῖς προσφιλές. Such a requirement is difficult enough to meet for a word having a wide range of strength and weakness of meaning within a single logical sense, but quite impossible to satisfy for a word such as φίλος which has several senses each having a logically distinct application. There are indeed moments when Plato seems to hanker after not merely a single analysis, but a single exact synonym for any *definiendum*.

This will no doubt have seemed an unduly arid exposition of nothing but the logical confusions of a dialogue which contains a number of interesting substantial arguments. I can perhaps add briefly that underlying the logical confusions of the *Lysis* Plato seems to have had a substantial difficulty about the nature of the good. Here of course we have to make subjective guesses about which of his points he placed most weight on; but at the final twist of the argument, where Plato says "we thought we had disproved the notion that good

<sup>27</sup> It may well be that ὅσιον, σῶφρον and καλόν are ambiguous in very different ways from φίλον (and from each other).

men could be friends," it has often been guessed that Plato thought it really ought to be possible to prove that good men were friends. This is quite likely; Aristotle certainly thought the highest friendship was that between good men. But Plato has earlier in the dialogue spent more time than on any other suggestion developing the idea that the good is pursued by men because they need it, not having yet achieved it. This too, although dismissed here, seems to be a serious belief of Plato's; men for Plato only need to realize that the true object of *all* their desires is none other than the good itself, and then they will pursue this one true aim. But in this case Plato was in a real dilemma, since basing pursuit of the good on the need for it felt by the not-yet-good is precisely a theory which implies the self-sufficiency of the already good, and so precludes friendship between good men. I hope you will have seen that Aristotle took the logical framework for his theory of friendship from the *Lysis* (not without some clarification); on points of substance Aristotle chose to believe in the friendship of good men at the cost of having to explain at some length why the good man is not self-sufficient. But Plato was at all times anxious to prove that our desire for the good was based on our real natural need for it, and furthermore that attainment to the good would be the full satisfaction of all our desires. This placed him in the real, and not "ironical," dilemma, of not being able to believe that men who had achieved goodness could continue to need friends. Confused though the argumentation of the *Lysis* may be, there are underlying it real problems about the part friendship can play in man's pursuit of the good.

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# 6

## Socrates the Epicurean?

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### 1. A Conflict in the *Republic*

At the end of *Republic* I Socrates persuades Thrasymachus that the just and virtuous person will do well, live well and be happy (353e4–354a4). Socrates at once admits that the conclusion is premature, and that he ought to have examined the nature of justice before deciding whether or not the just person is happy (354b1–c3).

The rest of the *Republic* might seem to promise a fuller defense of Socrates' claim that justice secures happiness. For Glaucon and Adeimantus claim to "renew the argument of Thrasymachus" (358b7–c1), with a better statement of his objections to justice; and we expect them to ask Socrates for a better defense of the thesis maintained against Thrasymachus.

We do not get what we expect. Glaucon and Adeimantus do not ask Socrates to show that justice by itself makes the just person happy. They ask him to show that justice by itself makes the just person happier than the unjust (361c3–d3). And it is this comparative claim that Socrates defends in the main argument of the *Republic*, in Books II–IX.

The thesis of Book I and the thesis of II–IX are vitally different. For the second thesis leaves open a possibility that the first thesis excludes. It is possible for A to be happier than B even though neither A nor B is happy; and so when Plato argues that the just person is in all circumstances happier than the unjust, he does not imply that the just person is happy in all circumstances.<sup>1</sup> He allows

<sup>1</sup> I translate εὐδαιμονία by "happiness." This use of the comparative marks one difference between εὐδαιμων and the English "happy"; the comparative suggests that εὐδαιμων has the logic of "straight" and (significantly) of "complete."



that happiness may have components that are not infallibly secured by justice. Though the second thesis is hard to believe, it is easier than the first.

Plato probably sees the difference between the two theses. In Book X he claims that justice leads to happiness because it normally secures honors, rewards and other external benefits in this life, and invariably secures the favor of the gods (612a8–614a8). Here Plato assumes that justice by itself does not secure happiness, and rejects the strong thesis defended at the end of Book I (the “sufficiency thesis”).

Plato has a good reason for making Socrates in Book I defend the sufficiency thesis. On this point as on others, Book I presents a Socratic argument for comparison and contrast with the rest of the *Republic*. For the early dialogues clearly commit Socrates to the sufficiency thesis.<sup>2</sup> In rejecting it Plato rejects a central element of Socratic ethics.

In later antiquity the interpretation of Socrates’ and Plato’s views about virtue and happiness remained a controversial matter. Chrysippus criticizes Plato for doing away with justice and any other genuine virtue by recognizing such things as health as goods (Plutarch, *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis* 1040d). On the other hand, the later Stoic Antipater wrote a book arguing that Plato maintained the Stoic thesis that only the fine is good (*Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* iii, Antip. 56). Among later Platonists Plutarch seems to accept Chrysippus’ interpretation of Plato, and so finds that Plato and Aristotle agree on this point against the Stoics. On the other side Atticus ascribes to Plato a view much closer to the Stoic position, and so contrasts him sharply with Aristotle: “He [sc. Aristotle] deviated from Plato first of all on the common and greatest and most decisive point, by failing to observe the measure of happiness and failing to agree that virtue is self-sufficient for this [sc. measure]” (ap. Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* 794c6–d2).<sup>3</sup> “While Plato shouted and proclaimed on each occasion that the most just person is the happiest, Aristotle refused to allow that happiness follows on virtue unless one is fortunate in family and physical beauty and other things” (794d10–13). Here Atticus assumes unwisely that Plato’s acceptance of the comparative claim commits him to acceptance of the sufficiency thesis.

Albinus is equally unwary; he reasonably finds in the *Euthydemus*

<sup>2</sup> One way to explain the parallels between *Rep.* I and the Socratic dialogues is to regard it as a Socratic dialogue. I think this solution is unnecessary, and that some evidence of self-consciousness in *Rep.* I suggests that Plato wrote it deliberately as an introduction to the *Republic*. See part 11 below.

<sup>3</sup> Edited by E. H. Gifford (Oxford 1903, 5 vols.). Atticus’ views are discussed by J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London 1977), p. 25.

a commitment to the Stoic thesis that only the fine is good, but claims that Plato has demonstrated this most of all in the whole of the *Republic*; "for he says that the man with the knowledge we have mentioned is the most fortunate and happiest," even in adverse circumstances (*Eisagōgē* 181. 7–9).<sup>4</sup> "Most fortunate" is Albinus' addition to the *Republic* (perhaps under the influence of *Euthydemus* 282c9), and he assumes that the *Republic's* comparative claim is equivalent to the sufficiency thesis.

This conflict in the interpretation of Plato is implicitly associated with different views on the relation of Plato to Socrates. It is highly probable that the Stoics recognized, as Cicero did (*Parad.* 4), the Socratic origin of their views on virtue and happiness. The Stoics are partly inspired by the Cynics, and the Cynics by Socrates. But Chrysippus' debt to Socrates does not lead him to ascribe the Socratic view to Plato; nor does his dispute with Plato lead him to ascribe the Platonic view to Socrates. Chrysippus' care in distinguishing Socrates from Plato contrasts sharply with Cicero's argument for finding the Socratic position in Plato; Cicero appeals to the *Gorgias* and the *Menexenus*, raising no question about whether these present Plato's views (*Tusc.* V. 35–36).

I want to suggest that Chrysippus is right in his interpretation of Plato and right to distinguish Socrates from Plato. But to see why Plato disagrees with Socrates we must see why Socrates believes the sufficiency thesis. If we can find his reasons we will perhaps also see the claims that Plato could not accept.

## 2. Socrates' Claims

To show that the sufficiency thesis is Socratic we can appeal to earlier dialogues:

1. In the *Apology* Socrates affirms that a better person cannot be harmed by a worse (30c6–d5), and that no evil at all can happen to a good person, either in life or in death (41c8–d2).
2. In the *Crito* Socrates affirms an essential premise of his argument about disobedience and injustice, that living well, living finely and living justly are the same thing (48b8–9). Since living well is the same thing as living happily, Socrates assumes that anyone who lives virtuously (i.e. finely and justly) ensures his happiness.
3. In the *Gorgias* Socrates argues that the virtuous and just person acts finely and does well, and thereby is happy (507b8–c7).

<sup>4</sup> Edited by K. F. Hermann in *Platonis Dialogi*, vol. 6 (Leipzig 1884). See Dillon, p. 299.

4. In the *Charmides* Socrates asks what sort of knowledge temperance is. If it is merely the knowledge of knowledge and ignorance, it will not produce happiness, since only the knowledge of good and evil will do that (173d3–5, 174b11–c3). It is assumed that the knowledge of good and evil ensures happiness; and if virtue is identical to that knowledge, virtue must ensure happiness.
5. The same assumption is made in the *Euthydemus*. Though we find it hard to describe the product of the kingly craft, we take it for granted that there is a craft securing happiness.<sup>5</sup>

This evidence commits Socrates fairly clearly to the sufficiency thesis. The first three passages are the clearest. The last two are less clear; for the crucial assumption appears in an argument that runs into difficulties, and we might say that Socrates wants to expose the assumption as a source of the difficulties. But the first three passages show that he cannot easily reject the assumption.

### 3. Questions about Happiness

To see why Socrates accepts the sufficiency thesis we must consider especially his conception of happiness. His views on virtue are comparatively clear, since inquiries into the nature of virtue are his main concern in the early dialogues. It is remarkable, however, that he never thinks it is worth asking what happiness is. A search for a definition would apparently be rather useful; but he never seems to feel the need of it. The *Republic* displays some of the same insouciance. At the end of Book I Socrates admits that his conclusion is premature; he cannot claim to know that justice ensures happiness until he has said what justice is. But he says nothing similar about happiness; and the *Republic* never offers any explicit account of the nature of happiness.

To see where Socrates and Plato fail we must turn to Aristotle's discussion of happiness in *Eth. Nic.* I. Aristotle notices that people all identify happiness with the highest good, but disagree about what happiness is (1095a17–22), and offer different candidates—virtue, honor, pleasure and so on. But he thinks these disputes are tractable because we can agree on something intermediate between the very general claim about the highest good and the disputed claims about candidates for happiness. His solution of the disputes proceeds through three stages:

<sup>5</sup> Socrates assumes that *ἥτις ἡμᾶς ὀνήσει*, 288e1–2, is equivalent to *ἦν ἔδει κεκτημένους ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας εἶναι*, 289c7–8; cf. d9–10, 290b1–2, 291b6, 292b8–c1, e5.

1. Formal criteria for the highest good—completeness and self-sufficiency (1097b20–21).
2. A conception of happiness meeting these criteria—activity of the soul according to virtue in a complete life (1098a16–18).
3. A candidate for the happy life—the life according to the specific actions and states of character described in the *Eth. Nic.*

These three stages make disputes more tractable. Even if we do not initially agree on the successful candidates we can agree on formal criteria, and use our agreement to form a conception of happiness that allows us to reduce our initial disagreement about candidates, by asking if they conform to a conception of happiness that meets the formal criteria. Aristotle practises this method on the lives of pleasure, honor and virtue to show that each of them is an unsuccessful candidate.<sup>6</sup>

Even this rough idea of Aristotle's method of argument suggests what is missing in Socrates and Plato.<sup>7</sup> They offer us many third-stage remarks, about candidates for happiness. Sometimes they offer second-stage remarks; Aristotle's argument about the human function is partly anticipated in *Republic* I. But they offer no explicit first-stage remarks to show us the appropriate formal criteria for happiness.<sup>8</sup> If, however, we are to understand Socrates' reasons for his third-stage claim that virtue is sufficient for happiness, we would like to find the implicit criteria and conception that might support it. We must ask him Aristotle's questions. Since Socrates does not ask them himself, we must rely on some inference and speculation to decide how he probably answers them. I will offer one account of his position, and try to explain why I think it is preferable to the most plausible alternative I can think of. But whether or not my account is right, I

<sup>6</sup> On the role of the formal criteria in this chapter see *Nic. Ethics*, trans. T. H. Irwin (Indianapolis 1985), note on 1095b14 ff.

<sup>7</sup> Some hints exploited by Aristotle appear in *Phil.* 20b8–22c4, in terms partly derived from *Rep.* 505b5–d1. Helpful remarks on formal criteria: N. P. White, "Goodness and human aims in Aristotle's ethics," in *Studies in Aristotle*, ed. D. J. O'Meara (Washington, D.C. 1981), pp. 225–46, at pp. 231, 234 f.

<sup>8</sup> I believe that in the *Protagoras* Socrates is seriously committed to hedonism (some grounds for this belief are ably urged by J. C. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor, *The Greeks on Pleasure* [Oxford 1982], pp. 58–68). It is important to explore the connections of the view of happiness that I attribute to Socrates with the discussions of hedonism in the *Protagoras* and *Gorg.* But I ignore the *Protagoras* here, because I would like my arguments to be independent of the dispute about hedonism, and because hedonism offers us only a conception of happiness that still leaves us to look for the criteria that justify it.



think it draws attention to a series of questions about Socratic ethics that need closer study.<sup>9</sup>

#### 4. Criteria for Happiness

When Socrates argues with interlocutors holding common-sense views, he must begin from these views, and either appeal to them in his own argument or explain why he rejects them. In the earlier dialogues Socrates does not always show that he sees how controversial some of his claims are. The Socratic Paradox, e.g., is taken for granted in the *Laches*, but defended only in the *Protagoras* and *Meno*.<sup>10</sup> Similarly, the sufficiency thesis is assumed in several dialogues; but only the *Gorgias* indicates that Socrates thinks it is paradoxical (470c–e), and only the *Euthydemus* defends it. We should not assume either that Socrates (or Plato) must have had a clear defense in mind when he first put forward the thesis or that the defense must have come later than the first statement of the thesis. If we attend to the *Gorgias* and *Euthydemus*, we can see that at least sometimes Socrates both sees that the thesis needs defense and defends it. He would be unwise to assume his view without argument; common beliefs about happiness and virtue do not make the sufficiency thesis seem obviously true. We should therefore see how Socrates might argue from common beliefs to show that his interlocutor must accept the sufficiency thesis.

The *Euthydemus* is our best source for such an argument, but it fails us at one essential point. Socrates does not begin with a statement of the criteria and conception he accepts in his claims about happiness. To see how the argument works, however, we must try to see his criteria and conception.

He begins with an assumption that he takes to be uncontroversial, that happiness is what we all want (278b3–6).<sup>11</sup> We achieve happiness by gaining many goods (279a1–4), and Socrates' list of goods is also meant to be largely uncontroversial (279a4–7). The reputed goods include bodily and social advantages, possessions and good fortune

<sup>9</sup> My treatment of Socrates' views on happiness in *Plato's Moral Theory* (Oxford 1977) is open to criticism for not having faced these questions. It is justly criticized by Gregory Vlastos, "Happiness and Virtue in Socrates' Moral Theory," *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* NS 30 (1984), 181–213, at p. 207 note 54, and by D. J. Zeyl, "Socratic Virtue and Happiness," *Archiv für Gesch. der Phil.* 14 (1982), pp. 225–38. In this paper I don't defend the claim that Socrates *does* take virtue to be merely instrumental to happiness and not an intrinsic good, but the weaker claim that the sufficiency thesis is compatible with the purely instrumentalist conception of virtue. (See Part 9, last paragraph.)

<sup>10</sup> See Irwin, *Plato's Moral Theory*, p. 72.

<sup>11</sup> Socrates identifies εὐδαιμονεῖν with εὐδαιμονεῖν, 280b6.



(279a4–c8); Socrates recognizes some room for dispute about the virtues and wisdom, but includes them too (279b4–c2).

To see the point of this list of goods we can usefully turn to Aristotle. In *Rhetoric* I. 5 he presents “by way of illustration . . . what happiness is, to speak in general terms, and from what things its parts [sc. come about]” (1360b7–9). He offers something closer to common-sense views than he offers in the *Ethics*, where his views on the right formal criteria and conception influence his presentation of common sense; and for our purposes the less sophisticated account in the *Rhetoric* is especially useful. To show what happiness is Aristotle offers four answers. It is “(1) doing well together with virtue, or (2) self-sufficiency of life, or (3) the pleasantest life together with safety, or (4) prosperity of possessions and bodies together with the power to protect them and act with them; for practically everyone agrees that happiness is one or more of these things” (1360b14–18). After presenting these conceptions of happiness Aristotle offers a list of its parts, rather similar to the list of reputed goods in the *Euthydemus*. He explains why they seem to be parts: “For in this way someone would be most self-sufficient, by having both the internal and external goods, since there are no other goods beside these. . . . Further, we think it proper for him to have power and fortune, since that will make his life most secure” (1360b24–29).

Aristotle suggests that the reputed goods are plausibly taken to be parts of happiness because they make someone self-sufficient; he has all the goods he could want, and needs none to be added. He is secure in so far as his good fortune protects him against sudden reversals and loss of happiness. Self-sufficiency and security are plausible formal criteria for happiness (1360b14–18), and they justify the common conception of happiness as consisting in the possession of all the goods there are.

In the *Euthydemus* Socrates' attitude to the popular candidates for happiness is far more critical than Aristotle's. He agrees with the popular view that it must include all the goods there are; but he claims that wisdom is the only good, and is therefore necessary and sufficient for happiness. To see if Socrates is right we should appeal to the formal criterion assumed by the popular candidates. If Socrates cannot show that his candidate for happiness achieves self-sufficiency and security, then he violates an apparently reasonable formal criterion for happiness. He must either challenge this criterion or show that his own candidate for happiness satisfies it.

## 5. Socrates' Argument

Socrates argues for the conclusion that wisdom is the only good and makes a person happy. We have every reason to suppose that he takes the conclusion seriously; for he identifies virtue with wisdom, and we have seen that he takes virtue to be sufficient for happiness. To justify his conviction about happiness he needs to show that there is no genuine part of happiness that is not secured by virtue, and that therefore the reputed goods that are independent of virtue are not elements of happiness at all. (Let us call these "external goods," remembering that in Socrates' final view they are really not goods at all.)

But though the conclusion is important the argument raises grave doubts; its faults seem to be recurrent, gross and obvious.

Socrates rejects the external goods in two stages. First he argues that good fortune is not an element of happiness that is independent of wisdom, because wisdom by itself secures all the good fortune that is needed (279c9–280a8). Next he argues that none of the external goods is a good at all, because it is their right use that secures happiness, and only wisdom ensures their right use (280b1–281e5).<sup>12</sup>

First Socrates considers good fortune. He mentions two types of crafts:

- (a) flute-playing, writing and reading;
- (b) generalship, navigation and medicine (279d8–280a4).

Though he does not mention it, a difference between (a) and (b) is fairly clear; the Stoics, following Aristotle, formulate it as the difference between stochastic and non-stochastic crafts (*Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* III. 19). In (a) fortune seems to be needed to prevent antecedent ill fortune. An expert writer cannot produce good writing without the appropriate material; and we may think that the supply of it is sometimes a matter of fortune. But once he has it, the

<sup>12</sup> In examining reputed goods Socrates does not distinguish instrumental from intrinsic goods. Indeed he does not describe *εὐδαιμονία* or *εὖ πράττειν* as an *ἀγαθόν* at all in the *Euthyd.*; and it might be argued that here he confines *ἀγαθά* to instrumental goods. The same is true of *Gorgias* 467c–468e. Sometimes *ἀγαθά* may seem to include intrinsic goods, *Gorgias* 494e9–495b4, 499e5, *Protagoras* 355c3–8 (contrast *Gorgias* 496b5–6). But this is not certain; I can see no clear reason for denying that, e.g., the pleasures mentioned in these passages are considered as goods because they are instrumental to happiness. If this is so, then the claim in *Rep.* 357b5 that some goods are goods because they are chosen for their own sakes reflects a departure from the Socratic conception of goods. The claim that happiness is not a good is not unparalleled; Aristippus (*Diog. L.* II. 87) may be exploiting a Socratic distinction to draw an un-Socratic conclusion.

competent exercise of his craft ensures the right result. In the crafts listed in (b) fortune also seems to be needed to prevent subsequent ill fortune. A pilot might exercise his craft quite competently with the right material, but still a sudden and unpredictable storm might sink the ship.

Keeping in mind these two areas of ill fortune we can examine Socrates' argument. He wants to show that good fortune need not be added to our list of goods once we include wisdom, since wisdom ensures the sort of success for which we wrongly think good fortune is needed. He argues:

1. In each case the wise person has better fortune than the unwise (280a4–5).
2. Genuine wisdom can never go wrong, but must always succeed (280a7–8).
3. Therefore wisdom always makes us fortunate (280a6).

In this argument Socrates seems to move without warrant to steadily stronger claims. Since (3) is supposed to eliminate good fortune as a distinct good apart from wisdom, Socrates should show that wisdom provides all the success that is normally taken to require good fortune. But all he shows in (1) is that wisdom ensures more success, other things being equal, than we can expect if we lack it. The claim in (2) seems stronger. Socrates seems to ignore the problem of antecedent ill fortune with both types of crafts; and even if this point is waived, he seems to ignore subsequent ill fortune in crafts of the second type. We might agree with Socrates that bad writing with a good pen on good paper indicates lack of the writer's craft; but we need not see any lack of craft in a pilot's failure to save his ship from an unpredictable storm. It is just this sort of failure that we avoid only if we have good fortune. These objections seem to show that Socrates is not entitled to (2), if it is understood in a strong enough sense to imply (3). Apparently, then, Socrates tries to prove that good fortune, as an external good distinct from wisdom, is unnecessary for happiness, but in trying to prove this ignores those very cases that seem to show why we need good fortune.

Socrates now argues that the other external goods are not really goods; and he needs to show this, since these external goods seem to depend at least partly on good fortune, which Socrates has just argued is unnecessary for happiness. In Socrates' view, the only real good is wisdom, and so this turns out to be the only good that we need for happiness. He argues:

1. It is possible to use the external goods well or badly (280b7–c3, d7–281a1).

2. Correct use of them is necessary and sufficient for happiness (280d7–281e1).
3. Wisdom is necessary and sufficient for correct use (281a1–b2).
4. Therefore wisdom is necessary and sufficient for happiness (281b2–4).

This is the conclusion that Socrates needs. But he strengthens it by a further defense of (1) and (2):

5. Each external good used without wisdom is a greater evil than its opposite, and each used by wisdom is a greater good than its opposite (281d6–8).
6. Therefore each external good and evil is in fact neither good nor evil (281e3–4).
7. Therefore wisdom is the only good and folly the only evil (281e4–5).

At (3) and (4) two possibilities need to be considered:

- (a) Given a reasonable supply of external goods, wisdom is necessary and sufficient for happiness.
- (b) Whatever external goods we may have or lack, wisdom is necessary and sufficient for happiness.

In his examples Socrates considers only cases that allow (a); he remarks that a supply of money and other external resources is still liable to misuse. He might say that wisdom guarantees the right use, not the initial resources; then he would have to concede the role of antecedent fortune, and would simply be ignoring the role of subsequent fortune in the exercise of some crafts. But if he concedes the role of antecedent fortune, he cannot maintain his claim to have eliminated fortune as a distinct contributor to happiness. The elimination of fortune requires the strong claim in (b). And for this strong claim Socrates seems to have given no sufficient argument.

A further question arises in (5)–(7). When Socrates says in (5) that health, for example, is a greater good than sickness if it is guided by wisdom, we might suppose he means that health, in these circumstances, is a good and otherwise is not. In that case Socrates can deny, as he does in (6), that health taken by itself (*αὐτὸ δὲ καθ' αὐτό*) is a good, and allow that it is a good when it is guided by wisdom. But if that is what (6) means, the transition to (7) is blatantly unwarranted, since (7) says that health is not a good at all.

We have two ways out of this unwelcome result:

- (a) In (7) Socrates only means that health is not a good by itself, and needs wisdom added if it is to be a good.
- (b) In (5) he does not mean that health is a good.



While (a) might seem to be a more reasonable conclusion, it would not fulfill Socrates' main aim in the whole argument; for the reasons we have already seen, he must show that wisdom is necessary and sufficient for happiness, and hence the only real good.

If we look again at (5), we can see that Socrates is not committed to regarding health as a good. If we adapt his remarks to show that health is a greater good, we will say: if wisdom leads health, health will be a greater good than sickness to the extent that it is more able to serve its leader when the leader is good (cf. 281d6–7). This account of how health is a greater good does not imply that health is good; “greater good” may simply mean “more of a good,” that is, “closer to being a good.” The explanation in “to the extent . . .” says that health is more able to serve wisdom. If a wise person wants to act he will often find it easier to act as he wants to if he is healthy than if he is sick.<sup>13</sup> Socrates, then, can consistently claim that health is not a good. But he surely has not justified this claim, or the sufficiency thesis; for he has not shown that virtue can do without a level of health that is not within its control.

After finding such serious flaws in this argument in the *Euthydemus* we might remind ourselves that the dialogue as a whole is concerned with eristic, and suggest that even the protreptic passages are not free of the fallacious argument that is rife in the rest of the dialogue. But if we dismiss the argument we will have dismissed our best evidence of Socrates' defense of the sufficiency thesis. Before we dismiss it we ought to see if Socrates can reasonably appeal to assumptions about happiness that make some of his moves less clearly illegitimate.

At this point we need to examine Socrates' criteria and conception more closely. For our previous objections will collapse if Socrates can justify two claims:

1. When we plan for happiness, we can always count on having the right material, so that antecedent ill fortune can be ignored.
2. Happiness is the sort of end that is infallibly secured by the correct exercise of wisdom.

To justify these two claims Socrates needs to show that he can defend them from a conception of happiness that satisfies reasonable formal criteria. If we return to Aristotle's general account of happiness Socrates seems to be wrong; for the completeness, self-sufficiency and

<sup>13</sup> In *Meno* 88c6–d1 Socrates concedes that external goods are in some circumstances actually beneficial. His claim here is different from the one in the *Euthyd.*, though either claim is consistent with his main claims about virtue and happiness. See Part 10 below.



security of happiness seem to require just those goods that are exposed to antecedent and subsequent ill fortune. Socrates needs to show that he need not accept these inferences from the formal criteria.

## 6. Happiness and Desire

Aristotle takes happiness to be the self-sufficient and secure life. He assumes that self-sufficiency and completeness imply each other; for the list of reputed goods achieves self-sufficiency because it includes all the goods there are (1360b26).

But how is completeness to be achieved? Both Socrates and Aristotle assume, first, that happiness is what we all want, and, second, that whatever else we want we want for the sake of happiness (*Euthydemus* 278e3–279a4).<sup>14</sup> If we are concerned with happiness because it is what we want, it will be complete in so far as it achieves all we want, and self-sufficient if it lacks nothing that we need to achieve all our desires. Aristotle sometimes explains the completeness of happiness in this way, saying that it is what we must attain to fulfill our desire (*Eth. Eud.* 1215b17–18).<sup>15</sup>

If we accept this account of completeness and self-sufficiency, the formal criterion of happiness seems to explain why we need the external goods, and why the loss of them will prevent happiness. If I lack the resources to satisfy my desires, or ill-fortune interferes with their execution, I lose happiness because I have my desires frustrated. The elements of my happiness, on this view, must include all that I need for the satisfaction of my desires; and hence they must include the external goods.

This conclusion, however, is open to challenge, for a reason that is briefly stated by Hume. Hume denies that the failure of metaphysical ambitions is a ground for unhappiness or discontent: "For nothing is more certain than that despair has almost the same effect upon us with enjoyment, and that we are no sooner acquainted with the impossibility of satisfying a desire, than the desire itself vanishes" (*Treatise*, Intro.). Hume draws our attention to a familiar fact, that we do not necessarily think ourselves unhappy simply because we

<sup>14</sup> The second assumption is not explicit in the *Euthyd.*; but no other object of wish (*βουλόμεθα*, 278e3) and no other basis for choice than happiness is mentioned. Here, in apparent contrast to *Gorgias* 467c ff., *ἀγαθὰ* are not said to be objects of *βούλησις*.

<sup>15</sup> This is not a complete or fair account of Aristotle's conditions for happiness. (This passage, e.g., raises a question about the relation between being *αἰπετόν* and filling desire.) But the fact that he speaks in these terms about happiness shows how someone might interpret the demand for completeness.

cannot fulfill clearly unfeasible desires that we might have had or once did have. When we see that a desire is unfeasible we give it up, and once we have given it up, we no longer suffer the unhappiness of frustrated desire.

If we attend to Hume's point we can reply to the claim that external goods must be elements of happiness. The loss of these goods seems to cause unhappiness because it makes some of our desires unfeasible, and it will cause unhappiness if we retain the unfeasible desires. But the rational person will react by giving up the desires that have become unfeasible; once he has given them up, he is no longer unhappy because they are unsatisfied. The loss of external goods seems to cause no loss of happiness, and the external goods are therefore not necessary for happiness.

In reply to Socrates we might urge that Hume is not right about every case; even if we realize a desire is unfeasible and that we would be better off if we gave it up, we may retain it, and so continue to suffer the unhappiness resulting from its frustration. While this might be a fair objection to Hume, Socrates can hardly accept it. Since he accepts the Socratic Paradox, he believes that everyone's desires are all concentrated on his own happiness and the means to it; as soon as we see that an action does not promote our happiness we will lose the desire to do it. Socrates' moral psychology offers him a strong defense of Hume's claim.

Just as the loss of external goods does not by itself cause unhappiness, their presence does not by itself secure happiness. We can still misuse them; and however many we have, we may have such extravagant and unfeasible desires that we are still unsatisfied. In favorable conditions as well as unfavorable we need feasible desires; and once we have them, we can secure happiness through the fulfillment of our desires.

We have seen, then, why external goods are neither necessary nor sufficient for happiness; and at the same time we have seen why the appropriate sort of wisdom will secure happiness. A wise person will see that he is better off with feasible desires; and if changing external conditions make some of his desires unfeasible, he will give them up. By adapting his desires to suit the external conditions, he will secure his happiness whatever the conditions may be.

A wise person is indifferent to external goods in so far as he does not regret their loss, and sees that they are neither necessary nor sufficient for his happiness. But he does not ignore them altogether. For they are means to the satisfaction of some desires he has. If the wise person wants a Rolls-Royce, and has the money to buy it, the money will help him to satisfy his desires, and for that it will be

useful to him. But if he loses the money, he will not suffer a loss of happiness, since he will adapt his desires to suit his reduced resources.

We have traced a conception of happiness that accepts the Aristotelian formal criteria, and interprets them in a particular way that leads to a non-Aristotelian conclusion, that external goods are not elements of happiness, and so are not genuine goods. Aristotle leaves himself exposed to this sort of argument as soon as he identifies completeness and self-sufficiency with the complete fulfillment of desires; for then it seems quite reasonable to adapt our desires in ways that secure their satisfaction.

On further consideration we may even think the formal criteria demand the adaptive strategy. For Aristotle recognizes security as a formal criterion of happiness; and security seems to him to require a reasonable supply of external goods, which in turn requires good fortune. We might challenge Aristotle's inference and claim that only an adaptive strategy properly fulfills his formal criterion. For the happiness of a wise and well-adapted person seems far more secure than the condition of someone who depends on the continuation of good fortune; dependence on external conditions makes our well-being insecure; and such an insecure condition can hardly count as happiness. From the formal criteria of happiness we have reached a conception of happiness as the complete fulfilment of desire, and an adaptive strategy for achieving that fulfilment. Let us call this an adaptive account of happiness; we have seen why it presents a plausible challenge to the common-sense view that regards external goods as elements of happiness.

### 7. Socrates' Account of Happiness

I have sketched an adaptive account of happiness to show how it can plausibly be derived from the common-sense criteria presented by Aristotle. I now suggest that this sort of account is presupposed in the *Euthydemus*. If Socrates relies on an adaptive account of happiness, he can answer our previous objections relying on external circumstances. He is free to ignore antecedent fortune; for the wise person needs no particular external goods, but only needs to find the desires that are feasible in the circumstances. If he suffers subsequent ill fortune, that will not threaten his happiness either; he will simply have discovered that some of his desires are unfeasible, and so will eliminate them. Socrates can justifiably claim that wisdom by itself secures all the good fortune that is needed for happiness, and that while favorable conditions (e.g. being healthy rather than sick) make

it easier to fulfill the desires I have, they are unnecessary for happiness and do not contribute to it in their own right.

If an adaptive account of happiness allows this defense of Socrates' argument, we have some reason to suppose he accepts or presupposes it. This is not a decisive reason; we may be able to find other accounts of happiness that explain this argument as well or better. To explain the argument we should both be able to refer to formal criteria for happiness that Socrates might be expected to assume, and be able to answer the objections that arise at different stages in Socrates' argument. I cannot think of any other account of happiness that will pass these tests as well as the adaptive account passes them; and therefore I am inclined to attribute the adaptive account to Socrates.

The implicit presence of an adaptive account in the *Euthydemus* is one reason for ascribing it to Socrates. But clearly we will have much better reasons if we can find other evidence to support us, and we will have to think again if we find conflicting evidence in other dialogues.

One argument in the *Lysis* assumes that the good person, as such, is sufficient for himself and to that extent needs nothing else (215a6–8). This assumption is not clearly challenged in the dialogue; and we can see why Socrates accepts it if he believes that happiness is complete satisfaction and accepts the sufficiency thesis.

In the *Apology* Socrates suggests that death is a good thing even if it is like a permanent sleep (40a9–e4). There are few days or nights in our lives in which we have lived better or more pleasantly than in the nights of dreamless sleep (40d2–e2). Though Socrates first assumes that death involves non-existence (40c6), his praise of death does not rest on this assumption; and so he forgoes the Epicurean argument that nothing bad can happen to us when we do not exist and are unaware of anything.<sup>16</sup> His argument is a different one—that death is actually good for us because it is so similar to a condition that is evidently better and pleasanter than most others. This claim is intelligible if an adaptive account of happiness is assumed; for in dreamless sleep we have no unsatisfied desires. The more seriously we take this account of happiness, the more seriously we will take Socrates' praise of death.

In the *Gorgias* Callicles claims that happiness requires large and demanding appetites and their satisfaction (491e5–492c8). Socrates asks him to consider the view that “those who need nothing are

<sup>16</sup> 14. This passage is, quite reasonably, adapted to Epicurean use and strangely conflated with some of the dualism of the *Alc.* in *Ax.* 365d–366a. See D. J. Furley, “Nothing to us?” in *The Norms of Nature*, edd. M. Schofield and G. Striker (Cambridge 1986).



happy" (492e3-4).<sup>17</sup> Callicles rejects this view because it would imply that rocks and corpses are happiest of all (492e5-6). Since Socrates has just suggested that a wise person will be temperate and self-controlled, the conception of happiness that Callicles rejects is plainly the Socratic conception.

Socrates says he wants to "persuade you to change your mind and to choose, instead of the unfilled and unrestrained life, the life that is orderly and adequately supplied and satisfied with the things that are present on each occasion. But do I persuade you at all actually to change your mind <and agree> that the orderly people are happier than the unrestrained?" (493c4-d2). In this last sentence we might take Socrates to be defending only a comparative claim (cf. 494a2-5), so that he is not committed to the stronger claim that the self-sufficient people are actually happy. The merely comparative claim, however, is not enough for the *Gorgias*. Socrates has already asserted the sufficiency thesis against Polus (470e9-10), and he reasserts this claim against Callicles (507b8-c4).<sup>18</sup> If he maintains the adaptive account of happiness, his argument is clear. For he takes virtue to result from temperance, and therefore to result from wise planning that removes demanding and extravagant desires (503c4-6). An adaptive account of happiness strongly supports the sufficiency thesis; without such an account the thesis is left with very weak support.

Here as in the *Euthydemus* we ascribe the adaptive account to Socrates because he needs it; and such an argument is less than conclusive. We are better off in the *Gorgias*, however; for here Socrates mentions an adaptive account of happiness, and closely links it to his claims about virtue and happiness. It is striking that in the *Gorgias* he fails to distinguish the sufficiency thesis from the comparative thesis that is defended in the *Republic*; and the dialogue offers only the adaptive account to support the sufficiency thesis.

These remarks in dialogues apart from the *Euthydemus* encourage us to believe that an adaptive account of happiness is not confined to this one dialogue. Indeed they suggest that whenever Socrates

<sup>17</sup> Here *δέισθαι* includes both wanting and needing. We might think it is important to distinguish the two, to insist that someone who does not want anything may still need some things, and to urge that only not needing anything is a reasonable condition for the self-sufficiency that is relevant to happiness. But for Socrates the distinction will be unimportant, since what we need for happiness is just what we need for the complete satisfaction of our desires; when we have no unsatisfied desires, then, in his view, we will need nothing.

<sup>18</sup> I doubt if Socrates or Plato is (as often alleged) either confused by or deliberately exploiting any ambiguity in *εὖ πράττειν*. See *Plato: Gorgias*, tr. Irwin (Oxford 1979), p. 223.



appeals to a conception of happiness to support his argument, he appeals to a conception that finds happiness in the complete satisfaction of desire. An adaptive account of happiness is an important, though largely implicit, element of Socratic doctrine.

I have suggested that the claims made in the *Euthydemus* about external goods are properly explained by the adaptive account of happiness accepted in the *Gorgias*. It is worth remarking, then, that this connection between the two dialogues may have occurred to the author of the pseudo-Platonic *Eryxias*. The argument here asks whether such external goods as wealth are really goods or really useful. The argument in the *Euthydemus* is used to show that these goods are not always beneficial (403a2–c5). Later Socrates claims that the happier and better person is the one who requires fewer external goods (405b8–c6). Just as the healthy person is better off and needs less than the sick person, so the person with fewer desires is better off than the person with many desires who needs large resources to satisfy them (405c6–406a3).

This argument fills the gap left in the *Euthydemus*, by explaining why the wise person, who knows how to use external goods and therefore will make the best use of those he has, will also be successful and happy, no matter how few of them he has. Part of his wisdom is his knowledge that he does not need any particular level of them to secure his happiness, and that he secures his happiness by satisfying the desires that fit the external goods available to him.

We do not know who wrote the *Eryxias* or when. But it is worth mentioning for our purposes, since the author echoes both the *Euthydemus* and the *Gorgias*, and sees how they might be combined. I think the connections he finds reflect an important Socratic assumption. It is easy to suppose that the *Eryxias* reflects the influence of Cynic and Stoic arguments. But we need not assume this; it is an intelligible, and to this extent not unintelligent, development of Socratic views.

## 8. Interpretations of Socratic Happiness

If Socrates accepts an adaptive account of happiness, we can perhaps understand better why he does not inquire curiously into the nature of happiness. He realizes that his views about virtue and knowledge and their relation to happiness are controversial; but he might well believe that a conception of happiness as completely satisfied desire is fairly uncontroversial, and that an adaptive strategy is a reasonable conclusion from it. We can support Socrates by noticing that these claims might not seem bizarre to all his contemporaries.

The *Menexenus* recognizes self-sufficiency as a source of happiness. A person's happiness is most secure if the things that promote it depend on himself rather than on the good or bad fortune of others; and such self-sufficiency is the mark of the temperate, brave and wise person (247e5–248a7). I mention this passage not because I imagine that this funeral speech is meant to express distinctively Socratic doctrine, but for just the opposite reason. Such a remark in a speech consisting mostly of moral platitudes suggests that an adaptive account of happiness would not be bizarre and unintelligible (even if it was not immediately obvious) to someone with ordinary views about happiness. This is not to say that Socratic ethics is free of paradox; it certainly outrages common sense at some points, but its aims are not alien to common sense.

Some of Democritus' remarks on happiness suggest that one of Socrates' contemporaries could accept an adaptive account. He says: "If you do not desire much, a little will seem much to you; for a small desire makes poverty equipollent with wealth" (B 284). For similar reasons he advises us to "keep our minds fixed on what is possible, and be satisfied with what is present" (B 191, DK p. 184. 9–10; cf. *Gorg.* 493c6–7). The claim about equipollence is just what Socrates needs to explain why recognized goods are not really goods, and why their loss is not really a harm; if I reduce my desires I will no longer miss the wealth I have lost, and my reduced resources will serve me just as well.<sup>19</sup>

Democritus' advice makes it easy to infer that an adaptive account of happiness will also be ascetic, advising us to reduce our desires to the minimum. Xenophon associates self-sufficiency and requiring nothing with Socratic asceticism (*Mem.* I. 2. 14, 6. 10). In fact, however, the connection between an adaptive account and asceticism is not simple. If asceticism requires the actual cultivation of limited and undemanding desires in all conditions, it does not follow from

<sup>19</sup> This apparent evidence of a contemporary view may be challenged; see Z. Stewart, "Democritus and the Cynics," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 63 (1958), 179–91. It is one of the fragments derived from Stobaeus, and sometimes taken to be contaminated by Cynicism. At the same time this claim fits well with Democritus' belief in the unimportance of fortune and the importance of wisdom and one's own efforts; cf. B 119 and the well-attested B 3. The occurrence of the term "equipollent," *ἰσσοσθενεία*, otherwise attested only in later Greek, may provoke doubts, but perhaps should not. It is a technical term of Skeptical argument (though this is not its only use); but this may be an example of a Skeptical term introduced by Democritus. For another example of such a term see P. De Lacey "οὐ μᾶλλον and the antecedents of ancient Scepticism," *Phronesis* 3 (1958), 59–71. The appeal to equipollence may indeed be connected with the use of οὐ μᾶλλον, since both can be connected with a doctrine of indifferents; see, e.g., Sextus, *Pyrr. Hyp.* III. 177 (cited by De Lacey, n. 19).

an adaptive account of happiness. If I can easily afford a steak and would prefer it over a bowl of porridge, an adaptive account of happiness does not require me to prefer the porridge; it simply requires me to give up the desire for steak if I cannot satisfy it. Still, we can see why in some conditions Socratic adaptiveness might require the actions that would be required by Cynic asceticism. We might, therefore, both deny that Socrates is a Cynic ascetic and suggest that his adaptive account of happiness made it easy to regard him as an ascetic.

The Cynic and ascetic interpretation of Socrates' views on happiness provoked a reaction. As Augustine remarked, the unclarity of Socrates' views encouraged disagreement among professed Socratics.<sup>20</sup> Augustine was reasonably puzzled that the anti-hedonist Cynics and the hedonist Cyrenaics could both claim to be Socratics.<sup>21</sup> But the dispute is intelligible if Socrates accepts an adaptive account. For while the Cynics interpret this ascetically, Aristippus points out that self-sufficiency and independence does not require abstention from pleasures when they are available. Like Socrates' temperate person who is satisfied with "the things present on each occasion" (*Gorg.* 493c6–7; cf. *Democ.* B 191), he "enjoyed the pleasure of things present, but did not labor in pursuing enjoyment of things not present" (*Diog. L.* II. 66).<sup>22</sup> While Aristippus' version of hedonism would have surprised Socrates, he legitimately rejects the ascetic inferences drawn from Socrates' claims about happiness and self-sufficiency.

The philosopher who agrees most closely with Socrates on this issue is probably neither Antisthenes nor Aristippus, but Epicurus. I am not concerned here with Epicurus' hedonism, but with the account of happiness that forms his particular version of hedonism. Epicurus clearly accepts an adaptive account of happiness, and therefore cultivates independence of external conditions: "We count self-sufficiency as a great good, not so that in all circumstances we will use only a few things, but so that a few things will suffice us if we do not

<sup>20</sup> "Quod [sc. summum bonum] in Socraticis disputationibus, dum omnia movet, adserit, destruit, quoniam non evidenter apparuit, quod cuique placuit inde sumserunt et ubi cuique visum esse constituerunt finem boni" (*Civ. Dei* VIII. 3).

<sup>21</sup> "Sic autem diversas inter se Socratici de isto fine sententias habuerunt ut (quod vix credibile est unius magistri potuisse facere sectatores) quidam summum bonum esse dicerent voluptatem, sicut Aristippus; quidam virtutem, sicut Antisthenes" (*loc. cit.*; cf. XVIII. 41).

<sup>22</sup> Probably the force of *παρόντων* is partly temporal, reflecting Aristippus' views about prudence and the future. But it should also refer to Socrates' and Democritus' use of the term, for what is available and feasible.

have many, genuinely convinced that those who enjoy luxury most pleasantly are those who need it least" (Diog. L. X. 130).<sup>23</sup> Epicurus' advice sounds quite similar to Democritus'; but, unlike Democritus, he sharply rejects the ascetic inference supporting Cynicism. At the same time he clarifies Socrates' claim about self-sufficiency. Socrates left himself open to Cynic and Cyrenaic constructions, but committed himself to neither.<sup>24</sup> Epicurus best appreciates the role of an adaptive account in Socrates, and its consequences for the wise person's attitude to external circumstances. As we will see, the Epicurean position also captures some of Socrates' claims about the virtues, and reflects some of the difficulties in them.

### 9. The Sufficiency of Virtue

We turned to the *Euthydemus* to understand the account of happiness that is assumed in the sufficiency thesis. Having seen how Socrates conceives happiness we can now return to this thesis.

Socrates needs to connect wisdom with virtue. We have seen why knowledge of good and evil will be sufficient for happiness, if an adaptive account of happiness is accepted. For the wise person will be the one who knows that an adaptive strategy secures happiness; and this wisdom will secure his happiness. If we agree with Socrates in identifying virtue with the knowledge of good and evil, it follows that virtue is sufficient for happiness.

But we may still wonder how this conception of virtue is connected with the particular sorts of actions and states of character that both common sense and Socrates count as virtuous. Can Socrates explain why the wise person will characteristically be unafraid in battle, moderate in his appetites and demands, and unwilling to cheat or steal?

We can see the main line of argument if we consider why someone might be attracted to intemperate, cowardly or unjust action. If I am thinking about my happiness I might suppose that a particular vicious action will secure me some external good that I need to be happy, and that I will reduce my happiness if I deny myself that good. If I cheat, I can get the money I think I need to satisfy my desires; and if I do not cheat, and forgo the money, then apparently I lose something I need for happiness. An adaptive account implies that this argument is mistaken. If I forgo an external good, I simply

<sup>23</sup> I translate Cobet's attractive though unnecessary emendation ἀρκώμεθα (χρώμεθα, codd.), which makes the connection with the *Gorg.* and Democritus especially clear.

<sup>24</sup> The difference between the Socratic and the ascetic position is overlooked by E. R. Dodds, *Plato: Gorgias* (Oxford 1959), on 492e3.



need to adapt my desires to new circumstances, and I will not necessarily forgo any happiness.

Socrates insists strongly that a virtuous person will allow nothing to count against doing the virtuous action, no matter what the cost may be; the only question he need ask himself is what the virtuous action is, and his answer to that question should guide his action (*Ap.* 28b5–9).<sup>25</sup> His account of happiness makes this pattern of choice quite reasonable; since the virtuous person will not see any threat to his happiness if he pays the price of virtuous action in loss of external goods, he need not concern himself with this price in deciding what to do. If Socrates were to choose an external good over the virtuous course of action, he would be choosing an action that is bad for him, and he refuses to do this; that is why he refuses to propose an alternative to the death penalty (*Ap.* 37b5–e2).<sup>26</sup> For the same reason a good person cannot be harmed; no loss of external goods will threaten his happiness.

When Socrates makes these strong claims about virtue, he is not allowing himself a rhetorical exaggeration or an expression of unwarranted faith. He is drawing attention to a consequence of an adaptive account of happiness. A virtuous person can certainly suffer the loss of external goods; such losses require him to change his desires; but they do not threaten his happiness, since he adapts his desires to fit the circumstances.

If this is a defensible account of Socrates' claim about virtue, one consequence is worth noticing. It is easy to suppose that if Socrates thinks virtue all by itself is sufficient for happiness, then he must attribute some intrinsic value to virtue; it might be identical to happiness, or a part of happiness whose presence is causally sufficient for the presence of the other parts. If, however, Socrates holds an adaptive account of happiness, he can maintain the sufficiency of virtue without attributing any intrinsic value to it.

## 10. The Value of External Goods

We may hesitate to accept the sufficiency thesis because it seems to imply that no external good is worth pursuit at all; since these alleged goods do not promote happiness, they will not be genuine goods,

<sup>25</sup> This passage is appropriately stressed by Vlastos, "Happiness," p. 188, as evidence of Socrates' belief in the "sovereignty" of virtue over other goods.

<sup>26</sup> In saying that it would be bad for him to *choose* imprisonment as a penalty Socrates does not imply that there would be anything bad about imprisonment in itself. For a different view of this passage see Richard Kraut, *Socrates and the State* (Princeton 1984), p. 38 n.



and so apparently not worth pursuit. This objection was raised against the Cynics and Stoics who supported the sufficiency thesis. If we ascribe the thesis to Socrates we may well suppose he is open to the same objection; and if the objection seems cogent, we may hesitate to ascribe the thesis to him.

We may hesitate still more when Socrates sometimes seems to admit that external goods are goods. Sometimes he lists them as goods without hesitation (*Gorg.* 467e4–6, *Meno* 78c5–d1, *Lys.* 218e5–219a1). He says he would wish neither to do nor to suffer injustice (*Gorg.* 469c1). He allows the reflective pilot to wonder if he has benefited or harmed people by saving them from drowning (*Gorg.* 511e6–512b2). He even claims that virtue is the source of wealth and any other goods there are (*Ap.* 30b2–4).<sup>27</sup>

To admit that Socrates regards external goods as genuine goods introduces conflict with some of his other views:

- (a) He explicitly contradicts this view in the *Euthydemus* (281e3–5).
- (b) If the sufficiency thesis is true, and if nothing is good without contributing to happiness, then external goods cannot contribute to a virtuous person's happiness.
- (c) We avoid this conflict if we say that external goods make the virtuous person happier than he would be without them, and that this is what makes them goods, though even without them he would be happy. But if they are goods, then the loss of them should harm the virtuous person, and we are in conflict with the claim that the good person cannot be harmed.

We can remove any appearance of conflict if we deny either that (i) Socrates makes virtue the only good, or that (ii) he accepts the sufficiency thesis; or that (iii) he thinks the good person cannot be harmed. Alternatively, we can understand the claims about external goods so that they are consistent with (i)–(iii).

In the first three passages above (*Gorg.* 467e etc.) Socrates simply asks his interlocutor about commonly-recognized goods, and nothing in the argument depends on his agreeing with the interlocutor that these are genuine goods. The passages therefore provide very weak evidence for reinterpreting his explicit statement in (i). When he says

<sup>27</sup> Vlastos, "Happiness," p. 208 n. 66, follows J. Burnet, *Euthyphro, Apology, Crito* (Oxford 1924), *ad loc.*, in translating "from virtue wealth and the other things become goods" (taking ἀγαθὰ as predicate). This provides a less exact balance with the previous clause ("virtue does not come to be from wealth"); and the other translation, if I have explained it correctly, does not commit Socrates to praise of money-making. If Burnet's translation is accepted, then this will be a passage where Socrates allows goods whose loss does not leave a person any less happy.

he would not wish to suffer injustice Socrates refrains from saying he would wish not to suffer it.<sup>28</sup> He has no reason to wish for it, since suffering injustice is in itself no benefit to him, and he can say this even if not suffering injustice is no benefit to him either.<sup>29</sup> These passages do not require us to reinterpret (i).

But there is a broader reason for wanting Socrates to modify (i); we do not want Socrates to be a Cynic, believing that he has no reason to choose external goods over their opposites. It is worth noticing, then, that Socrates can consistently maintain that health is preferable to sickness without rejecting (i)–(iii). As we have seen, he is entitled to say that if I have a feasible desire, I have reason to choose a means to its fulfillment, and such a means is useful to me. To this extent Socrates could say that the means are instrumental goods. However, it is easy to suppose that if they are instrumental goods, I will be worse off without them; and in Socrates' view this is false. If I lack instrumental means to satisfy a desire I will just give up the desire, and I will be in an equally good position to achieve my happiness.

If, then, Socrates holds an adaptive account of happiness, he has some reason for allowing that external goods are goods (they are sometimes instrumental means to the fulfillment of my desires) and some reason for denying this (their presence or absence makes no difference to my happiness). Sometimes he compromises between these two claims by speaking in comparative terms. Just as in the *Euthydemus* he says health is a greater good than sickness for a virtuous person, he says the person who is killed unjustly is less wretched and pitiable than the one who kills unjustly (*Gorg.* 469b3–6), and that doing injustice is a greater evil than suffering it (509c6–7). We might insist that these comparative terms do not imply that external goods and evils are genuine goods and evils, even if the presence of one

<sup>28</sup> Vlastos, p. 198, and Kraut, p. 38 n., explain the passage differently.

<sup>29</sup> Vlastos, p. 192 f., understands Socrates in *Ap.* 30c6–d5 to mean that death or imprisonment or dishonor would be some harm to him, but a much smaller harm than doing injustice, and when Socrates says that a better man cannot suffer harm from a worse (30c9–d1) Vlastos takes him to mean that he can suffer no major harm. We might be forced to suppose that Socrates does not mean exactly what he says if we had compelling reason to adopt Vlastos's view in other passages, but this passage taken by itself must be *prima facie* evidence against Vlastos's view, and I doubt if other passages require us to take Socrates to be speaking in exactly here. As I explain below, even if Socrates were to admit that these external goods are goods, he would not have to admit that their loss makes him any less happy, and therefore would not have to admit that their loss harms him (even if he also concedes, at first sight paradoxically, that their presence benefits him).

and absence of the other counts as a benefit (509d1).<sup>30</sup> But it may be better to allow that Socrates does count external goods as genuine goods, and then to insist that they do not make a virtuous person any happier than he would be without them. We need not, then, be surprised to find apparent evidence of Socrates' speaking both ways; and we need not infer that he must reject (ii) or (iii).

### 11. Conflicting Views on Happiness

I have tried to show that Socrates holds an adaptive account of happiness, and that it is consistent with his recognition of reasons for choosing external goods. But even so I doubt if he sticks consistently to an adaptive account. Some of his remarks seem to require a different view that seems irreconcilable with the sufficiency thesis.

In the *Crito* Socrates compares justice in the soul with health in the body; he wants to show that it is not worth living with an unjust soul, and to show that he appeals to Crito's agreement that it is not worth living (*βιωτόν*) with a diseased body (47d7–e5). The same claim about health is affirmed still more strongly in the *Gorgias*. There Socrates argues that it does not benefit a person to live with his body in bad condition, since he is bound to live badly (505a2–4).<sup>31</sup>

These claims raise difficulties for the view that virtue is sufficient for happiness. For apparently the virtuous person could be in bad health; if bad health deprives him of happiness, it cannot be true that no evil can happen to him, and his wisdom cannot make good fortune unnecessary for his happiness.

At the same time, these claims raise wider questions about the nature of happiness. Socrates might maintain a conception of happiness as the complete fulfillment of desire, and argue that bodily sickness inevitably frustrates desires that we cannot help having; in that case he must admit the failure of an adaptive strategy for securing happiness. Alternatively, he might allow that we could cease to desire the health we cannot have, and still insist that we are unhappy because of how we are, not because of how we feel about it. In this case Socrates must reject the conception of happiness as complete fulfillment of desire. He will have to interpret the formal criterion of completeness and self-sufficiency as requiring fulfillment of our nature and capacities, not just of our desires.

<sup>30</sup> Kraut, p. 38 n., may be over-confident in claiming that "469b3–6 suggests that someone who is unjustly killed is to be pitied" and that "at 509c6–7 he [sc. Socrates] calls suffering injustice an evil."

<sup>31</sup> Zeyl, "Virtue," rightly cites these passages as evidence for Socrates' views on happiness; but he does not discuss their bearing on the sufficiency thesis.

It is worth asking whether this "Aristotelian" conception of happiness, referring to fulfillment of our nature and capacities, explains more of Socrates' claims than we have explained with the adaptive account. The main difficulty is its failure to explain the sufficiency thesis. Socrates appeals to the Aristotelian conception to suggest that virtue is necessary for happiness (*Cri.*, *Gorg.* locc. citt.), but it is not easy to see how it could also support the sufficiency thesis.

In *Republic* I Plato highlights this difficulty by relying on the Aristotelian conception. Socrates asks, "Will the soul achieve its function well if it is deprived of its proper virtue, or is this impossible?" (353e1-2). Thrasymachus agrees, as Crito did, that it is impossible, so conceding the necessity of virtue for doing well. But Socrates infers, "It is necessary, then, for a bad soul to rule and attend badly, and for a good one to do all these things well" (353e4-5).<sup>32</sup> This abrupt and illegitimate inference from necessity to sufficiency has no parallel in earlier dialogues; and though the *Republic* refers again to the Aristotelian conception (445a5-b4), Plato does not repeat the fallacious inference. Its presence in Book I may be a further sign of his self-consciousness in that book. Believing (as the rest of the *Republic* shows) that Socrates is right in appealing to the Aristotelian conception, Plato sees that this will not justify the sufficiency thesis; and so he abandons the sufficiency thesis in the rest of the *Republic*.

The Aristotelian conception, then, will not by itself explain Socrates' major claims about virtue and happiness. To explain these claims it is reasonable to ascribe the adaptive account to him as well. We have no reason to believe that Socrates sees the conflict between these two views.

## 12. Objections to Socrates

I have argued that an adaptive account of happiness explains the sufficiency thesis. But this result does not imply a satisfactory defense of virtue. Some unwelcome results of Socrates' views show what might be wrong both with his account of happiness and with his claims about virtue.

The problem about virtue is a special case of a general problem in the adaptive account of happiness. This account tells us what to do with desires that we have; satisfy the feasible ones and get rid of the unfeasible. It does not tell us how to choose between two equally

<sup>32</sup> On εὖ πράττειν in this argument see above, note 18. The inference (indicated by ἄρα, 353e4) from necessity to sufficiency is still invalid whatever we decide about the use of εὖ πράττειν.



feasible sets of desires. Indeed it must tell us that from the point of view of happiness there is nothing to choose between them. If I have the resources and capacities to be a musician, a politician or an athlete, and I want to be one, the adaptive account of happiness does not forbid me to try. But it does not explain why I should not want to do nothing but lie in the sun or torture insects. The choice between these two lives will have to depend on other grounds than happiness.

This conclusion might not surprise us. For it is not obviously false that an admirable and a deplorable life can make different people equally happy. But Socrates seems to think that happiness should be our sole and sufficient guide in deciding between different ways of life; and if happiness leaves so many questions open, it seems to be an inadequate guide for him.

If we apply this point to Socrates' claims about virtue, we can see where he faces questions. An adaptive account of happiness explains the sufficiency thesis. In Socrates' view, a virtuous person has seen that his happiness requires him to have flexible or feasible desires; he therefore cultivates these desires and eliminates others, and so ensures the satisfaction of his desires. He therefore ensures his happiness, and loss of external goods is no threat to it. To this extent Socrates can defend his claim that the virtuous person cannot be harmed and will be happy. He will not lose any happiness by being brave, temperate and just.

The same sort of argument shows why an opponent such as Crito or Callicles or Thrasymachus is wrong to suppose that happiness requires vicious action or vicious character. I will believe that happiness requires me to be unjust or intemperate or cowardly if I want the external goods secured by these vices, and I believe that these goods are necessary for my happiness. But if I believe this, I must accept a mistaken, non-adaptive account of happiness.

Socrates can argue, then, that virtue is sufficient for happiness and vice is unnecessary for happiness. But this argument seems to give him no reason to be virtuous rather than non-virtuous. He may convince me that my happiness does not require me to profit at my neighbor's expense. But I can still be happy if I am indifferent to my neighbor's interests or unconcerned about the other people fighting in the battle beside me. If my desires are flexible and feasible, I can secure happiness for myself even if I refuse to do any of the actions of the just and brave person. And if I feel greedy or malevolent or cruel or extravagant, an adaptive account of happiness does not prohibit the satisfaction of these inclinations.

This philosophical weakness in Socrates' position helps to explain the historical puzzle we mentioned earlier—the sharp conflict between the views of professed Socratics about the right account of



happiness. Socrates' adaptive account endorses neither the Cynic nor the Cyrenaic view; but it is hard to see how Socrates can deny that both views satisfy his account, or how he could justify preference for one view over the other. The sharp conflict between the Socratic schools reflects their common acceptance of a Socratic assumption, and, as Plato (in the *Philebus*) and Aristotle see, we can resolve this conflict only by rejecting the shared Socratic assumption.

Socrates, then, offers a weak defense of virtue. Though the sufficiency thesis may seem to recommend virtue rather strongly, it does not; for being virtuous is at best one of many possible results of an adaptive strategy.

Even if we agree with Socrates that the happy person has no need to violate the accepted rules of virtuous action, we need not agree that such a person is really virtuous. Mere absence of temptation to vicious action is not the same as a positive desire to do virtuous action; and we might argue that the positive desire is necessary for virtue. Further, we might argue that only the right sort of positive desire is sufficient for virtue; perhaps the virtuous person must value virtue and virtuous action for themselves, not simply as instrumental means.

We might even doubt that virtuous lives will normally be a subset of happy lives. Will a just person not desire to promote other people's good, and will his desire, in unfavorable conditions, not be frustrated? It looks as though a virtuous person will be less happy, according to Socrates' conception of happiness, than someone who is wrongly indifferent to the results of virtuous action.

For these reasons we might doubt if Socrates has an adequate defense of virtue. If he has no answer to our objections, it does not follow that he is wrong. It may be our estimate of virtue that is wrong. But the objections should at least encourage us to reconsider Socrates' case. Especially they should encourage us to reconsider the adaptive account of happiness.

At this point we might argue that if the adaptive account of happiness leaves Socrates open to such objections, we have good reason for doubting that he accepts it. And indeed this would be a good reason, if we also had good reason to believe that Socrates both sees these objections and sees their bearing on his account of happiness. But we have no good reason to believe either of these things.

### 13. Plato's Reply to Socrates

We may now return to the beginning of the argument, and the conflict between *Republic* I and the rest of the *Republic*. I have argued for these conclusions:

1. Socrates believes the sufficiency thesis maintained in *Republic* I.
2. He believes it because he accepts an adaptive account of happiness.
3. Such a conception makes just lives at best a proper subset of happy lives.

I now suggest a further conclusion:

4. Plato rejects the sufficiency thesis because he rejects the adaptive account of happiness.

Plato sees that it is reasonable to maintain an apparently weaker claim about virtue to avoid the price that must be paid for Socrates' stronger claim. The most plausible defense of the sufficiency thesis rests on an adaptive account of happiness. Once an adaptive account is rejected, the sufficiency thesis must be rejected; and Plato defends instead the comparative claim about virtue and vice.<sup>33</sup>

To show that Plato rejects an adaptive account of happiness, we need to understand the implicit criteria and conception assumed in the *Republic*. In particular we need to understand Plato's reasons for claiming that the people with unjust and disordered souls must all be unhappy. If we examine these reasons, we will see that Plato's claims about unjust people rest on an account of happiness that is not purely adaptive.

I will not defend this suggestion here. I have simply suggested why Plato might have good reasons for rejecting Socrates' sufficiency thesis. The thesis should be rejected not simply because it is counter-intuitive, but also because it rests on an account of happiness that is more deeply in error. When we see that Socrates' account of happiness leads him into error, we learn an important Socratic lesson that Socrates apparently has not learned himself; we need a clearer account of what happiness is supposed to be, and what would be a plausible candidate for happiness. This is the lesson that Plato and Aristotle learn, to different degrees. Once they examine happiness more carefully, they abandon Socrates' sufficiency thesis.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Plato's rejection of the Socratic Paradox gives him a further reason for rejecting Socrates' account of happiness (see note 10), though it would not by itself justify him in rejecting the conception of happiness as fulfillment of desires.

<sup>34</sup> An earlier version of this paper was read to the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy in December 1984, and benefited from questions raised on that occasion. Questions from audiences at Colgate University and at William and Mary College, especially from Daniel Little, helped me to improve a still earlier version. I have also benefited from criticisms by Gail Fine, and from a very helpful correspondence with Gregory Vlastos. I am especially indebted to the papers by Vlastos and Zeyl cited above.

# 7

## Forms as Individuals: Unity, Being and Cognition in Plato's Ideal Theory

RICHARD D. MOHR

This paper, building upon the unique-world argument of the *Timaeus*, interprets anew and makes coherent some central features of Plato's theory of Forms, in particular the sense in which each Form is one, the way in which cognitive access to Forms is a kind of acquaintance, and the sense in which Forms "really are."<sup>1</sup> The interpretation advanced might be descriptively dubbed "extreme monadism."

The position stated starkly is the following. What it is about each Form that constitutes it as the Form it is and as distinct from all others is not analyzable into relations and attributes. This claim is not that Forms have no relations to each other. The position is not a patently self-defeating monadism. There are relations between Forms and they are all necessary ones in consequence of the eternity of each Form. Relations between Forms and the phenomena come and go since the phenomena come and go. But relations between Forms cannot be other than they are. Some of these necessary relations are merely formal relations, like sameness, difference, and compatibility. But others are relations between the contents of Forms; one Form would not be what it is if another were not what it is. But relations between Forms do not constitute the core content of any

<sup>1</sup> The interpretation in general outline is intended to integrate with central tenets of the American unity school of Platonic scholarship—in a way that spares those tenets many recent critiques.

Form. No Form can be exhaustively reduced to, analyzed into, or derived from other Forms. This holds true of any Form regardless of its degree of specificity or generality. It applies to both the Idea of animal-in-general and the Idea of land-creature, both the Idea of element and the Idea of fire.<sup>2</sup>

Conversely, Plato seems to hold that the relations which Forms have among themselves are not entailed by what each Form is. This admittedly is highly counter-intuitive. One usually thinks, for instance, that one thing is different from another *entirely* by virtue of what each is. But Plato explicitly claims just the opposite, at least for merely formal relations. No Form is the same as or different than another because of what it is: "Each one [of the parts of the Form of difference, i.e., each and every Form] is different from the others not by reason of its own nature (*διὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν*) but because of its participation in the Form of difference" (*Sophist* 255e4–6). What a Form possesses of necessity, then, is sharply distinct from what it is to be the Form it is.

More importantly and surprisingly, each Form is not distinguished as the Form it is by virtue of possessing properties. Each is uniquely distinguished neither by the possession of a set of properties nor by the possession of some single, simple, unanalyzable property. Each Form is fundamentally an individual, not a thing qualified. As the Form it is, each is *τι* or *τοῦτο*, not *ποιόν*. It is only in relation to a Form that *something else* has (or is) a quality, whether the something else is a Form, soul or phenomenon.<sup>3</sup> Such qualities, however, neither singly nor in groups are constitutive of the core content of any Form, though they entirely exhaust the content of any phenomenon.

<sup>2</sup> So correctly, H. F. Cherniss, who notes the sharp distinction for Forms between necessity and "essence": "What Aristotle calls genus, differentia, and species are for [Plato] all distinct ideal units, each other than the others, each having aspects which imply the existence of the others or are compatible with them, but each being an independent nature which cannot be exhaustively analyzed into the others" (*The Riddle of the Early Academy* [Berkeley 1945], p. 54; see also more generally chapter one of Cherniss' *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Early Academy* I [Baltimore 1944]). The unique-world argument itself has sometimes been construed as a denial of this view. See, for example, R. E. Allen, *Plato's 'Euthyphro' and the Earlier Theory of Forms* (London 1970), p. 88, note 1. Against this denial, see R. D. Mohr, *The Platonic Cosmology* (Brill 1985), pp. 29–33.

<sup>3</sup> In the case of phenomena, since they have the status of images of Ideas cast onto the mirror of Space, it is more accurate to say simply that they are qualities (or congeries of qualities) than that they are things which have qualities. Each is *τοιούτον* with no *τοῦτο* (*Timaeus* 49c7–50b5).

## I. Forms as Unique

These conclusions, especially regarding qualities, are consequences of Plato's claims in the unique-world argument (*Timaeus* 30c–31b) that both the Form of animal-in-general and the world as animal-in-general are unique and yet that the world is an instance or image of the Form. I assume that uniqueness in the argument is an external or metaphysical attribute of the Idea of animal, that is, that uniqueness is a property of the Idea *qua* Idea, rather than *qua* being the particular Idea it is.<sup>4</sup> Further, I suggest that the Idea of animal is thought to be unique because it serves as a standard or measure. Plato twice gives an argument that each Form is unique by virtue of its status as a standard (*Republic* X. 597c, *Timaeus* 31a).<sup>5</sup>

Further, as standards, Forms are the fundamental individuals of the Platonic universe: everything else is dependent for its identification and intelligibility upon them. But they do not stand in this relation to anything. It is in this way, as self-sufficient, basic and independent, that the Idea of animal is repeatedly said to be complete in every way (*Timaeus* 30d2, 31b1), just as standards or measures in general are said to be complete (*Republic* VI. 504c1–3).<sup>6</sup> The Idea of animal is not complete in the sense of being a whole of essential constitutive parts, a whole which is unique, if it exhaustively contains all the instances of some type.<sup>7</sup> So Forms as standards turn out to be both fundamental individuals and fundamentally individuals.

Imagine the following scenario. Someone introduces Romulus to me, alleging that Romulus is an only child (*μονογενής*). Now if Remus is standing nearby, birth certificate in hand, I would be in a good position to say that the introducer was at least mistaken. If it further turned out that the introducer was fully familiar with Remus, say, by being his parent, then I also could reasonably claim that the introducer

<sup>4</sup> So, Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism*, pp. 295–96 and David Keyt, "The Mad Craftsman of the *Timaeus*," *Philosophical Review* 80 (1971), 230–35. Those who take uniqueness as a property peculiar to the Idea of animal derive their interpretation from R. D. Hind, *The Timaeus of Plato* (London 1888), pp. 94–95; they include Richard Parry, "The Unique World of the *Timaeus*," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 17 (1979), 1–10 and Richard Patterson, "The Unique Worlds of the *Timaeus*," *Phoenix* 35 (1981), 105–19, against which see Mohr, *Cosmology*, pp. 15–16.

<sup>5</sup> See Mohr, *Cosmology*, pp. 24–26.

<sup>6</sup> On this important but little discussed passage and on the completeness of Forms generally, see Mohr, *Cosmology*, pp. 33–36.

<sup>7</sup> Parry and Patterson construe uniqueness in this way, that is, as exhaustive completeness (see note 4 *supra*). This sort of uniqueness, however, simply is not found in Plato's account of the way the world is unique in consequence of its animality (*Timaeus* 33b–37c).



either was crazy or was lying. If further the introducer, in self-defense, claims that Romulus is an only child *just exactly because* he is an identical twin to Remus, I would have to conclude that the introducer is not crazy, but is intentionally being perverse, hoping perhaps for a chuckle on my part.

Those numerous critics, who suppose that Forms have the properties of which they enable the recognition in other things, are committed, it seems to me, to viewing Plato in the unique-world argument as taking upon himself the same role as the introducer in this Roman scenario. For if the Idea of animal is such that, when it is copied, a formal similarity obtains between it and the world with respect to animality, and if both the Idea and the world are claimed to be unique each as being the sole possessor of animality-in-general and if this is claimed to be so as a direct result of the similarity of Idea and world, then Plato must be making a bad joke. For one cannot without contradiction claim that two formally identical things are each severally unique with respect to the very property they have in common, and further one cannot in all seriousness draw attention to the contradiction by claiming the two things are unique *because* they are formally identical. Since the unique-world argument and its surrounding pages are deadly serious, some way out of the Roman paradox needs to be found.

One way out, which will not work, is to claim that the Idea and its instance, though similar with respect to the very property of which allegedly each is the only possessor, possess it each in a different manner or in relation to some further distinguishing feature, such that each is unique in possessing the common property in some way the other does not. The Moon is unique in this way. It is unique not *qua* moon, but in relation to the Earth. It is the Earth's only moon. On this account, the Idea of animal will be the only animal-in-general which is an Idea and the world will be the only animal-in-general which is a phenomenal object. This way out will not work for it marks a retreat from the explicit and emphatic claim that the world is unique *because* it is like the Idea (*Timaeus* 31a8-b2).

The correct way out of the paradox is to recognize that Plato is using "unique" in two subtly but importantly distinct senses. The world is unique in the sense of being one in number and the only instance or possessor of its kind. Thus Plato calls the world *μονογενής* (*Timaeus* 31b3, 92c9), which here has its root sense "only begotten" (cf. *Critias* 113d2). Plato, however, crafts the unique-world argument carefully so that this term is not used to qualify the model. He uses rather the abstract coinage *μόνωσις* ("one-ness") to describe the uniqueness of the model (*Timaeus* 31b1). In part the choice is perhaps

governed by a desire to avoid associations of generation which attach to *μονογενής*. In part the choice is perhaps an attempt to signal a slight change of sense. However, because the term is a Platonic nonce-word, its sense, which eventually comes to mean "singularity by virtue of isolation or remoteness,"<sup>8</sup> has to be gleaned from the argumentative context.

When the context is scrutinized carefully, it turns out that in ascribing uniqueness to the Ideas, Plato does not mean that each Idea is one in number and the only instance or possessor of its kind, but rather means that each Idea is one in number and the only one for its kind, the kind or common characteristic of which it makes possible the identification in its various instances. Each kind has but one thing which makes possible the determination that the things which possess the kind indeed do possess it. This one thing is the Form for that kind (so *Republic* X. 596a6–b4).

Within the unique-world argument the subargument showing that the Idea of animal is unique indeed establishes it as unique in the sense of being one-for-a-kind and not in the sense one-of-a-kind (*Timaeus* 31a4–7; cf. *Republic* X. 597c). Important results follow from this establishment. For the world can be unique in the sense of being one-of-a-kind, which is the only way in which an instance of a Form could be unique *qua* instance, and the world can be unique in this sense without, as it were, "competition," since the Idea of animal is no longer unique *in this sense*. But if the world alone is to have the status of being unique in the sense of being one of the kind it is (i.e., of-Animal),<sup>9</sup> then the Idea of animal will necessarily not be of that kind. The Idea of animal, therefore, must be fundamentally an individual since it is numerically one, and yet is independent of being of a kind with respect to what it is. Though some things may be said of it (e.g., its external or metaphysical properties and its merely formal relations), its "essence" is not an attribute or quality.

Insofar as the uniqueness of the Idea of animal is an external or metaphysical property of the Idea, what the unique-world argument as a whole adds to Plato's arguments for the uniqueness of Forms is a commitment (sometimes read even as implied in those arguments)<sup>10</sup> that each Form is not of the kind of which it allows the determination in other things. Forms are fundamentally individuals.

<sup>8</sup> See *LSJ*<sup>9</sup> s.v.

<sup>9</sup> The kind is determined by multiple occurrences of an asymmetrical relation which individuals hold severally to a unique other individual, on analogy with the way in which all the particular sculptures and paintings of Churchill constitute a kind: of-Churchill.

<sup>10</sup> For example, Cherniss, *Selected Papers* (Leiden 1977), pp. 332–34.

Plato then resolves the Roman paradox by using "unique" in subtly ambiguous ways when he ascribes it variously both to Idea and instance. Each *Ideá* is fundamentally an individual and is unique in the sense of being one for a kind; whereas the world is unique as being one of a kind, the only instance of its Form. This means, though, that Plato is neither crazy nor disingenuous in asserting that the world is similar to its Idea and yet that both world and Idea are unique.

## II. Some Problems and their Resolutions

If Plato indeed construes Forms fundamentally as individuals, new problems may appear to crop up where old ones were resolved. For the implications of this view for his logic and epistemology will have a tendency at least initially to boggle the mind.

If it is asked, for example, in what way Forms for different kinds differ from each other, it turns out that no ordinary vocabulary exists in which to state the answer accurately. They are numerically distinct to be sure. But if what has been said about Forms so far is true, it is logically impossible to say that they are formally distinct. For they no longer are to be thought of as having properties with respect to what each is by means of which they might be formally distinguished. And yet they cannot simply be bare particulars capable of being interchanged without any subsequent effect. For they must be discernibly distinct in order to be each for its kind alone. So two features of the unique content of Forms may seem to be severally paradoxical and jointly contradictory: on the one hand, a Form's uniqueness cannot be analyzed in terms of its possession of properties, properties which might distinguish one Form from the next, and yet on the other hand, the various contents of Forms must be fundamentally individuals without, though, being merely fungible.

Some intuitive sense, however, can be made of these curious conditions if it is noted that they jointly apply to pre-theoretical understandings of the referents of mass nouns (gold, glass, water, flesh, wood). Aristotle is on the mark when he gives these, rather than the referents of count nouns (horses, trees, golf balls) as paradigm cases of matter—that of which predications are made. They are metaphysically distinct as that to which properties or forms attach, but are themselves neither simply properties nor form/matter composites. For each is distinctively a stuff. The referent of a count noun is not a stuff. A horse, a cow and a man are not three "stuffs" or three kinds of stuff. Aristotle is therefore off the mark with his doctrine of *relative* matters—the view that, for instance, gold is a

qualification of yet another matter, water, in the same way that a ring's shape is a qualification of its gold. On this view, "gold" would become a count noun and gold would cease to be a stuff—would lose its most distinctive metaphysical character. A form/matter or attribute/thing analysis applies neatly only to the referents of count nouns.

Indeed common understanding does not suppose that the referents of mass nouns are *things* which have properties that account for their various distinctive natures. Rather the properties which common understanding associates most closely or "essentially" with the referents of mass nouns are properly ascribed rather to things *other* than the referents themselves—things which, however, have the properties by virtue of the referents themselves serving loosely as standards for identifying the properties. Thus one says that water is wet, but really what one means by wet is that a wet thing is one that has water on it or in it in a way that can be felt. One uses water to identify things as wet. Or one says that water is drop-forming, but really what is meant when one calls something drop-forming is that it acts in air as water does. Or one says that water is life-giving, when what one really means is that for a non-artificial object, taking in water is required to maintain it as the kind of thing it is. So similarly stand to each other the items of the following couples: gold/golden, lead/leaden, flesh/fleshy.

On the other hand, everyday pre-theoretical, pre-Bohr understanding does not suppose that some deep, hidden, ultimately quantifiable structure or "genotype" is metaphysically lurking in the nature of things to guarantee and account for the unique natures of the referents of mass nouns.

Common understanding tends to view the referents of mass nouns as primitives. Water is a prime case. Once it is seen that the properties most closely associated with it are not what make it what it is but are consequences in other things of what it is, nothing is left to say about it in the language of properties that gets to the heart of what it is. And yet it is different than gold. The unique content of the referent of a mass noun is neither on the one hand analyzable into properties nor on the other merely a fungible particular. Something like this understanding of mass nouns as indicating primitive contents, I suggest, stands behind Plato's understanding of the unique contents of Forms.

It also stands behind his understanding of the necessary relations between contents of Forms. The descriptions in the late dialogues of relations between contents of Forms are elaborated almost entirely in terms of metaphors of artistic and natural production which apply



chiefly and in some cases exclusively to mass nouns: blending, pervading, cutting, purifying, intermingling, interweaving, harmonizing. These are metaphors of processes by which stuffs come to be related or distinguished and help explain how Plato can both maintain the view that the contents of Forms may necessarily entail each other and yet that no Form's content is exhaustively analyzable into that of other Forms.

The relations between contents of Forms may be viewed, as Plato's metaphors suggest, on an analogy with blendings which produce alloys. Brass would not be what it is if copper and zinc were not what they are, and yet one has not exhausted or even much clarified the nature of brass in saying that it is copper blended, pervaded, mixed or infused with zinc. Zinc and copper are not said of brass, nor brass of either of them. Neither of them is either a genus or a differentia of brass, and yet they, in the distinctive ways of stuffs, are as "essential" to it as anything might be. So too, I suggest, Plato views the contents of Forms as "blending" and standing to each other in the ways that the referents of mass nouns are distinctively interrelated. They may stand in relations of necessary entailments to each other and yet not constitute singly or in groups the "essence" of each other.<sup>11</sup>

If Forms are unique individuals the contents of which are not distinguished by properties, then not only will Forms not be essentially described in Aristotelian definitions per genus and differentia but also the names of Forms will not even be disguised definite descriptions. For Forms are not what they are as the result of even partially being solutions to sets of conditions which might be treated discursively. If the names of Forms are names in any modern sense, they

<sup>11</sup> Besides the metaphors of blending, harmonizing and the like, Plato does use another set of metaphors to describe some relations between Forms: embracing and scattering—two metaphors which apply most aptly to the referents of count nouns rather than mass nouns. But, he uses these metaphors not to suggest substantial relations between Forms, that is, necessary relations of content by which one Form would not be what it is if another were not what it is. Rather the two metaphors are simply complementary ways of indicating merely formal relations of similarity: *x* encompasses, embraces or surrounds *y* and *z* if it is a Form of which they are instances, and *y* and *z* are scattered or dispersed if they have a formal identity between them by virtue of each participating in some one Form *x*. Thus, "are scattered" is equivalent to "participate in." Like the participation relation, the dispersion relation holds not only between one Form and others (e.g., *Sophist* 260b8) but also between a Form and its phenomenal instances (*Timaeus* 37a5, *Philebus* 15b5). Because similarity relations hold most clearly between the referents of count nouns, not mass nouns, Plato's use of the metaphors of encompassing and scattering to indicate such relations is well motivated and clever, since it allows him to hold in reserve his metaphors of blending to indicate substantial relations between Forms. On the encompassing relation, see Mohr, *Cosmology*, pp. 27–29.



are most like Russellian logically proper names, which pick out individuals as individuals from a field of immediate acquaintance. However, the invariably spatial determinations which provide the distinctness needed for "this" and "that" in ordinary deictic discourse are either completely inappropriate or hopelessly metaphoric when applied to the "field" of Ideas. It will be the content of each Idea showing forth itself as it is which constitutes the distinctness necessary for their being picked out by "this" and "that." Further, though names of Forms do not harbor descriptive elements, nevertheless, since each Idea has a peculiar content, the names of Forms may be used incorrectly. If one Form is called by a name, it will be incorrect to call any other Form by that name.

It is frequently objected that if Forms are fundamentally individuals and not primarily fulfillments of conditions or are not in some other way subjects of significant descriptions, but are simply given individuals which at best can merely be named rather than described, then they lose their explanatory power and so too their very reason for having been hypothesized in the first place, and so allegedly fail in their metaphysical and epistemological mission.<sup>12</sup> The answer to this charge is that the explanatory power of Forms as standards lies in their *relations* to other things. Standards allow us to describe and identify other things and insofar as standards form necessarily related clusters, they can explain causal relations among other things. In this regard, Plato is no more silly than Aristotle or any philosopher who wishes to claim that some principles of explanation must themselves be beyond explanation.

### III. Acquaintance with Forms

It might be argued that, if Forms are fundamentally individuals and not essentially things qualified, then, even with possible problems of their causal inertness set aside, Platonic Forms will fail to be within the category of the cognizable on pretty much any theory of cognition which one might pick.

Since Aristotle's day, it has been hard to imagine that anything could be, or could be perceived as being, one without it also being one of some kind (*Physics* II, chapters 1–3, 7; *De Anima* II, chapter 12). However, some intuitive grasp can be had of what it is like to take in something as being one without having also to consider it as

<sup>12</sup> For instance, this charge of explanatory vacuousness has been leveled by J. M. E. Moravcsik, "Recollecting Plato's Theory of Forms," *Phronesis* supplementary volume II (1976), pp. 18–20.

one of some kind, a kind which is capable in theory of multiple instantiations, if it is acknowledged that something like this is how an individual recognizes non-reflexively other individual people as unique. One's immediate taking in of others is as their being each numerically one but not of some kind. Even if one is pressed into cataloguing a list of a person's accidental characteristics and quirks which are sufficiently diverse to apply collectively only to this person (gait, eye-color, gender, general location, sense of humor, pretensions, etc.), one would be chary of calling this compounded predicable a kind, even if the catalogued characteristics were jointly capable in theory of duplication. Humans tend to perceive even Romulus and Remus immediately as unique without appealing to their spatial distinctness or the order of their births. The reasons for humans first thinking of people as individuals rather than collocations of properties are complex, resting probably at the intersection of theology, sociology, biology and ethics. The point is only that people in fact do take in other people fundamentally as individuals. Perceiving or grasping Forms will be roughly analogous to the way one takes in people as individuals.

Platonic knowledge, as a kind of seeing or apprehending with "the mind's eye" (*Republic* VI. 508d4), will be strongly disanalogous then to Aristotelian perception or perception-like passive thought (*De Anima* II, chapter 12; III, chapter 4) in which processes the cognizer becomes formally identical with the object of cognition. A Form just as the Form it is has no qualitative nature with which to stand in a relation of formal identity to a perceiver. For it is a "this" (τοῦτο) with no essential "such" (ποῖόν).

#### IV. The Third Man Argument

That the Ideas are fundamentally individuals rather than things qualified spares Plato's two-tiered ontology from entailing the vicious logical regress of the Third Man Argument (TMA).<sup>13</sup> The unique-world argument helps pinpoint where Plato supposes the TMA goes awry when directed at his theory of Ideas. The TMA assumes that (a) any Form along with its instances can be taken as members of a set of which all the members severally but in common possess the attribute which makes the instances instances of the Form. The TMA further assumes that (b) since in accordance with good Platonic

<sup>13</sup> For texts see *Parmenides* 132a1-b2 and 132d1-133a6; Aristotle's *On the Forms*, in Alexander (of Aphrodisias), *In Metaphysica commentaria*, ed. M. Hayduck (*Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca*, 1) (Berlin 1891), 84.21-85.11.

principles all attributions of properties to things are made by reference to some Form beyond the set of things which consists of members with a common property, there must be another Form over and above the first. Given (a) and (b), and if in addition (c) the new Form too is formally identical to the members of the earlier set, then there will be an infinite regress of Forms. The regress will be vicious because by virtue of (b) prior members of the regress presuppose (for their identification) posterior members of the sequence, of which there is no last member. Plato would reject (a) and *a fortiori* reject (c). He accepts (b). In the vocabulary of the recent critical tradition, (a) and (c) presuppose self-predication of Forms, that is, they assume that each Form possesses the same property it defines in other things. And (b) presupposes the non-identity of Form and instance, that is, it presupposes that a thing which possesses an attribute cannot be numerically identical with the Form by which one claims the thing has the attribute it has.

Those who suppose that Plato is committed to the TMA argument, in order to get the requisite premise (a) for the argument, must assume that in the unique-world argument Plato is reproducing the Roman paradox discussed above. They must claim that the Idea of animal and the world severally but in common possess the attribute "animal," so that Plato is being intentionally perverse in calling each unique because the two are so similar.

If Forms are fundamentally individuals and are not things which possess characteristics with respect to what each peculiarly is, Plato is clearly not committed to and indeed would deny premise (a) and its self-predication assumption. For one will not be able to make a mental review of a Form and its instances in such a way that it turns out that they are discovered to form a set the members of which each possess some formal identity with every other member.

## V. The Really Real

If Forms are fundamentally individuals, a fairly precise account can be given of the Platonic sense of "to be" and of what Plato means when he says that each Form "really is" (*Republic* X. 597d2, *Philebus* 59d4, *Phaedrus* 247c7).

The sense of the Platonic "to be" has been extensively debated. Recently, the range of possible senses of "the Form of F is" has become saturated. Every possible sense of the Greek "to be" has been ascribed to the Platonic "to be." The possible senses of εἶναι are:

1. incomplete copula: "to be" = "to be F" (by far the most popular critical view; taken as the Platonic "to be" by G. Vlastos *et al.*).<sup>14</sup>
- 2a. complete first-order veridical: "to be" = "to be so," "to be as it is said to be," "to be the case" (i.e., "is the state of affairs which true propositions describe") (C. Kahn).<sup>15</sup>
- 2b. complete second-order veridical: "to be" = "to be true" (as applied to propositions) (G. Fine).<sup>16</sup>
3. complete existential: "to be" = "to exist" (old guard unitarian critics).<sup>17</sup>

If Forms are standards or more especially are fundamentally individuals, the Platonic "to be" will have to be a complete existential sense. The old guard unitarians are right on this matter. The Platonic "to be" is *some* sense of "to exist."

If Forms are not fundamentally (if at all) things qualified with respect to what each particularly is, then the Platonic "to be" as applied to the Form of F cannot mean "to be F;" and so *a fortiori* the distinctive way in which a Form is said to be, i.e., "completely" or "really" cannot mean "to be F *par excellence*," or "to be F to the greatest degree possible" [therefore, not 1].

If Forms are fundamentally individuals then *a* Form by itself, though it is said "to be," does not constitute a state of affairs which can be captured in propositional form. So it does not seem that the Platonic "to be" is a first-order veridical sense ("to be the case"). Only a network or combination of Forms could be said to be in this sense. And it is clear that the Ideas as a whole are said to be because each individual Idea is said to be and not vice versa. In general the view that the Greek "to be" is a first-order veridical sense fails to

<sup>14</sup> Gregory Vlastos, *Platonic Studies* (Princeton 1973), pp. 42–57 and especially 58–75; Richard Ketchum, "Plato on Real Being," *American Philosophical Quarterly* (1980), 213–20; G. Santas, "The Form of the Good in Plato's *Republic*" in *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy II*, ed. John P. Anton and Anthony Preus (Albany, NY 1983), pp. 232–63; and Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, "'Nothing' as 'Not-being': Some Literary Contexts that Bear on Plato" also in *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy II*, pp. 59–69.

<sup>15</sup> Charles Kahn, "Some Philosophical Uses of 'to be' in Plato," *Phronesis* 26 (1981), 105–34.

<sup>16</sup> Gail Fine, "Knowledge and Belief in *Republic V*," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 60 (1978), pp. 121–39.

<sup>17</sup> Frequently only implicitly assumed, but see for example, Cherniss, *Papers*, pp. 131–32 and Allen, "Participation and Predication in Plato's Middle Dialogues" in *Studies in Plato's Metaphysics*, ed. Allen (London 1965), pp. 57–58.



give full weight, or indeed any weight, to the role that unity plays in defining "being" at least in Parmenides and Plato<sup>18</sup> [so, not 2a].

When it is claimed that the Platonic "to be" is a second-order veridical sense, which when taken together with the qualifiers "really" and "completely," is solely applicable to the Forms, what is meant is that *all* propositions which actually have a Form as their subject's referent will invariably be true (whereas some statements about a phenomenal object will be true, others false). But as with sense 2a, a Form just by itself, though it is, does not establish the truth of even a single proposition (regarding what it alone is) let alone establish the truth of a whole field of propositions [so, not 2b].

Forms, therefore, must be said "to be" in some complete existential sense. The Platonic "to be" is some sense of "to exist." However, if Forms are fundamentally individuals, the sense of "exist" here cannot be the post-Kantian sense in which "to exist" means "to be an instance of a concept" or "to be the value of a variable."<sup>19</sup> If Forms are fundamentally individuals with respect to what each one is, then they are not even candidates for serving as things over which one may quantify. On this modern account of existence, the instances of Forms will exist, but Forms themselves will not. With respect to being the Form it is, each Form possesses no properties which can be cast as predicates in such a way that the Form's name may be said to provide a value for their variables.

Further, however one construes those among the Great Kinds in the *Sophist* which are dispersed to and said of all Forms (namely, Being, Sameness, Difference, and Rest), it is clear that Plato supposes Forms to exist because they participate in Being rather than because they can be values for bound variables of the predicates "same," "different," and "at rest" (*Sophist* 252a, 254d, 256a, e, 259a). Ironically, on my account Plato turns out not to be a Platonist, as "Platonist" is used in current discussions of number theory, wherein to be a Platonist is to be committed to quantifying over abstract entities.

Because the Platonic "to be" applies directly to individuals as individuals, it must mean something within the constellation of notions "to be actual," "to be substantial," "to be there in such a way as to provide an object to point at," and "to present itself." When the adverbial qualifications "really," "completely," or "purely" are at-

<sup>18</sup> See Kahn, "Why Existence does not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek Philosophy," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 58 (1976), pp. 323-34.

<sup>19</sup> For a denial that the modern sense of "to be" is the sense used by Greek philosophers generally, see Kahn, *ibid.*, pp. 323-25.



tached to this sense of "is," the compounded designation means "is this way (actual, self-presenting) *on its own* or *by virtue of itself*," or "is there to be picked out independently of its relations to anything." These adverbial qualifications are basically equivalent to the Platonic *καθ' αὐτό*, especially when it is contrasted with *πρός τι*.

The main engine for the opposing, most widely held view that the Platonic "to be" is a predicative sense—"to be F"—is the contention that an existential sense would be incompatible with Plato's various claims that different things may have different *degrees* of being or admit of *more or less* being (e.g., *Republic* V. 479c8–d1; VII. 515d1–3).<sup>20</sup> Only the predicative sense, so it is claimed, can properly capture the notion of different things being in different degrees, since only predicates (or at least some of them) pick out properties which can be manifest in varying degrees. Allegedly existence cannot admit of degrees, since "existence" is not a predicate. However, this allegation will be true only if "to exist" is construed in the modern sense as "to be an instance of a concept," "to be the referent of a subject of which predications are made" or more formally "to be the value of a bound variable." For admittedly a thing cannot partially be an instance of a concept. This is clearly the case with concepts like cow and seven. And even if one were tempted to claim that, say, a piece of cloth might partially instantiate red or some concept that admits of degrees, it would be more accurate to say simply that it is an instance or token of the type or shade it is, say, puce. And yet, if "to exist" is taken not in the modern sense, but as meaning "to be substantial (independently of its relations to anything else)" or "to be there on its own in such a way as to be pointed at" or the like, then its sense is completely compatible with *an* understanding of different things possessing different degrees of being—an understanding on which the various degrees need not form a *continuous* scale.

The telling example of this understanding for the Platonic metaphysics is the following. A shadow or an image in a mirror or a dream object will *be less* (real), in the requisite sense, than its original. And the original will *be fully* or *be completely* (real), again in the requisite sense. For its substantiality is not further dependent upon something else in the way the image is dependent upon it. And yet there is no continuous scale of degrees between the grade of existence of the image and that of its original. This account, then, of the Platonic "to be," which simply appeals to intuitions that stand behind some quite ordinary linguistic conventions concerning "being" and

<sup>20</sup> So Vlastos, pp. 60–63, 66, and especially Mourelatos, p. 65.

“real,” captures better than does Vlastos’ the central metaphor of original and image by which Plato chiefly conveys his metaphysics of Forms.<sup>21</sup>

Plato does not suppose that his talk of a thing admitting more or less of something else entails that the something else consists of a scale of *continuous* gradations. For in the *Statesman* Plato ranks number (i.e., integers) along with length, breadth and thickness (or swiftness) as examples of things that admit of more and less (284e) and yet he is as fully aware as Aristotle that numbers do not admit of continuous variation. Five fingers are not just sort of odd; they just are odd and not even a slight bit even or a slight bit six (*Phaedo* 103e–104b, 104d–105b, 105d, 106b–c, and especially *Cratylus* 432a–b). For Plato, being, like integers, may be manifest in non-continuous degrees.

Plato is a neo-Platonist to the extent that he thinks that being is sometimes a predicate; however, he fails to be a neo-Platonist in that he does not suppose that an examination of any two grades of being will always reveal some third intermediary grade.

This reading of the Platonic “to be” also accounts nicely for what Plato says about the sense in which things other than Forms *are*. The phenomena or objects of opinion exist on this account, but they do not “fully” or “really” exist (*Republic* V. 479c8–d1, cf. VII. 515d1–3; *Timaeus* 28a2–4, 52c4–5). They are there to be pointed at, but not by virtue of themselves. They are doubly dependent on other things. For their ability to shine forth, they depend both upon the Forms by virtue of which they are the images they are and upon the Receptacle or Space, which serves as a medium for their reception (*Timaeus* 52a–c).

In calling the Receptacle itself a “this,” Plato seems to want to assign to it the same full reality which he assigns to the Forms (50a1–2, a7–b2). Plato’s confessed trouble with designating clearly the mode of cognition of the Receptacle (52b1–2) then arises not because the Receptacle lacks qualities or attributes (50b–c, d–e, 51a7), but rather

<sup>21</sup> Vlastos and Mourelatos simply mistake the implications of Plato’s use of the image metaphor as a vehicle for explaining senses of “to be.” They too hastily assimilate the metaphor to the predicative sense of “to be.” Neither author gives any weight to or shows any awareness of Plato’s exclusive use, as a vehicle for his ontology, of *non-substantial* images, ones that is which, like shadows, images in mirrors, and television pictures, but unlike photographs, sculptures, and paintings, require for their existence—their “being there”—the persistence both of their originals and of a medium in which they must appear. See Vlastos’ analysis of the shadow images of *Republic* VII. 515d, pp. 61–62 and Mourelatos’ analysis of dream and shadow images, p. 62. For a detailed look at the nature of non-substantial images and the implications of their use in Plato’s exposition of his ontology, see E. N. Lee, “On the Metaphysics of the Image in Plato’s *Timaeus*,” *Monist* 50 (1966), pp. 341–68.

because, though it is a "this," it indeed does not shine forth or present itself. When one looks to it, one does not see it, one sees what is *in* it (52b3-5). When one points at it, one does so indirectly.

If this characterization of the existence of Forms is correct, the earlier account of their acquaintance is reinforced: the mode of cognition of Forms must be a form of unmediated acquaintance, operating on a rough analogy with the way in which without a moment's reflection and really without doubt one spots an individual or recognizes him as the individual he is.

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# 8

## A Dramatic Interpretation of Plato's *Phaedo*

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No scene which presents itself to the imagination excites greater pathos than that of Socrates sitting on his prison couch and cheerfully drinking his cup of poison. Long after the reader has forgotten the wandering maze of arguments in Plato's *Phaedo*, he carries fixed in his mind the heroism of Socrates during his last day, his persistence in pursuing difficult arguments, and the nobility with which he meets his death. And Plato has achieved his aim, for the dialogue is not about the immortality of the soul—indeed, the arguments, as generally recognized, are unsuccessful—no, the dialogue is about the heroic death of Socrates and the proposition that only the philosopher—as epitomized in the person of Socrates—can meet death heroically.<sup>1</sup> For only the philosopher *knows* that he *cannot know* about the afterlife and the soul, and he is thus the *only one* who can die courageously.

The *Phaedo* shows, perhaps more than any other dialogue, how

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Paul Friedländer (*Plato*, Vol. I, tr. Hans Meyerhoff [Princeton 1969], p. 122), who says that all the Platonic dialogues are ultimately encomia to Socrates. Nietzsche too saw the figure of Socrates as charismatic or inspirational. Hans-Georg Gadamer (*Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato*, tr. P. Christopher Smith [New Haven and London 1980], p. 22) writes: "As Nietzsche has so aptly put it, this figure of the dying Socrates became the new ideal to which the noblest of the Greek youth now dedicated themselves instead of to that older heroic ideal, Achilles. Thus the *Phaedo*'s poetic power to convince is stronger than its logical power to prove."

philosophy may be subordinated to drama in Plato.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, unless one understands the arguments, and sees their weakness, he will not

<sup>2</sup> Since Schleiermacher's insight that "Form and subject are inseparable, and no proposition is to be rightly understood except in its own place and with the combinations and limitations which Plato has assigned to it" (reprinted in *Great Thinkers on Plato*, ed. Barry Gross [New York 1979], p. 71), there has been a great deal of attention paid to drama in Plato. Friedländer, Jaeger (especially in Volume II of *Paideia, The Ideals of Greek Culture*, tr. G. Highet, Oxford 1943), Leo Strauss (*The City and the Man*, Chicago 1964), Allan Bloom (in the preface to his translation of the *Republic*, New York 1968), Jacob Klein (*A Commentary on Plato's Meno*, Chapel Hill 1965), and Drew Hyland ("Why Plato Wrote Dialogues," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 1 [1968]) discuss the importance of the dramatical parts of the dialogue. Wilamowitz (*Platon* Vol. I, Berlin 1919, p. 123) suggests that the purpose of the early dialogues is poetic and imaginative—not profound or philosophical, in short, that their purpose is dramatic. While I would agree with Wilamowitz that the purpose may be dramatic, I do not agree that the purpose is not also philosophic or profound; as I hope to show for the *Phaedo* each may serve the other.

In the case of the *Phaedo*, some, while admitting the brilliance of the drama, do not admit its primacy. A. E. Taylor, for example (*Plato: The Man and His Work*, London 1926), says the dialogue shows Plato's dramatic art "at its ripe perfection" (p. 174), but thinks the dialogue is about "the divinity of the human soul, and 'imitation of God' as the right and reasonable mode of conduct" (p. 177). Raven (*Plato's Thought in the Making*, Cambridge 1965) praises the drama in passing, but says that the dialogue "is concerned as a whole . . . with the immortality of the soul" (p. 79).

The two who deal most with the dramatical qualities of the *Phaedo* are Kenneth Dorter, ("The Dramatic Aspect of Plato's *Phaedo* [*Dialogue* 9, 1970: 564–580]) and Gadamer (*op. cit.*). Dorter points out, in the manner of the followers of Strauss, a number of significant details (e.g., that 14 men were on Theseus' ship and 14 at Socrates' execution); and while he discusses details with insight, he does not seem to have a sense of the dramatic purpose of the whole. He argues that Socrates' purpose is to convince his audience not to fear death (p. 574). But quite inconsistently, he concludes that the lesson of the dialogue is that "If we wish to attain an immortality more meaningful and personal than the objective immortality in which all temporal things share equally, we must win it through a philosophical attempt to apprehend and assimilate ourselves to the immutable ground of what is." Dorter points out a number of details, and he is quite good at showing why some of the arguments are specious, but he fails to ask the fundamental question: *why does Plato allow Socrates to use obviously specious arguments?* Gadamer, having brilliantly shown that the arguments are invalid, argues (pp. 36–37) that the point of dialogue is that science, even the advanced science of Plato's day, cannot answer the important questions about human life and our understanding of it. We must, he says, "think beyond the surrounding world given to us in sense experience and beyond our finite existence." The growing scientific insight of Plato's time "does not obviate the need for thinking beyond the reality of the world, and it has no authority to contest religious convictions." Certainly Gadamer is right, that the dialogue shows us that even the best scientists, i.e., the Pythagoreans, cannot prove the immortality of the soul. But this is subordinate to the dramatic point: that for Socrates to be courageous, he must be aware that *he* does not know about the immortality of the soul; indeed, one of the reasons for the true philosopher's courage is that he knows the limits of his knowledge, he alone knows what he knows and does not know.



understand the drama of the dialogue except superficially; and it is towards the drama of Socrates' death that everything in the dialogue points.<sup>3</sup> But seeing the weakness of the arguments is important only if one asks and then understands why the arguments are weak, and why their weakness is essential if Socrates is to behave heroically, and why, moreover, he is most heroic when his arguments are weakest.

Some of the master's arguments are refuted by the interlocutors, some by the dramatic situation.<sup>4</sup> Socrates' initial statement was twofold: that the philosopher welcomes death (61c) and that we ought not to commit suicide because we are the property of the gods (62b).

<sup>3</sup> The dramatic purpose of the dialogue is therefore to inspire by a means other than discursive reasoning. To be sure, one must see the faults in the arguments to be so moved. As Jaeger (p. 36) put it: "We feel Socrates' intellectual power by dramatically showing its more than intellectual effect on men" and again (p. 90), "Plato had often felt Socrates' power to guide men's souls. He must have known that as an author his own greatest and hardest task in recreating Socrates' teaching was to make his readers feel the same influence he had once felt himself." Aristotle had, of course, recognized the literary and mimetic quality of the dialogues, so much so that he had called them poetry (*Poetics* 1447b11). Cf. Julius Stenzel, *Plato's Method of Dialectic*, tr. D. J. Allan (Oxford 1940), p. 2. Indeed, Longinus, *On the Sublime* (13), maintains that Plato competed with Homer in poetic mimesis—surely for an effect that was emotional.

<sup>4</sup> I shall present here the merest outline of the arguments, just enough to show where the arguments fail. That the arguments are unsound has been noted by most scholars (see below), despite a few ingenious attempts to rescue them (on these also see below). Here I wish merely to enable the reader to recollect the arguments and their failings. What I wish to do is show why the arguments must be weak for the dialogue to achieve its dramatic purpose, and why their intentional weakness is the dialogue's beauty and strength. Of course, that the arguments *must* be weak is also one of the points of the dialogue, for it is not possible in this life to form absolute proofs for the immortality of the soul.

The proofs are objected to generally by Friedländer (Vol. III, p. 36), who observes that they do not reach their goal; by A. E. Taylor (*op. cit.*, p. 103), who says: "In point of fact, the first two proofs are found to break down and the third, as Burnet observes, is said by Socrates (107b6) to need clear explanation. Thus it is plain that Plato did not mean to present the arguments as absolutely probative to his own mind." Raven acknowledges the difficulties though he will not discuss them (p. 103). J. H. Randall, Jr. (*Plato: Dramatist of the Life of Reason*, New York 1970, p. 215) declares: "The arguments are not to be taken literally: they are all myths and parables." Norman Gulley (*Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, London 1962) discusses difficulties with the arguments (pp. 32–33) and various inconsistencies (p. 47). Hackforth (*Plato's Phaedo*, New York 1955, p. 19), Klein (pp. 26, 108, 126), and J. B. Skemp (*The Theory of Motion in Plato's Later Dialogues*, Cambridge 1942, p. 7) all point out that Socrates hints at the inadequacy of his own proofs. Gadamer (p. 22) sums it up well: "The proofs of the immortality of the soul which follow one another in this discussion all have something deeply dissatisfying about them. . . . The arguments themselves are unconvincing, however much the human presence of Socrates is convincing."

Cebes correctly perceives that if the second part of Socrates' statement is true, then the first cannot be: a wise man would not be glad to leave masters so good and wise as the gods. Socrates' first argument on the immortality of the soul, the principle of generation from opposites, is equivocal and faulty right at the beginning, as Socrates shifts from all things which are born (70d) to things which have an opposite (70e)—surely a great reduction from many things to just a few.<sup>5</sup> This argument is not refuted by the interlocutors, but Cebes brings an abrupt end to the discussion and urges Socrates to move on to another proof—that based on the theory of recollection.<sup>6</sup> This theory is not refuted by any dialectical exchange; it is, however, effectively refuted by the dramatic elements of the dialogue: joke after joke reminds us that nobody can, even after it is explained, recall the doctrine of recollection.<sup>7</sup> First Simmias begs to have it told to him (73a); later, after Socrates has explained the entire theory again, Simmias laments that when Socrates is dead, on the next day, nobody will be left who can explain the theory: in other words, it will have been forgotten (78a). The theory is, in addition, inadequate because, as Simmias observes (77a–b), even if it were valid, it would explain the existence of the soul only *before* birth, not *after* death.<sup>8</sup> Socrates' third argument maintains that the soul lives free of the body in the realm of ideas and cannot be destroyed with the body because of its aloofness from things physical (and the death of the physical cannot be at the same time the death of the non-physical). The argument depends on the soul's having little or no communion with the body (80d) even during life. But Socrates himself does not seem convinced by his own argument, for if the soul were not

<sup>5</sup> The argument equivocates by failing to distinguish properly between absolute and relative terms (cf. Friedländer, Vol. III, p. 45).

<sup>6</sup> Objecting to the theory of recollection (*anamnesis*) is virtually a cottage industry among Plato scholars. On difficulties with the argument here see K. W. Mills' two articles, "Plato's *Phaedo* 74b7–c6," *Phronesis* 2 (1957), 128–147 and 3 (1958), 40–58; J. M. Rist, "Equals and Intermediates in Plato," *Phronesis* 9 (1964), 27–37; Dorothy Tarrant, "Plato, *Phaedo* 74a–b," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 77 (1957), 125; Kenneth Dorter, "Equality, Recollection, and Purification," *Phronesis* 17 (1972), 198–218; and Gadamer, pp. 26 ff. The account of recollection is, according to these scholars, incomplete and inadequate, and even Tarrant's variant reading won't save it. For a summary of the inconsistencies and a citation of more literature, see Richard J. Ketchum, "Knowledge and Recollection in the *Phaedo*: An Interpretation of 74a–75b," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 17 (1979), 243.

<sup>7</sup> On a similar joke on memory, see *Meno* 71c and the discussion of the joke in William S. Cobb, Jr., "Anamnesis: Platonic Doctrine or Sophistic Absurdity?" *Dialogue* 12 (1973), 604–28.

<sup>8</sup> And, of course, the theory of recollection is mired in the problem of infinite regress (i.e., whence the original knowledge?). See Cobb, esp. pp. 619–21.

connected to the body in some way, why should the body be a prison to it?<sup>9</sup> And he seems to deny the non-physical nature of the soul as he draws his argument to a close. He says, "Because each pleasure and pain like a nail nails the soul to the body and affixes it and makes it bodily . . ." (83d).<sup>10</sup> If, then, a pleasure and pain can affect the soul, why not death? That Socrates' principal interlocutors are dissatisfied with the arguments—as they should be—is made abundantly clear when Simmias and Cebes, whispering to one another, are interrupted by Socrates, who says (84c): "Indeed, there are a good many doubts and objections, if one cares to go through the argument with adequate thoroughness." Simmias, thus prodded, agrees (85d): "You see, Socrates, when I reflect on what has been said by me and Cebes here, it does not appear quite adequate."

Socrates, after several important speeches to be considered shortly, takes up Simmias' argument that the soul is an attunement and Cebes' argument that the soul, like the last overcoat of a tailor, may outlive its wearer. Socrates' refutation of Simmias depends on earlier arguments, for the refutation rests on the soul's existence before the body's; that is, the soul cannot be like an attunement because the soul existed before the body, but the attunement did not exist before the harp. But, of course, this argument depends on arguments which were found unsatisfactory by Simmias and Cebes (in the passage referred to above, where Simmias says the previous arguments have been unsatisfactory).<sup>11</sup> If the previous arguments, which sought to prove that the soul existed before the body, were inadequate, then this refutation, which depends on those earlier arguments, must be similarly inadequate. Socrates' refutation of Cebes' argument depends on the proposition that souls, which by definition contain life, cannot receive the opposite of life and remain souls: they must withdraw before death and fly elsewhere.<sup>12</sup> Socrates draws an analogy with

<sup>9</sup> See Burnet, Taylor, *ad loc.* See also T. M. Robinson, *Plato's Psychology* (Toronto and Buffalo 1970), pp. 21–22; also Gadamer, pp. 27–29.

<sup>10</sup> Translations of passages from the *Phaedo* are the author's. Others are as cited in the text.

<sup>11</sup> For a severe criticism of the arguments on attunement, with a lucid explication of its illogicality, see W. F. Hicken, "Phaedo 92a11–94b3," *Classical Quarterly* 48 (1954), 16–22.

<sup>12</sup> The fallacies are subtle, but have not escaped the commentators. For a very good discussion of how at the beginning of the argument *ἀθάνατος* is the opposite of *θάνατος*, but at the end it is the opposite of *θνητός*, see David Keyt, "The Fallacies in *Phaedo* 102a–107b," *Phronesis* 8 (1963), 170 ff. The view is also that of T. L. Landmann, "Tendenz und Gedankengang des platonischen Dialogs 'Phaedo,'" *Gymnasialprogramm* (Königsberg in Pr., 1871), p. 8 and of G. Schneider, *Die Weltanschauung Platons dargestellt in Anschlüsse an den Dialog Phaedon* (Berlin 1898), pp. 106–108. T.

snow: when snow receives fire it will not remain snow, but it will either retreat or be destroyed. Snow is, however, destroyed by fire and does not, even if it is made into a snowman, get up on its legs and run away. The argument is seductive, but is rather silly when studied carefully.<sup>13</sup> And though Socrates' interlocutors seem to agree, they do admit to doubts.<sup>14</sup> Simmias, at the end of the dialogue's dialectical portions, when Socrates has completed his "refutation" of Cebes, says (107a-b):

I myself do not find anything to disbelieve in what has been said. *But the arguments are about a great subject, and I do distrust human frailty, and I am still compelled to feel doubt in my own mind about what we have said.*

After approving of Simmias' skepticism, Socrates launches into his myth on the habitations of the soul after death and the description of the earth. As various commentators on Plato have observed, Socrates tells a myth when the arguments have gone about as far as they can; where logical reasoning and certainty end, speculation in the form of myth begins.<sup>15</sup>

Elsewhere, when Socrates discusses the nature of the soul, he also brings in myth, and the very act of telling the myth seems to be for

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M. Robinson (pp. 27-29), having discussed the difficulties, concludes that "one interpretation introduces as many anomalies as it is meant to solve." D. O'Brien, in two long articles ("The Last Argument of Plato's *Phaedo* I and II," *Classical Quarterly* 17 [1967], 198-231 and 18 [1968], 95-106), while finding fault with the argument sees some use in it for the historian of philosophy, since he says it anticipates Anselm's ontological argument for the existence of God. See also Hackforth (p. 164), who says that "from the standpoint of logic, the argument has petered out into futility"; I. A. Crombie (*An Examination of Plato's Doctrines*, Vol. II, London 1962), who calls the argument "a nest of confusions" (p. 169) and says the conclusion follows "if we do not look too closely" (p. 164); and J. B. Skemp (p. 8), who describes the final proof as "a blatant *petitio principii*"; also Gadamer (pp. 34-36).

<sup>13</sup> The argument, however, is not without some defenders. Dorothea Frede, "The Final Proof of the Immortality of the Soul in Plato's *Phaedo* 102a-107a," *Phronesis* 23 (1978), 27-41, thinks that Socrates is certain about the last argument. But Gregory Vlastos ("Reasons and Causes in the *Phaedo*" [*Modern Studies in Philosophy: Plato: I. Metaphysics and Epistemology. A Collection of Critical Essays*, Garden City 1971]), while defending what he sees to be the most important argument (that which takes place in 95e-105e), admits that it is not "entirely clear or wholly true" (p. 133).

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Gadamer, p. 36: "As convincing as the discussion might have been, the conclusion is drawn that the proofs are not sufficient and that one must continue to test their premises insofar as is humanly possible. Evidently in questions of this sort one cannot expect greater certainty." See also Stenzel, p. 8.

<sup>15</sup> Cf., for example, Friedländer, Vol. I, pp. 189-90; J. A. Stewart, *The Myths of Plato* (London and New York 1905), pp. 24-102 *passim*; S. Rosen, *The Symposium of Plato* (New Haven and London 1968), pp. 207-11; W. Jaeger, pp. 151-52.



him an admission that scientific knowledge is impossible. Hence it is necessary to give a similitude, a metaphorical and speculative account of the nature of the unknowable. In the *Phaedrus*, when Socrates is delivering his “serious” speech on the nature of love, he says concerning the soul:

What the nature of the soul is would be a long tale to tell, and *most assuredly only a god alone could tell it*, but what it resembles, that a man might tell in briefer compass (246a).

A bit later he extends our imprecision to the “immortal”: “‘immortal’ is a term applied on the basis of no reasoned argument at all, but our fancy (*πλάττομεν*) pictures the god whom we have never seen, nor fully conceived, as an immortal living being” (246c) [tr. R. Hackforth]. Or, as Timaeus explains to Socrates when he is about to tell his myth concerning the generation of the gods and the cosmos (*Timaeus* 29c–d):

If then, Socrates, amidst the many opinions about the gods [the immortals] and the generation of the universe, we are not able to give notions which are altogether and in every respect exact and consistent with one another, do not be surprised. Enough if we adduce probabilities as likely as any others, for we must remember that I who am the speaker and you who are the judges are only mortal men, and we would do well to accept the tale which is probable and inquire no further [tr. B. Jowett].

For Plato and Socrates, then, the realm of the divine was not absolutely knowable by mortal men. The soul’s immortality, which caused it to be most like to the divine (*Phaedo* 80b), also prevented it from being understood by human reason (*logos*).<sup>16</sup> Socrates’ very making of a myth, then, shows that he himself does not believe the soul’s immortality a matter which can be proven. This is not to say, of course, that the myth has no value. As Friedländer and others have argued, the real value of the myth lies in moving the soul towards virtue by a means which bypasses discursive reasoning and affects the soul directly, a means we may call, in a non-Platonic context, “inspiration.”<sup>17</sup> And this is clearly a chief purpose of the myth here, as Socrates discusses in the context of the soul’s future

<sup>16</sup> On the equivalence of immortality and divinity, see W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, Vol. IV (Cambridge 1975), p. 330. Cf. Rosen (*op. cit.*): “The *Phaedrus*, *Phaedo*, and *Timaeus* all teach us that it is impossible to grasp the immortal and divine by means of *logos*” (p. 209).

<sup>17</sup> Inspiration may be the way art in general functions: it does not work by shaping the reason in men, but works instead by a direct grasp on the soul. Thus poets, seers, and prophets operate by inspiration and deliver their messages without *knowing*



habitations the need to make sure that the soul is pure and virtuous in this world (107 ff.).

Thus the arguments, by their failure, and the myths, by their very presence, point to the impossibility—at least in our mortal state—of knowing about the afterlife. Indeed, time after time, repeated through the dialogue is the insistence that we cannot know for sure. Thus Socrates begins the dialogue (63b–c):

I will *try* to be more persuasive to you than I was to my judges. If I did not *believe*, Simmias and Cebes, that I should pass over first to other gods, both wise and good . . . I should be wrong not objecting to death; but know well that I *hope* I shall enter the company of good men, even though I would not affirm it confidently; but that I shall come to gods who are very good masters, know well that if I would affirm confidently anything else, I would affirm this.

Later (85c), Simmias, voicing his objections to some of Socrates' arguments, says:

For it seems to me, as perhaps also to you, Socrates, that to know clearly about such matters in this present life is impossible, or at least extremely difficult.

And at the end of the dialogue, when Socrates has described his vision of the afterlife, he concludes (114d):

It is not fitting for a sensible man to affirm confidently that such things are just as I have described; but that this or something of this sort is what happens to our souls and their abodes, and since the soul is clearly immortal, that this is so seems proper and *worth the risk* of believing; for the risk is noble.

The dialectic on the immortality of the soul confirms these statements that absolute knowledge about such matters is impossible. If the arguments prove anything, it is this. But not all men, of course, know that absolute knowledge about such matters is impossible. Indeed, some believe certain legends (70c) that there is an afterlife, just as others believe (70a) that when a man dies the soul leaves the body and goes out like a breath or whiff of smoke; the many, however, do not understand and do not think about these matters. That is why, says Socrates (64b), the many do not understand the sense in which the philosopher wants to die. The many think they know

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what they mean (*Apology* 22c). Statesmen, too, because of the absence of teachers, cannot have been taught virtue and must have received it by a divine inspiration (*Meno* 99d). Cf. also *Laws* 682a, 719c. And as Friedländer observes (*op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 190), Socrates in the *Phaedo*, *Gorgias*, and *Republic* often speaks of the purpose of myths as inspiration to virtuous conduct.

whether there is or is not an afterlife. But—at least if he has been through the conversation of the *Phaedo*—the philosopher *knows* that he does not know about the future habitations and state of the soul.

It is for this reason—that the philosopher alone *knows* that he does not know the future condition of his soul—that the philosopher is the only one who can die courageously.<sup>18</sup> An earlier dialogue, the *Laches*, had grappled with the question of courage. That dialogue appeared to be aporetic, for there courage was shown to be a kind of knowledge, like the other virtues.<sup>19</sup> But if courage were knowledge of the outcome, what bravery would be involved in the action? For example, if a fully equipped army were going against one armed only with toothpicks, the powerful army would have knowledge that it would be victorious: no courage would therefore be involved; and the weak army would have knowledge it was going to lose; and it would therefore be rash, not courageous, in joining battle. But the *Laches* did contain the clue to courage: it is knowledge of your ignorance of the outcome, with a willingness to persevere. Only the man who knows that he does not know the outcome will go into battle courageously; and the philosopher will be the most courageous of men—for he, like Socrates, is most aware that he does not know the outcome.

Here lies, I think, the true meaning of the weak nature of the arguments in the *Phaedo*. The dialogue is not, of course, about the immortality of the soul; it is about the death of Socrates. It is about the very things Echecrates inquired of Phaedo (57a): “What was it the man said before his death? And how did he die?” The dialogue is about the courageous way in which Socrates died; if one does not see how and why the arguments fail to provide certain knowledge of the soul, one cannot see the courage in facing death and Socrates’ heroism.

Socrates’ courage is brilliant. When Cebes objects to his arguments concerning suicide, Socrates is pleased (63a). And yet why should Socrates be pleased? Socrates’ argument that suicide is wrong rested on the assumption that we have good masters here on earth and that we should not violate their proprietary rights by killing ourselves,

<sup>18</sup> Socrates says too (*Phaedo* 68c) that only the philosopher is courageous in the right way.

<sup>19</sup> In the *Laches* it is suggested that courage is an endurance of the soul; the dialogue seemed aporetic because it seemed that courage could be neither knowledge nor ignorance. My suggestion is in keeping with Socrates’ position throughout the dialogues: knowledge of ignorance is a *kind of* knowledge; courage is a special kind of ignorance—ignorance of the outcome; it is also an endurance of the soul in seeking the outcome.

who are their property; but if our masters are so good, Cebes has asked, why should the philosopher be *glad* to leave them? It was necessary for Socrates' argument to be sound so that Socrates could face death with confidence: Socrates should not therefore be pleased that his argument was defeated. Yet he is pleased; and his pleasure is heroic: it places in jeopardy his equanimity, but the promise of an argument holds the prize of truth before him.

Crito warns Socrates that, if he talks, he may have to take extra doses of poison. Socrates is impatient with such matters, and disdaining Crito's concern declares (63e): "Oh, let the jailer be; let him do his job and be ready to give me two portions, even three." After the arguments on recollection, Socrates consoles his friends: yes, there will surely be someone in Hellas, large as it is, who will help them overcome their fear of death (78a).

But nowhere is Socrates more heroic than in the great central portion of the dialogue, when Simmias and Cebes express their penetrating objections to his theories. First, he must force them to express their objections. Socrates is himself aware that the argument may be weak (84c):

Indeed, there are a good many doubts and objections, if one cares to go through the argument with adequate thoroughness.

Simmias affirms that he and Cebes are unsure of the arguments but are reluctant to trouble Socrates in case he is distressed by the approaching execution. As before, when Cebes objected to this theory on suicide, Socrates displays good humor. Socrates laughs and launches into his famous comparison of himself and a swan, the bird sacred to Apollo (84e–85b). Again, as in virtually all the dialogues, Socrates distinguishes himself from the many, who do not understand; in this case what they do not understand is the nature of the swan's song. Socrates' position is dangerous by any standards: he is urging his interlocutors to come forward with the strongest possible objections to his arguments. The greatest possible courage will be necessary to confront them.

At this point (88c) the outer dialogue, the framing narrative, is interrupted as Phaedo tells Echecrates that those present, while they had been convinced by earlier arguments, were now beginning to doubt the whole business. Echecrates asks Phaedo many questions about both the discussion and Socrates' demeanor. Phaedo answers that Socrates was never more wondrous than then. Philosophy, we remember from the *Theaetetus*, begins in wonder; and surely philosophy is provoked by the wondrous majesty of Socrates on the day of his execution.

Phaedo compares Socrates to Heracles with the advantage going to Socrates, for Socrates will have to contest alone with two opponents—Simmius and Cebes—while Heracles had the aid of Iolaus in fighting the Hydra (89c). Socrates, with ironic modesty, jokes that he is merely Iolaus, but Phaedo corrects him. The comparison to the mightiest Greek hero—with Socrates clearly named as the superior (for he will fight single-handedly with two where Heracles fought with only one)—shows that the others present also recognize that Socrates is a hero.

No part of the dialogue shows Socrates more a teacher of philosophic courage than the speech he launches into on “misology”—the hating of argument (*logos*) (89d ff.). Repeated dead-ends in argument may lead, Socrates warns, to a hating of arguments in general; but a philosopher must stick to his post. The difficulty in avoiding misology comes from having to engage in arguments to gain the truth, but until the truth is gained the outcome is uncertain: one cannot know the end of the argument—whether it will be a dead-end or a live birth of an idea—until the argument is over. But if, because of difficulties, the philosopher does persist in the argument but comes to hate *logos*, he will certainly never get at the truth; to persist in the argument requires courage: courage, the knowledge that he does not know the outcome, but the persistence to endure. The passage on *misology* is, really, more important than the arguments on immortality insofar as it presents the doctrine of philosophical courage while the arguments merely show that courage in force. Socrates is himself providing the model of argument, for he is a lover of *logos*; and despite the aporetic nature of his arguments, he dies sticking to his philosophic post, pursuing the truth to the end.<sup>20</sup> And later, when he has taken up Cebes’ argument, Socrates will heroically exclaim: “Let us go attack like Homeric heroes, and see what strength there is in what you say” (95b).

The arguments over, Socrates, nobly risking belief in the happy futurity of his soul, cheerfully drinks the hemlock, and in that simple action does his civic duty with the same courage we observed in argument. How can Socrates face death with such calm, indeed with

<sup>20</sup> This courage was characteristic of Socrates in his youth, too. The exercise of this youthful courage is the focus of the autobiographical passage: when Socrates saw the difficulties in the positions of the various philosophers and especially of Anaxagoras, whose positions were the most promising, far from becoming a *misologue*, he began his independent search for wisdom. In a similarly heroic passage, Socrates says in the *Meno* (86b) that it is far more courageous to find out what is not known than to say that, since it is impossible to learn the truth, there is no need to try.



such cheer? Why should knowing his ignorance enable him to be so serene?

Socrates' knowledge of his ignorance is what has given him philosophic life. Ever since Chaerephon told him of the Delphic oracle that there was no man wiser than he (*Apology* 21a), Socrates' mission has been to test the truth of the pronouncement. His life has been spent going from one person who believed himself wise to another and demonstrating to each that though he thought he was wise he was not really so. Socrates found that he was wiser than the others, for he alone knew that he did not know. Politicians claimed to know about statecraft but did not really know; poets claimed to know about poetry but did not understand their own poems. But Socrates at least knew that he did not know—here lay his superior wisdom (*Apology* 21b–23b). In this sense he is true to his life's mission even here in the *Phaedo*. He has spoken with students of philosophy, with followers of Pythagoras (Simmias and Cebes), and we must not forget that it was the *Pythagoreans* who claimed to know about the immortality of the soul. And again he has done as always: he has shown those who might presume to know that they did not know. In this sense the dialogue is true to the form of the aporetic dialogues—those which searched for but failed to discover the truth.

But in a larger and profounder sense, it was this knowledge of ignorance which enabled Socrates to be a philosopher at all. For a philosopher, we know from the *Symposium*, is imbued with philosophic *ἔρως*. That is, he is an intermediary between knowledge and ignorance. As Diotima tells Socrates (*Symposium* 203e f.):

Love stands midway between ignorance and wisdom. You must understand that none of the gods are seekers after truth. They do not long for wisdom, because they are wise—and why should the wise be seeking wisdom that is already theirs? Nor, for that matter, do the ignorant seek the truth or yearn to be made wise. [tr. M. Joyce]

Only the man aware of his own ignorance, the one pulled by love towards wisdom, can be a philosopher. Socrates, knowing that he is to die, believes that he will soon find this wisdom which he has been seeking, if it is to be found. For this wisdom is not to be found in mortal life. The truth about the immortality of the soul cannot be discovered by argument: it must be discovered experientially. His eagerness to learn and the possibility of learning the truth account for his cheer.

And finally, Socratic ignorance is, of course, not *absolute* ignorance. It is ignorance mingled with knowledge. The man courageous in battle perseveres despite knowing that he is ignorant of the outcome—



whether he will win or lose. But in another sense he knows the alternatives and faces them nevertheless. Either he will be victorious or he will die honorably—alternatives both noble. Socrates, as he has said in the *Apology* (40c–d), also knows the alternatives: either he will enjoy a dreamless sleep or he will go to that happy realm to which his virtue and philosophy have entitled him. He knows the alternatives and he knows his ignorance, an ignorance he had mentioned with great clarity in the *Apology* (29a–b):

For let me tell you, gentlemen, that to be afraid of death is only another form of thinking that one is wise when one is not; it is to think that one knows what one does not know. No one knows with regard to death whether it is not really the greatest blessing that can happen to a man, but people dread it as though they were certain that it is the greatest evil, and this ignorance, which thinks that it knows what it does not, must surely be ignorance most culpable. This I take it, gentlemen, is the degree, and this is the nature of my advantage over the rest of mankind, and if I were to claim to be wiser than my neighbor in any respect, it would be in this—that not possessing any real knowledge of what comes after death, I am also conscious that I do not possess it. [tr. Hugh Tredennick]

At the end of the dialogue, Socrates' friends weep at his fate. Perhaps, had they been convinced by the arguments for the immortality of the soul, they would bear calmly the master's death. Their weeping seems to be a dramatic corroboration of their lack of conviction that the arguments of the present conversation, at least, have been airtight. It may be suggested, however, that there remains a possibility at a later time of finding such a proof. Such a possibility would not affect the drama of the moment: Socrates has done his very best, but as so often in his life, the truth has eluded him and again he has discovered that he does not know. Have the interlocutors learned that *they* cannot know about the soul's immortality? Simmias had spoken earlier (85c) about the impossibility or at least extreme difficulty of such knowledge. Perhaps here at the end the weeping of Socrates' friends is an acknowledgment that without Socrates they may not be able to escape perplexity (*ἀπορία*) on this matter; or perhaps it suggests that they are not up to Socrates' high standards, that despite their wish to please the master, their courage is not so great as his. This weakness was alluded to earlier, when Cebes admitted that there was in him "a little boy who has a childish" fear of death (77e) in need of a Socratic charm to purge the fear. Perhaps only the master has so developed the man in his soul as to possess the courage necessary to face the uncertainty in death. The friends' lack of composure in the face of Socrates' calm perhaps shows that Socrates

is the only true philosopher and shows too how lonely a condition that is.

In the *Crito* Socrates had told of his dream in which a woman came to him and said that on the third day he would be home in Phthia (44b). The line, from Book IX of the *Iliad* (363), was originally spoken by Achilles to the embassy, when Achilles declared to Odysseus that he was leaving Troy the next day and would arrive home on the third. That line could not help but contrast the situation of the two men. Achilles had voluntarily left battle; his departure for home would leave the Greeks in a state of perplexity concerning the conduct of the war; indeed, his prayer would be fulfilled and there would be nothing between the Greeks and destruction. Socrates, though condemned by his own people, did not flee Athens; but his departure from life would similarly leave his people in great perplexity. The failure to come to a conclusion in the dialogue made that perplexity, that ἀπορία, all the more apparent. When Socrates left his prison house of Athens, the city's soul was departing, leaving for its eternal home.

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# 9

## The *Timaeus* on Types of Duration

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This paper casts another glance at a number of questions in the realm of cosmo-theology that have divided students of the *Timaeus* since the time it was written. Did Plato clearly distinguish, in this dialogue, the concepts of eternity, sempiternity, and everlastingness? If he did, with what sort of duration did he credit the Demiurge, World Soul, the Forms, and the physical universe? What relationship does the answer to the first question have to assertions, in such dialogues as the *Laws*, that "soul" is both autokinetic and the source of the motion of other things? And finally, why did Plato's unique description of the eternal (as the "perpetuous" or "abternal," *διαίωνιος*) apparently fail to interest, except peripherally, the post-platonic tradition?

I start from a partial statement of the problem in Cornford (p. 98, n.1): even at 37d, he says, "where [Plato] is contrasting eternal duration (*αἰών*) with everlastingness in time, [he] will not reserve *αἰώνιος* for "eternal" and *αἰδιος* for "everlasting." *αἰδιος* is applied both to the model and to the everlasting gods." This apparent conceptual sloppiness disturbs Cornford, who at 37d7 is tempted to conjecture *ἀέναον* ("ever-flowing") for *αἰώνιον*. But this seems unnecessary: a willingness to use synonyms is no indication of an author's conceptual confusion, and in fact a careful examination of Plato's usage of these terms in conjunction with others shows, I think conclusively, that he has in the *Timaeus* a clear and precise cosmo-theology to express.

Let us begin with the supposed terminological inexactitude that revolves round three adjectives: *αἰδιος*, *αἰώνιος*, and *διαίωνιος*. The

first, a word going back to Homer and meaning "ceaseless," "without end," is applied to the eternal duration of the specific Form dubbed by Plato "Eternal Living Creature" and of the Form-world generally, and to the unceasing duration, once they are formed, of the gods. The second, meaning literally something like "age-long," is applied to the duration of the same Eternal Living Creature and, if the manuscripts do not deceive us, to the unceasing duration of the universe once formed. The third is applied specifically and solely to the Eternal Living Creature. Which term Plato is likely to use will turn, one may conjecture, on perspective: when he wishes to stress the unceasing nature of the Forms or the gods, the time-honored word *αἰδῖος* will serve the purpose adequately, being equally applicable to both. When he wishes to emphasize the immensity of the duration, numerical and non-numerical, of the formed universe and its paradigm respectively, an appropriate term at his disposal is *αἰώνιος*, a word he may actually have invented for the purpose; apart from its use here, and in a joking reference to *αἰώνιος μέθη* at *Rep.* 363d2, the first known use of the term in extant Greek writing is in the writings of Plato's contemporary, Demosthenes (1. 13, 1. 19). When he wishes to emphasize the "eternity," in the most exact sense, of the formed universe's paradigm he applies what is undoubtedly a coinage of his own, *διαίώνιος*, which one might translate, to catch the tone of its initial strangeness, "perpetuous" or "abternal"; the force of the *διά* seems to be that the paradigm *πάντα αἰώνιά ἐστιν ὃν* (38c1-2), in the sense that its duration is for eternity as a plenitude, the force of the (tenseless) *ἐστιν ὃν* that the paradigm's duration is non-temporal.

The noun that parallels *διαίώνιος*, "perpetuity" (= "eternity"), it should be added, is for Plato *αἰών* (37d6, 38c2, etc.), a bold piece of transference of a word which till that date had been understood by most if not all Greeks as meaning something like "a very great length of time." It is, like *διαίώνιος*, a term he frequently, though not invariably, uses as his word for eternity in the strictest sense.

In addition to the above terms, Plato has and makes use of other, remarkably exact and consistent terminology for the concepts of eternity, sempiternity and everlastingness. First, in talking of what he thinks of as eternal in the genuine sense, i.e., in talking of the Forms, the Demiurge, and Space (*χώρα*), he is careful to use either the "tenseless" *ἐστι* alone (37e5, of "eternal being"), or the tenseless *εἶναι* with *ἀεί* (27d6, of the world of Forms: 52a8, of Space: 34a8, of the Demiurge), or the participial noun derived from *εἶναι* with *ἀεί* (50c5, of the Forms of the four "natural kinds"). Eternity itself, *αἰών*, he describes as "abiding in unity" *μένοντος ἐν ἐνί* (37d6), by contrast with that which is subject to numerical progression.

In the very strictest sense, only the Forms appear to be thought of by Plato as eternal, since no manner of *κίνησις* can be attributed to them. Hence the ascription to Forms, and to Forms alone, of the term *διαιώνιος*. The Demiurge, by contrast, is subject to at least the *κίνησις* of thought and emotion, and in general of intellectual/moral “process”—a *κίνησις* which is in fact *αὐτοκίνησις*,<sup>1</sup> and the only exact instance thereof in the dialogue, that Plato will describe elsewhere as the condition of in fact *all ψυχή*. Space, too, in eternal motion, is forever moving and being subjected to (further) motion by that which it contains (52e3–4). On these grounds Plato can use language of the Demiurge which suggests both the changelessness of eternity and “process”; while he is subject to the *κίνησις* of thought and emotion, such that he can “intervene” to form the world, he nonetheless (42e5–6) “continued to abide by the wont of his own nature” (*ἔμεινεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ τρόπον ἦθει*; tr. Cornford). (Cf. 37d6, where Eternity is described as *μένοντος ἐν ἐνί*). Likewise Space, while still being dubbed eternal, has a structure and manner of existence so different from that of the Forms that it can only be ascertained by at best a “bastard form of reasoning” (52b2).

When Plato wishes to speak of “everlastingness” (i.e., duration without end but with a beginning in time and measurable by time)<sup>2</sup> he will still talk of “abiding” (*μένειν*), but of abiding forever (*ἀεί*) (the astral gods are so described at 40b6), or of being “in motion forever” (at 58c3 he talks of *ἡ ἀεί κίνησις* of the four primary bodies). The crucial verb *εἶναι*, which would with *ἀεί* have signalled eternity rather than everlastingness, is conspicuously and to my mind studiously avoided.

<sup>1</sup> See below, p. 149. Efforts by many to “collapse” Demiurge and World Soul (or Demiurge and the *νοῦς* within World Soul) founder on this point. The entire description of World Soul in the *Timaeus* emphasizes its dependence—whether in time or *ab aeterno*; the argument is unaffected—on something other than itself. The Forms moreover are portrayed as wholly paradigmatic; there is no hint of any supposed role for them that might be understood as one of efficient causality. (Compare in an earlier dialogue the Form of the Good, which, says Socrates, “produced” the sun.) This can only mean that the Demiurge himself is expected to be seen as what he purports to be—the formed world’s efficient cause, including that of its soul. If he is meant further to be understood as a personal divinity (and nothing in the text suggests convincingly that he is not; the “account” is described as “likely,” not “unlikely”), then his soul, and his alone, can be said to possess the non-dependent *autokinesis* that Plato will eventually extend to all rational soul in the *Phaedrus* and to all soul as such in the *Laws*.

<sup>2</sup> By contrast with a stance adopted in an earlier article (see below, note 5), I prefer now to talk for clarity’s sake of “everlastingness,” rather than of “sempiternity” in some secondary sense of the word.



For the sempiternal as such Plato does not have an exact term. There are, however, it seems, four necessary conditions for the ascription of sempiternity to X: these are (a) that X be a potential object of perception; (b) that it be, from a beginningless past to an endless future, dependent upon an entity that is itself eternal; (c) that it be in a state of beginningless and endless motion; (d) that it possess a form of duration not measured, except incidentally, by time. Space, for example, is eternal (albeit in some less strict sense of the term: see above) rather than sempiternal; it is in no way dependent on anything else for its existence, and it is the object, not of perception, but of (bastard) reasoning. The "traces" (ἵχνη) of the Forms that are "in" Space are, by contrast, sempiternal, being (a) "visible" (ὄρατά, 30a3); (b) in beginningless and endless motion; (c) ceaselessly dependent upon Space as a condition both of their activity and, in some measure, of the quality of that activity; and (d) unmeasured by time, except in the incidental instance of their ever being constituted, by an external agent, into formed bodies. The dependence relationship between the traces of matter and Space is further reinforced by Plato's asseveration that it is the "nature" of the Wandering Cause to "sustain (sc., in motion)" (φέρειν, 48a6-7).<sup>3</sup>

Strategic uses of verbs such as εἶναι, μένειν and φέρειν, with the addition, where necessary, of the adverb ἀεί, are in effect "fail-safe" techniques adopted by Plato to guide the reader to his exact intentions when more time-honored terminology alone might perhaps have confused. At 40b6, for example, when discussing the manner of duration of the astral gods, he uses the term αἰδῖος, an adjective we have already noticed him applying to the Form-world generally and the archetypal Form Eternal Living Creature in particular. That it is the gods' everlastingness that is in question, however, not eternity is, as we have seen, made clear in the very same sentence when he talks of their μένειν ἀεί not their εἶναι ἀεί. At 37e4-6, by contrast, where the manner of duration of Forms such as Eternal Living Creature is described as αἰδῖος, the case for the meaning "eternal" in duration, as distinct from sempiternal or everlasting, seems clinched by Plato's

<sup>3</sup> Cf. [Pl.] *Epin.* 983b, where Cornford, following Harward and followed by Tarán, translates φέρειν as "set in motion," and *Tim.* 43a7, where he translates βιά ἐφέροντο καὶ ἔφερον as "cause and suffer violent motions." But this places an intolerable strain upon the verb φέρειν, whose natural sense is "support" (of a pedestal bearing a statue) or "carry" (of a ship carrying a passenger). At *Tim.* 48a6-7 and *Epin.* 983b it is probably best construed in terms of sustention, in the first case the sustention of basic matter by the Errant Cause, in the second the sustention of all living things by θεός. (See LSJ<sup>9</sup>, s.v., A1). At *Tim.* 43a7 the sense is surely that soul-circles both "carry (along)" and are to their detriment "carried (along) by" the body and its movements.

immediate statement, in the very next sentence, that he means by the term *αἰδιος* that (and only that?) sort of existence to which *τὸ ἔστιν μόνον κατὰ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον προσήκει*. A little earlier, at 37d7, he had talked of the formed universe as an *αἰώνιον εἰκόνα* of eternity, an adjective Cornford found so inappropriate (see above, p. 143) that he was tempted to conjecture *ἀένανον*, as in *Laus* 966e. I have already suggested, in terms of the immensity and perhaps awesome duration of the universe and its paradigm, one possible reason why Plato used the adjective *αἰδιος* here, in spite of any *prima facie* confusion it could have generated. However that may be, the status of the formed world's duration as everlasting, not sempiternal or eternal, whatever Plato's choice of adjective for it, is demonstrated by the subsequent reference to it as that to which *τὸ ἦν τό τ' ἔσται . . . πρέπει λέγεσθαι* (38a1–2).

Fail-safe techniques of this type are, of course, unnecessary when Plato's exact, technical terminology — *αἰών, διαίωμιος* — is in question. They signify, univocally, (a) "perpetuity" (= "eternity"), the manner of duration of the Form-world in general and the formed universe's paradigm in particular, and (b) "perpetuous," the noun's neologistic adjectival counterpart.

Whether Plato believed, when he wrote the *Timaeus*, that the world and its guiding Soul were sempiternal, rather than everlasting, as many have thought, seems to me very doubtful. Here, as before, Plato has what looks like a fail-safe technique to direct the reader to his precise intention. This consists in the exercise of remarkable carefulness in the use of the mood and tense of verbs, not least in those contexts where he might be thought to be offering hints that the dialogue is to be read figuratively rather than literally. At 37b5, for example, the world is described as *τὸ κινούμενον ὑφ' αὐτοῦ*, and scholars have been quick to find here a reference to the uncaused, self-moving soul of *Phaedrus* 245c, the clear inference being that the world and its soul are sempiternal, not, as the surface-interpretation of much of the *Timaeus* might suggest, everlasting entities. But the equivocity of the term "self-moving" is apparent in Cornford's own description (note *ad loc.*) of "the heaven as a whole, which, as a living creature, is self-moved by its own self-moving soul"; in what sense, except some trivial one, is X self-moving if its supposed self-motion is dependent upon the (real or supposed) self-motion of Y? As it happens, Plato goes on (37c6–7) to make it clear that the *Phaedrus* doctrine of soul is not in question when he says, "When the father who had begotten it (sc., the world) saw it set in motion (*κινηθέν*) and alive," etc. (the mood and tense are significant); the "autokinesis" of the formed universe is revealed, for anyone who had ever doubted

his meaning, as analogous in all important respects merely to the commonplace, non-technical type of self-motion Plato attributes to any animal as distinct from any plant (77c4–5)—that is, it is dependent self-motion (i.e., in the strictest sense not self-motion at all), and had a beginning in time.

A second supposed hint of a doctrine of the sempiternity of the world in the *Timaeus* is to be found at 30a3, where the pre-cosmos is described as *πάν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατόν*. Since the organized cosmos had already been called (28b 7–8) *ὁρατός . . . ἀπτός τε . . . καὶ σῶμα ἔχων*, some have inferred that talk of a pre-cosmos is clearly to be taken as figurative only. No fail-safe technique, however, on Plato's part is needed this time to see that the two descriptions are totally different, in spite of the use of the common word "visible." The formed world is composed of specified objects, and has bulk (*σῶμα*); that is why it is both *ὁρατός* and *ἀπτός*. The pre-cosmos possesses merely "traces" of reality. A strong hint of what Plato meant in nonetheless calling it *ὁρατός*, despite the fact that it did not consist of formed objects, is to be found at *Phaedo* 79a6 ff., where *ἀδής* seems to be a Platonic synonym for "non-physical" or "non-corporeal." The pre-cosmos, however, while not corporeal (it possesses no formed *σώματα* within it), is not wholly incorporeal either; it is apparently something like one of the ghosts Socrates describes at *Phaedo* 81c4, creatures hovering somewhere between materiality and immateriality, but not graspable (*ἀπτά*) because they do not consist of formed bodies (*σώματα*).

A third "hint" at 28a1, where according to the Oxford text the Forms are contrasted with a world described as *γινόμενον ἀεί* turns out to be illusory. Quite apart from the dubiousness of the manuscript evidence and ancient secondary evidence for *ἀεί*,<sup>4</sup> parallel texts in the *Timaeus* itself, where *ἀεί* is conspicuously absent, make it clear that Plato is attempting to contrast Forms, which do not have a *γένεσις*, with material objects, which do.<sup>5</sup>

One final point. On the far from obvious assumption that the *Phaedrus* ante-dates the *Timaeus*, many have inferred that all *κίνησις*, whether the *Timaeus* is read literally or figuratively, must have as its source some form of *ψυχή*, since at *Phaedrus* 245c *ψυχή* is said to be the self-moving source of all *κίνησις*. This has led to various claims, ranging from the existence of an Irrational World Soul behind the motions of pre-matter (Plutarch) to an irrational element in World Soul that is never fully mastered by rationality (Cornford). But Plato himself offers an account, in the pages of the *Timaeus* itself, that

<sup>4</sup> See John Whittaker, *Phoenix* 23 (1969), 181–82 and *ibid.*, 27 (1973), 387–88.

<sup>5</sup> See *Tim.* 37b2–3, 48e6–49a1, and T. M. Robinson, *Phronesis* 24 (1979), 105–109.

suggests much more precisely what his thinking is. At 57e ff. we read:

Motion will never exist in a state of homogeneity. For it is difficult, or rather impossible, that what is to be moved should exist without that which is to move it, or what is to cause motion (τὸ κινῆσον) without that which is to be moved by it. In the absence of either, motion cannot exist; and they cannot possibly be homogeneous. Accordingly, we must always presume rest in a state of homogeneity, and attribute motion to a state of heterogeneity (ἀνωμαλότητα). Further, inequality (ἀνισότης) is a cause of heterogeneity, and the origin of inequality we have already described. (tr. Cornford)

While for an instant the reader may imagine that the κινῆσον mentioned here will be an existent of some sort—like, say, ψυχή—the subsequent references, in the same passage, to ἀνισότης and ἀνωμαλότης make it clear that Plato is referring to particular *conditions* under which, according to the passage in question, the “primary bodies” operate. As it happens, exactly the same conditions obtain, as Cornford sees (p. 240), for the movements in Space of the δυνάμεις of the pre-cosmos, which are described (52e2–4) as “neither alike nor evenly balanced” (μὴθ’ ὁμοίων . . . μήτε ἰσορρόπων), as having “no equipoise within any region of it” (κατ’ οὐδέν αὐτῆς ἰσορροπεῖν), and as being “everywhere swayed unevenly” (ἀνωμάλως πάντα ταλαντομένην). The natural conclusion to be drawn from this can only be that, just as the eternal equipoise of a given Form (or of the World of Forms as a whole) is the basis of its/their eternally unchanging state, the sempiternal lack of such equipoise among the δυνάμεις of pre-matter accounts for their sempiternal κίνησις; no further doctrine of a supposed presence of ψυχή need be imported.

I conclude from the above that for the Plato of the *Timaeus* the Forms, God, and Space are eternal, the Forms in the most basic sense and God and Space in another, logically differentiable sense involving κίνησις, if only in God’s case the κίνησις involved in thought and volition. The ἔχνη or *Urstoff* that characterize Space are by contrast sempiternal, and the formed world, including its soul, everlasting. It is a scenario he sees only as “likely”; he is in no way bound by it, and will in later dialogues, notably the *Philebus* and *Laws*, make significant modifications to it. But that is another essay. For the moment I wish to turn briefly to the post-platonic tradition and ask what happened to some of the key transformations and neologisms we have noticed in the *Timaeus*, particularly that of the “perpetuous.” The first thing that can be said is that the use of αἰών to mean (in certain contexts) “eternity” is largely accepted by subsequent philos-



ophy; this group includes not only Aristotle (*passim*), Philo (1. 496, 619), and Plotinus (3. 7. 5), it also encompasses Epicurus (*Sent.* 20), much exercised to allay "fears concerning eternity." The same goes for the cognate adjective αἰώνιος and adverb αἰωνίως, though a growing commitment to a much more technical philosophical vocabulary is very apparent. One notable exception is however Aristotle. The omission of both words throughout the Corpus is striking, and can hardly have been accidental. One can only assume that for Aristotle the new terminology was superfluous; he himself is content to rely on context and the time-honored Homeric word αἰδῖος to describe both the eternal life of God (*Metaph.* 1072<sup>b</sup>29) and the sempiternal duration of the cosmos.<sup>6</sup> The neo-platonic tradition, by contrast, sees virtue in Plato's terminology. In a well-known passage Plotinus carefully distinguishes the "eternal" (αἰώνιος) from the "sempiternal" (αἰδῖος), and Proclus (*Inst.* 172) has the same commitments when he writes of νοῦς as being ἀκίνητος αἰωνίως πάντα ὧν.<sup>7</sup> They differ from Plato in that the language is now truly technical; no fail-safe techniques are needed to guard against possible misinterpretation. Their case is aided by the relative simplicity of their own cosmology vis-à-vis Plato's; once the doctrine of a pre-cosmos is discarded (as it was within a generation of Plato by Xenocrates, if not by others), the notion of temporal everlastingness, which only made sense in terms of such a doctrine, can also be quietly jettisoned, leaving simply the notions of the eternal (time-transcendent) and the sempiternal (time-measured). With these two concepts now finally clarified, the concept of the διαίωνιον can also be discarded as at best a superfluous synonym for the αἰώνιον, dreamed up by Plato to cover his own failure to make appropriate distinctions between the terms αἰώνιος and αἰδῖος. That is, of course, to state the case most strongly; in practice, *pietas* toward the master was such that a word like διαίωνιος was unlikely to be abandoned in so unfeeling a manner. We find it used, for example, of εὐδαιμονία in Philo (2. 569), in Philodemus (*de piet.* 80), and nearer the end of classical antiquity, in the Emperor Julian (*Or.* 4. 144c); Philodemus also used it of "living creatures" (*de piet.* 111). Philo in particular finds the word to his liking—so much so that he coins the verb διαίωνίζειν (a coinage which, perhaps because Philo is not Plato, enjoys a brief day of glory in his own works and is never heard of again). It is only in the fifth century that Proclus (*Theol. Plat.* 5. 37) and Syrianus (*in Metaph.* 103. 28) return to the use of the word in the way that Plato had originally planned—and then in its adverbial

<sup>6</sup> For references see Bekker s.v.

<sup>7</sup> See also Simplic. in *Epictet.*, p. 77D.



form only. Even at this stage it still appears to be little more than complimentary and complementary; its value is at best that of emphatic synonym.

It is worth emphasizing that the distinctions with which Plato wrestled in the *Timaeus* constitute one of the history of philosophy's success-stories, not one of its failures. On the debit side, to be sure, from Plato's point of view, lies the fact that his doctrine of the everlastingness (measured in time) of the formed cosmos was largely rejected, albeit by the rough technique of denying that he ever espoused any notion of the world's temporal formation in the first place. Parasitic upon this was the large-scale rejection of the notion of the sempiternal as the non-temporal or perhaps extra-temporal mode of duration that Plato considered to be a characteristic of the world's pre-matter; the sempiternity of (formed) matter is understood, from Aristotle onwards, as being unequivocally in the temporal mode, though without beginning or end. On the credit side, the seminal nature of Plato's discussion is such that the relationship of eternity to sempiternity does in fact finally get clarified, and three of the four basic neologisms and verbal transformations he employed to meet the problem, αἰών, αἰδῖος and αἰώνιος, have become, along with other major Platonic coinages such as the notion of ποιότης, part and parcel of subsequent Greek thinking, and in various translations part and parcel of the western heritage.

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*Psychagogia* in Plato's *Phaedrus*

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From ancient times, there has been much discussion whether Plato's *Phaedrus* is a unified composition. The problem is that the dialogue seems to have a variety of topics—love, beauty, the soul, rhetoric, dialectic, and writing—and that it seems to fall into two halves, the first comprising three speeches, the second consisting of dialectical discussion. In favor of the unity of the dialogue, ancient and modern scholars have argued that the various topics are closely interwoven.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The Neoplatonist Hermias (5th century A.D.) discussed the unity of the *Phaedrus* in his commentary on the dialogue. He notes that the dialogue has been thought to be about love, rhetoric, the soul, the good, primary beauty, and beauty of every kind. He agrees with Iamblichus that the unifying topic of the *Phaedrus* is "beauty of every kind"; and he proposes that there is a gradual ascent from Lysias' love for the beauty of Phaedrus' body to Phaedrus' love for the beauty of Lysias' *logos*, then to psychic beauty, to the beauty of the cosmic gods, to intelligible beauty, and finally to Eros and beauty itself, with a subsequent reversal back to psychic beauty and then to the beauty of *logoi* (pp. 8–12 of P. Couvreur's edition, *Hermiae Alexandrini in Platonis Phaedrum Scholia*, Paris 1901). I agree with Werner Jaeger that the *Phaedrus* is unified by the problem of rhetoric (*Paideia*, tr. by Gilbert Highet, vol. 3, New York 1944, p. 184). I also agree in large part with Ronald B. Levinson that unity is achieved through a series of "dialectical transformations and reconciliations" of a number of themes, among them love and beauty, madness, rhetoric, and philosophy ("Plato's *Phaedrus* and the New Criticism," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 46 [1964], 293–309). In a perceptive, short note Robert G. Hoerber proposes that the unity of the *Phaedrus* consists in the "proper Collection and Division" of the four topics: erotic passion, Platonic love, current rhetoric, and dialectic ("Love or Rhetoric in Plato's *Phaedrus*?" *Classical Bulletin* 34 [1958], 33). Others who have argued for the unity of the *Phaedrus* are: Gustav E. Mueller, who suggests that the real theme is the question "what is man?" in "Unity of the *Phaedrus*," *Classical Bulletin* 33 (1957), 50–53 and 63–65; John I. Beare, "The *Phaedrus*: its structure; the ἑΡΩΣ theme: notes," *Hermathena* 17 (1913), 312–34; W. C. Helmbold and W. B. Holther, "The Unity of the 'Phaedrus,'" *University of California Publications in Classical Philology* 14 (1952), 387–417; and Paul Plass, "The Unity of the *Phaedrus*," *Symbolae Osloenses* 43 (1968), 7–38 (reprinted with numerous typographical errors in *Plato: True and Sophistic Rhetoric*, ed. by Keith V. Erickson, Amsterdam 1979).

This approach is, I think, correct. At the same time, the dialogue seems to me more unified than has been thought. The underlying theme that binds the whole dialogue is, I suggest, Plato's new definition of rhetoric as a certain "*psychagogia*" (261a, 271c). The dialogue begins with an illustration of the wrong type of *psychagogia* and moves gradually toward a revelation of the right kind of *psychagogia*; and throughout this progression Socrates exemplifies the right kind of *psychagogia* by leading the youthful Phaedrus from a fascination with the wrong kind of rhetoric to a contemplation of the right kind. This progression leads from Lysianic to Isocratean rhetoric and then to genuine, philosophical rhetoric.

The term *psychagogia* occurs twice in the *Phaedrus*, both times in the final, dialectical section of the dialogue. Socrates bases his examination of rhetoric on the definition of rhetoric as "a certain *psychagogia* through words, not only in the law-courts and all other public meetings, but also in private meetings, alike in matters small and large, and properly no more to be esteemed in important than in unimportant matters" (261a-b).<sup>2</sup> Later in the discussion, Socrates reverts to this definition by reminding Phaedrus that the function of speech is "*psychagogia*" (271c).

This new definition of rhetoric is immediately conspicuous as a revision of the view presented in the *Gorgias*. Here Gorgias describes rhetoric as "the ability to persuade by words jurors in the law-court, councillors in the council, assemblymen in the assembly, and anyone in any other meeting that is political" (452e).<sup>3</sup> In the *Gorgias*, rhetoric is the practice of public persuasion. In the *Phaedrus*, by contrast, Socrates views rhetoric as a means of influencing individuals, in private or in public, on matters of individual concern.

Plato signals this shift by alluding to the *Gorgias* both in the discussion that leads up to the new definition and in Phaedrus'

<sup>2</sup> *Phaedrus* 261a-b: . . . ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων, οὐ μόνον ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι δημόσιοι σύλλογοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις, ἢ αὐτῇ σμικρῶν τε καὶ μεγάλων πέρι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐντιμότερον τό γε ὄρθον περὶ σπουδαῖα ἢ περὶ φαῦλα γιγνόμενον;

<sup>3</sup> *Gorgias* 452e: τὸ πείθειν . . . οἷόν τ' εἶναι τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ δικαστὰς καὶ ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ βουλευτὰς καὶ ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐκκλησιαστὰς καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ συλλόγῳ παντί, ὅστις ἂν πολιτικὸς σύλλογος γίγνηται. Cf. 454b, 455a. P. Kucharski examines in detail how the discussion of rhetoric in the *Phaedrus* is an outgrowth of the discussion in the *Gorgias* in "La Rhétorique dans le *Gorgias* et le *Phèdre*," *Revue des Études grecques* 74 (1961), 371-406. Antje Hellwig's *Untersuchungen zur Theorie der Rhetorik bei Platon und Aristoteles* (*Hypomnemata* 38, Göttingen 1973) is also a valuable contribution to this topic.

response to it. Socrates begins the discussion by asking whether the rhetorician must know the truth (259e). This question is the focus of Socrates' entire examination of rhetoric. As a possible answer, Socrates sums up the position taken by Gorgias in the *Gorgias*: that if an aspiring rhetorician lacks knowledge, he must acquire it, but that knowledge by itself is insufficient for persuasion (*Gorgias* 458e–460a, *Phaedrus* 260d). Socrates also reminds Phaedrus that there are arguments purporting to show that rhetoric is not a skill, *τέχνη*, but an “unskilled routine” (*ἄτεχνος τριβή*), lacking in knowledge (*Phaedrus* 260e); Socrates used such arguments in the *Gorgias* (463b, 501a). Then, after stating his new definition, Socrates asks Phaedrus whether this is what he has heard; and Phaedrus expresses surprise, saying that he has heard no more than that rhetoric concerns lawsuits and public speaking (261b). Phaedrus' surprise is itself surprising, since all of the rhetoric exemplified previously in the *Phaedrus* has been of a conspicuously private kind. The three speeches that preceded all dealt with the intimate question of the relationship between lover and beloved. In expressing surprise, Phaedrus stands for the general reader who is familiar with the discussion in the *Gorgias* and who is now being alerted that a new view is being proposed.

Socrates responds to Phaedrus' surprise by arguing that his definition fits common rhetorical practice. Rhetoricians, he points out, practice an art (if indeed it is an art) of opposition (*ἀντιλογική*), which aims to make the same thing appear to be both one thing (such as just) and its opposite (such as unjust); and this aim, which consists in making anything resemble anything at all, is not confined to public speaking (261b–e). Consequently, Socrates argues, since rhetoric is the practice of deception, and since deception cannot be successful unless the deceiver knows the truth, the rhetorician must have knowledge.

Socrates draws no attention for the time being to the term *psychagogia*, the key term of his definition. This term is another new element in the definition; Plato did not use the term in any previous discussion of rhetoric. The reason it does not strike the attention of Phaedrus is that it is entirely compatible with the familiar view of rhetoric as the practice of public persuasion. The term suggests beguilement; and by emphasizing the deceptive nature of rhetoric in his discussion, Socrates invites the reader to understand the term in a pejorative sense for now, as the practice of alluring and beguiling others. Later, he will reveal the full meaning of the term and the full novelty of his definition.

The earliest attested meaning of the compound *psychagoge* is that of “conjuring” or “evoking” souls of the dead. From this use, there



evolved the notion of influencing the souls of living people, with the connotation of "alluring" or "beguiling" them.<sup>4</sup> Using the verbal form, Aristophanes combines the two senses and gives his own twist to them in a portrait of Socrates in the *Birds*, produced in 414 B.C. Here the chorus of birds sees a strange sight: Socrates "is conjuring souls" (ψυχαγωγῶν, 1555) by a lake among the "Shadow-feet." When the cowardly Peisander comes to this place to get back the spirit (ψυχή) that deserted him when still alive, Socrates slays a young camel just as Odysseus had slain sheep: and Chaerephon is drawn to the blood from the world below. In casting Socrates as a conjurer of souls, Aristophanes is parodying Socrates' well-known ethical concern, his care for the soul.

Plato uses the noun, *psychagogia*, only in the *Phaedrus*; but the verbal form occurs in two other dialogues. In the *Laws* (909b), he plays on the basic sense of "conjuring" souls of the dead to add to it the notion of "beguiling" the living; and in the *Timaeus* (71a) he uses the verb to refer to the beguilement of the desiring part of the soul by means of images. His contemporary and rival, Isocrates, uses the verb to describe the effect of poetic devices on the listener. In *Evagoras* (10), he points out that poets can "charm" their listeners with beautiful rhythms and harmonies even though their diction and thoughts may be poor; and in *To Nicocles* (49), he remarks that rhetoricians who wish to "allure" their listeners must use the crowd-pleasing device of myth, just like the poets.

Gorgias did not use the term, as far as we know. But it is well suited to convey his notion that speech has the power to effect "most divine" deeds, as attested by poetry and magical incantations. It fits even more directly his claim that words have the same power with respect to the soul as drugs have with respect to the body; as a result, Gorgias held, a speaker can shape a soul in whatever way he wishes and in particular "drug" and "bewitch" a soul "by an evil persuasion."<sup>5</sup>

The term *psychagogia* in Socrates' definition thus agrees with the familiar notion of rhetoric as a power that works on the soul and may be used to deceive it. But as the argument of the *Phaedrus* proceeds, a new meaning unfolds. Socrates gradually develops the view that genuine rhetoric is an art by which a speaker guides another to the truth by adjusting his words to the other's soul. Rhetoric no longer appears as a pseudo-art of deception, but is shown to be an

<sup>4</sup> Evaghl los Moutsopolos has a brief survey of the uses of ψυχαγωγία in *La Musique dans l'oeuvre de Platon* (Paris 1959), pp. 259-60.

<sup>5</sup> *Praise of Helen* 8-14.

art of teaching individuals to discover the truth about themselves. After considerable argument, Socrates is ready to draw attention to the component *psychagogia* in his definition. The new term in fact sums up everything that is new about his view of rhetoric. Reverting to his definition, Socrates claims that "since the function of speech is *psychagogia*" (271c), the rhetorician must know the types of soul, as well as be able to recognize actual occurrences. Socrates now relies on the etymology of the term *psychagogia* to reveal its underlying, true meaning, "guidance of the soul." Only sham rhetoric beguiles others; real rhetoric guides souls to self-knowledge through a knowledge of soul.

The notion of *psychagogia* thus has pivotal importance in the *Phaedrus*. Its importance, moreover, is not confined to the latter part of the dialogue. It serves as a theme for the entire dialogue. Just as in his dialectical discussion Socrates moves from the notion of a sham rhetoric to that of a genuine rhetoric, so the action of the dialogue as a whole moves from a display of pseudo-rhetoric to a revelation of genuine rhetoric; and this is a transition from *psychagogia* as beguilement to *psychagogia* as guidance of the soul. Throughout this progression, Socrates serves as an example of a true rhetorician and true "psychagogue." Against Aristophanes' portrait of Socrates as conjuror of souls, Plato sets a portrait of Socrates as a "psychagogue" who guides souls to the truth by seeking it himself.

This *psychagogia* has four stages. First, Socrates joins Phaedrus in an apparent celebration of Lysias' speech (227a–34c); second, Socrates undertakes to deliver a speech of his own, to rival Lysias' speech (234c–42a); third, Socrates opposes this speech with a mythical recantation that reveals something of the truth (242a–57b); and fourth, Socrates teaches by a dialectical examination, which exemplifies genuine rhetoric, that genuine rhetoric consists in a dialectical search for the truth (257b–79c). Each succeeding stage is built on the preceding stages; and the whole forms a sequence in which each part is complemented by all the others. The remainder of this paper will examine this relationship among the four stages.

The dialogue begins with a meeting between Phaedrus and Socrates close to the city walls. Phaedrus is enthralled by a speech of Lysias, in which the speaker attempts to seduce "someone beautiful" (227c), whom he does not love, by pleading ingeniously that it is advantageous for a person to yield to a non-lover, not a lover. Phaedrus is so impressed by the speech that he has spent the entire morning memorizing it. But we do not learn this fact from Phaedrus; we learn it in time, and with precise details, from Socrates, who is invited by Phaedrus to join him in a walk outside the city. When Socrates asks

Phaedrus to recite the speech to him, and Phaedrus replies that his memory can't possibly do justice to a speech composed over a long period of time by the cleverest of present writers, Socrates exclaims: "If I don't know Phaedrus, I have forgotten myself" (228a). He then reveals all: that Phaedrus first had Lysias recite the speech repeatedly, then borrowed the manuscript to study it, and finally went outside the city, manuscript in hand, to practice it. Socrates knows Phaedrus well; and as a clinching demonstration of his insight, he makes Phaedrus come up with the manuscript that he has been hiding under his cloak. In exposing Phaedrus, Socrates shows that he recognizes with whom he is dealing. We shall learn later that a knowledge of the other's soul is a prerequisite of the true orator.

The opening scene shows us a Socrates who is no less enthusiastic about getting to know Lysias' speech than Phaedrus is about learning it by heart. Socrates describes himself as a "fellow bacchic reveler" (*συγγορυβαντιῶντα*), who is so passionate a "lover of discourses" as to be "sick" about listening to them (228b-c). Socrates' and Phaedrus' walk into the countryside looks indeed like a bacchic revel, with overtones of comedy, in which the two celebrants lead each other in turn. First Phaedrus invites Socrates to lead on (227c, 228b) and Socrates suggests that they turn away from the road to go along the river-bed in search of a secluded spot (229a). Subsequently Phaedrus picks out a spot and leads Socrates to it. The landscape takes on an air of mystery, as Phaedrus recalls the story of Oreithyia being snatched by Boreas (229b). It is as though the pair of worshippers, too, has been carried off by some supernatural power. This impression is reinforced when the spot, which Phaedrus picked out from a distance, turns out to be a grove sacred to the Nymphs and the river-god Achelous. Socrates duly celebrates the grove with a lyrical description; and he thanks Phaedrus for leading him, like a stranger, to an alien territory (*ἐξενάγηται*, 230c), the countryside. Phaedrus acknowledges that Socrates is indeed like a stranger who has been led (*ξεναγούμενω*). Socrates' explanation for this *xenagogia* is that Phaedrus has found a drug by which to lead him wherever he wishes: this is to dangle "discourses in books" in front of him just as others dangle fruit or branches in front of animals that are hungry (230d-e).

This Bacchic revel and *xenagogia* is also a *psychagogia*. The souls of both men have been conjured to an alien territory by the drug-like power of words. On the surface, Phaedrus has acted as leader in this journey: beguiled by Lysias' speech, he seems to have beguiled Socrates and lured him to a place of estrangement. But in reality, as will become increasingly clear, Socrates has been Phaedrus' leader: guided by a divine power, he has guided Phaedrus to a place of purification,

where both men may be truly at home. Socrates claims he is entranced: in reality he has a perfect grip on himself. There is a glimmer of the true state of affairs when, in response to Phaedrus' question where Oreithyia was carried off, Socrates is able to give an answer ("two or three stades downstream, where we cross to Agra," 229c). The stranger, Socrates, knows the territory better than Phaedrus. Then, in the discussion concerning Oreithyia, Socrates remarks that he is still searching to know himself (229e). Although he seems to have been swept away by Dionysiac enthusiasm, Socrates keeps in mind his life's goal. Acting as a "psychagogue," he associates Phaedrus with himself in a search for self-knowledge, by guiding him to a holy place where Phaedrus may be healed of his evil enchantment.

The topography provides a suitable setting for the *psychagogia*. Not only do the two men journey to an unfamiliar place, but there is a physical boundary that separates their normal abode from the alien territory. In order to reach the sacred grove, they must cross a river. This river serves as a sacred border, like the body of water outside Hades that separates the souls of the living from the souls of the dead. Later Socrates will be prevented by his inner voice from crossing the river until he has performed a ritual expiation (242b-c); and finally both men cross the river after offering a prayer to Pan and the other deities of the place (279b-c). As though conjured by a ritual act, the souls of the two men have been transported to a realm from which they are normally excluded and win their release through ritual purification. The extraordinary setting of the *Phaedrus*, which has surprised and delighted the readers of Plato, introduces the theme of the entire dialogue, rhetoric as *psychagogia*.

After Phaedrus has read aloud Lysias' speech, Socrates confirms that he has engaged in a Bacchic celebration with Phaedrus (*συμβάκχευσα*, 234d). But he now attributes his enchantment, not to the speech itself, but to Phaedrus' excessive delight at the speech. By transferring his enthusiasm from the speech to the hearer, Socrates now assumes the role of lover of Phaedrus.<sup>6</sup> In order to lure Phaedrus away from his admiration of Lysias, he also sets himself up as a rhetorical rival to Lysias. His immediate strategy is to hurl an apparently rash challenge: he claims that "ancient wise men and women" (235b) have spoken and written more copiously on the same

<sup>6</sup> Anne Lebeck notes in "The Central Myth of Plato's *Phaedrus*" (*Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 13 [1972], 267-90, p. 281) that Socrates is here overcome by the sight of his beloved, Phaedrus, in just the way that Socrates later describes in the recantation (254b). V. Tejera aptly views Phaedrus as the "erotic . . . generator" of both of Socrates' speeches ("Irony and Allegory in the *Phaedrus*," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 8 [1975], 71-87, p. 74).



subject treated by Lysias and that he, Socrates, could do better himself. Socrates is careful to attribute his own fullness of invention to some source that he can't name just at present, "perhaps beautiful Sappho or wise Anacreon or even some prose writers (συγγραφέων)" (235c). He says that he knows he is ignorant; so it must be that he got his inspiration from elsewhere and that "because of my stupidity I have forgotten this very thing, how and from whom I heard" (235d).

Who, if anyone, is Socrates' source? Malcolm Brown and James Coulter have shown in detail that the organization and content of Socrates' first speech are Isocratean.<sup>7</sup> The most important Isocratean features pointed out by them are: clear organization, based on a clear determination of the subject matter; sometimes by means of a definition; the view that human beings are guided by opinion (δόξα) or desire (ἐπιθυμία); the praise of "divine philosophy" (239b); and the claim that nothing is more valuable for humans or gods than "the education of the soul" (241c). As Brown and Coulter point out, Plato considered this a debased view of philosophy and of human nature, since it substitutes opinion for knowledge and cold calculation of material advantages for a commitment to truth.

Another Isocratean feature, pointed out by R. L. Howland, is the overall purpose of the speech, that of improving on a rival rhetorician by composing a speech on the same theme.<sup>8</sup> Isocrates' *Busiris* is particularly pertinent. Here Isocrates attempts to outdo his rival, Polycrates, by first defining what an encomium is; and he ends by admitting that even though both he and his rival may be speaking falsehoods, his speech is superior because it is properly an encomium.<sup>9</sup>

There are further indications that Socrates is using Isocrates as a model for his first speech. With some emphasis, Socrates draws attention to the rhythmic quality of his speech. Shortly after he has started his speech, he breaks off by saying that he is already close to speaking in dithyrambs (238d); and when he ends, he says that he is no longer talking in dithyrambs but in epic verse (241e). The use of rhythm was a conspicuous feature of Isocrates' style. Well aware that

<sup>7</sup> "The Middle Speech of Plato's *Phaedrus*," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 9 (1971), 405-23.

<sup>8</sup> "The Attack on Isocrates in the *Phaedrus*," *Classical Quarterly* 31 (1937), 151-59, p. 153. The *Helen* (composed about 370 B.C.) and *Busiris* (about 390 B.C.) are two outstanding examples of this endeavor. Another example is the *Panegyricus* (380 B.C.), where Isocrates tries to outdo the many predecessors who have spoken on the same theme by choosing the right starting-point (15).

<sup>9</sup> *Busiris* 9 and 33. In the *Helen* (14-15), Isocrates likewise proposes to improve upon a rival (Gorgias) by first making clear what an encomium is.



poets charm their listeners by the use of rhythm, Isocrates demanded in his programmatic *Against the Sophists* that the rhetorician must speak "rhythmically and musically" (εὐρύθμως καὶ μουσικῶς).<sup>10</sup> As he claimed in late life, his speeches are akin to poetry, that is, to works composed "with music and rhythms" (μετὰ μουσικῆς καὶ ῥυθμῶν), and have "a rather poetic and elaborate diction";<sup>11</sup> and they tend to be adorned "with beautiful rhythms and elaboration" (εὐρυθμίαις καὶ ποικιλίαις).<sup>12</sup>

Moreover, Socrates seems to plant a clue in the very way that he describes the source that, he says, eludes him. Isocrates was a prose writer (συγγραφεύς) who advised his students not to be ignorant of the poets and other "wise persons" (σοφιστῶν) but to cull from them what is best just as bees gather honey from flowers.<sup>13</sup> Socrates has a convenient excuse for his forgetfulness: Isocrates' speeches are a repertory of second-hand ideas; and it is hard to see anything original in his speeches.<sup>14</sup>

The reader knows from other dialogues to be wary of Socrates' confessions of ignorance and forgetfulness. In the *Phaedrus*, there is

<sup>10</sup> *Against the Sophists* 16 (composed about 390 B.C., roughly the time at which Isocrates founded his school). Isocrates demanded poetic rhythm in his Τέχνη (Sauppe II 225), μεμύχθω παντὶ ῥυθμῷ μάλιστα ἰαμβικῷ ἢ τροχαϊκῷ. R. C. Jebb discusses the importance of prose rhythm in Isocrates' rhetoric in his *The Attic Orators*, vol. 2, London 1893, pp. 56–58. For the actual rhythms used by Socrates in his speech, see Karl Mraz, "Platos Phaedrus und die Rhetorik," part 2, *Wiener Studien* 37 (1915), 88–117, pp. 96–97.

<sup>11</sup> *Antidosis* 46–47 (dated 354–53 B.C.).

<sup>12</sup> *To Philip* 27 (dated 346 B.C.).

<sup>13</sup> *To Demonstus* 51–52 (dated about 374–72 B.C.); and *To Nicocles* 13 (dated about the same time). In *To Nicocles*, Isocrates also mentions that Hesiod, Theognis, and Phocylides are agreed to be "excellent counsellors for the life of men" (43). Isocrates' praise of the poets is not unmixed; along with much wisdom, he also attributes to them calumnies and lies (for example, at *Busiris* 38). On Isocrates' eclecticism, see also the next note.

<sup>14</sup> There are, I think, other allusions to Isocrates in the way in which Socrates leads up to his speech; but these are difficult to prove and carry weight only in combination. There is, I think, an allusion to Isocrates in the friendly bargaining that goes on between Phaedrus and Socrates prior to Socrates' delivery of the speech. Phaedrus would have Socrates use none of the arguments used by Lysias; and Socrates protests that he should be allowed to use those arguments of Lysias which are inevitable in any treatment of the subject (235e–36a). Isocrates maintains in his famous *Panegyricus* (8) that "one must not avoid those subjects about which others have spoken previously but one must try to speak better than them" (8); and in *To Nicocles* (41) he excuses his lack of originality by saying that in speeches of this type one should look not for novelty, but for the ability to "bring together the greatest number of ideas scattered in the thoughts of others and speak most beautifully about them." Socrates, it seems to me, is imitating Isocrates' eclecticism. It is true that in

special reason to suppose that Socrates is toying with his interlocutor. Socrates has been playing with Phaedrus at uncovering Phaedrus' devotion to Lysias. We saw Phaedrus hiding Lysias' manuscript and protesting that he can't recite his speech; and we saw Socrates uncovering the subterfuge and teasing Phaedrus about it. A similar scene is now being staged, with roles reversed. Socrates now plays the role of the enthusiastic and bashful student of rhetoric, and he gives Phaedrus a chance at uncovering his rhetorical inspiration. After boasting of his rhetorical capacity, Socrates suddenly becomes reluctant: he says that he has been teasing Phaedrus, and that he really can't deliver a more refined speech than Lysias'. Thereupon Phaedrus sees through Socrates, just as Socrates saw through him earlier. Phaedrus says: "If I don't know Socrates, I've forgotten myself"; and he accuses Socrates of playing coy. Phaedrus uncovers Socrates' desire to speak. In time, he also uncovers his source.

Phaedrus reveals the source to us at the very end of the dialogue when, in response to Socrates' command to tell his friend Lysias about true rhetoric, Phaedrus commands Socrates to tell his friend too. Socrates asks coyly who this is, and Phaedrus replies: "The beautiful Isocrates" (278e). Isocrates has not been named at all before this; and his mention at the close of the dialogue may surprise the reader. Isocrates has, however, been very much present throughout the dialogue; and the first allusion to him is in the way Socrates describes the source of his first speech.

Socrates delivers his speech, covered up "in shame," as he says. The pose is appropriate because he is hiding behind Isocrates, whose message is shameful. But Socrates also arranges very carefully that he has nothing, really, to be ashamed of. In the first place, he announces at the very beginning that the speech is addressed to a "boy, or rather youngster (*μειρακίσκος*), very beautiful" (237b) by one

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the *Helen* (15) Isocrates announces that he will leave aside everything that others have said. This has led Howland to suggest that in demanding the right to use some of his rival's arguments Socrates in fact attacks Isocrates, by showing that his straining for novelty is absurd (p. 154 of the article cited in note 8). I suggest that in the *Helen* Isocrates is demonstrating that he can do what he normally chooses not to do. Plato parodies Isocrates by having Phaedrus attempt to impose the conditions of the *Helen* on Socrates, who is imitating Isocrates, and then having Socrates respond, appropriately, with an Isocratean position.

I suspect that there is another allusion to Isocrates, in particular the *Panegyricus* (which was read at the hundredth Olympic festival in 380 B.C.), when Phaedrus accepts Socrates' terms with the extravagant promise that if Socrates can outdo Lysias on these terms he will set up a statue of Socrates at Olympia (236b). Phaedrus here exalts Socrates to the rank of the famous rhetoricians who composed for the Olympic festival, among them Gorgias, Lysias, and—most exalted—Isocrates.

of his many lovers, who cleverly pretends not to be in love with him. The speech is, therefore, an exercise in the professional rhetorician's pseudo-art of deception. Socrates denounces this type of exercise later in the dialectical discussion, when he points out that some rhetoricians maintain that there is no need to know the truth, since arguments from likelihood (*eikós*) are more convincing than the truth (272d–74a). But Socrates differs from the ordinary rhetorician in announcing his subterfuge at the outset. By using this stratagem, he not only guards against the charge of deceiving his listener, but also suggests that Lysias' speech is in fact a piece of deception perpetrated by a lover who pretends not to be one.

Socrates invokes the "boy" at the beginning of his speech (237b) and refers to him again later by saying that "we must return to the boy" (238d). The same "boy" is invoked by Socrates at the beginning of his second speech, the recantation. Socrates now asks where the boy is to whom his previous speech was addressed, and Phaedrus answers: "Here he is, next to you, always very close, whenever you want him" (243e). The beautiful boy to whom Socrates addresses both his speeches is none other than Phaedrus. He is listener and addressee at once. Hence Socrates has another, subtler defense against the charge of deception: he cannot be accused of deceiving the "boy" of his first speech, because he is the very person he warns against the deception. As the exchange at the beginning of the recantation tells us, Socrates has succeeded in attracting Phaedrus' love. He has done so in the manner of a genuine rhetorician by adjusting his words to the soul of his listener: he has impressed Phaedrus by constructing a speech which is on the surface no less ingeniously deceptive than that of Lysias, but which is in fact designed to be truthful.

Furthermore, Socrates bases all the arguments of his first speech on a definition of love as an irrational desire for the enjoyment of bodily beauty. In his recantation later on, Socrates shows that the definition is misguided: it defines a left-handed, perverse type of love, as opposed to a right-handed, genuine love. Hence all his arguments showing that a lover is harmful to his beloved are unsound. But to the extent that the definition applies to an attitude commonly called "love," the arguments are sound. Socrates is truthful in arguing: if love is a certain irrational desire, then it is harmful to associate with a lover. Because all of the speech hinges on an explicit definition of love, and this definition corresponds to a certain attitude that passes as "love," even though it does not state the truth about love, Socrates is not in fact deceiving his listener.

Socrates deliberately does not give Phaedrus a chance to applaud

his speech. He stops the speech abruptly at mid-point, after completing his arguments against the lover and before adding any arguments in favor of the non-lover. Socrates explains to the bewildered Phaedrus that if he goes on, he will surely be possessed by the nymphs to whom Phaedrus threw him (241e). He feigns madness of the left-handed kind, as he will make clear later, in order to let himself be swayed subsequently by a prophetic power that exemplifies a right-handed, or divine, kind of madness (242c).

Prevented by his inner voice from crossing the river, Socrates undertakes to purify himself by a speech of recantation. This new speech not only subverts, but also complements the preceding speech. We expected a praise of the non-lover; but Socrates now offers a praise of the genuine lover to balance the previous condemnation of the debased lover. The new speech complements the other by showing that there is a genuine type of love, the love of soul and of truth, as opposed to the fake love that is directed at another's body. The two speeches together show that the latter type of love is to be shunned, the former to be pursued. The speeches thus form a carefully constructed progression, in which the first speech turns out to be a fragment that is completed and given new meaning by the second.

In his recantation, Socrates continues to aim his remarks at Phaedrus, invoking him at intervals as "beautiful boy" or "boy" (243e, 252b, 256e). Again he adjusts both content and style to Phaedrus. He now uses myth to turn Phaedrus from falsehood to truth; and he acknowledges his rhetorical strategy ironically at the end by excusing himself to Eros for the "poetic expressions" which Phaedrus forced on him (257a). The use of myth is intended to lift Phaedrus' awareness from the narrow focus on human selfishness in the Isocratean speech to a new cosmic vision, in which humans aim to recover a divine condition of knowledge through love of another. Socrates now shows Phaedrus that reason is the guiding faculty of the human soul and that genuine philosophy is a search for divine enlightenment.

In this praise of love, which turns out to be a praise of the love of wisdom, philosophy, Socrates not only practices genuine rhetorical *psychagogia*, but also makes *psychagogia* the subject of his discourse. He shows that the lover guides the soul of another toward its former divine condition and thereby guides and finds himself. The genuine rhetorician, we will learn later, has the same aim as the lover; and ultimately genuine rhetoric and genuine love will appear as one.

Socrates later describes his speech as a playful "mythic hymn" which "perhaps" touches upon the truth and is not "altogether unconvincing," and which honors "with measure and pious speech



(μετρίως τε καὶ εὐφήμως) my master and yours, o Phaedrus, Eros, the guardian of beautiful boys" (265b–c). Not only is the content of the myth clearly anti-Isocratean, but Socrates sums up the difference between his and Isocrates' rhetoric by the phrase "with measure and pious speech." As we saw earlier, Isocrates demanded in *Against the Sophists* that the rhetorician speak "rhythmically and musically" (εὐρύθμως καὶ μουσικῶς), and he took pride in his use of poetic rhythms. In his previous parody of Isocrates, Socrates drew attention to the use of poetic measures. In his new speech, Socrates replaces the measures of poetry with genuine measure—the measure of truth and piety. The phrase μετρίως τε καὶ εὐφήμως serves as a signal that Socrates is replacing Isocratean rhetoric with a rhetoric of truth. As Socrates later states explicitly, this new rhetoric aims at pleasing the gods, not humans (273e).

The succession of three speeches thus constitutes a transition from Lysianic to Isocratean rhetoric and then to a new rhetoric that repudiates both of these kinds. When Socrates finishes his recantation, he has won over Phaedrus to the new rhetoric. Phaedrus joins enthusiastically in Socrates' prayer that Lysias should abandon his kind of rhetoric and turn to philosophy and that he, Phaedrus, should devote himself entirely to the love that is accompanied by philosophy; and he abandons Lysias as vulgar (ταπεινός, 257c). But Phaedrus has little understanding of what the new love entails. Nor indeed is Socrates' unfolding of a new rhetoric complete at this point. Socrates' speech of recantation is itself a fragment: it must be followed by dialectical discussion if it is to count as a contribution to genuine rhetoric. Myth is but a step toward understanding: it needs to be complemented by rational, dialectical examination if it is to be part of a genuine philosophical search.

Socrates therefore detains Phaedrus in the sacred grove while he teaches him by example and precept at once what genuine rhetoric is. The issue raised by Lysias' manuscript at the beginning of the dialogue is: how does one write well? Socrates tackles it by asking the prior question: how does one speak well? As a prelude to the discussion, Socrates invokes certain "noble creatures"—arguments—to come "and persuade the beautiful boy Phaedrus (καλλίπαιδά τε Φαῖδρον πείθετε) that unless he philosophizes adequately, he will never be an adequate speaker about anything" (261a). In his reference to Phaedrus, Socrates makes clear that the new section of discourse, like his preceding two speeches, is aimed directly at Phaedrus. Moreover, the juxtaposition of "beautiful boy" and "Phaedrus," with the pun παιδ- . . . Φαιδ-, indicates that Phaedrus is identical with the beautiful "boy" who has kept reappearing throughout the dialogue.



The name "Phaedrus" signifies "bright" and "boy": Phaedrus is the bright boy, the beautiful boy, who has attracted Socrates all along and who, we may assume, attracted Lysias.<sup>15</sup> The beautiful boy appears for a final time at the very end of the dialogue. Here Socrates prays that he may become beautiful inside, and Phaedrus joins in this prayer. The beautiful boy Phaedrus is to become beautiful in soul, along with his dialectical associate and teacher, the lover of his soul and of wisdom in general, Socrates.

We have already touched on some of the arguments of the dialectical section. Appropriately, Socrates begins his argument with a definition

<sup>15</sup> The same pun, with the same identification of "beautiful boy" with "Phaedrus," occurs again at 265c: . . . Ἐρωτα, ὦ Φαῖδρε, καλῶν παίδων ἔφορον. Paul Plass rightly notes that καλλίπαις echoes the vocatives of καλὸς παῖς of Socrates' recantation (p. 37 of the article cited in note 1); in my view, the term echoes all references to "beautiful boy" throughout the *Phaedrus*.

Some scholars have held that Phaedrus was too old at the dramatic date of the dialogue to qualify as the "boy" of Socrates' two speeches. L. Parmentier argued that since Phaedrus, who appears in the *Protagoras* (315c) as a disciple of Hippias, must already have been about eighteen in 432 B.C., the dramatic date of the *Protagoras*, and since the dramatic date of the *Phaedrus* is about 410 B.C., Phaedrus could no longer have been young in the *Phaedrus* ("L'Age de Phèdre dans le dialogue de Platon," *Bulletin de l'Association Guillaume Budé* 10 (1926), 8–21). G. J. de Vries agrees with Parmentier that Phaedrus was not a young man in the *Phaedrus*, although he thinks Plato had no precise dramatic date in mind (*A Commentary on the Phaedrus of Plato*, Amsterdam 1969, pp. 6–7). R. Hackforth, who suggests a dramatic date early in the period 411–404 B.C., thinks that Phaedrus would be about forty (*Plato's Phaedrus*, translation and commentary, Cambridge 1952, p. 8). De Vries and Hackforth agree that such a mature age would not prevent Socrates from addressing Phaedrus as "boy" (παῖ, 267c) and "young man" (νεανία, 257c); and they explain Phaedrus' response to Socrates at 243e as a "fiction" (de Vries, p. 113) and as something "playful" (Hackforth, p. 53, n. 1). They also assign to καλλίπαιδα (261a) the implausible sense of "begetter of beautiful discourses" (De Vries, p. 202; Hackforth, p. 121). This sense was suggested by the Neoplatonist Hermias as an alternative to the straightforward meaning "beautiful boy" (p. 223 of the edition cited in note 1).

As for the dramatic date of the *Phaedrus*, K. J. Dover has argued persuasively for the period 418–16 B.C. (*Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum*, Berkeley 1968, pp. 41–43). This brings the dramatic date of the *Phaedrus* close to that of the *Symposium*, about 416 B.C. In this dialogue Agathon is depicted as a beautiful young man (νέον at 175e, μερακίῳ at 223a), whose charms are irresistible to Socrates and Alcibiades. The same Agathon is presented in the *Protagoras* as "still a young lad" (νέον τι ἐτι μεράκιον) and beautiful (315d). E. Zeller pointed out that there is a slight anachronism between the description of Agathon in the *Protagoras* (about 432 B.C.) as still young and the description of him in the *Symposium* as young (*Über die Anachronismen in den platonischen Gesprächen*, Berlin 1873, p. 86). There is an analogous anachronism, I suggest, concerning Phaedrus. Since Socrates calls him "boy" (267c), "young man" (257c), and "beautiful boy" (261a), we must suppose that he is a young person in the *Phaedrus*. Phaedrus is also a young person in the *Protagoras*: his youth, it appears, is just as lasting as the beautiful Agathon's.

of rhetoric. He will specify later that any discussion that is to be orderly must begin with a definition. As previously discussed, Socrates offers a new definition of rhetoric as a “*psychagogia* in words” that occurs both in public and in private (261a–b). The shift from public to private rhetoric, we now recognize, reflects a new concern with Isocratean rhetoric, whose primary aim is not to influence the public, but to educate individuals through private communication. The threat perceived by Plato is no longer Gorgianic demagoguery, but Isocratean “philosophy.” That is why Socrates undertakes to show Phaedrus how one must practice genuine philosophy.

Although Plato does not mention Isocrates by name until the very end of the dialogue, all of the demands stated by him in the dialectical section imply a reform of Isocratean rhetoric. In the first place, Socrates argues that since a rhetorician must know the truth in order to be skillful at leading a person from one belief to its opposite, the person who “hunts out opinions” (262c) will not possess a genuine art of rhetoric. Isocrates maintained that the rhetorician requires appropriate opinions, not knowledge; and Socrates previously exemplified this point of view in his first speech.<sup>16</sup> Socrates now responds directly to Isocrates: given that the skilled rhetorician is able to make the listener believe anything at all, the rhetorician must know the truth, and not be content with plausible opinions.

Next, Socrates takes Isocrates’ demand for an initial definition of the subject matter and transforms it into a demand for dialectical knowledge.<sup>17</sup> The rhetorician, it now turns out, must have the dialectical ability both to gather instances into a single form (*ἰδέα*)

<sup>16</sup> See especially *Against the Sophists* 8, where Isocrates claims that those who rely on “opinions” are more successful than those who profess to have “knowledge,” and *Helen* 5, where he claims that “it is much better to have suitable opinions about what is useful than to have accurate knowledge about what is useless.”

<sup>17</sup> There is a strong verbal similarity between the way in which Socrates sets out the requirement for definition in the *Phaedrus* and the way Isocrates proposes to define the function of a king in *To Nicocles* (dated about 374–72 B.C.). Isocrates writes: “First we must investigate what is the function of kings; for if we encompass (*περιλάβωμεν*) the force (*δύναμιν*) of the whole matter in a summary, we shall speak better about the parts by looking toward (*ἀποβλέποντες*) this. I think that all men would agree (*ὁμολογήσαι*) . . .” (*To Nicocles* 9; cf. 2, where the term *ὀρίσαι* is used). Similarly Socrates uses the expressions *δύναμιν*, *ὁμολογία* *θέμενοι* *ὄρον*, and *ἀποβλέποντες* in defining love in his first speech (237c–d) and later uses *περιλαμβάνειν* (273e). Late in his life, Isocrates again uses the terms *ἀποβλέποντες* (*On the Peace* 18) and *περιλάβωμεν* (*Antidosis* 217) with reference to initial definition. This similarity, together with other similarities between the *Phaedrus* and *To Nicocles* (see notes 13 and 14), suggests that Plato had in mind *To Nicocles* (along with earlier speeches) when composing the *Phaedrus*. This view is in accord with the date now generally assigned to the composition of the *Phaedrus*. Whereas most scholars of the nineteenth century assumed

and to divide forms into types (262c–66d). Socrates illustrates this transformation in his sequence of two speeches. In his first speech, he uses Isocratean definition to delineate a perverse type of love and to construct an example of perverse rhetoric. In the recantation, Socrates uses dialectical skill to propose that genuine love is a type of divine madness and to suggest that genuine rhetoric is a search for truth. As Socrates himself points out (265c), it was dialectical skill (for which he disclaims credit) that enabled Socrates to pass from a condemnation to a praise of love. Like the pseudo-rhetorician, Socrates moves from one position to its opposite; but unlike the pseudo-rhetorician, he guides the listener from falsehood to truth.

The third main departure from Isocratean rhetoric consists in Socrates' demand that the rhetorician must have a knowledge of soul in general and of the soul of the listener in particular. This departure is an added precision, based on the preceding two reforms. Here, the initial Isocratean position is unmistakable. In *Against the Sophists* Isocrates criticized his fellow rhetoricians for thinking that the whole of rhetoric consists in a knowledge of its components, the types of discourse, without there being any need for the ability to combine them. Isocrates claims that "it is not very difficult to know the forms (ἰδεῶν) out of which we make and compose all speeches" (16). Then he sums up his teaching about rhetoric:

But it requires much care and is the job of a manly soul that has opinions (ψυχῆς ἀνδρικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς) to choose the forms that are necessary for each subject and to mix them with one another and to arrange them properly, and, further, not to miss the right opportunities (καιρῶν) but to elaborate the whole speech fittingly (πρεπόντως) with thoughts and to speak rhythmically and musically (εὐρύθμως καὶ μουσικῶς) in the choice of words (16–17).

After summarizing the duties of both student and teacher, Isocrates concludes:

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an early date (relying in part on Diogenes Laertius' report of a tradition that the *Phaedrus* was Plato's first dialogue, 3. 38; and on the view of Olympiodorus, in the sixth century A.D., that it was first, *Vita Platonis* 3), Léon Robin (*La Théorie platonicienne de l'Amour*, Paris 1908) and Hans von Arnim (*Platos Jugenddialoge und die Entstehungszeit des Phaidros*, Leipzig 1914) showed that its date of composition must be later than the *Republic*. Hackforth dates the *Phaedrus* close to the *Parmenides* and *Theaetetus*, with the conjecture that it was composed about 370 B.C. (pp. 4–7 of the edition cited in note 15); and de Vries dates it a few years later, also close to the *Theaetetus* (pp. 7–11 of the commentary cited in note 15). I am inclined to agree with W. K. C. Guthrie that it is "much more in the spirit of the middle group than of the *Sophist*" (*A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. 4, Cambridge 1975, p. 397); a date of about 374–370 B.C. seems to me appropriate.

When all these requirements coincide, those who practice philosophy will attain perfection. But to the extent that they fall short of anything that has been said, those who approach it will be inferior.<sup>18</sup>

It is not enough for a rhetorician, according to Isocrates, to know the types of discourse. Instead, the essential features of good rhetoric are: an orderly arrangement of types of speech; a recognition of the right opportunity; fitting opinions; and harmonious expression.

Similarly to Isocrates, Socrates criticizes the writers of rhetorical hand-books for teaching only the “preliminaries” of the art in teaching just the components (268a–69c). He then goes on to draw out the implication, which Isocrates never contemplated, that the genuine rhetorician must know the various types of soul, as well as recognize particular souls, in order to be able to know what type of speech is suitable for a particular person (269d–72b). He sums up his teaching about rhetoric as follows. Since the function of speech is *psychagogia* (271c), the speaker must first know the types of soul and the corresponding types of discourse, then observe both souls and speeches and learn to recognize particular souls as requiring particular types of discourse. When one has learned all this, and in addition recognizes the right occasions (*καιρούς*) for speaking and keeping silent, then

the art is beautifully and completely perfected, but not before. But if anyone falls short of any of this in speaking or teaching or writing, though claiming to speak with art, the person who is not persuaded is the winner.<sup>19</sup>

This summary, which hinges on the definition of rhetoric as *psychagogia*, is a counterproposal to Isocrates’ statement in *Against the Sophists*. Plato knew this statement well. He first parodied it in the *Gorgias*, when Socrates claims that contemporary rhetoric is not an art (*τέχνη*), but flattery practiced by a “conjecturing and manly soul” (*ψυχῆς . . . στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας*, 463a).<sup>20</sup> In the *Phaedrus* Plato

<sup>18</sup> *Against the Sophists* 16–18: τὸ δὲ τούτων ἐφ’ ἐκάστῳ τῶν πραγμάτων ὡς δὲ προελέσθαι καὶ μῖξαι πρὸς ἀλλήλας καὶ τάξαι κατὰ τρόπον, ἐτι δὲ τῶν καιρῶν μὴ διαμαρτεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι πρεπόντως ὄλον τὸν λόγον καταποικίλαι καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι εὐρύθμως καὶ μουσικῶς εἰπεῖν, ταῦτα δὲ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας δεῖσθαι καὶ ψυχῆς ἀνδρικής καὶ δοξαστικής ἔργον εἶναι. . . καὶ τούτων μὲν ἑκάντων συμπεσόντων τελείως ἔξουσιν οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες· καθ’ ὃ δ’ ἂν ἐλλειφθῇ τι τῶν εἰρημένων, ἀνάγκη ταύτῃ χεῖρον διακείσθαι τοὺς πλησιάζοντάς. Isocrates offers a brief summary of his main requirements at *Panegyricus* 9. He also stresses the importance of right combination and right occasion at *Helen* 11.

<sup>19</sup> *Phaedrus* 272b: . . . καλῶς τε καὶ τελῶς ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη ἀπειργασμένη, πρότερον δ’ οὐ. ἀλλ’ ὅ τι ἂν αὐτῶν τις ἐλλείπη λέγων ἢ διδάσκων ἢ γράφων, φῆ δὲ τέχνην λέγειν, ὃ μὴ πειθόμενος κρατεῖ.

<sup>20</sup> W. H. Thompson points out this parody in his edition, *The Phaedrus of Plato*, London 1868, reprinted New York 1973, p. 174.



responds to Isocrates' statement in detail. In place of Isocrates' *εὐρυθμῶς καὶ μουσικῶς*, he puts *μετρίως τε καὶ εὐφήμως*, as we have seen. In place of opinions, he puts knowledge. He transforms the requirement for orderliness and combinatorial skill into a requirement for dialectical analysis and a knowledge of soul. A "fitting" speech thus becomes a discourse adapted to teaching another the truth. Socrates pointedly keeps the important Isocratean requirement for "right occasion," *καιρός*, but transforms it into a requirement for knowing when to use words of a particular sort to a particular person. Finally, Socrates takes direct aim at Isocrates in his concluding statement. Isocrates made the tautological claim that deficient rhetoricians are inferior. Using words that carefully balance Isocrates' wording, Socrates responds with the pointedly meaningful remark that the pseudo-rhetorician's opponent is superior. Socrates here denies that Isocrates has a genuine art of rhetoric and claims the superiority of his demands to those of Isocrates.<sup>21</sup>

Socrates has been shown throughout the dialogue as striving for a "perfect" rhetoric that is opposed to Isocrates'. From the beginning, he has demonstrated an insight into Phaedrus' soul. Moreover, he is clearly engaged in a search for knowledge of the soul in general and, most importantly, of his own soul. In his recantation, he presents a general theory of soul in mythic form; and he announces right at the beginning of the dialogue that he is still searching to know himself, as he investigates whether or not he is a beast "more complex than Typhon" (230a). As for knowing when to speak and when to be silent, surely Socrates has shown this ability all along.

After setting out his requirements for a genuine rhetoric, Socrates returns to the problem with which the discussion began: how does one write well (274b)? He argues that the real value of writing lies in words "written" in the soul for the sake of instruction (278a). These are words of truth planted in the soul like seeds, which are to bear fruit and sow seeds in turn in other souls (276e-77a). Socrates condemns writing that is used to freeze a discourse into an object of unthinking memorization.

<sup>21</sup> Howland points out the correspondence between Isocrates' and Socrates' conclusions at p. 158 of the article cited in note 8. He also points out the similarity between Isocrates' requirements for the student and Socrates' demands at 269d. Hartmut Erbse discusses this latter correspondence in pp. 330-36 of "Platons Urteil über Isokrates" (*Hermes* 99 [1971], 183-97), reprinted in *Isokrates*, edited by F. Seck, Darmstadt 1976, pp. 329-52. Plato also appears to subvert Isocrates' notion of "fitting" in the *Euthydemus*, where Socrates criticizes at length a rhetorician whom he does not name, but who cannot be anyone but Isocrates. Socrates here attributes to his opponent "*εὐπρέπεια* rather than truth" (305e).



This final discussion balances the initial scene of the dialogue, where we saw Phaedrus mindlessly and laboriously memorizing a written speech by Lysias. But more than that, it serves as a final condemnation of Isocrates. More than any other rhetorician, Isocrates relied on written discourse. He was notorious for not speaking in public, but writing discourses to be read in public; and he instructed his pupils by having them memorize and imitate his written compositions. In clear contrast with Isocratean teaching, Socrates has been instructing his pupil, Phaedrus, by involving him in discussion. He ends the discussion, moreover, with a final example of proper teaching: he asks Phaedrus to convey what he has heard to Lysias (278e). Phaedrus is to foster the seeds of truth planted in him by planting similar seeds in another soul.

We might expect the dialogue to end here; but there is unfinished business. So far, Socrates has overtly opposed only Lysias in particular and contemporary rhetoricians in general. There has been no mention of Isocrates, who, it has been argued, is the primary target of Socrates' criticism. Plato has put a puzzle to the reader, sowing clues throughout the dialogue. It is now time to reveal the mystery. The astute Phaedrus has figured it out. He divulges his discovery at last, when Socrates asks him to inform Lysias about genuine rhetoric. Putting his discovery as a puzzle in turn, he asks Socrates to inform his friend too. Socrates continues the game by asking "who?"; and Phaedrus tells: "The beautiful Isocrates."

Socrates' ensuing comparison between Lysias and Isocrates has provoked much controversy. Some consider his remarks about Isocrates a bitterly sarcastic denunciation of the rhetorician; others regard it as high praise, or at least as praise tinged with regret.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Erbse argues (in the article cited in the preceding note) that although there are similarities between Plato's and Isocrates' views of rhetoric (including a similarity in their demands for the correct combination of types of discourse), Plato's requirements are basically different; hence Plato does not praise Isocrates without qualification, as many have thought. He suggests instead that Plato has sincere praise for Isocrates as genuinely superior to other rhetoricians, and that Plato honestly regrets that Isocrates did not rise to greater heights. By contrast, Howland, who considers the "whole dialogue . . . primarily . . . a direct and comprehensive attack on the educational system of Isocrates," takes Plato's evaluation as expressing "the most comprehensive damnation with the faintest possible praise" (pp. 152 and 159 of article cited in note 8). De Vries takes Plato's evaluation as a "bitter taunt" and "mordant sarcasm" (pp. 18 and 264 of his commentary, cited in note 15; see also his reply to Erbse, "Isocrates in the *Phaedrus*: a reply," *Mnemosyne* 24 [1971], 387–90). Similarly, James Coulter considers the remarks an insult showing "outrageous condescension" ("*Phaedrus* 279A: The Praise of Isocrates," *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 8 [1967], 225–36, p. 233).

Socrates notes that Isocrates is "still young," but that he will venture a prophecy. Since Isocrates has a "nobler nature" than Lysias, Socrates says, he would not be surprised if Isocrates would with advancing years far surpass all other rhetoricians in the type of discourse that he is attempting "now"; and "if this is not sufficient for him, [he would not be surprised if] some more divine impulse (*ὁρμὴ θειοτέρα*) were to lead him to greater things, for by nature there is a certain philosophy in the disposition of the man."<sup>23</sup>

What is the distinction between the speeches that Isocrates is "now" attempting and the "greater" things that he might accomplish? I suggest that the distinction lies within the dialogue, not in any external historical circumstances. "Now" is the present, fictional time of the dialogue; and the type of speech that Isocrates is attempting "now" is the kind of *psychagogia* that Socrates practices (on the surface) in his first speech. Socrates praises "divine philosophy" (*θεία φιλοσοφία*, 239b) in this speech. But this "divine" philosophy, we learn in the recantation, has nothing divine about it. In the recantation and dialectical examination Socrates shows what a truly "divine" impulse is, and what truly "divine" philosophy is. The "more divine impulse" that Socrates hypothesizes is precisely the leap from the vulgar "philosophy" of his first speech to the genuine philosophy of the recantation and dialectical discussion.

Socrates leaves it open whether the "young" Isocrates will take this leap. But the reader knows that Isocrates has not taken it, since Plato composed the dialogue when Isocrates was over sixty years old.<sup>24</sup> Plato, I suggest, judged Isocrates superior to Lysias in precisely the way that the second speech of the dialogue is superior to the first. But this superiority, Plato indicates, is worth nothing. Indeed it is a liability. Despite its greater orderliness and smoother rhythms, Isocratean rhetoric is still a pseudo-rhetoric, dealing in deception; and because it is more effective, it can do more harm. Isocratean rhetoric holds out a promise of better things. But the promise unfulfilled is a far greater danger than Lysianic rhetoric ever was.

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<sup>23</sup> *Phaedrus* 279a-b: . . . ἔτι τε αὐτῷ μὴ ἀποχρήσαι ταῦτα, ἐπὶ μείζω δέ τις αὐτὸν ἄγοι ὁρμὴ θειοτέρα· φύσει γάρ, ὦ φίλε, ἐνέστί τις φιλοσοφία τῇ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς διανοίᾳ.

<sup>24</sup> See note 17 for the date of composition. In 370 B.C. Isocrates would have been sixty-six.

## Aristotelian Explanation

GARETH B. MATTHEWS

Jaakko Hintikka's influential paper, "On the Ingredients of an Aristotelian Science,"<sup>1</sup> suggests an interesting experiment. We should select a bright and promising graduate student in philosophy who has never read any Aristotle. We should then give our student Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* for close study, add a little extra coaching on "the role of existential presuppositions in syllogistic premisses" (55), drop the hint that "syllogisms are the universal tool of any systematic science" (*ibid.*) and then ask our student to predict "the ingredients of an Aristotelian science." If what Hintikka tells us in his paper is right, we could reasonably expect from such a student a moderately accurate sketch of the *Posterior Analytics*.<sup>2</sup>

Clearly any student who followed those instructions and produced the sketch of the *Posterior Analytics* Hintikka himself offers in his paper would deserve an "A"; for Hintikka's result is indeed what the student in our experiment should have projected. But do the constraints of the experiment fit the real Aristotle? Does the outline of an Aristotelian science that emerges in the *Posterior Analytics* actually conform to the Hintikka projection? I think the answer to both questions is "No."

<sup>1</sup> *Nous* 6 (1972), 55–69. Simple page references refer to this article. Line references are, of course, to Aristotle.

<sup>2</sup> "... Aristotle's syllogistic theory, together with his belief that syllogisms are the universal tool of any systematic science, naturally led him to a specific view of the ingredients of a science. One is almost tempted to say that Aristotle's views on the first principles of a science are predictable on the basis of his syllogistic theory, including his ideas of the role of existential presuppositions in syllogistic premisses" (55).

Hintikka is right to link the notion of demonstration in Aristotle with that of explanation. Here there is an interesting parallel between Aristotle and a modern proponent of the deductive-nomological model of explanation, such as Carl G. Hempel. Just as for the modern deductivist there is a certain symmetry between explanation and prediction, so, for Aristotle, there is a symmetry between explanation (giving the cause) and demonstration. On the modern deductivist's view, to explain an event one must come up with a law, or lawlike generalization, from which, together with appropriate initial conditions, that event could have been predicted.<sup>3</sup> What explains a given phenomenon, on this view, is precisely what could have been used to predict that the phenomenon would occur. On Aristotle's view, to explain why every C is an A one must produce appropriate premises from which that conclusion can be demonstrated. "Demonstration" (*ἀπόδειξις*) Aristotle says, "is syllogism that can show the cause" (*δεικτικὸς αἰτίας*) (85b22). So what explains the fact that *p* is, on this view, precisely what can be used to demonstrate the fact that *p*.

What count as appropriate premises for demonstrating that every C is an A, and hence for explaining why this is so? According to Hintikka they are basically the universal, affirmative, categorical propositions that link the species, C, to the genus, A, through the mediation of some intermediate genus, B (57, 59).

There may, of course, be more than one intermediate genus, so long as successive intermediates are nested in order of what they encompass. Thus suppose the following propositions true:

Every C is a B<sub>2</sub>.

Every B<sub>2</sub> is a B<sub>1</sub>.

Every B<sub>1</sub> is an A.

Suppose further that the terms, "C," "B<sub>2</sub>," "B<sub>1</sub>," "A," constitute what Solmsen has called an "*Eidoskette*";<sup>4</sup> that is, suppose they are nested in such a way that the comprehension of each (1) includes the comprehension of all its predecessors but (2) is narrower than the comprehension of each of its successors. The series, "isosceles,"

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Carl B. Hempel, *Philosophy of Natural Science*, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ 1966), pp. 48-50.

<sup>4</sup> "The syllogism originated out of "*Eidosketten*," i.e., ideas arranged along a chain in the order of decreasing extension, their normal relation being that of genus, species, inferior species, etc. Chains of this kind had been worked out and theorized upon by Plato and his pupils in the Academy, in connection especially with their favorite method, the *diaeresis*" (Friedrich Solmsen, "The Discovery of the Syllogism," *Philosophical Review* 50 [1941], 410).

“triangle,” “rectilinear,” “(plane) figure,” may serve as an example of such a chain.

Now the question,

Why is every C an A?

can be given this answer:

Because every C is a  $B_2$  and every  $B_2$  is an A.

Or this answer:

Because every C is a  $B_1$  and every  $B_1$  is an A.

I shall call the concept of explanation illustrated by these answers the “mediating concept of explanation.” The intermediate genus locates the species within the genus by mediation.

What can be said for the mediating concept of explanation? Well, we sometimes put it to work. Suppose a library catalogued on the Dewey decimal system has its 100s on the first floor and its 900s on the third. To an expression of puzzlement that Ralph Barton Perry’s *The Thought and Character of William James* is on the third floor, not on the first, the librarian might explain, “A book devoted to the life of a single philosopher will be on the third floor, because it’s biography.” Or again, to a pupil puzzled over how it is that whales are warm-blooded creatures we might point out that whales are, after all, mammals and, of course, mammals are warm-blooded creatures.

Hintikka tells us that Aristotle “reduces all syllogisms to those of the first figure” (57) and that the alleged “superiority [of the first figure] is somehow due to the fact that syllogisms in the first figure turn directly on the transitivity of class-inclusion” (*ibid.*). “Accordingly, he says, “Aristotelian explanation will operate by making class-inclusions clear through [the] transitivity of this relation, that is, by inserting intermediate terms between the ones whose connection is to be explained” (*ibid.*). No doubt the story about the first figure and its importance to Aristotle is really somewhat more complicated than this. But we can at least agree on a main point: what Aristotle’s syllogistic prepares us for is the idea of constructing explanations by the insertion of terms intermediate between the comprehensions of the “ones whose connection is to be explained.” That is what our mythical “A” student should anticipate from a careful study of the *Prior Analytics*—namely, an account of science based on the mediating concept of explanation.

What we actually find in the *Posterior Analytics* is something quite different. To be sure, certain passages do suggest that Aristotle has the mediating concept of explanation in mind. Thus, for example, Aristotle says at 84a36–37, in a passage Hintikka cites, “It is by adding a term internally, not externally, that a proposition is dem-



onstrated." Even more striking is the schematic example near the end of B17 (99a30–99b3); it certainly seems to presuppose the mediating concept.

Yet to conclude from passages like these that it is the mediating concept of explanation that Aristotle wants to build science on would be a mistake. In fact Aristotle makes a special point in the *Posterior Analytics* of rejecting the mediating concept. One could say that his reason for rejecting it is that the mediating concept assures us only of a sufficient condition for C's being A's, whereas what Aristotle is really after in science is something much, much stronger.

For convenience's sake let us suppose that all Aristotelian demonstrations can be cast in the form of the Barbara syllogism:

Every B is an A.

Every C is a B.

---

∴ Every C is an A.

Thus one asks, "Why is every C an A?" and the answer is, "Because every C is a B and every B is an A."

What Aristotle does in the *Posterior Analytics* is to place stringent conditions on what can function as middle and major terms in a scientific demonstration, conditions unanticipated in the *Prior Analytics*, and to some extent out of keeping with that work. For one thing, the attribute expressed by the major term must be essential, or *per se* (καθ' αὐτά—A4), to the subject expressed by the middle. Much more surprising from the perspective of the *Prior Analytics*, and hence much more interesting for present purposes, is the requirement that the major term be (as Mure renders "*katholou*" in the Oxford translation of the *Posterior Analytics*) "commensurately universal" with the middle. This requirement is introduced and explained at A4–5, argued for in A24, and referred to here and there pretty much throughout the *Posterior Analytics*.

What the English expression "commensurately universal" brings out most clearly is the extensional force of the requirement that Aristotle has in mind. That is, what it best suggests is simply that the major and middle terms must be coextensive, that they must be "reciprocals" (τὰ ἀντιστρέφοντα), as Aristotle sometimes puts it (78a27, 84a24).

The additional force of the requirement Aristotle is interested in is perhaps better put by saying that, if it is really because of being B's that C's are A's, then it must be *qua* B that a thing is A (73b27, 74a35, 75b36, etc.); or again, B must be the *first subject* of A (73b39, 74a12, 74a38, etc.). I shall call this requirement the "first-subject

requirement" and the concept of explanation to which it leads the "first-subject concept of explanation." But I should add the warning that typically in the *Posterior Analytics* Aristotle uses "*katholou*" ("commensurately universal") to introduce in its full force what I am calling the "first-subject requirement."

An example may help make the concept clearer. At the end of *Posterior Analytics* A5 Aristotle considers why the brazen isosceles is a figure with interior angles adding up to two right angles, or, as we might say more simply, a  $180^\circ$  figure. Using the mediating concept of explanation we might come up with the answer that the brazen isosceles is, after all, an isosceles, and every isosceles is a  $180^\circ$  figure. But Aristotle rejects that. His complaint is that other things besides the isosceles have angles adding up to  $180^\circ$ . Isosceles is not the first subject of  $180^\circ$  figure; triangle is. Equivalently, it is not *qua* isosceles, but *qua* triangle, that the brazen isosceles is a  $180^\circ$  figure. So to demonstrate that the brazen isosceles is a  $180^\circ$  figure, or to explain why this is so, it is not enough to link brazen isosceles to  $180^\circ$  figure by means of the mediating term, isosceles. Mere mediation does not demonstrate, or explain. One needs to find the first subject of  $180^\circ$  figure, which, according to Aristotle, is triangle. Thus it is by being a triangle, he thinks, that the brazen isosceles is made to be a  $180^\circ$  figure.

It would be understating things to say that Aristotle's theory of the syllogism does not prepare us for this first-subject requirement. Consider just the coextensional import of the requirement alone. In at least one passage in the *Prior Analytics* (46a39 f.) Aristotle insists that, in an affirmative syllogistic demonstration, the major term will always have a comprehension greater than that of the middle. What this passage brings out is the great importance to Aristotle's conception of the syllogism that the idea of an *Eidoskette* has. In fact, of course, there is no good reason to limit the application of syllogistic reasoning to arguments made up of nested terms of ever increasing comprehension. A Barbara syllogism with convertible major and middle terms is best viewed as a special case of Barbara—no more and no less valid than Barbaras made up of terms that yield a bona fide *Eidoskette*. But when the Aristotle of the *Prior Analytics* is willing to do that (for example, in B5 or B22), it is by way of a concession, and certainly not by way of constructing an ideal case.

So we have two quite different notions of explanation—the mediating concept and the first-subject concept. The first arises naturally out of Aristotle's syllogistic; the second makes its appearance, unforeshadowed, in the *Posterior Analytics*.

No doubt Aristotle's interest in the first-subject style of explanation

has something to do with his interest in eliminating competition among putative causes of one and the same thing. To be sure, Aristotle allows that one and the same thing might have several different causes in several different senses of the word "cause" ("aitia"). They will seem to be competitors only to one who has failed to note or take seriously the fact that "cause" is being used in different senses. But if we stick with a single sense of "cause," Aristotle is inclined to expect, or anyway to hope for, a unique cause.

We are thus meant to suppose that no attribute has more than one first subject—that if G and H are distinct, it will not be both *qua* G and *qua* H that A-things are A. By contrast, the mediating concept of explanation guarantees non-uniqueness. If B is merely a species, or subordinate genus, of A, there will be at least one other species (or subordinate genus), B', such that being B' will be an equally good way of being A. Thus if being a mallard is the cause of something's being a duck, so will being a teal be the cause of something's being a duck.

There is a related feature of the mediating concept of explanation that makes it much less attractive than the first-subject concept. To be a mallard is to be a duck of such-and-such a sort. The claim that *x* is a duck because it is a mallard thus looks either trivial or false. It looks trivial if we take "of such-and-such a sort" as so much extra baggage. What we are left with is "*x* is a duck because *x* is a duck." But the claim looks false if we suppose the differentia to be any part of what makes something a *duck*. Being such-and-such a *sort* of duck, one wants to say, is no part whatsoever of what it is that makes something a *duck*.

It is worth emphasizing that simply requiring the major and middle terms to be "reciprocals" would be insufficient to guarantee the kind of explanation Aristotle is after in the *Posterior Analytics*. Since "All and only triangles are 180° figures" is logically equivalent to "All and only 180° figures are triangles," it would seem that being a 180° figure is as much a cause of something's being a triangle as being a triangle is the cause of something's being a 180° figure. But Aristotle expects "is the cause of" to be asymmetrical; if B is the cause of A, it will follow that A is not the cause of B. To use another of Aristotle's examples, since all and only nearby heavenly bodies are non-twinklers, it might seem that being a non-twinkler is as much a cause of being nearby as being nearby is a cause of non-twinkling (78a30 ff.). This seems clearly wrong to Aristotle and paradoxical, at least, to most of the rest of us. It is, of course, a paradox familiar to anyone who has tried to understand the notion of causation in terms of the idea of necessary and sufficient conditions.

Incidentally, it is one of the attractive features of the mediating concept of explanation that it guarantees asymmetry by ruling out commensurate universality. Being a mallard will be the cause of something's being a duck, but obviously being a duck will not, of itself, be the cause of anything's being a mallard. This sort of consideration seems to underlie Aristotle's brief reversion to the mediating concept at 99a30–99b3.

Pretty clearly Aristotle understands the “*qua*” notion and the “first-subject” idea in such a way that they guarantee asymmetry. From “triangle is the first subject of 180° figure” it will follow that 180° figure is not the first subject of triangle. So recourse to the mediating concept of explanation is not required to capture the desired asymmetry. And the first-subject requirement, as we have already noted, offers the additional promise of securing the uniqueness of any adequate explanation.

The form of syllogism that an ideal Aristotelian explanation calls for is thus Barbara-plus. But, contrary to what the *Prior Analytics* would lead us to expect, the form is not Barbara plus the stipulation that the minor, middle and major terms be nested in order of increasing comprehension—far from it. We learn in the *Posterior Analytics* that the form is Barbara plus the stipulation that the middle term name the first subject of the attribute expressed by the major. The ideal in science, according to Aristotle, is to discover, concerning given attributes, *qua* what it is that things have them.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> An earlier draft of these comments was delivered in the symposium of the American Philosophical Association, Western Division, at which Professor Hintikka presented his paper. Those earlier comments had the benefit of a delightful discussion with the late G. E. L. Owen. Whether that benefit accrues to these comments as well, by a sort of nonlogical transitivity, I cannot judge.





# 12

## Some Comments on *Metaphysics* E. 2, 3

C. J. F. WILLIAMS

### I

I wish to call in question a certain interpretation of sentences in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* E, an interpretation which is enshrined in the English translations most widely used. According to this Aristotle is interested here in the contrast between gradual and instantaneous change. It is my belief that this distinction has no relevance at all to the passages in question.

### II

I begin with the first two sentences of E. 3:

Ὅτι δ' εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἰτία γενητὰ καὶ φθαρτὰ ἄνευ τοῦ  
γίγνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι, φανερόν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτ', ἐξ ἀνάγκης  
πάντ' ἔσται, εἰ τοῦ γιγνομένου καὶ φθειρομένου μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς  
αἰτίον τι ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

I should translate this as follows:

That there are principles and causes which are capable of coming to be and perishing without <actually> coming to be and perishing is clear. For if this were not so, everything would be of necessity, given that there must needs be a cause of what non-accidentally comes to be and ceases to be.

Christopher Kirwan translates thus:

It is obvious that there are origins and causes that are able to come to be and to be destroyed without [being in process of] coming to be and being destroyed. For otherwise everything will be of necessity, if whatever is [in process of] coming to be and being destroyed necessarily has some cause non-coincidentally.<sup>1</sup>

The words which Kirwan candidly places in brackets are central to his interpretation of the entire chapter. The word "process," without the warning sign of brackets, occurs also in the translations of Ross and Warrington,<sup>2</sup> and the interpretation it embodies is to be found in, if it is not derived from, the commentary on this passage ascribed to Alexander of Aphrodisias.<sup>3</sup>

The difference between Kirwan's translation and mine lies, not only in the occurrence in his translation of this word "process," but in the construal of the phrase *μη κατὰ συμβεβηκός* in the second sentence. Kirwan takes this with *αἰτίον τι ἀνάγκη εἶναι*; I take it with *τοῦ γιγνομένου καὶ φθειρομένου*. Again Kirwan's construal conforms to that of the other translators. If *μη κατὰ συμβεβηκός* is taken in this way, with *αἰτίον τι ἀνάγκη εἶναι*, the heavy emphasis on the present tense of *γιγνομένου* and *φθειρομένου* involved in including the phrase "in process of" in their translation is more or less inevitable.<sup>4</sup> To say without qualification "there must needs be a cause non-accidentally of what comes to be and ceases to be" would be to rule out altogether the existence of things whose only cause is an accidental cause. It would contradict a sentence of the previous chapter: *τῶν γὰρ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ὄντων ἢ γιγνομένων καὶ τὸ αἰτίον ἐστι κατὰ συμβεβηκός* (1027<sup>a</sup>7-8). There has to be some restriction on the generality of "what comes to be and ceases to be." On my interpretation, however, Aristotle is restricting the necessity of having a cause to non-accidental

<sup>1</sup> Aristotle's *Metaphysics Books Γ, Δ, Ε*, Clarendon Aristotle Series (Oxford 1971). The same interpretation is to be found in W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics* (Oxford 1924), Vol. I, pp. 362 sq.

<sup>2</sup> *The Works of Aristotle Translated into English*, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford 1928), Vol. VIII; *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, ed. and translated by John Warrington (London 1956).

<sup>3</sup> Alexander Aphrodisiensis, *In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria*, ed. M. Hayduck (Berlin 1891). Hayduck (p. v) does not regard the commentary on Book E as a genuine work of Alexander.

<sup>4</sup> Not quite inevitable, since Aquinas manages to avoid it. He, like Ross and Kirwan, construes *μη κατὰ συμβεβηκός* with the succeeding, rather than with the preceding words. But he does not interpret *γιγνομένου* and *φθειρομένου* as referring to process. His way out is to take the clause *εἰ τοῦ γιγνομένου . . . ἀνάγκη εἶναι* (1027<sup>a</sup>31-32) as a genuine conditional, repeating the content of *εἰ γὰρ μη τοῦτο* (1027<sup>a</sup>30-31). Kirwan and I interpret it as a reason-giving clause, taken by Aristotle to state something true, although we differ about *what* it states. (Aquinas takes the first sentence of the chapter in the way I do.)

comings to be and ceasings to be. The way is therefore open for the backward-stretching chain of causality to come to an end with an accidental coming-to-be: δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι μέχρι τινὸς βαδίζει ἀρχῆς, αὕτη δ' οὐκέτι εἰς ἄλλο (1027<sup>b</sup>11–12).

If Ross and Kirwan's motivation for translating τοῦ γιγνομένου καὶ φθειρομένου as "whatever is in process of coming to be and being destroyed" is the construal of the second sentence, the immediate consequence of it is their need to translate τοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ φείρεσθαι in the first sentence in the same way. This makes the first sentence an assertion of the existence of causes that come to be and perish instantaneously. Kirwan has considerable difficulty in explaining how the argument of the chapter as a whole can be taken to support this thesis. On my interpretation the first sentence asserts the existence, amongst possible causes, of some which are unactualized possibilities—a rejection, in effect, of the Megarian modal thesis "If possibly *p*, then *p*." This fits in admirably with the opening words of the second sentence, which point out that admitting this thesis is tantamount to admitting the determinist thesis "If *p*, then necessarily *p*."<sup>5</sup> It is, however, causal determinism that the chapter as a whole is concerned to refute, and the third sentence of the chapter begins a *reductio* argument against the thesis of causal determinism: suppose every event is determined by some prior cause; then eventually the series of causes of future events will reach back to the present or the past; but what is or has been the case cannot now be otherwise; ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα πάντα ἔσται τὰ ἐσόμενα (1027<sup>b</sup>8–9). This is regarded as absurd; and the statement of 1027<sup>b</sup>11–12, insisting that breaks occur in causal chains, is brought in as the alternative. Where the break occurs we have an ἀρχή of which we can say: ἔσται οὖν ἢ τοῦ ὁπότερ' ἔτυχεν αὕτη, καὶ αἵτιον τῆς γενέσεως αὐτῆς ἄλλο οὐθέν (1027<sup>b</sup>12–14). Such principles and causes, before they occur, belong to the class of things which are capable of coming to be and perishing without *having to* come to be and perish. Now there would be no such class if whatever *could* come to be *did* so. If "possibly *p*" entailed "*p*," "*p*," as we have seen, would entail "necessarily *p*"; and if these were both true, "possibly *p*" would entail "necessarily *p*". So for there to be a class of things which come to be, but which do not, in virtue of some prior cause, come to be *necessarily*, there has to be a class of things "which are capable of coming to be and perishing without (actually)

<sup>5</sup> Aristotle shows himself aware of this equivalence, which, as I am about to argue, is crucial to the understanding of this chapter, not only by his words at 1027<sup>b</sup>30–31, but also by his attributing to the Megarian determinists, in *Metaphysics* Θ. 3, the thesis that potentiality is indistinguishable from actuality.

coming to be and perishing"—which is how I translate the first sentence of E. 3. The uncaused causes of 1027<sup>b</sup>12–14 do, of course, themselves actually come to be; but they have to belong to a class of *γενητά* which, at a time when *they* have not so far come to be, includes others which never will. It is the existence of these which the first sentence of E. 3 asserts.

### III

Support is claimed for the view that these sentences are concerned with “processes” by a similar interpretation of a sentence in E. 2.<sup>6</sup> The sentence is found at 1026<sup>b</sup>22–24:

τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλον τρόπον ὄντων ἔστι γένεσις καὶ φθορά, τῶν δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὐκ ἔστιν.

Kirwan translates:

with things-that-are in another sense there is [a process of] coming to be and destruction, but with things [that are] coincidentally there is not.

Again Aristotle’s contention is supposed to be that accidental beings come to be and perish instantaneously. If this were what the sentence meant it would have little connection with the remarks which precede it. These mention certain arguments of the sophists, which are said to be for the most part concerned with the accidental. Examples given are: Whether musical and literate, or musical Coriscus and Coriscus, are different or the same; Whether everything that is, but not always, has come to be, so that if, being musical, someone has come to be literate, he has also, being literate, come to be musical. Clearly the sophists were getting entangled, or entangling others, in puzzles over being (*εἶναι*) and coming to be (*γίγνεσθαι*). They were drawing attention to sentences like

- (1) Someone musical is literate
- (2) Coriscus is musical
- (3) Someone being musical has come to be literate
- (4) Someone being literate has come to be musical.

If (1) and (2) are taken as assertions of identity, the sophists used what we should now call Leibniz’s Law to derive from “Coriscus has come to be musical” and from (3) and (4) the *prima facie* absurdities

<sup>6</sup> See Kirwan, *op. cit.*, pp. 192, 196; and Richard Sorabji, *Necessity, Cause and Blame* (London 1980), p. 6. Cf. Ross, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 360, 362.

Musical Coriscus has come to be musical  
 Someone musical has come to be musical  
 Someone literate has come to be literate.

Aristotle's regular response to sophisms like this is to draw a distinction between *per se* identity and accidental identity,<sup>7</sup> a distinction which has close connections with two other distinctions, that between *per se* and accidental unity and that between *per se* and accidental being. It is the last of these which, in my view, is relevant to the sentence at 1026<sup>b</sup>22–24.

But is this view correct? *Has* the sentence at 1026<sup>b</sup>22–24 any close connection with the preceding passage? Whether or not this is so depends on the translation of the first part of 1026<sup>b</sup>22: δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων. The phrase τῶν τοιούτων λόγων echoes τοιούτοι τῶν λόγων of 1026<sup>b</sup>20—the arguments of the sophists which I have sketched. Ross and Kirwan, however, see it as having a different reference. Ross has to defend with parallels his interpretation of τοιούτων as forward-looking against the more natural backward-looking interpretation. He and Kirwan take it to refer to arguments like that *to be given* in 1026<sup>b</sup>22–24. (What arguments would be *like* this, and in what sense is it an “argument?”) The presence of καὶ might be thought to support this, by indicating that we are about to be given *new* evidence for the proximity of τὸ συμβεβηκός to τὸ μὴ ὄν. This view is encouraged if φαίνεται in 1026<sup>b</sup>21 is translated (with Kirwan) by “obviously”: δῆλον δὲ καὶ then comes out naturally as “as is plain also.” But φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ συμβεβηκός ἐγγύς τι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος should, perhaps, rather be translated “for the accidental *seems* <to be> something approximate to non-being.” The copula is here omitted after φαίνεται, so we cannot know whether what we have is elliptical for φαίνεται ὄν or φαίνεται εἶναι. The rule “φαίνομαι ὥν quod sum, quod non sum φαίνομαι εἶναι” is therefore inapplicable.

I am, however, inclined to construe the sentence as if it were εἶναι which was present after ἐγγύς τι—τι itself is a sign of reservation on Aristotle's part. So “seems to be” rather than “obviously is” is preferable as a rendering of φαίνεται. Again, this sentence, as γάρ indicates, is not a conclusion drawn from the exhibition of sophistical arguments, τοιούτοι τῶν λόγων, but a comment on them. What it suggests is only represented as a conclusion, as something shown to

<sup>7</sup> See Alan Code, “Aristotle's Response to Quine's Objections to Modal Logic,” *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 5 (1976), 159–86; Gareth B. Matthews, “Accidental Unities,” in *Language and Logos*, edd. M. Schofield and M. Nussbaum (Cambridge 1982), pp. 223–40; and my own interpretation of Aristotle's distinctions, “Aristotle's Theory of Descriptions,” in *The Philosophical Review* 94 (1985), pp. 63–80.



be true, by the following words, δῆλον δὲ . . . , for which 1026<sup>b</sup>22–24 provides a backing, as the γάρ of 1026<sup>b</sup>22 makes clear. δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων cannot, therefore, be introducing a *further* reason for the conclusion. So the καὶ here is not to be translated “also,” but by emphasizing in some way the succeeding words. My own way of translating δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων would be “This is clear from such arguments themselves.” The following sentence explains this, by showing that the fallacy of some at least of the arguments lies in the assumption that there is γένεσις and φθορά of τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὄντα. This harks back to a premise of one of the sophistical arguments, πᾶν ὃ ἂν ᾖ, μὴ αἰεὶ δέ, γέγονεν. It is unbelievable that the remark about γένεσις and φθορά at 1026<sup>b</sup>22–24 has no connection with this premise. What then is the connection?

## IV

The connection cannot be discovered without understanding the structure of the sophism which, as I see it, 1026<sup>b</sup>22–24 is designed to solve. This argument is not easy to reconstruct. Aristotle’s sketch of it is given in 1026<sup>b</sup>18–20:

εἰ πᾶν ὃ ἂν ᾖ, μὴ αἰεὶ δέ, γέγονεν, ὥστ’ εἰ μουσικὸς ὢν γραμματικὸς γέγονε, καὶ γραμματικὸς ὢν μουσικός.

The consecutive clause here is a hypothetical proposition, but the sentence as a whole is an indirect question introduced by εἰ: the sophists query the apparently analytic “Whatever is, but has not always been, has come to be” on the grounds that, if it is true, (3) and (4) are mutually implicative. (It is clearly immaterial which is taken as implying which.) However, the connection between “Whatever is, but has not always been, has come to be” and its alleged consequence is not immediately obvious.

The connection is quite overlooked in recent reconstructions of the sophism.<sup>8</sup> Here the propositions μουσικὸς ὢν γραμματικὸς γέγονε and γραμματικὸς ὢν μουσικός <γέγονε> are translated “The musical person has become the literate person” and “The literate person has become the musical person.” With “singular terms” in both subject and complement position, and the truistic assumption that what a person has become he now is, Leibniz’s Law is thought to be enough to license substitution of complement for subject, and vice versa. No appeal to the principle πᾶν ὃ ἂν ᾖ, μὴ αἰεὶ δέ, γέγονεν is needed.

<sup>8</sup> By Code and Matthews, whom I follow, for the sake of argument, in my “Aristotle’s Theory of Descriptions.”

However, the absence of the definite article from Aristotle's actual exposition of the sophism and the presence of the participle *ὄν* suggest that in any case another reconstruction is required. The following has some plausibility:

- (3) Someone being musical has come to be literate
- (3A) Someone being musical is literate
- (3B) Someone being literate is musical
- (4) Someone being literate has come to be musical.<sup>9</sup>

Here the move from (3) to (3A) rests on the principle, already mentioned, that what a person has become he now is; the move from (3A) to (3B) relies on the convertibility of an I-proposition; and the move from (3B) to (4) rests on the premise, explicitly stated by Aristotle, *πάν ὁ ἄν ᾧ, μὴ ἀεὶ δέ, γέγονεν*, together with the commonsense assumption that a person who is musical has not always been so (musical technique has to be learned).

Set out in this way, the fallacy is made plausible in English only by a clumsily literal rendering of the Greek, retaining the participial construction "being musical" and "being literate." A more natural English version would be

- (3') Someone who was musical has come to be literate
- (3A') Someone who was musical is literate
- (3B') Someone who was literate is musical
- (4') Someone who was literate has come to be musical.

The present participle, in Greek as in English, has to represent both the imperfect and the present tense of the finite verb. When relative clauses are substituted this distinction between the present and imperfect tense can be made explicit; and now the fallacious reasoning can easily be seen to occur in the transition from (3A') to (3B'). We have a pair of propositions not of the form "Some A's are B" and "Some B's are A," but of the form "Some A's are B" and "Some C's are D."

It should not be thought, however, that the fallacy rests simply on a superficial feature of Greek, its inability to make fine tense distinctions at the participial level. It would have been possible to set out the sophism thus:

- (3'') Some musical person has come to be literate
- (3A'') Some musical person is literate
- (3B'') Some literate person is musical
- (4'') Some literate person has come to be musical.

<sup>9</sup> An equally plausible translation would be obtained by deleting "Someone" and inserting "he" after the second word in each of these sentences.

Here there is nothing amiss with the move from (3A'') to (3B''), but the other steps are invalid. (This would be strikingly obvious if we substituted "illiterate" for "musical" in (3'') and (3A'') and "unmusical" for "literate" in (3B'') and (4'').) They are invalid because the unexpressed tenses involved in the "subject-phrases," "Some musical person" and "Some literate person," are different in the case of (3'') and (4''), where "has come to be" is the main verb of the sentence, from what they are in the case of (3A'') and (3B''), where the main verb is "is." If these were made explicit, (3'') would begin "Some person who was musical," (3A'') "Some person who is musical," (3B'') "Some person who is literate," and (4'') "Some person who was literate." The fallacies arrive through failure to appreciate the quantificational structure of propositions whose "grammatical subject" is of the form "Some musical person," or, for that matter, "The musical person." Aristotle's distinction between accidental beings and unities and *per se* beings and unities is an attempt to trace these fallacies to their source. It is an attempt remarkably similar to that constituted by Russell's Theory of Descriptions.<sup>10</sup> He presents a wide variety of sophisms which can be solved by application of the *per se* / *per accidens* distinction. (A variation on the theme of the sophism outlined at 1026<sup>b</sup>18–20 is given at *Metaphysics* K 1064<sup>b</sup>23–26, and the same sophism is hinted at in *Topics* 104<sup>b</sup>25, sqq.) Thus the fallacious inference from (3'') to (3A'') can be seen to be due to allowing an expression like "Some musical person," which in Aristotle's terms stands for an accidental being, to be substituted for *x* in "If *x* has come to be *F* then *x* is *F*"—a valid schema if names, which, in Aristotle's terms, stand for *per se* beings, are substituted for *x*. Again, the inference from (3B''), even if expanded to "Some literate person is musical, but has not always been so," to (4'') fails to exemplify the schema "*x* is *F*, but not always; therefore *x* has come to be *F*," because the expression substituted for *x* stands for an accidental being: put the name of a *per se* being (a "logically proper name") in this position, and all will be well. Since the topic of *Metaphysics* E. 2 is accidental being, one might well have thought that this would be the moral he wished us to draw.

## V

If we had merely the exposition of the sophism in 1026<sup>b</sup>18–20, together with Aristotle's general theory of accidental being and his

<sup>10</sup> I have tried to establish this similarity in my paper "Aristotle's Theory of Descriptions" (above, note 7).

indication that this would provide the clue to solving the sophism, we should perhaps be content with the reconstruction of his thought given in the previous section. But, as I have already argued, the solution is supposed to be given by application of the thesis of 1026<sup>b</sup>22–24. (The thought is: the thesis receives support from its ability to solve such paradoxes, and itself lends support to the doctrine of the proximity of accidental being to non-being.) This, I believe, shows that Aristotle interpreted the sophism in a way distinct from those put forward in section III. What is at stake is the distinction between what, in *De Generatione et Corruptione* I. 3, he calls “coming to be ἀπλῶς” and “coming to be *something*.” The reconstruction that is needed is the following:

- (3'') Someone literate who is musical has come to be
- (3A'') Someone literate who is musical is the same as someone musical who is literate
- (4'') Someone musical who is literate has come to be.

What we have is simply an application of the Law of the Substitutivity of Identicals (Leibniz's Law), which allows us to pass from (3'') to (4'') on the strength of the identity statement (3A'').

Understood in this way, the argument might well be accepted as valid. The evident invalidity of the argument depended on interpreting μουσικὸς ὦν γραμματικὸς γέγονε and γραμματικὸς ὦν μουσικὸς γέγονε as (3) and (4), respectively. It looks as though the sophists took these sentences one way and Aristotle another. It is important, therefore, to see how these Greek sentences are ambiguous as between (3) and (4), on the one hand, and (3'') and (4'') on the other.

I have discussed in my note on *De Gen. et Corr.* I. 4. 319<sup>b</sup>25–26,<sup>11</sup> the parallel ambiguity of ἄνθρωπος δ' ἄμουσος ἐγένετο, which occurs in Aristotle's text at that point. The context there, however, is his attempt to distinguish alteration, ἀλλοίωσις, from generation and corruption, γένεσις καὶ φθορά. He is arguing that if ἄνθρωπος ἄμουσος ἐγένετο could be construed in the same way as ὑγρὸν ψυχρὸν ἐγένετο (which would describe the generation of water), where cold is *not* a *per se* affection of wet, as unmusical is of man, it would report a case of generation. As it is (319<sup>b</sup>30–31), it is a case of alteration. Unfortunately, Aristotle does not stick to his distinction between γίγνεσθαι ἀπλῶς and γίγνεσθαί τι, the existential and copulative senses of “come to be,” in order to disambiguate ἄνθρωπος ἄμουσος ἐγένετο and distinguish generation and alteration. He allows an existential interpretation

<sup>11</sup> Aristotle's “*De Generatione et Corruptione*,” in the Clarendon Aristotle Series (Oxford 1982), p. 101.



of the sentence and transfers the distinction from γίγνεσθαι to its subject. In ἄνθρωπος ἐγένετο the subject, man, is a *per se* being, so the sentence reports a case of generation; in ἄνθρωπος ἄμουσος ἐγένετο the subject, unmusical man, is an accidental being, so the sentence reports a case of alteration. As I remarked in my note on the passage, Aristotle thus cuts away the ground from under the feet of his own distinction.<sup>12</sup>

Here, in the *Metaphysics* passage, it seems to me, it is by interpreting μουσικὸς ὦν γραμματικὸς γέγονε as "Someone literate who is musical has come to be" and γραμματικὸς ὦν μουσικὸς <γέγονε> as "Someone musical who is literate has come to be" that Aristotle argues that the one entails the other. For the "literate musical" is the same accidental being as the "musical literate" (3A'''), and if "has come to be" is truly predicable of the one it is truly predicable of the other. Moreover, so the argument goes, since this accidental being "is, but not always" (for there was a time, according to (3), when the musical was not literate), "has come to be" must be truly predicable of it under either description. Aristotle's answer, that there is no coming to be of accidental beings, challenges the premise of this last part of the argument. Accidental being is not covered by the phrase "is, but not always," since accidental being is not fully entitled to be said to *be*; in some ways, Aristotle holds, it is closer to *what is not*. This seems, if anything, to be his misleading way of saying that a sentence like μουσικὸς ὦν γραμματικὸς γέγονε cannot be understood in the sense "Someone literate who is musical has come to be," but only in the sense expressed by (3).

However, there is a sentence in *De Generatione et Corruptione* which seems flatly to contradict this interpretation of *Metaphysics* 1026<sup>b</sup>22–24. At 319<sup>b</sup>29–30 the text reads:

διὸ ἀνθρώπου μὲν ταῦτα πάθη, ἀνθρώπου δὲ μουσικοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπου  
ἀμούσου γένεσις καὶ φθορά.

ταῦτα are musicality and unmusicality. "Musical man" and "unmusical man" are often said to be names for accidental beings, and this sentence attributes to them, explicitly, γένεσις καὶ φθορά. But at 1026<sup>b</sup>23–24 Aristotle says there is no γένεσις καὶ φθορά of accidental beings. When I was preparing my notes on the *De Generatione et Corruptione*, I was not aware of this sentence in the *Metaphysics*. Had I been so aware, I should have felt more inclined than I was to regard 319<sup>b</sup>29–30 as an alien intrusion into the text. Philoponus and Joachim are both unhappy with the text as it stands, and Philoponus suspects

<sup>12</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 102.



a scribal error. However that may be, the doctrine of *De Generatione et Corruptione* demands that there be a sense of γένεσις in which it is contrasted with ἀλλοίωσις, and in this sense what ἄνθρωπος ἄμουσος ἐγένετο and (3) and (4) report are not cases of generation or corruption, but of alteration. Whatever the verbal clash with 319<sup>b</sup>29–30, the overall doctrine of *De Generatione et Corruptione* I. 3–4 fully justifies the interpretation of 1026<sup>b</sup>22–24 as denying that there is generation and corruption of accidental beings. The reason for the denial is not that such changes are instantaneous, but that there are no such changes. The sophist argues for the paradoxical conclusion that either (3) entails (4) or the principle “What is, but not always has come to be” must be abandoned. Aristotle’s reply is that we need not fear that the truth of μουσικὸς ὦν γραμματικὸς γέγονε will entail that of γραμματικὸς ὦν μουσικὸς γέγονε, since, in the sense in which the former will entail the latter, in the sense, namely, of (3’’), the former is not going to be true at all. Accidental beings, such as “Someone literate who is musical” is supposed to stand for, are not subjects of γένεσις or φθορά. We have no need to jettison the principle πᾶν ὃ ἂν ᾖ, μὴ αἰεὶ δέ, γέγονεν, because in the only sense in which it is relevant to that principle, μουσικὸς ὦν γραμματικὸς ἐστίν, οὐκ αἰεὶ δέ is false. The principle should be interpreted, Aristotle is suggesting, as equivalent to πᾶν ὃ ἂν ᾖ ἀπλῶς, μὴ αἰεὶ δέ, ἀπλῶς γέγονεν. But μουσικὸς ὦν γραμματικὸς ἐστίν ἀπλῶς would be asserting *per se* being falsely of an accidental being; so the principle has no application in this case.

## VI

My argument has been that neither E. 2 nor E. 3 is concerned with the distinction between gradual and instantaneous change. The point of the sentence in E. 2 to which this distinction was thought to be relevant is, I maintain, to restrict γένεσις to what elsewhere Aristotle calls ἀπλὴ γένεσις, “coming to be *simpliciter*.” The sentences in E. 3 for whose interpretation translators have thought it necessary to use the word “process” are, in my view, saying that some comings to be, namely those which are accidental, are not necessitated by prior causes. But, it will be objected, these interpretations of E. 2 and E. 3 are incompatible with each other. In E. 2 I make Aristotle say that only *per se* beings come to be. In E. 3 I attribute to him a theory about the coming to be of ὅντα κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

On the surface the incompatibility is there anyway. In 1026<sup>b</sup>22–24 Aristotle denies that there is γένεσις of ὅντα κατὰ συμβεβηκός. But in 1026<sup>b</sup>33 and 1027<sup>b</sup>7, before we have even reached the end of chapter 2, Aristotle is using γίγνεσθαι to refer to accidental beings. Little

wonder that he does so again in chapter 3! The point is that Aristotle's use of γένεσις and γίγνεσθαι is far from uniform. Sometimes ἀλλοίωσις is described as a subordinate species of γένεσις; sometimes γένεσις is a species co-ordinate with ἀλλοίωσις. I am not, in this paper, concerned to affirm that there is a single sense of γίγνεσθαι or γένεσις, to be found in the sentences of E. 2 and E. 3 we have been examining: rather, I am concerned to *deny* that these words are used in these sentences in the single sense of a "process" of coming to be, in a sense which rules out instantaneous change. My belief is that passages in Aristotle's works that have been interpreted as devoted to the distinction between gradual and instantaneous coming to be have less unity than has been supposed. The passages in *Metaphysics* E which have been thought to require this interpretation should, I have argued, be understood in other ways, though not in just one other way. To deal thoroughly with the "process" interpretation it would be necessary to examine the long list of passages cited, e.g., by Ross in his note on 1026<sup>b</sup>22–24, to see how many of them require us to talk of gradual or instantaneous change. If they all do, my interpretation of E. 2 and 3 is called in question. I think in fact that many of them do not; but there is hardly room here to justify this claim. It is a topic for another paper.

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# 13

## Leo the Philosopher: *Job* and Other Poems\*

L. G. WESTERINK

### I. Life and Work

Leo the Mathematician and Philosopher (b. 790/800, d. after Jan. 869) has now a firmly established place among the leading figures of the ninth century Byzantine revival of classical culture and science.<sup>1</sup> His claim to it, however, rests, rather than on his own record, on the accounts of various chroniclers, in which historical fact is mixed with a certain amount of legend.<sup>2</sup>

From their sometimes conflicting information the following biographical outline has been pieced together by P. Lemerle. Born, probably, at Constantinople, Leo received some kind of higher education from an unnamed scholar on the island of Andros; for the

\* This paper could not have been written but for the generosity of R. P. Joseph Paramelle, of the Institut de Recherche et d'Histoire des Textes (Paris), who drew my attention to the poem and gave me his own transcript of the first hundred lines.

<sup>1</sup> On Leo, see in the first place, E. E. Lipšic, "Vizantijskij učenyj Leo Matematik," *Vizant. Vremennik* 2 (27), 1949, 106–149, and P. Lemerle, *Le premier humanisme byzantin*, Paris 1971, 148–176; further literature in Lemerle, p. 148, n. 1; add H. Hunger, *Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner*, 2 vols., Munich 1978, in various places (see index), esp. I, 18–19 and II, 237–239; N.G. Wilson, *Scholars of Byzantium*, London 1983, 79–84.

<sup>2</sup> In particular, Theophanes Continuatus, ed. I. Bekker, Bonn 1838: Ps.-Symeon, *ibid.* pp. 603–760; Scylitzes, ed. J. Thurn, Berlin 1973.

rest he is said to have been self-taught. His fame reached the caliph al-Ma'mūn (813–833), who invited him to Baghdad. The emperor Theophilus (829–842), now realizing Leo's true value, appointed him to teach at the Church of the Forty Martyrs (of Sebaste). A fire signal chain between Constantinople and Cilicia (the Muslim frontier), the meaning of the signal depending on the hours when it was given, is said to have been his invention. Eventually (840) he was ordained metropolitan of Thessalonica by the iconoclast patriarch John the Grammarian, a relative. His incumbency came to an end when, in the regency of Theophilus' widow Theodora, the tide turned in favor of image worship (843). During the personal rule of Theodora's son Michael III (855–867) and on the initiative of the emperor's uncle and chief advisor Bardas (d. 866), he was appointed to the chair of philosophy at the newly-founded school in the Magnaura Palace. The last known date is the earthquake of January 869, which Leo is said to have survived by locating the only safe place in a collapsing church.

To this second-hand information can be added the tangible evidence of stray notes in some manuscripts, which connect Leo with our texts of Plato, Ptolemy, Archimedes and Euclid.<sup>3</sup> Epigrams I–VI (reprinted below) must have figured originally in Leo's copies of the authors they present: Cyrinus + Marcellus on mechanics, Paulus' *Apotelesmatica*, Theo + Proclus, Achilles Tatius (either by Leo or by Photius),<sup>4</sup> Porphyry (most probably the *Isagoge*, in which case the volume must have contained the entire *Organon*) and Apollonius of Perge. There is, however, no explicit testimony to the effect that Leo himself edited or revised these texts, except in the case of Plato.<sup>5</sup>

The amount of extant writings from the hand of this eminent scholar and scientist is disappointingly small. After the elimination of the work of two namesakes and near-contemporaries, who until recently were often confused with him,<sup>6</sup> Leo Choerosphactes, magister and proconsul (ca. 850–ca. 920), and the emperor Leo (VI) the Wise (born 866, ruled 886–912), this is all that remains:

<sup>3</sup> Details in Lemerle, pp. 167–171.

<sup>4</sup> Photius is mentioned first, Leo only as an alternative claimant; the verse technique (paroxytone ending) does not favor this claim, see below p. 204.

<sup>5</sup> See the note at Plato, *Laws* 743b in O (= Vat. gr. 1), in G. C. Greene, *Scholia Platonica*, Haverford 1938, p. 322; further particulars in Lemerle, p. 168, n. 73.

<sup>6</sup> The error still prevails in K. Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzant. Litteratur*, 2nd ed., Munich 1897, 722–723; it was set right chiefly by E. Lipšic, *op. cit.*, cf. G. Kolias, *Léon Choïrosphaktès*, Athens 1939, 65–68.

In prose: (1) a sermon on the occasion of the feast of the Annunciation;<sup>7</sup> (2) a four-page note on Euclid;<sup>8</sup> (3) some extracts on astrology and related subjects, many of them, as is often the case with this kind of material, of doubtful attribution or authenticity.<sup>9</sup> In verse: (1) *Job*, a didactic poem in 638 hexameters, which until now has escaped notice, and is presented here for the first time; (2) ten or eleven epigrams, which I have added to round off Leo's poetical work, as well as for convenient reference and comparison.

## II. The Epigrams

With only two exceptions, all the epigrams have been preserved in the *Anthologia Palatina*. Numbers I–VI are book epigrams, serving either as headings or as colophons to manuscripts. The genre is well represented in the *Anth. Pal.* (in particular, IX. 184–214); it had a long past (starting with Callimachus) and a long future (well into the eighteenth century); in the ninth century examples are especially frequent, ranging from distichs to effusions of over 200 lines.<sup>10</sup> Those by Leo may have been gleaned directly from his own library, perhaps by himself. The puzzling *νῦν* in III. 13 ("Theo, who *now* instructs the city of Alexander") has led to the conclusion that these epigrams and their poet belong to the fifth century; but, as Lemerle has pointed out, since Theo lived in the fourth century and Proclus, who shares the poem with him, in the fifth, the "now" cannot possibly refer to the time of writing.<sup>11</sup>

Epigram VII is an enigma for which no satisfactory solution has yet been offered. It may originally have been a *technopaignion*, the three lines, which are of nearly equal length (35, 35, 34 letters), representing the herald's wand: one line (the first?) for the staff, the

<sup>7</sup> Edited by V. Laurent, "Une homélie inédite de l'archevêque de Thessalonique Léon le Philosophe sur l'Annonciation (25 mars 842)," *Mélanges Eugène Tisserant*, II (Studi e Testi 232), Rome 1964, 281–302.

<sup>8</sup> Euclid, ed. Heiberg, vol. V, pp. 714–718 (= Heiberg–Stamatis V. 2, pp. 341–345).

<sup>9</sup> Listed and discussed by Lemerle, pp. 171–172.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. L. G. Westerink, *The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo*, I, Amsterdam 1976, 30–31; long prefatory poems, e.g., to the anti-Manichaean collection in Laur. 9, 23 (Alexander Lycopolitanus, ed. Brinkmann, Leipzig 1895, XVI–XXII) and to Xenophon's *Anabasis* in Paris. gr. 1640, f. 123<sup>v</sup> (14th cent.; the poem is addressed to Leo VI).

<sup>11</sup> Christ–Schmidt–Stählin, *Griechische Literaturgeschichte*, vol. II, Munich 1924 [1961], p. 980, n. 6. Lemerle, *op. cit.* 169, n. 80.



remaining two for the serpents. I have failed, however, to discover any letter pattern. The addressee who is invited to contemplate this figure is apparently a Sicilian living in Constantinople; one possible candidate would be Leo's ungrateful student, Constantine the Sicilian, about whom later.

The Homeric cento, VIII ("The Rape"), also stands by itself, unless Stadtmüller was right in attributing *Anth. Pal.* IX. 381 ("Hero and Leander") and IX. 382 ("The Echo") to the same author.

All these poems are from Book IX of the *Anthology*; one more (Number IX) has survived in Book XV. 12, a short meditation on the best way of life by "Leo the Philosopher, surnamed the Pagan." Whether Leo must be held responsible for some of the palindromes in the *Appendix Planudea* (= Book XVI. 387c) and in the larger collection edited by L. Sternbach,<sup>12</sup> is doubtful. Some manuscripts mention Leo the philosopher or Leo the rhetorician as the author; in the lines themselves the names Leo and Photius occur.

The two remaining epigrams have been preserved elsewhere. Number X is from the so-called *Sylloge Euphemiana*,<sup>13</sup> a small collection of epigrams (most of them also in the *Anth. Pal.*) compiled in the reign of Leo VI. Writing to his doctor, Leo points out the absurdity of a regime of cold water for an old man of a naturally phlegmatic temperament, in an unusually cold month of February and in an icy, drafty house.

The last, Number XI (also published by Sternbach, *loc. cit.*), exemplifies the Byzantine notion of satire: crude, brutal insult in verse. The speech defect which Leo indicates is clearly a problem with the *r*-sound, but not the substitution of *l* for it, as in the *τραυλίζειν* of Alcibiades (Aristophanes, *Wasps* 42-46); the sound produced is described as a turtle-dove's cooing, perhaps a soft uvular *r*. Leo seems to consider it an odious mannerism rather than a speech impediment. Chronologically, it is unlikely (though not quite impossible) that the student in question was the quaestor Anastasius ὁ Τραυλός, another poet of the *Anthology* (XV. 28), also known as a composer of hymns and as a hagiographer.<sup>14</sup> In the title of the

<sup>12</sup> "Analecta Byzantina," *České Museum Filologické*, 6, (1900), 299-303.

<sup>13</sup> Edited by F. G. Schneidewin, *Progymnasmata in Anthologiam Graecam*, Göttingen 1855; the poems in question already in Boissonade, *Anecdota Graeca*, II, Paris 1830 [Hildesheim 1962], pp. 470-471.

<sup>14</sup> H. G. Beck, *Kirche und theologische Literatur im byzantinischen Reich*, Munich 1959, 605.

*Anthology* poem, ὁ Τραυλὸς figures (practically) as a proper name, and Arethas, in some unfriendly comments on one of Anastasius' poems,<sup>15</sup> also uses it as such: 'Ἀναστασίου τοῦ τέως κοιαίστωρος, ᾧ τὸ Τραυλὸς γνῶρισμα. The date of Arethas' letter is unknown; if Kougeas' guess is right,<sup>16</sup> the unnamed individual who (some time after 920) accused Arethas of high treason,<sup>17</sup> and who is described in similar words, was this Anastasius. On this assumption, there would be a difference of at least fifty years between Leo and Anastasius.

To the genuine epigrams, I add three more which are certainly not by Leo, but have been repeatedly printed as his, thus introducing biographical errors. Number XII follows (in Vat. gr. 915) two poems written after Leo's death by his former pupil Constantine the Sicilian; the first, in elegiac couplets, accuses Leo of paganism; in the second (in iambic trimeters) Constantine defends himself against the reproach of ingratitude to the memory of his teacher, but the title describes it as 'Ἀπολογία Λέοντος φιλοσόφου, καθ' ἣν Χριστὸν μὲν σέβει, τὰ Ἑλλήνων δὲ φανλίζει, a description totally irreconcilable with the content of the poem.<sup>18</sup> In consequence, the epigram following it was also taken to be by Leo, who thus in his old age bade farewell to poetry and became a student of rhetoric under Photius. In Photius' correspondence there is a letter to Leo concerning a point of Biblical Greek, but we have no evidence of any closer contact.<sup>19</sup>

Items XIII and XIV are the dedicatory poems of the *Sylloge Euphemiana*, already mentioned. Since in the manuscripts and in Boissonade's edition they are preceded by Leo's epigram X, Leo became their author and thereby a native of Hypata in Thessaly and a contemporary of Leo the Wise, which led to further confusion with Leo Choerosphactes, even after Schneidewin had pointed out the error.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>15</sup> *Scripta minora*, ed. Westerink, I, Leipzig 1968, 322. 29–33.

<sup>16</sup> S. B. Kougeas, 'Ὁ Καισαρεύας Ἀρέθας, Athens 1913, 22.

<sup>17</sup> Arethas, *op. cit.*, 288. 7–20; 231. 3–12.

<sup>18</sup> The poems were published by P. Matranga, *Anecdota Graeca*, Rome 1850, II. 555–559; on the episode see, besides Lemerle pp. 172–175, R. Anastasi, "Costantino Siculo e Leone Filosofo," *Siculorum Gymnasium*, N.S. 16 (1963), 84–89; M. D. Spadaro, "Sulle composizioni di Costantino il Filosofo del Vaticano 915," *ibid.*, 24, 1971, 175–197.

<sup>19</sup> Photius, Ep. 208, ed. Laourdas–Westerink, vol. II (Leipzig 1984).

<sup>20</sup> *Op. cit.* (above, note 12), pp. 6–7.

I. Λέοντος φιλοσόφου εἰς βίβλον μηχανικὴν

Βίβλος μηχανικὴ· Κύρινος δέ μιν ἐξεπόνθησε  
Μαρκέλλου γνωτοῖο συνερχομένου κατὰ μόχθον.

II. Τοῦ αὐτοῦ Λέοντος φιλοσόφου εἰς τὴν βίβλον Παύλου ἀστρολόγου

Θέσφατα μαντῶης Φοιβίδος, ὄργια τέχνης  
ἀστρολόγων, Παῦλός μ' ἐδιδάξατο κύδιμος ἀνὴρ.

III. Τοῦ αὐτοῦ Λέοντος εἰς τὰς βίβλους Πρόκλου καὶ Θέωνος, τῆς  
μὲν Θέωνος ἀστρονομικῆς, τῆς δὲ Πρόκλου γεωμετρικῆς

Βίβλος Θέωνος καὶ Πρόκλου τῶν πανσόφων.  
βίβλος πόλου τε καὶ χθονὸς φέρει μέτρα·  
Θέων πόλον μὲν καὶ Πρόκλος μετρεῖ χθόνα,  
Πρόκλος μὲν οὖν γῆν καὶ Θέων μετρεῖ πόλον.  
ἄμφω δ' ἐπ' ἴσης τῶν ἐπαίνων ἄξιοι,  
ἄμφω δ' ἀμοιβὴν τῶν λόγων τετεύχατον.  
Θέων Πρόκλου γὰρ λαμβάνων σοφὰς θέσεις  
δείκνυσιν ταύταις τοὺς δρόμους τῶν ἀστέρων·  
Πρόκλος δὲ δείξεις τοῦ Θέωνος λαμβάνων  
ταύταις ἀναλύει καὶ προβάλλει τὰς θέσεις.  
ἀλλ' ὦ σοφὴ ξυνωρί, χαίρῃ μοι λίαν·  
χαίροις, Θέων ἄριστε, πάνσοφον κάρα,  
ὁ νῦν πυκάζων τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου πόλιν·  
χαίροις δὲ καὶ σύ, Πρόκλε, τοῦ Σαρπηδόνος  
ἄριστον αἶμα τοῖς ὅλοις βοώμενον.

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IV. Φωτίου πατριάρχου Κωνσταντινουπόλεως, ἄλλοι δὲ φασιν  
Λέοντος τοῦ φιλοσόφου, εἰς τὴν βίβλον Λευκίππης

Ἐρωτα πικρόν, ἀλλὰ σώφρονα βίον  
ὁ Κλειτοφῶντος ὥσπερ ἐμφαίνει λόγος·  
ὁ Λευκίππης δὲ σωφρονέστατος βίος  
ἅπαντας ἐξίστησι, πῶς τετυμμένη  
κεκαρμένη τε καὶ κατηχρειωμένη,  
τὸ δὴ μέγιστον, τρεῖς θανοῦσ' ἐκαρτέρει.  
εἵπερ δὲ καὶ σὺ σωφρονεῖν θέλῃς, φίλος,  
μὴ τὴν πάρεργον τῆς γραφῆς σκόπει θέαν,  
τὴν τοῦ λόγου δὲ πρῶτα συνδρομὴν μάθε·  
νυμφοστολεῖ γὰρ τοὺς ποθοῦντας ἐμφρόνως.

5

10

## V. Λέοντος φιλοσόφου εἰς τὸν φιλόσοφον Πορφύριον

Τῇ τῶν λόγων σου κογχύλῃ, Πορφύριε,  
βάπτεις τὰ χεῖλη καὶ στολίζεις τὰς φρένας.

## VI. Λέοντος φιλοσόφου εἰς τὰ Κωνικὰ Ἀπολλωνίου

ᾧν ἦδε βίβλος ἔνδον ὠδίνω, φίλε,  
βαθὺς χαρακτήρ καὶ περισκελὴς ἄγαν  
δεῖται κολυμβητοῦ δὲ πάντως Δηλίου.  
εἰ δ' αὖ κυβιστήσῃ τις εἰς ἐμοὺς μυχοὺς  
καὶ πᾶν μεταλλεύσειεν ἀκριβῶς βάθος,  
γεωμετρῶν τὰ πρῶτα λήψεται γέρα,  
σοφὸς δ' ἀναμφίλεκτος εἰσκριθήσεται.  
τούτων δὲ μάρτυς ἐγγυητὴς τε Πλάτων.

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## VII. Τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἰς κηρύκιον

Σχῆμα παλαιοτάτων ἀνδρῶν κηρύκιον ἄθρει,  
Θρινακίης οἰκιστὰ Κορίνθιε, ὅς ποτ' ἔπινες  
ἀμφιβόητα ῥέεθρα Συρηκοσίης Ἀρεθοῦσης.

## VIII. Λέοντος φιλοσόφου εἰς παρθένον φθαρεῖσαν, Ὀμηρόκεντρα

Μήτηρ ἐμὴ δύσμητερ, ἀπηνέα θυμὸν ἔχουσα,  
λίην ἄχθομαι ἔλκος, ὃ με βροτὸς οὐτάσεν ἀνὴρ,  
νύκτα δι' ὀρφναίην, ὅτε θ' εὐδουσι βροτοὶ ἄλλοι,  
γυμνὸς ἄτερ κόρυθός τε καὶ ἀσπίδος, οὐδ' ἔχεν ἔγχος.  
πᾶν δ' ὑπεθερμάνθη ξίφος αἵματι· αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα  
οὐρόν τε προέηκεν ἀπήμονά τε λιάρόν τε.

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## IX. Λέοντος φιλοσόφου εἰς ἑαυτὸν τοῦ ἐπονομαζομένου Ἑλληνος

Εὖγε Τύχη με ποεῖς ἀπραγμοσύνη μ' Ἐπικούρου  
ἡδίστη κομέουσα καὶ ἡσυχίη τέρπουσα.  
τίπτε δέ μοι χρέος ἀσχολίης πολυκηδέος ἀνδρῶν;  
οὐκ ἐθέλω πλοῦτον, τυφλὸν φίλον, ἄλλοπρόσαλλον,  
οὐ τιμάς· τιμαὶ δὲ βροτῶν ἀμενηνὸς ὄνειρος.  
ἔρρε μοι, ὦ Κίρκης δνοφερὸν σπέος· αἰδέομαι γὰρ  
οὐράνιος γεγαῶς βαλάνους ἅτε θηρίον ἔσθην·  
μισῶ Λωτοφάγων γλυκερὴν λιπόπατριν ἐδωδὴν,  
Σειρήνων τε μέλος καταγωγὸν ἀναίνομαι ἐχθρῶν

5

V. Anth. Pal. IX 214. VI. Anth. Pal. IX 578 || 3 Diog. Laert. II 22 || 8 cf. Elias, *In categ.* 118.18. VII. Anth. Pal. IX 579 || 2-3 cf. Anth. Pal. XIV 73.3. VIII. Anth. Pal. IX 361 || 1 *Od.* 23.97 || 2 *Il.* 5.361 || 3 *Il.* 10.83 || 4 *Il.* 21.50 || 5 *Il.* 16.333 | *Od.* 1.123 || 6 *Od.* 5.268. IX. Anth. Pal. XV 12.

ἀλλὰ λαβεῖν θεόθεν ψυχοσσόον εὐχομαι ἄνθος, 10  
 μῶλυ, κακῶν δοξῶν ἀλκτῆριον· ὧτα δὲ κηρῶ  
 ἀσφαλῆως κλείσας προφυγεῖν γενετήσιον ὀρμήν.  
 ταῦτα λέγων τε γράφων τε πέρας βιότοιο κιχείην.

X. Λέοντος φιλοσόφου

Ψυχρὸν τὸ γήρας, ἢ τ' ἐμὴ κρᾶσις φύσει  
 (φεῦ) φλεγματώδης· μὴν δ' ὁ Φεβρουάριος  
 ψυχρὸς μάλιστα, ζῳδιον δ' Ὑδρηχοῦ  
 τὸ νῦν πολεῖον καὶ συνὸν μεθ' ἡλίου  
 πῆγνυσσι καὶ τὸν οἶνον ἐν τισιν τόποις 5  
 τοὺς τ' ἀμφορεῖς ῥήγνυσιν ἐκ τῆς ψύξεως.  
 ὁ δ' οἶκος ἔνθα νῦν κατασκηνῶ πάλιν  
 ἀγάννιφός τε καὶ λίαν δυσχείμερος.  
 ὁ θρασκίας δὲ δριμύς ἐστι καὶ πικρός,  
 ὀξύς, δυσαῆς, Ταρτάρου προᾶς ἔχων 10  
 ὁ γὰρ νότος λέλοιπεν ἡμῶν τὸ κλίμα.  
 πῶς οὖν, τοσοῦτων ψυχροτήτων ἐν μέσῳ  
 ὀρῶν με συσχεθέντα τὸν ταλάντατον,  
 ὕδωρ κελεύεις προσφέρεσθαι, φίλτατε;  
 εἰ γὰρ με πείσεις, ἢ χιῶν γενήσομαι 15  
 ἢ καὶ χάλαζα, καὶ θανῶν νεκροστόλοις  
 ἄψανστος ὡς κρύσταλλος ὧν φανήσομαι  
 τῇ σῇ πεποιθῶς ψυκτικῇ παραινέσει.  
 ἄπελθε τοῖνον εἰς τόπους τῆς Ἰνδίας  
 εἷς τ' Ἀγυσύμβων εἷς τε Βλεμύων πόλεις, 20  
 ὅπου λέγουσιν ἀμπέλους μὴ βλαστάνειν·  
 ἐκείσε δεῖξον σὴν ἰατρικὴν, σοφέ.  
 ἡμῖν γὰρ οὐκ ἔνεστι χρεία τῆς τέχνης,  
 εἰ ζῆν θέλομεν καὶ τὸν ἥλιον βλέπειν.

XI. Λέοντος φιλοσόφου εἰς τραυλὸν μαθητὴν αὐτοῦ

ᾧ τραυλορῆμον τραυλεπίτραυλε γνάθε,  
 τραυλόλαλον πάντραυλον ἔντραυλον στόμα,

X. Boissonade pp. 469–470; Schneidewin pp. 7–8, Cougny IV 77, pp. 412–413  
 || 20 read Ἀγισύμβων | Βλεμύων Boissonade. XI. Sternbach pp. 297–303 (L = Laur.  
 5, 10, f. 214'; M = Paris. Suppl. gr. 690, f. 108'; P = Paris. 1720, f. 73'); also in V  
 = Vat. gr. 1276, f. 100' || *tit.* as in LV: στίχοι εἰς τὸν φυσιγνάθον P, εἰς τραυλόν M || I  
 τραυλεπὴ τραυλεγνάθε L || 2 om. M | τραυλίλαλον P (read τραυλήλαλον?) ||



τραυληγοροῦν ἄναρθρον τρυγόνος τρόπον,  
σύριζε, κράζε, τρύζε σὸν τραυλὸν μέλος,  
κροῦ κροῦ κεκραγῶς ἐν πρυμνοῖς δένδρων κλάδοις. 5

\*XII. (by Constantine the Sicilian)

Οἶον δὴ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἡρώϊκοελεγείον αὐτοῦ·  
Ἔρρε μοι, ὦ τριτάλαινα Πολύμνια, ἔρρετε Μοῦσαι,  
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν ἀπὸ νῦν ῥητορικῆς ἔραμαι,  
Φῶτιον ἀρχιερεῖα γεροντοδιδάσκαλον εὐρών,  
ὃς με γάλακτι ἐὼν θρέψε θείων ναμάτων.

\*XIII (by compiler of *Sylloge Euphemiana*)

Εἰς Εὐφήμιον·

Ταυτά σοι ἐσθλὰ νοῶν, Εὐφήμει, ἐσθλὰ χαράττει  
Μουσὸπóλος ξείνος ἀμφαγαπαζόμενος,  
ὃς προλέλοιπε πάτρην ἥδ' Ἑλλάδα καλλιγύναικα  
καὶ γλυκερὴν καλύβην Θετταλικῆς Ὑπάτης,  
καὶ νῦν ἄστυ κλυτὸν Βυζάντιον ἀμφοπολεύει 5  
πιστὸς ἐὼν θεράπων κοιρανίης μεγάλης,  
ἦν ῥα Λέων μεθέπει ὁ σοφώτατος ἐν βασιλεῦσιν  
ἐν δίκῃ, ἐν σοφίῃ, ἐν πυκιναῖςπραπίσιν.

\*XIV (by the same)

Ἄλλα εἰς τὸν αὐτόν

Βαῖα μὲν ἐξ Ἑλικῶνος ἀπηνθισάμην, πάννυ βαιὰ  
λείρια, Μουσάων, Εὐφήμει, πάγκλυτα δῶρα.

### III. Job

The poem *Job*, or, *On Indifference to Grief and on Patience*, has been preserved by the late Byzantine author John Eugenicus, who included it in a collection of miscellaneous material which he copied in 1439, now Parisinus Gr. 2075. Though this particular item (ff. 396<sup>r</sup>–410<sup>v</sup>)

3 τραυληλαοῦν M | τρόπω L || 4 κράζε, τρύζε (τρίζε P), σύριζε LPV | σύντραυλον V, σὸν λάλον M || 5 πρυμνοῖς Sternbach: πρύμνοις L, πρέμνοις PV, ἄκροις M. XII. Matranga p. 559, Cougny III 255 (pp. 332–333); from Vat. gr. 915, f. 228<sup>v</sup> || 4 ἐὼν θρέψε] ἔθρεψε MSS. and edd. | θείων] perh. ὁσίων. XIII. Boissonade p. 470; Schneidewin pp. 5–6; Cougny III 256 (p. 333) || 8 πυκιναῖς Boissonade: πινυταῖς Schneidewin. XIV. Boissonade p. 470; Schneidewin p. 6; Cougny III 257 (p. 334).

is duly recorded in Omont's description of the manuscript,<sup>21</sup> nobody seems to have paid any attention to it, until Father J. Paramelle rediscovered it some ten years ago.

In the manuscript, the poem itself is preceded by a *protheoria* in prose, short and to the point, which sounds like a program rather than a summary, and must be by Leo himself.<sup>22</sup>

The poem can be summed up as follows:

*Prologue* (1–18). Ours is a message of joy. We must first deal with the question of character (which may be such as to resist all treatment), after which we will recount the story of Job and other lights of this earth. If only happiness were less rare in the world!

*Part I* (19–38): character. There is no cure for the lachrymose temperament of Heraclitus, nor for Timon's innate misanthropy.

*Part II* (39–215): Job. His prosperity and subsequent misfortunes, grief and resignation (39–101); his disease, his wife's reproaches (102–154). The visiting friends: Job curses the day of his birth (155–186); Zophar's [Eliphaz'] answer (187–201). After seven years (!) God intervenes and restores Job's fortunes (202–215).

*Part III* (216–638): a consolation on traditional lines, with pagan and Christian examples. We must follow Job's example (216–226). Though grief over the loss of relatives and friends is natural and may be overpowering, because the origin is physiological as much as mental, there are considerations by which we can master it (Thales, Xenophon) (227–315). The only profitable tears are those we shed because of our sins (316–338). Examples of David, Abraham, the mother of a young martyr of Sebaste,<sup>23</sup> the mother of the Maccabees, Socrates (339–399). Why should we grieve when a loved one has escaped the miseries of this world? (400–430). Loss of honor and rank can be borne (Dionysius, Orontes) (431–487). So can poverty (Jacob, a shepherd; the apostles, fishermen; Artaxerxes, Anacreon, Antisthenes) (488–608). Whatever happens to us has happened to others; nothing in this world is stable (609–627). Musonius' prayer; the poet's own (628–638).

Obviously, the work is written in the tradition of the *διατριβή* of Hellenistic and Roman times, with two important differences: (1) it

<sup>21</sup> H. Omont, *Inventaire sommaire des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Nationale*, II, 1888.

<sup>22</sup> The *protheoria* which Eugenicius wrote to Heliodorus' *Aethiopica* (A. M. Bandini, *Catalogus codicum Graecorum Bibl. Laurentianae*, III, Florence 1770 [Leipzig 1961], 322–323) is totally different in manner: verbose, and heavily rhythmical.

<sup>23</sup> One of the "Forty Martyrs" in whose church Leo taught for many years (above p. 194).

is entirely in verse, and thereby different from the Menippean satire as well as from the Epictetan prose tract; (2) it differs from comparable Greek prose works in that, like Cicero's *Tusculanae*, it attempts to strengthen the reader against any kind of misfortune: bereavement, disgrace, poverty. The philosophy is of a homely, unpretentious kind, not unlike that propounded in Epigram IX. There is nothing, here or elsewhere, to indicate a metaphysician who could have played a leading part in the preservation and revival of Neoplatonic literature.<sup>24</sup> When Constantine the Sicilian mentions Proclus among the friends that Leo will meet in hell

(ἦχι Χρυσίππους Σωκράτέας τε ἰδοῖς,  
Πρόκλους τ' ἡδὲ Πλάτωνας, Ἀριστοτέλεις, Ἐπικούρους,  
Εὐκλείδας τε φίλους καὶ Πτολεμαστρονόμους),<sup>25</sup>

he may be thinking of the commentary on Euclid; actually, the other names in the list suggest that he had no distinct notion of Leo's philosophical interests.

The learning displayed in the poem is less than impressive. Commonplaces, such as Heraclitus the weeping philosopher (20), hellebore used to cure insanity (27), Timon the misanthrope (31), the jealous Cerberus (33–35), taken by themselves, mean little or nothing; added up together, they seem to point to a reader of Lucian. Of the apophthegms cited, no less than three come from Ps.-Plutarch, *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*; some more, probably, from other works by, or attributed to, Plutarch (234–235; 256–257; 292–294). Diogenes Laertius may be another source, and so may Aelian's *De natura animalium*.

As regards the formal qualities of the poem, the *protheoria* is instructive. Avoiding "harder" or "harsher" words, Leo says, he will use a "more pedestrian and more Homeric" style, for the sake of clarity as well as of pleasant effect. The more difficult poetic style which he has decided not to use is apparently that of Nonnus and of the later poets of the *Anthology*, Paul the Silentarius, Agathias, and their circle.

Once one has accustomed oneself to the transformation of Homeric verse into a colloquial, almost Horatian hexameter, it becomes possible to appreciate the skill and variety with which Leo handles this medium. He gives a plausible imitation of the manner of the Stoic preacher,

<sup>24</sup> He is, with Leo Choerosphactes, one of the few possible owners of the so-called "philosophical collection" (nine manuscripts of Plato, Damascius, Maximus of Tyre, Proclus, Paradoxographi, Olympiodorus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Simplicius), on which see *The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo* (above, note 10), pp. 30–31.

<sup>25</sup> Matranga, p. 556 (II, 12–14).

combined with that of the Christian homilist, which, at least for a short period of his life, he actually was. With the Homeric language comes also Homeric meter, or what is supposed to pass for it, and here we are faced with a problem, that of the prosody of this poem.

In the epigrams, Leo's hexameters (a total of 26 lines), though they do not meet the rigorous requirements of the Nonnian hexameter, are all sound by classical and Hellenistic standards. Similarly, his iambic trimeters are regular Byzantine dodecasyllabics, with only one case of the use of an anapest (III. 10); besides the paroxytone verse end, which around this time became the rule, Leo also admits the proparoxytone and the oxytone end. Here and there, but rarely, a dichronon is given the wrong quantity:  $\alpha$  at IX. 1, *σώφρονα*;  $\iota$  at I. 1, *Κύρινος*;  $\nu$  at V. 1, *Πορφύριε*.

The poet of *Job*, on the contrary, permits himself considerable freedom in the matter of prosody. I list the principal irregularities.

- (1) Elision not expressed in writing (e.g., 146, 154, 160), a practice not uncommon in the period.
- (2) Crasis not expressed in writing (233, 474).
- (3) Hiatus after a long vowel without *correptio* (10, 28, 61, 68, 70, etc.).
- (4) Hiatus after a short vowel (21, 26, 40, 43, 48, 61, etc.); with lengthening of the short vowel (27, 185).
- (5) Intrusive movable  $\nu$  either before a vowel (29, 264, 368, 555), or before a consonant (125); omission of movable  $\nu$  (103).
- (6) Confusion of single and double consonants: 27 *ἐλεβόροιο*, 34 *ὀπίσω*, 75 *στήθεις*, 130 *γάννυνται*, 152 *δύσσομεν*, 262 *τόσων*, 370 *ῶσους*, 374 *ἔρριψεν*, etc.
- (7) Lengthening of *dichrona*: 6 *Ἀραβίης*, 41, 112, 199, 211 *Σατάν* (short first syllable 45, 102), 53 *τάδ'*, 62 *ἀνδριάντα*, 63 *παρὰ*, 108 *δέμας*, 118 *ὄναρ*, 148 *πάλιν*, 162 *ἀπόντα*, 195 *σὺν*, etc.; also of visibly short vowels: 93, 131, 157 *τὸν*, 115 *ἔβαλε*, etc.

Most of these can be either discarded as merely orthographical, or corrected as common errors (though it should be borne in mind that on the whole the text is in excellent shape), or defended on the ground of comparable cases in Homer.

Other anomalies are less easy to account for:

- (8) Faulty caesuras, especially diaeresis after the second or the third foot (16, 153, 446, 537, 638; 382, 393, 411, 416, 436, 445, 477, 486, 620); in later Byzantine attempts at writing hexameters these are the clearest indication that the sense of the hexameter is lost.
- (9) Metrical imperfections for which there is no obvious emendation, e.g., 169 *ἐλκωθέντα καὶ γυμνὸν* (short *καὶ*), 174 *ἔζοντο δ' οὔτι* (redundant *δ'*), 195 *σὺν δ' εἴ ποτε προθέλνυμον* (short *εἰ*), 531 *καὶ*

ἡμίγυμνος (-γυμ- short), 538 ἀποσκενὴν ποτ' Ἀρταξέρξης ('Αρ- short), 598 Ἀντισθένης (-τι- short), 605 οὐχ ὁρᾶν γὰρ χρῆ.

There are two possible explanations: either Leo improved his technique in the course of a lifetime, or he deliberately applied a looser standard for what he considered a more popular genre, in which case the qualification πεζοτέραις καὶ μάλλον Ὀμηρικαῖς [λέξεσι] would hold for the meter as well as for the style. I do not think that the anomalies warrant the supposition of another "Leo the Philosopher" or of an erroneous title, all the less so as these lines, whatever their imperfections, are technically too good to be considered the work of a poet of later (Comnenan or Palaeologan) times.

### Προθεωρία

Ἡ κοσμικὴ λύπη κατὰ πολλὰ καὶ γίνεται καὶ λέγεται, περὶ ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγῳ διαλαβεῖν· τὰ δὲ κεφαλαιωδέστερα ταῦτά ἐστι, πλούτου καὶ δόξης ἀποτυχίαι καὶ φίλων καὶ συγγενῶν θάνατοι. πειράται τοίνυν ὁ λόγος τοὺς περὶ ταῦτα λελυπημένους ἀπὸ τῆς κατὰ τὸν Ἰῶβ ἱστορίας, ἀπὸ λογισμῶν καὶ παραινέσεων καὶ ἱστοριῶν καὶ παραδειγμάτων καθ' ὅσον οἶόν τε παρηγορεῖν καὶ ἐπανακτᾶσθαι. ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι σαφηνείας ἕνεκα καὶ γλυκύτητος τὰς τραχυτέρας ὁ λόγος ἀποστρέφεται λέξεις, χρήται δὲ πεζοτέραις καὶ μάλλον Ὀμηρικαῖς.

Λέοντος φιλοσόφου Ἰῶβ ἢ περὶ ἀλυπίας καὶ ὑπομονῆς

Ἀρχόμεθ' εὐφροσύνης· καὶ γὰρ τάδε φάρμακα λύπης  
ἀργαλέης, ἣ δὴ πολλοὺς ἔκτεινε καὶ ἐσθλοὺς.  
ἀρχόμενοι δὲ φύσεις καὶ ἥθεα πρῶτα κρινοῦμεν,  
ὧν ἀνθισταμένων τέμνειν πολὺ κάλλιον ὕδραν·  
εἶτα καὶ αὐτὸν Ἰῶβ μνησώμεθα καρτερόθυμον, 5  
γαίης Ἀραβίης κλυτὸν ἥλιον, εἶτα καὶ ἄλλους  
ἀστέρας ἐγχθονίους, οἱ ἐννήγασαν ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα,  
ὄφρα τις ἐκ τοῦ ἐτοίμου ἔχοι παραμύθιον αἰγλῆν.

Χαίρε πάτερ μέγα κῦδος Ἰῶβ, μέγα θαῦμα βίοιο,  
ἄφθιτον ἄλλο γένος· χαίροιτε δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐκείνου 10  
ἵχνεσιν ἐσπόμενοι καὶ ἵχνια θεῖα λιπόντες  
εὐστεφέες συνέβητ' ἐπὶ σάββατα καὶ λειμῶνας.

Αἰῶ' ὠφελλ' ὁ βίος τὰ κρέσσονα πλείονα φέρβειν,  
τῶν δὲ χειριοτέρων σπάνιν εἰδέναι· ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν δὴ



ἐν τι καὶ ἔν που ὀράται ἐπὶ σκοπέλοις, τὰ δὲ χεῖρω 15  
 λόχμαι καὶ δρυμὰ καὶ ἄλλη ψάμμος οὐκ ἐπίοπτος,  
 ὡς τῇ ἄνω ἰότητι παρίσταται, οὐδέ τις οἶδεν  
 ὑψίστοιον νόον, καὶ εἰ πάνν ἄλκιμός ἐστιν.

Ἄλλ' ἦτοι φύσιες μὲν ἐπὶ ψυχροῖς ἀραρυῖαι 20  
 πολλοὺς καὶ νῦν δρῶσιν ἀμειδέας Ἡρακλείτους,  
 οἳ ῥα νομίζοντες δακρυῶδεα πάντα γε εἶναι  
 πάντ' ἄνδρ' οἰκτίζουσι καὶ ἄσχετα δακρυχέουσι,  
 σχέτλιοι· ἦ γὰρ ἔμελλον ἐπὶ σφίσι δάκρυα χεῖναι.  
 οἱ δὲ τόδ' οὐχ ὀρώσων ἐπ' ἀχλύι, πάντα δ' ἐταῖρον  
 μύρονται, καὶ οὐδὲ γελῶμενοι ἐξανιᾶσιν. 25

τίς ποτε τοὺς προσάγοιτο; τίς ἂν τάδε ἰήσαιτο;  
 οὐδ' ἂν ἄπασαν ἄλλα ἄντ' ἐλλεβόροιο ποτίζοις,  
 νίψεις ἢ πείσεις κἄν σαρδόνιον μειδῆσαι.  
 ἔνθεν ἐατέοι εἶσ'· εἰ γὰρ πειρᾷ μεταβάλλειν,  
 ὀξύτερον γοόωσιν ἐνείρουσιν τέ τιν' ὕβριν. 30

Τοὺς δέ κε Τίμωνας—καὶ γὰρ τινές εἰσι καὶ ἥδη  
 τῶν ἐθέων ἐκείνου καὶ κράσεως εὐμοιροῦντες—  
 ἐς κόρακας βαλέειν ἢ Κερβερίους ἐπὶ χώρου·  
 εἰ μὴ τοὺς κ' ἐλάσειεν ὁ Κέρβερος αὐτίς ὀπίσσω,  
 οὐκ ἐθέλων ὀράαν βριαρώτερον ἄλλον ἑαυτοῦ. 35  
 τοῖς σὺ μὴ ἐγγίζεις, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ὑγιῶς ἀπελεύσῃ·  
 ἐν γὰρ σφιν γενέεσσι τομείς πεφύασιν ὀδόντες,  
 οἳ σε κακὸν δράσουσιν, ἐκάς δ' ὑλάουσί τι δριμύ.

Αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ τούτους ἐξεώσαμεν ἐς Κυνόσαργές,  
 αὐτὸς δ' ὦ Θεότιμε, εὖ φρονέων ἐπακούοις 40  
 ἄθλον Ἰῶβ καὶ Σατάν. ὃς εὖξατο τόνδε σαλεῦσαι,  
 ὡς ὁ μὲν ἦν ἀρετῇσι περίπλεος εἶχέ τε τέκνα  
 κεδνὰ καὶ οἶκον ἄκλειτον ἀπ' οὐρανόθεν τε ἐπαινον·  
 τῷ δ' ἐπὶ πυρφόρον ὄμμα Σατὰν βάλεν, ἐκ δ' αἰτήσας  
 τόνδε καὶ ἀμφιλαβῶν οὕτως ἐχόρευε κατ' αὐτοῦ. 45

Ἀγρόθεν ἤλυθέ τις κεκονιμένος ἰδρώων τε,  
 ἐν δὲ στάς προθύροις δακρυῶδεος ἥρξατο μύθον·  
 “Κλυθι, μέγιστε ἄναξ, Ἄβραμ προφερέστατε παίδων,  
 δήμιος ἦλθε φάλαγξ κεκορυθμένοι αἰγείησι,  
 σίντιες ἐκ Συρίης, ὥσεί τινος ἀντιώωντος” 50  
 ἐκ δὲ βόας λύσαντο καὶ ἤλασαν εὐρυμετώπους,

33 Zenob. 3.87 (CPG I 78–79) || 39 Diogenian. 4.86 (CPG I 246) || 42–43 Job 1.1–2 || 44–45 cf. Job 1.6–12 || 46–53 Job 1.13–15 || -

16 perh. ἀλή ψάμος || 17 perh. ὡς || 27 ἐλεβόροιο P || 29 εἰσίν P || 30 ἐνείρουσι P | perh. τὴν || 31 κε| perh. γε || 32 read κείνου || 34 ὀπίσω P || 40 write εὐφρονέων || 42 ὡς P || 43 ἄκλειτον = ἄκλειστον or ἄκλιτον? || 49 αἰχέησι P ||

καὶ δὲ καὶ ἄνδρας ἔπεφνον ἀολλέας ἀμφ' ἀρότοισι·  
μοῦνος ἐγὼν ὑπάλυξα τεῖν τάδ' ἐξαγορεύων."

Ὡς ὃ γε ταῦτ' ἐθρήνει· ἐφίστατό τις ποθεν ἄλλος,  
ἐν δ' ἐπιβάς προθύροις λιγυρὸν κατοδύρετο μῦθον 55

"Κλῶθι, μέγιστε ἄναξ, Ἄβραμ προφερέστατε παίδων,  
θεσπιδαῆς πῦρ ἤφθη ἀπ' οὐρανόθεν πάννυθι  
πάντα τε πίονα μῆλα καὶ ἀνέρας οἰοβοτῆρας  
ἥύτε χόρτον ἔλαψε, πολὺς δ' ἀναείρετο καπνός·  
μοῦνος ἐγὼν ὑπάλυξα τεῖν τάδ' ἐξαγορεύων." 60

Ἦλθε καὶ ἵπποπόλος καὶ αἰγονόμος τάδε εἴρων·  
τὸν δ' ἄρετῆς κλίνειν οὐκ ἔσθενον ἀνδριάντα.

Φθεγγομένων δ' ἔτι τῶνδε παρὰ ποσὶν ἄλλος ἐπέστη  
ἀσθμαίνων, καὶ μῦθον ὑποβλήδην τὸν ἔνισπεν

"Ὡμοὶ ἄναξ φιλότεκνε, σύνεξ τὰ μὴ εἶδομεν ἔργα· 65  
παῖς ὁ πρεσβύτερος τὰ πρόλοιπά σου ἀγλαὰ τέκνα  
δαῖτ' ἐντυνόμενος κικλήσκετο, οἱ δὲ συνῆλθον.

ὥς δὲ φίλῃ ἐπὶ δαιτὶ παρήμενοι ἐστιώωντο,  
ἐκ δ' ὀρέων ροιζήδον ἐπέσσυτο θέσφατος ἥχος,  
ἐν δ' ἔπρησε δόμον, καὶ αὐτίκα σοῖς ἐπὶ παισὶν 70

ἤριπε θεσπεσίως, κατὰ δ' ἔκταθεν ἀγλαὰ τέκνα,  
ἣ δὲ τράπεζα τάφος, κρητὴρ δ' ἐπιτύμβιος οἶνος·  
μοῦνος ἐγὼν ὑπάλυξα, ὥς αἶθε μοι ἦν τότε ὀλέσθαι."

Δὴ τότε Ἰῶβ ἐφάνη καὶ σάρκινος ἦν ἄρα καὶ ζῶς·  
σπλάγχχνα γὰρ οἱ στήθεσσι φιλοστόργοισιν ἀγέρθη 75

μνησάμενῳ παίδων θεοειδῶν, οὓς τέκεν αὐτὸς  
καὶ ἀρεταῖς ἀτίταλλε, καὶ ἔλπετο χεῖρεσιν αὐτῶν,  
εὖτε φάος προλίποι, ξυνῆς ὁσίης τετυχήσαι.

τῶν τότε ἐπιμνησθεὶς χαλεποῦ καὶ ἁώρου ὀλέθρου  
κρατὸς ἀπὸ ζαθέου μελανόχροας εἴλκετο χαίτας, 80

αἷς ἡὔχει κομόων καὶ ἐφαίνετο τίμιος ἀστοῖς,  
ἀντ' αὐτῶν δὲ κόνιν κατεχεύατο αἰσχος ἑαυτῷ.

ἐκ δ' ἄρα πορφύρεον φᾶρος κλυτὸν ἀμφοτέρησι  
ῥῆξε διδοὺς καὶ τοῦτο, πάλιν τ' ἐπὶ γυμνὸς ἐχώρει.

ἐς δὲ γόνυ κλινθεὶς κεφαλὴν τ' ἐπὶ γαῖαν ἐρείσας 85

χεῖν ἀπὸ βλεφάρων ποταμῶν πυρόντα ῥέεθρα,  
φῆ δὲ βαρυστενάχων ἐπιθαρσύνων τε ἑαυτόν·

"Ὡδε γὰρ ἐκ μήτρας ὑπὸ ἥλιον ἦλθον ἀνείμων,  
χεῖρεσιν οὐτι φέρων, οὐτ' ἄρ τέκος οὔτε τι ἄλλο·

54-60 Job 1.16 || 61 (not in Job) || 63-73 Job 1.18-19 || 74-101 cf. Job 1.20-21

54 perh. Ὡς, and comma after ἐθρήνει || 55 κατοδύρετο P || 57 ἤφθη Paramelle: ἤσθη  
P || 67 ἐντυνόμενος P || 75 στήθεσι P | perh. ἐγέρθη || 83 φάρος P || 84 ἐπὶ P || 87 φησὶ P

ὦδε θέμις γυμνόν με πάλιν καὶ οὐδὲν ἔχοντα 90  
 κείσ' ἵμεν ἀπροτίμαστον, ἄοικον, ἄπαιδ', ἀπέριττον.  
 εἰ δέ γε <καὶ> μὴ νῦν, ἀλλ' αὖριον ὤλετο πάντα.  
 εὖ μοι ταῦτα συνῆλθ', ἵνα τὸν ἔρον ἥλιθα πάντα  
 τῶν καὶ τῶν ἀφελὼν εἰς οὐρανὸν ἄρτιον ἔλκω.  
 οὐκ ἐμὰ ταῦτα (πόθεν;), σὰ δὲ καὶ τῶν σῶν ταμιείων 95  
 εἰσόκεν οἶδας ἀφήκας· ἔως ἔδει ἐμπαρέθηκας·  
 νῦν ὅταν οὐκ εὖ ἔχῃ, ὅτε λώιον οὐ φῆς εἶναι,  
 καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς ποιῶν πάλιν αὐτὸς ἀπηύρω,  
 ὥς αἰεὶ τὰ ἐναντί' ἐπίστροφα ἄλλοπρόσαλλα." 100  
 φῆ καὶ ἀναστὰς ἔστο τριβώνιον ἐν χροῖ λυγρόν,  
 καὶ μένεν ἐς τὸν ἄνω βυσσὸν κρατερῶς ἀτενίζων.  
 Οὐδ' ἀλαδὺς Σατὰν ἦστο, ὅρινε δέ μιν τάδε μᾶλλον·  
 δῆ τότ' ἐπέρραξεν τῷ Ἰῶβ χαλεπώτερον ἄλλων.  
 ὥς δὲ λέων βλοσυρῶς ἐν πτολέμοις ἀνθρώποις  
 ὑσμίνηνδε μολῶν, καὶ αὐτίκα μὲν κακὰ τεύχων, 105  
 εὖτε τυπῇ πᾶλλει ἰταμώτερος αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ,  
 ὥς στερρῷ τῷ Ἰῶβ ἰταμώτερον ἔμπεσε δαίμων.  
 αὐτίκα πᾶν τὸ δέμας ἐξέξεσεν ἔλκεσι θείοις,  
 δεινοῖς, ἀπροσίτοις, ταρσῶν ἄπο βρέγματος ἄχρι.  
 καὶ ἥλγει μὲν, ἔτλη δὲ ἀποξύνων καὶ ὁμοργνύς 110  
 ὅστράκῳ ἰχώρας συχνὸν χρόνον· ἀλλὰ καὶ οὕτως  
 οὐ μεθίει Σατὰν οὐδ' ἐβρίζετο, ἀλλὰ οἱ ἦγεν  
 μῆχος ὃ οἱ κατέλειψεν ἔχειν ἄγκυραν ἀγῶνος,  
 μῆχος ᾧ οὐ Σαμψών, οὐτ' ἄρ Σολομών ἀντέσχεν,  
 μῆχος ἀφ' οὗ καὶ ὄλην ἀπάνω κάτω ἔβαλε φύσιν. 115  
 Τὸν δ' ἀπαμειβομένη κατονείδεεν ἰς ἀλόχοιο·  
 "Ἀθλείς, ἀλλὰ μάτην, καὶ ἐς ἡέρα καὶ σύ γε τύπτεις.  
 ἐλπίδ' ἔχεις, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὄναρ ἀνύπαρκτον ἄελπτον·  
 ἦπου σοι νυστάζει ὑπὲρ κλυτὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα·  
 πρὶν γὰρ τήνδε γ' ἐλθεῖν, οἶμοι, ἀπολώλαμεν, οἶμοι, 120  
 νώνυμοι, οὐτι λιπόντες, ὄνειδεα δ' οἶα καὶ αἶσχη.  
 τὸ σχετλιώτατον, οἱ καλοὶ καὶ ἀμύμονες νῆες  
 αἱ θαλεραὶ τε θύγατρες, ἐν αἷς ὦδινα καὶ ἔτλην,  
 πρὶν τινα καρπὸν ἔχειν μοι ὀλώλατο πάντες ἄριστοι.  
 τίς ποτε τοιάδ' ὅπως πεν ἦ ἔκλυε; τίς τὰδ' ἐνέγκοι; 125  
 καὶ δ' ἐγὼ ἡ δύστηνος ἐλευθερίῃ καὶ ἀδείῃ  
 ἀνθήσασα πάλαι γηρῷ μόχθῳ τε καὶ αἰδοί,

108–111 Job 2.7–8 || 116–136 Job 2.9 || 117 cf. CPG II 111, note; 1 Cor. 9.26 ||

93 συνῆλθεν P || 96 εἰσὸς P || 99 mg. γνωμικόν P | ἐναντία P || 103 ἐπέρραξε P || 104  
 mg. παρ(αβολ)ῇ P || 109 ἀπὸ P || 116 τόνδ' P || 120 perh. τήνδ' ἐλθεῖν || 123 θυγατέρες P  
 || 125 ἐκλυεν P ||

οἶκον ἀπ' οἴκου ἰοῦσα, τόπον τόπου, οὐδὸν ἀπ' οὐδοῦ.  
 ἄλλοις μὲν {οὖν} φίλον ἔσθ' Ὑπερίωνα νωθρὸν ὁδεύειν,  
 οἷς ὁ βίος χαρίεις, ἔν' ἐπ' ἡματα μακρὰ γάννυνται 130  
 τὸν δ' ἐγὼ ἤθελον ἐς τὸν Αἰγοκερῆα θαμίζειν,  
 ὡς ταχὺ παυοίμεσθα πολυπλανέος καμάτοιο,  
 τόσσαι με τρύχουσιν οἰζύες ἀλγινόεσσαι.  
 νῦν δ' ὅτι τῆς χείρῳ ζωῆς τὸ θανεῖν μέγ' ἄμεινον,  
 εἶπέ τι τυτθὸν ἔπος πρὸς κύριον, ὡς σὲ καὶ ἡμᾶς 135  
 θάσσον ἀπαλλάξειε πολυχρονίων ὁδυνάων."

Τὴν δ' ὀφρὺς συνάγων ἠνίπαπε καρτερὸς Ἰῶβ.  
 "Ἔγω γύναι, ἣ σε ἔολπα περιφροσύνησιν ἐρίζειν  
 οὐρανίαφι Ῥεβέκκα, ἐπεὶ θεὸν οἶσθα καὶ αὐτὴ  
 νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀκλειῶν πασέων μάλα πόλλ' ἀπολείπεις. 140  
 ὅπποτε βουλεύειν γὰρ ἔδει θεοεικέα βουλήν,  
 ὡς θεὸς Ἰλαος εἶη, καὶ ἄνακτός περ εὐῶσα,  
 νῦν τὰ ἐναντία σὺ ξυνάγεις, γύναι τάλαν,  
 τὰς Σειρήνας Ἰῶβ μάλα ῥηιδίως καὶ ἀάπτως.  
 εἰ γὰρ ὅθ' ὁ πλάστης τὰ χρήστ' ἐπέχευεν, ἐνώμας, 145  
 ἡμεῖς ἀμφοτέρησιν ἐδεχνύμεθ', ἠνίκα νῦν δὴ  
 ἀφράστοις πρᾶπίδεσσιν οἰσάμενος τὰ μὴ ἴσμεν  
 ἄντα πάλιν ἐρύη, ἡμᾶς δ' ἐθέλει πονέεσθαι,  
 σὺ μὴ ὑποστῶμεν, γλώσσαν δ' ἐπαφῶμεν ὁδοῦσιν;  
 οὐκ ἀγαθοὶ θεράποντες οἱ ἐν θαλίῃσιν ἄνακτας 150  
 αἰνοῦντες μετὰ δὴ τι κακὸν τρύξουσιν, βοῶσιν.  
 εἶτα σὺ γινώσκεις ὅτι αὐτίκα δύσομεν αἶαν;  
 ἐκ τίνος; ἦ πόθεν; ἀλλ' ἔτ' ἀνάσχεο καὶ θεο χεῖρα  
 χεῖλεσι, καὶ εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι ἀθάνατον πέλει ἐλπίς."

Ὡς κατεπαχνομένη σιγὴν ἤνεγκε καὶ αἰδῶ 155  
 μῦθος ἐὺς καὶ θήρας ὑπέρχεται ὅστις ἀκούσει.  
 τοῖσι μὲν οὖν δέον ἦν καταδύνεσθαι τὸν ἐχθρόν,  
 ἐκ δ' ὃ γ' ἀναιδείης καὶ τέτρατον ἄθλον ἐκίνει.  
 ὡς γὰρ ταῦτ' ἠχέιτο κατ' ἄστεα καὶ κατὰ δήμους,  
 τόφρα οἱ ἐστιχόντων' ἐσθλοὶ φίλοι ἡγεμονῆς, 160  
 Σωφᾶρ ὁ Μιναῖος, δύο δ' ἄλλοι κοίρανοι ἦσαν,  
 οἳ μιν ἀπόντα τίον ἦν πατέρ' εὐνοος υἱός  
 οἳ ῥ' ἔζον παραφάσθαι Ἰῶβ φιλῆς κατὰ θεσμά.  
 ἀλλὰ Σατὰν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ῥεδόμενον, "Φίλος ἐστὶν  
 ἄλλος ἐγώ," προφθὰς μετὰ γ' ἔτραπε καὶ σφας ἐποίει 165

137-149 Job 2.10 || 159-163 Job 2.11 || 164-165 Pythagoreans (Hermias *In Phaedr.* 192.10-11 Couvreur), cf. Aristot., *Eth. Nic.* IX 4, 116a31-32 ||

129 ὑπερίωνα P || 130 γάννυνται P || 137 τήνδ' P || 142 Ἰλαος; ἱ in eras. of 4 lett. P || 143 σὺ ξυνάγεις] σύξ- from σωξ- P | two syll. missing at end || 146 ἐδεχνύμεθα P || 150 οἱ P || 152 δύσομεν P || 154 ἴσθι P || 160 ἐστιχόντων P || 163 ἔζον P ||

ἀντ' ἐσθλῶν κακίης παρακλήτορας, οὐ λίθον αὐτός,  
 ὥς φασιν, κινῶν, τὴν δὲ κτίσιν, ὄφρα τι μάρψοι.  
 τὸν δ' ὥς οὖν ἔγνωσαν ἀγαλλόμενον ποτὶ κόπρῳ,  
 ἐλκωθέντα καὶ γυμνόν, ὀδωδότα, τὸν πρὶν ἄνακτα,  
 τὸν πρὶν ἐνὶ κλισμοῖσι τετιμένον ἀργυρέοισι, 170  
 φάρεα ῥῆξαν ἕκαστος ἀνῶμωξάν τε συνάμφω,  
 δὴν δ' ἄνεω ἔσταν καὶ ἐθάμβεον ὕψος ὀρῶντες.  
 οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰκόνα εἶχον ἐφευρέμεν, οὔτε παλαιὰν  
 οὔτε νέαν, ἔζοντο δ' οὔτι φράζοντες ὁπωσοῦν.

Αὐτὰρ ὃ γ' οἰθθείς ὥς μή τί γε βυσσοδομοῦσιν 175  
 ἄντα προνοίης—ἦ γὰρ ἐκίνεον ἐξόμενοί τι—  
 βυσσόθεν ὀχθήσας τὰ κάκ' αὐτῷ θεῖς ἐβοᾶτο·  
 “Ἐρρέτω ἡμαρ ἐμοὶ τὸ γενέθλιον, ἐρρέτω ἡ νῦξ  
 ἐν ἧ τις ‘Ἄρρεν’ ἔφη, ἐν ἧ ἔσπασα ἡέρα πρῶτον·  
 καδὲ κεν ἀράσαιτο καὶ ἀμφοτέρας θεὸς αὐτάς, 180  
 ὥς οὐ μητρὸς ἐμῆς ἐκλήισεν Εἰλειθυίας·  
 οὐκ ἂν ἐπειρήθην ἀδινάων τῶν ὀδυνάων  
 οὐδὲ προσοχθισμὸς καὶ Ὀλυμπίῳ ἦν καὶ ἐταίροις,  
 σὺν δ' ὕπνωσα καὶ αὐτός, ὅθι κρατεροὶ βασιλῆες.  
 δεῖμα τό γ' εἶχον ὑποπτον, ὃ ἔτρεμον, ὃ ἐδεδοίκειν, 185  
 ὥστε λέων με συνέσχε· σύνοιδα δὲ οὐδὲν ἐμαντῶ.”

Πρὸς τάδε Σωφὰρ ἔφη, ἄλλως κατὰ ταῦτα νοήσας·  
 “Καὶ σὺ δὲ ταῖς πετερόγεσσιν, Ἰῶβ πολὺ φίλτατε, ἤλως.  
 εἰ γὰρ ἐπετρόμεες καὶ ἐδείδης, ἦν τί σοι ἔνδον  
 ἔργον ἀεικές, ὃ σὺ κρύπτων μὴ ὑπιδέμεν εἰπᾶς. 190  
 ἐν γὰρ ἐν ἄτρεστον καὶ ἀκλινές ἐστι μάλιστα,  
 ἄνθρωπος τὸ συνειδὸς ἐλεύθερος οὐδὲ γρῦ εἰδὼς  
 ἐνδοθέν οἶ· τὸν κ' οὔτις ἐλεγχόμενον κατελέγχοι.  
 τῷδε καὶ οὐρανὴ ἔσεται χεὶρ καὶ διὰ παντός.  
 σὺ δ' εἴ ποτε προβέλυμνον ἰδοῖς θεοπειθέων ἄντα 195  
 ὀλλυμένην γενεήν, ἀνὰ δ' ἀνθέει αὐτίς ὀπίσσω·  
 οἱ δ' ἀσεβεῖς αὐτῇσιν ἀποφθινύθουσί γε ρίζαις.”

Τοιαῶδε μιν μέλισσον ἐπιπλήσσοντες ἐταῖροι  
 πολλὰ χανῶν δὲ λύκος Σατὰν κατελείπετο χάσκων,

166–167 Zenob. 5.63 (CPG I 146) || 168–174 Job 2.12–13 || 178–186 Job 3.1–26  
 || 187–197 Job 4.1–7 (Eliphaz!) || 188 Aeschyl. frg. 139 N. = Aristoph. Av. 808 ||  
 192 Zenob. 5.54 (CPG I 142–143) || 199 Diogenian. 6.20 (CPG I 273) ||

167 φασι P || 168 τόνδ' P || 169 delete καὶ? || 174 perh. ἔζοντ' οὔτι || 179 delete ἐν' ?  
 || 180 ἀράσατο P || 188 mg. παροιμία. τοῖς οἰκείοις πετεροῖς ἐάλω· ἐπὶ τῶν κρατουμένων τοῖς  
 ἰδοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐπιχειρήμασιν P || 191 mg. γνωμικὸν P || 192 γρῦ P || 195 ποτε] perh. που  
 || 199 mg. inf. παροιμία λύκος μάτην χανῶν P ||



καὶ Πρωτεὺς γεγωνὼς μάλα μυρίος οὐκ ἔδυνάσθη 200  
τόνδε φοβεῖν, μούνῳ δέ οἱ ὤφθη ἄελπτος ἢ ἐλπίς.

Ἐπτάετες μὲν τοῖσιν ἐνήθλεε καρτερὸς Ἴώβ,  
οὐπω δ' ὄγδοον ἦλθε, καὶ ἐκ νεφέων ἀδοκῆτως  
ὥς αὖρα πραεῖα λιγύθροος ἔπτατο μῦθος  
φάς· “Σὺ γὰρ ἀλλοίως ὑπελάμβανες ὑψόθεν ἡμᾶς 205  
χρηματίσαι σοι ὅλως, εἰ μὴ διελήλυθας οὕτως;  
οὕτω δειχθείης καὶ ἀληθινὸς ὢν καὶ ἀμύμων  
πέiraσι πᾶσιν, ὅπου φαεσίμβροτος ἐκτέτατ' Ἡώς.”

Εἶπε, καὶ αὐτῷ ἔπει κατῆι στέφος ἄθλον ἀγῶνος,  
ἀνθεμόεν ἀμάραντον, ὅου σέλας ἄστρα καλύπτει. 210  
τοῦ καὶ ἀπ' ἀγλαΐης ἀχλὺς πέσεν ὄμμασι Σατάν  
πολλὰ τετριγὼς Νιόβη τέλος ἐξεφάνθη.  
ἐν δ' ἐδόθη καὶ τὰ πρὶν ὀλωλότα διπλὰ τῷ Ἴώβ,  
διπλοῖ τε πλειῶνες ἀμείνονες· οἷσι καὶ εἶδεν  
υἱέας υἱέων τριτάτην καὶ ἔπειτα γενέθλην. 215

Τοῖα τὰ Ἴώβ πρῶτα καὶ ὕστατα, ταῦτα προνοίης  
τοῖσιν ἀεθλεύουσιν ἀέθλια. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς  
τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀνθραξι πυρούμεθα, εἰςὶ τοιαῦτα  
στέμματα, καὶ πολλῷ γεραρώτερα· πρὸς τὰδ' ὄραν χρῆ  
πρὸς τε σπλάγχχνα τὰ αὐτὰ περιρρυτὰ ὧδε γὰρ εἴη 220  
καὶ τάδε τὰ τρύχοντ' ἀδρανέστερα, πᾶς γὰρ ὁ κάμνων  
ἐλπίσιν οὔτε κόπου τόσον αἰσθεται οὔτε ἀνίης.  
εἰ δ' ὅσα πεισόμεθα κατὰ τὸν βίον οὐ μὴ ἔχωμεν  
πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνου ὅλως κρατέρ' ἄλγεα ἰσοφαρίζειν,  
δεῖ ὅσον ἐνδέομεν, τόσον εὐθυμῆν καὶ αἰεῖδεν, 225  
φιλανθρωποτέρου τετυχηκότες ὑψιμέδοντος.  
οὐ γάρ τις ἀδάμας καὶ χάλκεος ἦν μόνος Ἴώβ.

Ἄλλ' ὅτι μὲν κακὰ τις πάσχων πονεῖ καὶ ἀχεύει  
χηρωθεὶς ἀλόχου, στερεθεὶς παίδων τε φίλων τε  
μητρὸς τε γλυκερῆς καὶ ἀδελφείων ὁμοθύμων, 230  
οὐδεὶς ἀντιλέγει· φύσις ἔχει οἶκτον ἐκάστη,  
ἢ μὲν ἀφαυρότερον, ἢ δὲ πλεον, ἔστι δ' ὅταν δὴ  
καὶ φιλή καὶ ἦθος ὑπὲρ τὰ ἐσκαμμένα πηδῇ.  
καὶ διὰ ταῦτα Θαλῆς ἄγαμος μένε “Δεΐδια” φήσας  
“τὸν περὶ τέκνα πόθον, λύπην ἐπὶ μᾶλλον ἔοντα.” 235  
εἰ δὲ τις ἐκ δρῦός ἐστι παρηγμένος ἢ ἀπὸ πέτρης,  
κείνος τοῖς ἰδίους τεκμαίρεται ἄλγε' ἕκαστα.

202 (not in Job) || 203–204 cf. Job 38.1; 40.6 || 205–208 Job 40.8 || 213–215 Job 42.12–16 || 233 Zenob. 6.23 (CPG I 168) || 234–235 Plut., Solon 6 || 236 cf. Od. 19.163 ||

209 write κατίει || 213 διπλὰ P || 220 περιρρυτὰ P || 226 perh. τετυχηκότες || 229 στερηθεὶς P || 233 read τὰσκαμμένα || 250 δοθέντας P ante corr. ||

εἰσὶ μέν, εἰσὶν ἄχῃ καὶ δάκρυα, κἄν τις ἀνέλκῃ·  
καὶ γὰρ δακνομένης κραδίης ὑποδύεται ἔνδον  
πνεῦμα κακὸν θολερόν, φυσᾷ δέ μιν εἰς ὅσον ἴσχει 240  
βριθομένη, στενάχει δὲ καὶ αὐτίκα διπλόος ὀλκὸς  
σύρεται ἐκ βλεφάρων, κατὰ δὲ φλεγέθουσι παρειάς.  
ταῦτα καὶ οὐκ ἀφίησι παρηγορίας καταδύνειν  
εἴσω, ἐπεὶ τάναντί' ἀνάρσιά ἐστ' ἀλλήλων.  
ἀλλ' ἔμπης καὶ τῶνδ' ἐπὶ τὸ σκυθρωπὸν ἀγόντων 245  
δεῖ δὴ ἀνακτᾶσθαι καὶ ἀποκλίνειν ὅσον ἰσχὺς  
ἐλπίσιν ἀθανάτοις καὶ εὐτοκέεσσι λογισμοῖς.

Πρῶτα μὲν οὖν φανερόν γινῶναι ὅτι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος  
θνητὸς ἔφυ, καὶ οὐτὶς αἰδίδιος οὐδὲ ἄποτμος.  
τοῦ δὲ δοθέντος, ὅτι τεθνηκότας οἶο τοκῆας 250  
κλαίει, ἄχρῃ μὲν ἴσως ἡρίου οὐ νεμεσητόν·  
ὦν γὰρ ἔφυ τις, τούσδε μαραινομένους τε καὶ ἄπνους  
εἰσορόων, καὶ ἡλίθιός τις ἐχεύατο δάκρυ.  
ὃς δὲ παρεκτείνουτ', ἐδόκει καὶ οἶετο ἄρα  
πατρὸς Τιθωνοῖο καὶ 'Ηοῦς ἐκβλαστῆσαι, 255  
ἢ τῶνδ' οὐδς φιλήη στοιχείων συμπῆξασα,  
τῶν αὐτῶν νείκος καὶ ἀπεχθείη διαλύει,  
ἡνίκα τῷ πῆξαντι δοκεῖ λόγῳ εὖ τάδ' ἐνέειναι.  
εἰ δὲ σὺ πρῶτος ἔβης, ὁ δὲ φύσας τίπτ' ἂν ἐτύχθῃ;  
φύσιός ἐστι νόμος, καὶ εὖ ἔχει, ὥστε τοκῆας 260  
πρῶτ' ἵεναι, καὶ ἔπειτα τὰ παιδία. αἰῶ' ἔρρωτο·  
οὐκ ἂν ἅπας ὁ βίος τόσσων θρήνων καὶ ὀδυρμῶν  
μεστὸς ἔην. φεῦ δ' ἡ πρώτη κακίη γε καὶ αὐτὸ  
ἔτραπε καὶ μετέβαλεν, ἐφ' ὃ Γῇ τε καὶ 'Αμφιτρίτῃ  
δάκρυσιν ἀλήκτοις κατατήκοντ'· ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῶς 265  
τοῖς μὴ ἀναινομένοις παράκλησιν ἔστι τι ἄλκαρ.

Εἷς γὰρ ἀπῆλθε πᾶσι, ἕτερος περίεστί τοι ἴσως·  
κείθεν ἐν ἀθυμίῃ ἐσσί, παραψυχὴ ἔνθεν ἰκάνει.  
εἰ δὲ καὶ ἦλθεν ἅπαις, καὶ νυμφίον οὐκ ἴδες νιόν,  
οὐ σὺ μόνος, πολλοὶ δὲ πάλαι καὶ νῦν τὸδ' ὑπέσταν. 270  
τῷ δὲ 'Ιῶβ καὶ δῆμος ὅλος νεοθηλέων νιῶν  
ἡμαρ ἐς ἐν κατέδυν οὐνοφερὸν δόμον εἰς 'Αἶδαο.  
οὐχ ὑμέναιον ἄεισε, καὶ οὐκ ἀρετῆς τευ ἀπῆῦρα,  
ἀλλ' ὑπέμεινε καὶ ἔτλη, ὅτι σποδὸν εἴσιδεν αὐτόν,

256-257 Empedocles (cf. Ps.-Plut., *Plac.* I 3, 878A) || 274 Job 42.6 ||

256 ἦ = μάλλον ἢ (cf. 562) || 262 τόσσων P || 264 write μετέβαλ'? || 265 κατατηκόμεθα  
P || 268 ἐστὶ P || 269 ἦλθες P || 273 τεῦ P || 274 αὐτόν P ||

τὸν δ' ἐφύπερθε καὶ αὐτῆς γῆς καὶ ἀλὸς βασιλῆα. 275  
 ἦν δὲ νεογνῆς ὁδὶ καὶ φίλτερος ἔπλετο μᾶλλον;  
 ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἂν λέγομεν πιστεύομεν, εὐθυμέειν χρῆ.  
 εἰπὲ γάρ· ἐς τί δέμας τρύχεις κρατεραῖς ὑπ' ἀνάγκαις,  
 ἀγρυπνῶν, πεινῶν καὶ καινοτομῶν σέθεν οἶκον;  
 ἄλλου δὴ τινος ἢ ῥα ἢ ὥστε τυχεῖν βασιλείης 280  
 τῆσδε μόνης; ἐπεὶ ἐστι βιαστὴ τε κρατερὴ τε.  
 εἰ δὲ τόδ' ὥδε ἔχει, ὁ δὲ νῆπιος οὐ ὑπεραλλεῖς  
 νόσφι πόνων καὶ ἄτερθε μεριζομένοιο πλούτου  
 εἰς τὰ ἐκείσε καλὰ ἀνελήλυθεν ἀγλαόθυμος,  
 ἢ χρὴ ἑορτάζειν ἢ οὐ λαλείειν ἂν λαλοῦμεν. 285  
 ἄλλως τ' εὐδαίμων γὰρ ὁ τὸν βίον αἰψ' ἀπολείψας  
 πρὶν τὰ τύχης συνιόντα πόσας δώσουσι μερίμνας.  
 εἶτα καὶ οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ νῦν ὀλοφυρομένοιο  
 ἔθρηνοῦμεν, ἢ οὐδὲν ἐφιστάμεθ'; οὐδὲν ἀληθῶς  
 τίς περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἔφν λόγος; οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν 290  
 μηδὲν ἀθυμῶμεν ὅτι καὶ νῦν οὐδαμοῦ ἐστι.

Κάππεσε γὰρ Ξενοφῶντος ἐνὶ πτολέμῳ φίλος υἱός·  
 αὐτὰρ ὁ μικρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν ἀποστὰς εἶπεν· “Ἐμὸς γὰρ  
 ἦν πάις, οἱ τ' αὐτῷ καὶ ἐμοὶ μεγαλείον ὀπάζων.”  
 ἦδε καὶ Ξενοφῶν ὅτι θνητὰ τὰ θνητῶν ἐστιν. 295

“Ἀλλὰ παρηγορίην ἐνεποίεον οἴκοι ἑόντες.”  
 εἰ δὲ θεῷ τὸν ἔρων ὃν ἐκείνοις εἵχομεν ἀμφὶ  
 τρέφομεν, ἀρκεῖ τοῦτο· τὰ δ' ἄλλ' ὅσα μικρὸν ἐπόψει.

“Ἦν δ' ἀγαθὸς γ' ὁ φίλος, καὶ μιν προορῶν στεναχίζω.”  
 ἀλλ' ἔθελες εἶναι τοῦτον κακόν, ὅφρα σὺ χαίρῃς; 300  
 εἰ δ' ἦν, καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἔστενες, ὥστε τί φῶμεν;  
 ἄκριτα ταῦθ' ἡμῖν; μὴ δὴ, φίλε· ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἐσθλὸς  
 αἰνέισθω, ὁ δὲ μὴ τοῦ ὀδυρμοῦ πλεῖν ἐλεείσθω.

“Ἀλλ' ἔθελον ζῶειν μακρὸν χρόνον ἐνθάδε τοῦτον.”  
 ἀλλ' οὐπω δῆλον εἰ καὶ θεὸς ἤθελεν οὕτως. 305  
 “πλὴν οὐκ ἔστι χρόνου μακροῦ χρέος;” ἀλλὰ τί μακροῦ;  
 ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα τὰ αὐτὰ παθεῖν κείνόν γε καὶ ὅψε  
 ἄσσα σὺ νῦν; πῶς οὖν οὐκ ᾠκτειρας καὶ ἐκείνον;  
 ἢ φίλος ὃν φιλέει, τοῦτον χαλεποῖς ταμιεύει;

Ἡμεῖς δ' ἄχρι τίνος παραμείνομεν ἐνθάδ' ἑόντες; 310  
 οὐχὶ μεθ' ὥρην ἢ μετὰ τήνδ' ἐπιβείομεν ἄδου;

292–294 Ps.–Plut., *Consol. ad Apoll.* 33, 118F–119A; Diog. Laert. II 54–55 ||

275 ἐφύπερθε καὶ αὐτῆς] above line γρ. θεν, ἀπάσης γῆς P || 276 read νεογνὸς | ὁδὶ] δ  
 above line between ὁ and δι P || 277 πιστεύομεν P || 283 νέσφι P || 284 ἐκά κάλ' P ante  
 corr. || 289 ἐφιστάμεθα P || 298 ἄλλα P || 299 Ἦν] ἄν P | γ' om. P ante corr. || 300  
 mg. P || 301 δὲ P | οὕτω P ante corr. || 309 χαλεπῶς P ||

οὐ κόνις ἢ αὐτὴ ἐς αὔριον ἐσσόμεθ' αὐτοῖς;  
 ὅσος ὁδ' ἐστὶ βίος, παρέκνύε τις ἐμπαράκνυψας  
 ὀρσοθύρης, εἴτ' εὐθὺς ἐδύσατο πρὶν παρακνύσαι,  
 ὦδε διαγράφας τὸ πολυχρόνιον βιότοιο. 315

Εἴ γε μὲν ἐν νεκύεσσιν ἀγάρροα δάκρυα λείβων  
 οὐχὶ καὶ ἄλλοθί που τούτων δέη, εὖ ἂν ἐποίεις·  
 εἰ δέ τιν' εἰσὶ καὶ ἄλλα ἐν οἷς ἐπιδενόμεθ' αὐτῶν,  
 χρὴ καὶ ἐκέισε μάλιστα μέρος τί γε τῶνδε φυλάσσειν.  
 ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ἀμαρτὰς ἐγείνατο νηλέα λύπην, 320  
 λύπην καὶ μόρον αἰνόν, ὕφ' ὧν τὸ γένος κατέβαλλεν·  
 ἐκ δ' αὐτῶν καὶ ἐκείνη ἀπόλλυται ὥσπερ ἐχίδνη.  
 εἰ γὰρ {μῆ} λυπηθείς τις ἐπ' ἀμπλακίῃ καταχεύοι  
 δάκρυον, ἥδ' αὐτὴ σταγόνι λύετ' ἥυτε καπνός.  
 ἔνθα μὲν οὖν λύπη καὶ δάκρυον ἔργον ἀνύει, 325  
 ἐνταῦθ' οὐδ' ἡβαιὸν ἐπιστάμεθ' αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι·  
 ἦχι δὲ μηδὲν ὄνειαρ, ἐπὶ φθιμένοις δὲ μάλιστα,  
 Ὡκεανὸς Τηθὺς τε κατεΐβομεν ἐκ βλεφάροϊν.  
 κλαίων δ' οὐκ ἀνίης, ἀπειοικότα δ' ἔργα τελείεις.

Εὐλογον ἦν τόδε σοι, εἰ τρεῖς τινας ἢ δύο μόνους 330  
 ἀκλαύστους ἀπαθείς που ἀκήκοας· εἰ δέ γε πάντες  
 νηδύος ἐξ αὐτῆς γοεροὶ πίπτουσιν ἐπ' αἶαν,  
 ὥς ἐπ' ἀννητύοις \*\*\* ἀσχάλλομεν ἔργοις.

Εἷς μόρος ἀτρεκέως πουλύστονος, ἄξιος οἴκτου·  
 ἐν δ' ἄλλοις κλαίοντες ὀνοσσομέθ' ἡμέας αὐτούς, 335  
 ἡνίκ' ἀπολλήξαντες ἐπιγινώμεν τίνα τὰ χθές.  
 καὶ Ζήνων μὲν οὐδὲ τοῦ οὐ θανάτου ἀλέγιζεν,  
 ἐκπνέομεν δ' ἡμεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἐτέρων καθορώντες.

Μύρετο Δαυιδ καὶ ἐπλύνετο, ἐς δὲ τὸν υἱὸν  
 κλαίων, ὥς οὐδὲν κατανύετο, τῆς πρὶν ἀγωγῆς 340  
 εἶχετ', ἐπεὶ τὸ τελεσθὲν ἀμήχανόν ἐστ' ἀναλῦσαι.  
 εἰ δὲ σὺ τὸν Ἰσαὰκ τὸν ὄν νύεα θῆσαι ἐτάχθης,  
 τηλύγετον δῆτ' ὄντα καὶ ἀσπάσιον γλυκερόν τε,  
 οὐ καὶ τὰ ἐφετμὰ ἐπαμύξαο, καὶ πρὶν ἐκείνον  
 συμποδίσειν, πᾶν ἄρθρον ὑπεκλάσθης καὶ ἐλύθης; 345  
 ἀλλ' Ἄβραμ ἤγαγε καὶ ἐπτέρνισεν ἔκ τ' ἀνέτεινε  
 χεῖρα, βαβαί· πῶς γὰρ δὴ οἱ οὐ συνέδωκέ γε ἦτορ;

313–315 source not found || 322 cf. Aelian, *Nat. an.* I 24 || 337 prob. Zeno of Elea, cf. Diog. Laert. IX 27 || 339–341 2 Kings (2 Sam.) 12.15–23 || 343–347 Gen. 22.1–19 ||

312 εἰσαύριον P post corr. || 313 παρέκνύε] read (e.g.) παρέδειξε | τις] mg. ὁ πυθαγόρας δηλ(ονότι) P || 318 τινα P || 329 τελείης P || 330 μόνους P || 333 e.g. <μάτην> || 334 πουλύστονος] -ου- from -ο- P || 335 ὀνοσσομέθα P || 336 ἀπολλήξαντες P ante corr. || 339 perh. <καὶ> Δαυιδ || 344 read τὴν ἐφετμὴν ||

ἦ ταῦτ' οὐκ ἄλλως κατ' ἄρ' ἔδρασέν τε καὶ ἔτλη  
 ἦ ὅτι ἐν στήθεσσι πόθον πυρόεντα συνέσχε  
 πᾶν τὸ πέλας φλεγέθονθ' ὑπὲρ Ἡφαίστοιο κρατῆρας. 350  
 ὡς δὲ θρυαλλίς ἀμυδρὰ ἀνημμένη ἐν δαΐδεσσιν  
 ἠελίοιο πεσόντος ἅπαξ ἀποκίδνεται ὕλης,  
 ὡς πόθον ἄλλον ἅπαντα μετὰ φρεσὶν ὄντ' ἀνθρώπων  
 ἀστράψας ὃ γε θεῖος ἐπεσσυμένως κατέφλεξε  
 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ πρὶν περιώσια καὶ πέρα πειθοῦς 355  
 ῥᾶον ἐκείνῳ ἄνυτο, καὶ εἰ πολὺ μείζονα ἦσαν.  
 Τοῖα ἔρεξε γυνὴ Κολχίς πάλαι, ἥσπερ ὁ υἱὸς  
 ἀμφὶ Σεβαστείῃ τῇ ἐκείσε φάλαγγι συνήθλει,  
 οἱ Χριστὸν στέρνοισιν ἔνυτο καὶ αὐτῷ ἐνίκων.  
 διὰ τοῦτο τύραννος ἐμήνιε καὶ σφᾶς ἀνώγει 360  
 χειμερίην ἀνὰ νύχθ' ὅταν ἴστατο ἰς βορέαο,  
 λάϊνον ἐς λίμνην γυμνοὺς ἀπὸ πάντας ὀλέσθαι.  
 ἔνθ' ἔθανον πάντες μελανωθέντες κρυστάλλῳ  
 κεῖντό τε παννύχιοι κεκαφηότες ἄλκιμον ἦτορ.  
 πρῶτ' καὶ ὄχλος ἔβη, καὶ σώματα νεκρῶν ἐν ἀμάξαις 365  
 αἰρόμενοι ποτὶ πυρσὸν ἀγίνεον· ὡς δ' ἐπὶ παῖδα  
 τόνδ' ἔβαν, αὐτὰρ ὃ—καὶ γὰρ ἦν ἀκάμας τε κρατύς τε—  
 ζῶν ἐτι πνείσκει, ἔλεος λάβεν ἔνδοθι θυμῷ  
 καὶ ζωγρεῖν βούλεον—ἐδύνάτο γὰρ περιεῖναι—  
 δυσσεβέες, οἱ ὅσους κτείνοντες ζωὸς ἀφειδέως 370  
 εἶν ἐνὶ τεθνηῶτι ἐκῆδεον, ἔλλαβον οἶκτον.  
 ἦ δὲ τάδ' ὡς ἐνόησε, μεταδρομάδην ἔλε παῖδα  
 καὶ μιν ἀειρομένη ὥμοις ἐπὶ γηραλέοισι  
 φόρτον ἐλαφρὸν ἔριψεν ἐπ' ἀχθοφόροισιν ἀπήναις,  
 αἰέμνηστον ἔπος φαμένη τόδε· “Βάσκ' ἴθι, τέκνον, 375  
 ὥσπερ ἀεθλοσύνης, καὶ τῶν στεφάνων σφι μετάσχοις,  
 μῆδ' ἐπ' αἰεζώοις ἀγαθοῖς καὶ ὀψὲ προκόψας  
 αὐῆθι ὑποστρεφθῆς τόνδ' ἐς βίον ἀλγινόμεντα.  
 οὐχ ὁ τελευτήσας Ἄβελ ἄθλιος, ἀλλ' ὁ ἔτι ζῶν  
 δύσμορος ἦν καὶ μητρὶ καὶ ἀνδράσι καὶ θεῷ αὐτῷ. 380  
 φύσιός ἐστι θανεῖν πλήσσαι τε μόρον, κἂν μὴ νῦν,  
 ἀλλ' οὖν ὀψέ, καὶ οὐδεὶς οὐ μὴ φεύξεται οἶτον,  
 οἶος ἂν ᾖ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἦν μόρος, ἀλλὰ τῇ Ἀδὰμ  
 ζωῇ αἰεζῶω ζῶειν πέλεν, ἤθελον ἂν σε

357–389 cf. Basil., *Hom.* 19.8 (*Patrol. Gr.* 31.524B); see further *Bibl. Hagiogr. Graeca* 1201–1208n (vol. II pp. 97–99) ||

351 mg. παρ(αβολ)ῇ P || 359 perh. στέρνοισ' αἰνυτο || 360 perh. <καὶ> διὰ || 363 κρυστάλλῳ P ante corr. || 365 fort. νέκρ' || 368 πνείσκειν P || 370 ὅσους P || 374 ἔρριψεν P || 384 ζωῇ read (e.g.) φυλῇ ||



- ζώμεναι σὺν ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῦ προτέρου βίοιτοιο 385  
 ἐν λειμῶνι νέμεσθαι ἀκήρατον ἀγλαὸν ἄλσος.  
 νῦν δ', οὐ γάρ τις ἀλύξει ὄρον βροτόενθ', ὃς ἂν εἴη,  
 ὄλβιος ὅστις ἐκὼν καὶ ἐν κρατεροῖσιν ἀέθλοις  
 γυμνασθεὶς ἀρετῇσιν ἐπαινέτον οἶτον ἐπίσποι.”  
 Τοῖα ἐκείνη ἔθαλπε περικλυτὸν νῖα καὶ αὐτὴν. 390  
 τὴν γὰρ ὑπ' Ἀντιόχῳ τὰ ἃ φίλτατα τέκνα κοπέντα  
 βλέψασαν καὶ χερσὶν εἰς κτερίσασαν ἀφῶμεν,  
 μὴ καὶ θηλυτεράων φαινοίμεθ' ἥττονες ὄντες,  
 οἷς τε ἐκείναι ἔχαιρον ὀδυρόμεθ' ἀντίον ἡμεῖς.  
 Εἰ δὲ σμερδαλέον τι καὶ ἀπρόσιτον μόρος ἦεν, 395  
 οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ γε ποτῷ ἐγεγήθεε Σωκράτεος ἱς,  
 οὐδ' ἓνα μάρτυρον εἶδες ὑπαντιόντα τυράννοις,  
 οὐδέ τινες ὁσίων σταυρὸν ἀνελάμβανον ὥμοις  
 θνήσκοντες εἰς ἓν ἡμαρ, ἀειθανέες τινὲς ὄντες.  
 “Ἀλλὰ τάδ' ὑψιπετῶν καὶ θεσπεσίων πέλει ἀνδρῶν.”  
 ἀλλ' ἔθελες εἶναι τῶν οὐτιδανῶν καὶ ἀγεννῶν 401  
 καὶ μήθ' ὑομένων μήθ' ἡλίφ' αὐομενάων;  
 τοῦτο μὲν οὐδ' ἐθέλουσι παρίσταται· αἱ φύσιες τὰ  
 εἰσί, καθ' αὐτάς εἰσι, μόνον τὸ κέρδιον ἄλγος  
 ἐστὶ καὶ ἄλλ' ἄλγος τοῖσιν ἐθέλουσι δεδέχθαι. 405  
 Καὶ σύνες· εἰ σὸς ἐταῖρος ὑπεξέφυγεν κακότητα,  
 ἡγάλλου καὶ ἔχαιρες, ἥ ἔστενες οἴμωξές τε;  
 “Ἐκίρτων, ἐχόρευον, ἐπεκρότεον καὶ ἄειδον,  
 τοὺς τε πέλας ἐκάλεσσα μετασχέμεν εὐφροσυνάων,  
 ὥς ἡ Σπάρτη ἔοργεν, ὅτι Ξέρξης ὑπενόστει.” 410  
 εὖ γ' ὅτι εὐρύτερός μοι τῷ παραδείγματι γίνῃ  
 καὶ σύ γε τὸν νοῦν πρόσσχες ἐπισταμένως καὶ ἀληθῶς,  
 κἂν μὲν ἀλαστοτέρων καὶ φρικαλέων ἀποβάντα  
 πεύσειαι ὃν φιλείεις,— εἰ δ' οὐ, χρονιώτερον ἄλγει.  
 Οὐ στυγέεις τὰ βίου ἀτυχήματα ταῦτα, ἐταῖρε, 415  
 φεῦ, ὦν οἱ κωκυτοὶ καὶ ἐπέκεινα Γαδείρων  
 ἡχεῖνθ'; αἱ δὲ νόσοι ψυχῆς καὶ σαρκὸς ἐλαφρόν;  
 πῶς γάρ, ὅτ' ἀθρήσω πλευρίτιδας αἵματοέσσας,  
 τόν τε πάρος τρυφώοντα καὶ ἐννύμενόν τινα βύσσον

391–392 4 Macc. 8–12 || 396 Plat., *Phaed.* 117c3–5 || 402 Zenob. 5.53 (CPG I 142) || 416 cf. Apostol. 16.19, note (CPG II 661) || 418 cf. Hippocr., *De morb.* III 16 (VII 142.14–20 L.) || 419–420 cf. Luke 16.19–24 ||

391 mg. τὴν ἀγί(αν) σολομώνην δηλ(ονό)τι P || 393 perh. θηλυτέρων φαινοίμεθα || 396 mg. at ποτῷ] ἥγ(ουν) τῷ κωνείω P | σωκράτεο P || 399 read θνήσκον τ' || 405 ἄλλο P || 406 ὑπεξέφυγε P ante corr. || 409 ἐκάλεσα P ante corr. || 410 ὥς P || 419 ἐννύμενον P ||

πλούσιον ἐν φλογὶ νῦν καταδαιόμενον ἀμαράντω; 420  
 μήτ' αὖ ἐπ' ἐσχατιῆς ὅτι εὐφημον τὸ πενιχρόν.  
 πάντα τὰ ἄκρα κάκ' ἐστ', ἀρετὴ δ' ὑπὸ μέσσον ἐναίει.  
 ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πνοίη σε τύχης ἐπὶ αἰθέρ' ἀνέλκει,  
 μᾶλλον ἀποκλινέειν, εἰ δὲ πεσέειν μὴ ἀφ' ὕψους.  
 καλὸν τὸ προορᾶν τὸ γενησόμενον καὶ ἐθίζειν 425  
 ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἀθρώων πολλοὶ παρέκοψαν, ὄλοντο,  
 ὅσσοι ἐν εὐρείῃ κραδίῃ βραχὺ πνεῦμα φοροῦσιν.  
 εἰ δὲ μίτους σοι ἀκλεεῖς ἐπεκλώσατο μοῖρα,  
 μὴ δυσανασχετέ', οὐχ οἱ κάτω εἰσὶν ὀνοστοί,  
 τοὺς δὲ κατερχομένους νεφέων ἄπο οἶδε γελῶσιν. 430  
 Οὗτος μὲν συνετός, ὁ προγινώσκων τά οἱ ἐλθεῖν  
 ἐγγύθεν ἐστί, καὶ αὐτὰ σοφῇ μεθόδῳ ἀλιώσας  
 κρείσσων δ' ἔπλετο κείνος, ὅτις μετὰ τοὺς κινδύνους  
 εὖ τε φέρει καὶ αἰεὶ ἀναλλοίωτος ὀρᾶται  
 ὃς δὲ πεσὼν οὐ δύνατ' ἐνεγκέμεν, ἀμφιπονεῖτω. 435  
 ἔστι γε καὶ πλοῦς δεύτερος, εἰ θεὸς οὖρον ὀπάξοι.  
 δυστήνων δέ τε τέκνα τὰ δυστυχίης ἀμύητα,  
 οὐδέ κεν εὐτυχίην ἐπιτήδεός ἐστι φυλάσσειν  
 ὅστις δυστυχίην παναμήχανός ἐστιν ἐνέικαι.  
 Πᾶς φιλόδοξος ἄδοξος, ὁ δ' οὐ φιλόδοξος ἀρείων. 440  
 πουλὺ τι τοῦ φρονέειν ἐξουσία οἶδεν ἀφαιρεῖν.  
 ὕψος ὅσον τὸ τύχης, καὶ δυστυχίας τὸ βάραθρον.  
 ἴσθι μελικρήτῳ ἐναλίγκιον ἔμμεναι εὐχος  
 τυτθὸν μὲν σαίνει καὶ ἡδυμῖν ἀποτίκτει  
 βράσσονα, ἐς δὲ τὸ ἐξῆς ὥσπερ εἰς ἀρυταίνης 445  
 πικρότερον πόμα τοῦ ἀψινθίου ἄλλο ποτίζει.  
 Ἀλλὰ πεσὼν ἄχθη; εἰ μὲν ὅττι σήμερον αὐτός,  
 ἴσως εἰς τοὺς χθῆς μὴ ὀρᾶς φρεσὶ ταῦτα παθόντας  
 πᾶρ ποσὶ δ' ὅφει ὅσους καταπίπτοντας μετὰ δούπου,  
 ἐν δὲ τε τοῖσι κακοῖς τὸ ἔχειν μετέχοντας ἐλαφρόν. 450  
 "Χθῆς δὲ τι κῦδος ἔχοντες ἐπαινετοὶ ἡμεν ἐν ἄστει,  
 νῦν δ' ἐπὶ τοῖσι φίλοις διαβαίνομεν ἀνεπίγνωστοι."  
 φίλους τοῦσδε καλεῖς; ἐπιτριπτότατοι καὶ ἄπιστοι.  
 τὸν δ' Ἀντισθένη αὐτὸν ἐπερχόμενον κατ' ἀγυῖας  
 ἤνεσεν ὄχλος ὅσος γ', ὁ δ' ἀγωνία, "Οἷμοι" ἐπειπών, 455

422 cf. Aristot., *Eth. Nic.* II 6, 1106b36–1107a6 || 436 Georg. Cyp. 2.21 (CPG I 359) || 445 schol. Aristoph., *Eq.* 1090 = *Suda* A 4065 || 454–457 Diog. Laert. VI 5

421 αὐ] αἰ P || 422 read ἐναίειν? || 429 δυσανασχετέ' P || 433 ὅστις P || 438 ἐπιτήδεός P || 441 πολὺ P | οἶδε P ante corr. || 445 mg. ἀρυταίνῃ χαλκοῦν σκεῦος· ἐξ οὗ τὸ ἐλαῖον εἰς τοὺς λύχνους ἐγγέουσιν P || 447 read ὅτι || 455 γ' om. P ante corr. ||

“Ἄρά τί μοι κακὸν ἐστί, καὶ οὐ νοέω; ἐπεὶ ἄλλως  
οὐκ ἂν τοῖσιν ἐγὼν ἐπιήνδανον οὐδ’ ἐκροτούμην.”

“Ἄλλ’ ἐμέ τις φθόνος εἶλε κότον γε πάλαι καταπέψας.”  
αὐτὸ τόδ’ οὐ μικρὸν παραμύθιον, ὅτι περ αἰεὶ  
τὰ κρείττω ζηλοῦνται, ἅπαν δὲ κακὸν ἀμέγαρτον 460  
καὶ σὺ μὲν αἰνῇ ἅπασιν, ὁ δ’ οὐ βραχὺ αἰσχος ὀφείλει.

“Ἄλλ’ ἀδίκως τὰ πέπονθα καὶ ἐξ ἀδίκων ἀνθρώπων.”  
ἀλλὰ δικαίως ταῦτα παθεῖν καὶ ὑποῖσαι ἐβούλου;  
οὐ σὺ κακὸν τι πέπονθας, ὁ δὲ δράσας πολὺ χεῖρον.

Εἶτα πεσὼν ἄχθη; τίνος, ἢ τί μέγα χραϊσμοῦντος; 465  
εἰ ἀρετῆς, ναί, καὶ γὰρ ἐπάξιον· εἰ δέ τευ ἄλλου  
τῶν οὐχ ἴσταμένων, σὺ μὲν ἴστασο, ταῦτα δὲ πίπτει.

Σικελικῆς ἀρχῆς Διονύσιος ἔκπεσ’ ὁ πρέσβυς  
Δίῳν τόνδε καθείλ’, ὁ δ’ ἐκαρτέρει ἔμφροني θυμῷ.  
καὶ τις κερτομέων καὶ ἐγγελῶν ἐνένιπε 470

“Νῦν δὲ Πλάτων τί σ’ ὄνησε καὶ ἡ Στοά, οἷσιν ἐπηύχον;”  
“Πολλὰ μάλλ’,” εἶπε, “τύχης γὰρ ὀρέας μεταβαλλομένης μοι  
εὖ τε φέρω καὶ ὕμμες ἐπεγγελώω γελῶντας.”

Ὡς καὶ Ἀρταξέρξης τὸν εὖν ποτε γαμβρὸν Ὀρόνταν  
ἔξοχον ἰσχύσαντα κοτεσσάμενος κατέριψεν 475  
ἐξ ἔο καὶ δόξης· ὁ δέ, γενναίως ὑπενεικὼν

καὶ διαγνοὺς δόξης φύσιν, ἴσχευ’ “Ὡσπερ ὁ αὐτὸς  
δάκτυλος ἄρτι μὲν ἐν τι, πάλιν δέ τε μυρία ποιεῖ,  
ὧδε καὶ οἱ βασιλεῦσι τετιημένοι ὑψιθώκοις  
νῦν μὲν αὐτὸ τὸ πᾶν δεδυνήμεθα, νῦν δ’ ἐλάχιστον.” 480

Αὐτοὶ τε κοίρανοι ὅσσοι ἐπεσκήρτησαν ἐπ’ αἶαν,  
ἠέλιοι λάμπαντες, ἐφήμεροι δ’ ὑποδύντες,  
κῆπων τ’ ὠκύτεροι τοῦ Ἀδωνίδος ἐξήνθησαν,  
χρυσόθρονοι Κροῖσοι Πουλυκράτεες τε τυχήρεις,  
Ἀστυάγαι κρυεροὶ καὶ ἄβροϊ Σαρδανάπαλοι, 485  
ἄλλα τε μυρία τοιάδε γῆς ὑπερήφανα τέκνα,  
ὧν καὶ αἱ κλήσεις εἰ ὀλώλατο, κέρδιον αὐτοῖς  
ἦεν ἂν· ἀλλὰ μένει τίσις ἄφθιτος, ὄφρα καὶ ἡμεῖς  
τὴν κακίην ὀρόωντες ὑπερφερόμεσθα γεφύρας·  
ἢ δ’ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ αἶνος ἀφανροτέροις μερόπεσιν. 490

458 cf. *Il.* 1.81–82 || 463 cf. Xenoph., *Apol.* 28; Diog. Laert. II 35 || 468 Plut.,  
*Reg. et imp. apophth.*, Dionys. min. 3, 176D || 474–480 Plut., *ibid.*, Orontes, 174B ||  
483 Diogenian. 1.14 (CPG I 183) ||

456 mg. διχῶς δυνατόν ἀναγινώσκεισθαι· καὶ κατ’ ἀπόφ(ασ)ιν· ἄρα τί μοι P || after 458  
αὐτὸ τόδ’ οὐκρὸν, εἶτα πεσὼν ἄχθη· τίνος ἢ μέγα (= 459 + 465) expunged P || 459 *ὅτι περ*  
P || 461 *ὅδ’* P || 464 *χείρων* P || 470 *ὅδ’* P || 474 *ὡς* P | read *κάρταξέρξης?* (but cf. 538)  
|| 476 *ὑπενείκων* P || 477 *ἴσχευ* perh. *ἴσπευ* = *ἔισπευ*, cf. 539 || 481 delete *τε* || 483 perh.  
*ἐφήμέριοι* || 484 *πολυκράτες* P (cf. 593) ||

ὁ κληθεὶς Ἰσραὴλ οὐ μηλονόμος γεγέννητο;  
 τὸ πλεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ ἀλλότριον ἔτρεφε πῶν·  
 οἱ δὲ λόγου κήρυκες ἔσαν τίνες; οὐχ ἀλιήες;  
 τίπτε δ' ἀτιμότερον βωτῆρος ἢ ἀσπαλιῆος;  
 ἀλλ' ὀράας, πάντες καὶ ἡγεμονῆες καὶ ἄνακτες 495  
 γουνάζοντ' αὐτοὺς καὶ ἑωυτοὺς δορυφόρους,  
 καὶ σφι μένει καὶ δόξα καὶ αἱ κλήσεις ἄσβεστοι,  
 ὡς πρότερον μῆνη ἐξόλλυται ἢ γὰρ ἐκείναι.

Χθές μετὰ τῶν ἀβρῶν καὶ ἀνάνων συλλεγόμεσθα  
 τῶν τε κακῶν μετέχοντες ἑτερπόμεθ' ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀλγεῖν 500  
 σήμερον ἀρθμηθέντες ἐν ἀχράντοισι χορείαις  
 εἶπομεν Ὅττοτοί, ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰπεῖν Εὐοὶ εὐάν;  
 μῆ, μῆ δῆτ'· ἐσθλὸς γὰρ ἀποστρέφει ἄχθεα κόσμου.

Εἰ δέ τοι ἐν θαλάμοις τοιχωρύχος ἐγκαταδύσας  
 ἔξαγεν ὄλβον ὅσον κεκλειμένον, ἢ καὶ ὁ δῆμος 505  
 θωῆν τοι ἐπέθηκεν, ἢ ἄλλο τι τοῖον ὑπέστης,  
 εἰ μὲν ἀφ' αἵματος εἰ τοῦ τῶν ἀβίως βιούντων,  
 τέτλαθι· οὐ τι πέπονθας ὑπερφυῆς οὔτε τι κακόν.

καὶ γὰρ ἔχων οὐκ εἶχες, ἐπεὶ ἐχρῶ· ἀλλὰ ποῦ ἐχρῶ;  
 νῦν δ' ἀπορεῖς κατ' αὐτό· τί τοι τόδε καινὸν ἐτύχθη; 510  
 πλὴν ὅτι δειμαίνων οὐδὲ κλείειν βλέφαρ' εἶχες,  
 ἀλλὰ τις ἱκτεριῶν καὶ ὑπεσκληκῶς περινόστεις,  
 νῦν δ' ἀμέριμνος ἐὼν γλυκερώτερον ὕπνον ἰάυεις.

“φεῦ· ἀμέριμνος ἔγωγε καὶ ὑπνῶν, οἱ πλέονες γάρ·  
 ἢ δ' ἀμεριμνίῃ ἦν σὺ λέγεις ἔστω τοι μούνω, 515  
 ἡμᾶς δ' ἡ φροντίς εὖ ἐκοίταξε καὶ ἡῦξει.

οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ τρυγαῖος, ὃς οἶναις πολλὰ πονήσας,  
 εὔτ' ἂν ἡ ὥρη ἔπεισι Διώνυσόν τε φυλάσσοι,  
 ἄχθεται ἀγρυπνῶν, οὐδ' ἡ περὶ τὰ πρόβατα φρὴν  
 βώτορ' ἀνιάζει, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον εἰ ἀμεριμνεῖ, 520  
 τῶν δ' οὐ τι οὐ νεκύων διενήνοχε καίπερ ἐὼν ζῶς.”

ἀλλ' οὐ μαψιδίως ποιμὴν μένει οὐδὲ τρυγαῖος·  
 ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἐστ' εὐχρουν καὶ πιότερος μάλ' ἐαυτοῦ,  
 οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ σταφυλαὶ φυσῶσ' ὀλίγ'· οὐδ' ἄρα ποιμὴν  
 νῆστις αἰεὶ προθέει καὶ ἀνείμων ἐν νιφάδεσσιν, 525

ἀλλ' ἔδεται τυρὸν πίνει τε γάλακτος ἀμέλγων  
 ἐκ τ' ἐρίων σκέπεται σφάζει τέ τι. εἰ τὰ σὰ δ' εἶχον,  
 μηδὲν ἐρωτήσης· σὺ δ' ἐνδοθι πάντα καθειργνύς,  
 τῶν οὐδ' ἀκριβῶς ἐπισταμένων τὸ τί ἐστι

495 perh. ἡγεμόνες || 496 γουνάζοντες P | read αὐτοὺς δο(υ)ρυφοροῦσιν || 498 ἢ γὰρ  
 perh. ἡπερ || 499 συλλεγόμεθα P || 502 εὖ οἶ. εὖ ἂν P || 503 δῆτα P || 518 διώνυσόν P ||  
 521 write τι οὐν? || 526 τυρῶν P ante corr. ||

- φύσις καὶ ἀλκὴ ὀβολοῦ πολὺ χεῖρον ὀδεύεις, 530  
 αὐχμῶν καὶ ῥυπόων καὶ ἡμίγυμνος καὶ ἀλῆτης.  
 τῷ μὴ δὴ φθονέοις ἑτέροις, φίλε, οἱ κατὰ μοῖραν  
 χρήσονται τούτοις, σὺ δ' ἀμήχανός ἐσσι κεχρησθαι.  
 Κωμαστής δέ τις εἶ καὶ συμποτικώτατος ἄλλων,  
 καὶ τάδε τοι ξυνέβη; ἐσθλὸν τί σοι ὅψ' ἀντείλει· 535  
 φάρμακον ἢ πενίη τοῖς ἐν τρυφῇ εὐστοχόν ἐστιν,  
 αἷ τε μεταλλαγαὶ ὥς ἐπίπαν ἡδεΐαί εἰσι.  
 καὶ γὰρ ἀποσκευὴν ποτ' Ἄρταξέρεξ ἀπέβαλλεν,  
 αὐτὰ δὲ σῦκα φαγὼν καὶ κρίθινον ἄρτον ἐνισπεν  
 "Οἷς ἡδυμῆς γὰρ ἀπείρητος τόσον ἦα." 540  
 Οὐδέ κεν οἱ κόλακες ἄλλως σέθεν ἐκκεκádοντο,  
 οἷ σέυ ἐτι ζῶντος ἀπέτραγον ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος,  
 ὀφθαλμοὺς κραδίης μικρόν τί σε τυφλὸν ἔθηκαν.  
 νῦν δ' ὅταν ὀξὺ δέδορκας, ὅταν βίον ἐσθλὸν ἐφεύρες,  
 ἡνίκα τῇλε κακῶν θορύβοιο τε ἐξήλυξας, 545  
 τόφρ' ἐπὶ σοὶ θάνατον προκαλίζεαι· ἀλλ' ἔπρεπε πρίν,  
 πλὴν Ἀΐδην καλέων μῆδέν τι κάμης· ὁ γὰρ ἐστιν  
 ὀξὺς καὶ κλυτόπωλος, ἀοκνότατος περὶ πάντων,  
 καὶ πρίν μιν καλέσειας, ὁ δ' αὐτόματος κατοπάξει.  
 Εἰ δέ τις ἐσσι θεοῦ μοίρης καὶ ἐπέχραε ταῦτα, 550  
 αὐτὸς ἐὰ φρονέων τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον ἀκοῖναι.  
 εἶχε μὲν ὑψιμέδων σε φιλόξενον εὖσπλαγχνόν τε,  
 ἀχλαίνους ἐνδύντα, δεδεγμένον οἴκαδ' ἀοίκους·  
 νῦν δ' ἐθέλει σ' ὀράαν μεγαλήτορα καρτερόθυμον,  
 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μεθῆκ', ἐπεὶ ἄλκιμος εἶ, τάδε σῶζειν. 555  
 ἄσσα δ' ἐκείνῳ ἔαδ', ἔαδ' ὅτῳ αὐτὸς ἐράται·  
 πᾶς γὰρ ὃν ἂν στέργῃ, τὰ δοκοῦντά οἱ ἐσθλὰ νομίζει.  
 καὶ δ' ἀνθωμολόγει· οὐκ ἔστι τι φέρτερον ἀνδρὸς  
 στερροῦ, ὃς οὐκ ὤκλασε περιστάσεως συνιούσης.  
 ἐσθλὸς γ' οἰκτίρμων· ὃς καρτερὸς μέγ' ἀμείνων. 560  
 Παῦλον ὄρα καὶ ἴσθ' ἐν θλίψεσιν εὐχετόωντα  
 ἢ τινα κυδιόωντα μετὰ κλέος εὐρὺ καὶ ὄλβον.  
 Πλὴν εἰ μὲν τις ἅπαντ' ὀλέσας ἀκάχοιτο καὶ ἀλγοῖ,  
 οὔτις ὀνόσσεται οἱ ἀχρημοσύνης εὖ εἰδώς.  
 ζωὴ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα σαφῶς λέγεται τε καὶ ἔστι, 565  
 καὶ δάπτει μὲν, δάπτει ἔχει δ' ὄρον· εἰ δ' ἐπιτείνει,

538–540 Plut., *Reg. et imp. apophth.*, Artax. Mnem. 3, 174A || 547–548 cf. Eustath., *In Il.* 591.37 || 549 cf. Horace, *Carm.* II 18.40 || 561 Rom. 5.3 ||

531 ἀλείτης P || 539 σῦκα P || 540 τόσον P ante corr. || 548 κλυτοπῶλος P (cf. Eust. l.c.) || 549 ὅδ' P || 555 μεθήκεν P | after ἄλκιμος] γ' above line P\* || 556 ὅτῳ] ἄττα P ante corr. || 561 ἴσθι P || 562 ἦ = μάλλον ἦ || 563 ἀλγαί, οἱ above line, P ||



πρὸς τοῖς ὀλλυμένοις καὶ αὐτόν τις κ' ὀλέσειεν,  
 εἰ δ' ὅσα τις κάποβάλλει, ἔχει τι λελειμμένον ἐς δῶ,  
 ὅττι γε μὴ καὶ τὸ ξυναπώλεσεν ἀθυμείν χρῆ;  
 Ἄστατόν ἐστι φύσις πλούτου καὶ ἀδάμαστος. 570  
 πολλάκι γὰρ μοχλοὺς καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ κλείθρ' ὑπολλὺς  
 αὐτοῖσιν φυλάκεσσιν ἀπέδραμε καὶ συναπέπη.  
 καὶ τό γε θηητόν, ὅτι τυφλὸς ἑὼν, ὅτε φεύγει,  
 οὔτε τι προσκόπτει, πτηνὸς δέ τις ὥσπερ ἀπέδρα.  
 τὰς δὲ φύσεις οὐκ ἔστι τυραννῆσαι διὰ παντός· 575  
 εἰ ὅταν ἦν ὁ πλοῦτος ἐπὶ χθονός, ὁππότε σήτης  
 καὶ φῶρες λοχόωσιν, ἐφηδόμεθ', ὁππότε νῦν δὴ  
 σκηναῖς οὐρανίησι καὶ ἀσυλήτοισι μετέστη,  
 ἡμεῖς ἀντ' αὐτοῦ καταδύσομεν; ἔστ' ἄρα διπλοῦν  
 πῆμα, χθές δ' ἐνὸς ὄντος ὑπερφιάλως ἐπονούμεν. 580  
 εἰ περὶ τὰ ξυγχωρηθέντα ἄνωθεν ὀλέσθαι,  
 πτωχῶν λείψανα ὄντα, ἀθυμέομεν, δέον οἶμαι  
 καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖσι δοθείσιν, ἐπεὶ θεὸς ἔλλαβε καὶ τά.  
 Ἄλλ' ὀλοφυρόμενοι τὰ ὀλωλότα εὐρήσαιμεν;  
 φεῦ, εἰ φηλήτησιν ἐνὶ φρεσὶν ἔβρυν οἶκτος· 585  
 νῦν δὲ σὺ μὲν κλαίεις, οἱ δ' ἐγγελόωντες ἔδουσιν.  
 Ἀπάντων ἀχέων παραίτιός ἐστιν ὁ πλοῦτος,  
 τὸν δ' ἡμεῖς ἀμπρωτον οἰόμεθ' ἔμμεναι ἐσθλῶν,  
 καὶ τὸ κακὸν νοέοντες ἐπιτρέχομεν προλαβέσθαι.  
 ὥς δ' ἐπὶ πότμον ἐὼν σπεύδει φιλοπῶτα πυραύστης, 590  
 ὥς τῇ ἀπωλείῃ κατεπειγόμεθ' ἅμμιν ἐαντῶν.  
 τὴν δ' ἄλλως φρονέονθ' οἱ τῆς ἀρετῆς θεράποντες.  
 Πουλυκράτης ὁ Τύχης—ἦν γὰρ Σάμου ἐμβασιλεύων—  
 τῷ Τηίῳ ποτ' ἔδωκεν Ἀνακρέοντι τάλαντα  
 πένθ', ὁ δ' ἔδεκτο καὶ εἶχ'· ἐπὶ δ' αὔριον ἔστρεφεν εἵπας,  
 "Λάμβανε τὰῦτα, μέδον' μισεῖ καὶ ἀποστρέφεται γὰρ 596  
 δῶρον Ἀνακρείων, οὐκ εἰχ' ἄνδρα καθεύδειν."  
 ὦδε καὶ Ἀντισθένης ναυηγίου ἐκπερισωθεῖς,  
 "Εὐ γέ σοι, ὦ Τύχη," εἶπεν, "ἡ ἐνδυκῶς προνοῇ μου,  
 ἐς τό με συστείλασα τριβώνιον, ὥς ἀμερίμνως 600  
 αὐλακα τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς σοφίης ἀνατέμνω."  
 ὦδε Κράτης καὶ ἄλλοι ἀπείρονες, οἱ καὶ ἀφ' αὐτῶν

576-577 Matth. 6.19 || 590 Zenob. 5.79 (CPG I 151); Aelian, *Nat. an.* XII 8 ||  
 593-597 Stob. IV 31.78; 91 || 598-601 source? || 602-603 Diog. Laert. VII 87 ||

569 ὅτι P || 571 πολλάκις P || 572 αὐτοῖσι P || 573 θηητόν P | ὅττι P post corr. || 574  
 προσκάμπει P ante corr. || 577 ἐφηδόμεθα P ante corr. || 583 ἔλαβε P ante corr. || 588  
 οἰόμεθα P || 591 κατεπειγόμεθα P || 592 τήνδ' P || 597 εἶχ' from εἶχ' P || 598 write ἐκ  
 περισωθείς? || 599 after εἶπεν] γ' P\* ||

ὄλβον ἀπέρριψαν μάλα μυρίον, οὐκ ἑὰ γὰρ  
οὗτος ἐπὶ ψυχὴν σοφίης καταδύμεναι ὄλβον.

Καὶ τοῦτο ξυνίει λύπης ἄκος· οὐχ ὁρᾶν γὰρ χρὴ 605  
ἔργα πολυκτεάνων, οἷς γῆδια καὶ στίχες ἀνδρῶν  
καὶ δόξαι καὶ πῶλοι ἐύτριχες· εἰ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς  
θυμὸν ἐὼν δοίης, ἐκ θλίψιος οὐδέποτ' ἐκστής.

Δεῖ πᾶσιν ἀχέεσσιν ἐπισκοπέειν καὶ ἐρευνᾶν  
εἴ τις ὅλως τοιόνδ' ἢ νῦν ἢ πρῶτον ὑπέστη· 610  
κἄν τιν' ἐφεύρομεν—πολέας δ' ἐπὶ μείζουσιν ἴσως—  
αὐτόθεν ἐσσόμεθ' αὐτοὶ ἀνεκτότεροι ὅσον οὖν τι  
εἰ δὲ μόνοι λύπης ἐπὶ πυθμένα μοχθίζωμεν,  
εὐχετόωμεν ὅτι πλείον γ' ὑπομίνομεν ἄλλων.

Τοῖσδ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν καὶ τὸ σύνες, φίλε· ὅσσα σελήνης 615  
ὑψόθεν ἔστ', ἄτρεπτά τε καὶ πάγια πρόπαν ἐστίν,  
ὅσσα δὲ νέρθε πέλει, τρέπεταί τε καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται,  
ψυχὴ δ' οὐρανίην τιν' ὑπόστασιν ἔνθεον ἴσχει.

ὃς μὲν τε ψυχῆς πλείω λόγον ἐργάζοιτο  
καὶ παρὰ φαῦλον ταῦτα γίνεται ᾧδ' ἐπιόντα, 620  
τῷ δ' ὑποτέμενεται ἄλγος, ἐπαντέλλει δὲ γαλήνη.

ὃς δὲ μακρὰν χαίρειν τῇ κρέσσονι μοίρῃ ἐνίσποι  
καὶ τὰ τρέπτ' ἄτρεπτα θέλει καὶ οἶεται εἶναι,  
τῷ δὲ μελισσάων κατὰ τὸν νόμον ἔθνεα λύπης  
βομβοῦντ' ἠγερέθοντο, ἅπαντά τε δημὸν ἀφειδῶς 625  
καὶ μυελὸν βδάλλουσι, τὰ δ' ὅστέα μῶνον ἄσαρκα  
πέμπουσ' εἰν Ἀίδῃ, βεβρωτώμενα καὶ τάδε, οἴμοι.

Φεύγομεν οὖν ἄκοντες ἐκόντες τᾶχθεα κόσμου.  
οἷ γε μὲν ἀμφὶ μέγαν Μουσῶνιον, ὦ Ζεῦ, ἐφώνουν,  
ὕε περιστάσιας γύμνασμα σέθεν θεραπόντων. 630

τῶν δ' ἐγὼ ἀντία φημι καὶ εὐχομαι, ὦ λόγε Χριστέ,  
μηδεμίην δοίης ὑπερήνορα μηδενὶ λύπην,  
ἢ κρατερόν δάκνουσ' αὐτῆς τελέσει νόον ἡμῶν,  
ἀλλὰ γαληνοτέρως ἄλλα ταύτην ἀμφιπερῆσαι  
κεῖσέ τε δὴ σκηνῶσαι ἀλυποτέρῃσι μονῇσιν. 635

εἰ δ' οὐδεὶς Ἀτλαντα διαδράμοι ἄβροχον ἀνὴρ,  
κτῆμασι καὶ ἀγροῖς παραχωροῖς τι γενέσθαι  
καὶ τισι τοίοις, οἷς ἀμενηνότερον κακόν ἐστιν.

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629-630 source?

605 write ὁρᾶν χρὴ? || 608 ἐὼν P || 615 πᾶσι P || 618 τίν' P || 624 τῷδε P || 626  
μόνον P || 630 ὕε P || 633 τελέσει P || 636 read ἄβροχος

## Ad Themistium Arabum

GERALD M. BROWNE

In 1973, Dr. M. C. Lyons of the University of Cambridge published an edition entitled *An Arabic Translation of Themistius, Commentary on Aristoteles, De Anima*, Oriental Studies 2 (Thetford, Norfolk). The Arabic version, which comes from a manuscript discovered in the Qarawiyyīn Mosque in Fez, is the work of the well-known translator Ishāq ibn Ḥunain (ob. 298 A.H. = 910 A.D.). Lyons describes the quality of the Arabic as follows:

The word-for-word translation is entirely adequate . . . and, allowing for the difficulties of the original, the Arabic is surprisingly clear. Further, Ishāq's knowledge is shown to have extended well beyond technicalities. He is not baffled by a reference to the shirt of Nessus<sup>1</sup> and he is acquainted with the peculiarities of the Hippocentaurs and of Scylla.<sup>2</sup> Nor is his competence confined to prose, as he shows himself capable of producing a version of the cryptic hexameters of Empedocles.<sup>3</sup> (p. xii)

Regarding the Greek text that Ishāq had at his disposal, Lyons observes that it

had a considerable chronological advantage over the oldest extant Greek manuscript. In the introduction to his text of Themistius in

<sup>1</sup> L(yons) 120. 13 = H(einze; see below, note 4) 73. 5.

<sup>2</sup> L 156. 2 = H 89. 12-13.

<sup>3</sup> L 29. 11-13 = H 33. 12-14, L 31. 10 = H 34. 8, L 33. 17-18 = H 35. 13-14, L 152. 14 = H 87. 22.

the series *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, Heinze<sup>4</sup> notes as his oldest manuscript one of the eleventh century, Parisiensis Coislinianus no. 386, which he uses extensively, together with a later representative of the same tradition. His other manuscripts he traces, in the main, to the recension of "a not unlearned Byzantine."<sup>5</sup> Ishāq's original must antedate this tradition by some two hundred years or more. Its age alone, of course, is no guarantee of its accuracy and consequently there is included in this edition a list of comparative readings found in the Arabic and in Heinze's manuscripts. It must be admitted that the readings derived from the Arabic are in every case tentative, but their accumulation should present a reasonably accurate conclusion. This is that the Arabic represents no known branch of the present Greek manuscript tradition. It has a number of errors peculiar to itself, but in many places where there is a division in the Greek Mss. it follows the better reading and in a certain number of cases it seems to have preserved a better text than any to be found in Greek. (p. xiii)

Unfortunately, as I learned from Lyons, 13 years elapsed between the time when he submitted his typescript to the printer and the actual date of publication. During that period, the publisher mislaid the list of comparative readings, and consequently it is not to be found in the edition.<sup>6</sup> In working through the Arabic and comparing it to Heinze's Greek text, I have accumulated a similar list of readings; from this—in the notes that follow—I choose those that show that the Arabic translator's Greek *Vorlage* is superior to the manuscripts that form the basis of Heinze's edition. The number of these passages is significantly large, and the changes introduced into the text are often of considerable impact, so that the future editor of the Greek Themistius can ill afford to overlook the Arabic version. In this article, I cite the Greek in accordance with Heinze's edition, from whose apparatus I select pertinent data. Note that I use Ar to stand for Lyons' Arabic text. Passages from Aristotle's *De anima* conform to the critical edition of P. Siwek, *Aristotelis Tractatus de anima graece et latine* (Rome 1965). I had the opportunity to discuss the Arabic text with Dr. Lyons when I was a Visiting Fellow of Clare Hall in the fall of 1984, and I am grateful to him for valuable criticism.

<sup>4</sup> R. Heinze, *Themistii librorum de anima paraphrasis*, *Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca*, edita consilio et auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Regiae Borussicae 5. 3 (Berlin 1899).

<sup>5</sup> "A Byzantino quodam non indocto"—Heinze p. v.

<sup>6</sup> In his paper "An Arabic Translation of the Commentary of Themistius," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 17 (1955), 426–35, Lyons printed a few emendations obtained by comparing the Greek and the Arabic for the beginning of Section 7 of Themistius (L 214 – 217. 7 = H 116. 24 – 118. 5).

27. 38–39 οὕτω καὶ οὐχ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐλεεῖ ἀλλ' ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τῇ μέντοι ψυχῇ. . . .

For this segment of text, Ar has an additional clause:

كذلك ليست النفس هي التي ترحم بل الإنسان إلا أن الإنسان إنما يرحم بالنفس  
وليس النفس هي التي تتعلم بل الإنسان بالنفس

thus it is not the soul which feels pity, but man, although it is by the soul that man feels pity, and it is not the soul which learns, but man by the soul. . . . (18.3–5)

This suggests that the translator's *Vorlage* should be reconstructed as οὕτω καὶ οὐχ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐλεεῖ ἀλλ' ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τῇ μέντοι ψυχῇ, οὐδὲ ἡ ψυχὴ μανθάνει ἀλλ' ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῇ ψυχῇ. . . . Homoioteleuton may have caused the omission in the rest of the tradition. As reconstructed, the text is quite close to the corresponding passage in Aristotle: βέλτιον γὰρ ἴσως μὴ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλεεῖν ἢ μανθάνειν ἢ διανοεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῇ ψυχῇ (408b13–15). Note that تعلم also renders μανθάνειν on 81. 4 (= 55. 31 of the Greek). For the use of the particle إن to bring out the emphasis implicit in the Greek, cf. H. J. Polotsky, *Études de syntaxe copte* (Cairo 1944), pp. 26 and 65–68 as well as my comments in "Ad Artemidorum Arabum," *Le Muséon* 97 (1984), 208 (9. 5–6) and 209 (52. 15).

29. 3–5 ὥστε δηλονότι μάχοιτο ἂν οὐ πρὸς τὸ κινεῖσθαι προηγουμένως τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ [μὴ] κινεῖσθαι τὰς τοῦ σώματος κινήσεις. (μὴ delevit Heinze)

Here Ar reads:

فيظهر من قبل ذلك أن معاندته ليست على القصد الأول لمن قال أن النفس  
تتحرك لكن لمن قال أنها تتحرك حركات البدن

and so from that it is clear that his opposition is not primarily against the one who says that the soul is moved but against the one who says that it is moved in the movements of the body. (20. 9–11)

The Arabic version supports Heinze's deletion of μὴ and also suggests that προηγουμένως should be transposed: I reconstruct the *Vorlage* as ὥστε δηλονότι μάχοιτο ἂν οὐ προηγουμένως πρὸς τὸ κινεῖσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ κινεῖσθαι τὰς τοῦ σώματος κινήσεις. Possibly προηγουμένως fell out because of homoiarchon with the following πρὸς; its subsequent insertion may have been responsible for the addition of μὴ.

30: 20–22 καὶ ὅλως εἰ χρῆται ὀργάνῳ ἀφανεστέρῳ, πῶς οὐκ εὐλογον καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν αἰσθητικὴν χωριστὴν ποιεῖν τῶν ὀργάνων;



For this Ar provides a fuller text, which, unfortunately, contains a lacuna:

وبالجملة إن كان العقل يستعمل آلة وكان بهذا السبب ليس هو نوعا غير  
مفارق [ ] يستعمل آلة مكنونة فكيف لا يجب على هذا القياس  
أن نجعل النفس الحاسة أيضا مفارقة للآلات

and in short, if the mind uses an organ and is for this reason itself not an inseparable category [and also if] it uses a hidden organ, then how is it not necessary, in accordance with this reasoning, that we make the sensible soul also separable from the organs? (23. 11-13)

Regarding the lacuna, Lyons notes: "haec verba desiderantur ap. H." I venture to restore *إن أيضا*, which is incorporated in the above translation; for the phraseology cf. e.g. 7. 3. Note that the use of the 3rd pers. masc. sg. *يستعمل* after the lacuna shows that the subject is *العقل*, not *النفس*. The Greek underlying the passage as a whole may have been *καὶ ὁλως εἰ χρήται ὀργάνῳ (μηδ' αὐτὸς ὢν ἀχώριστον εἶδος, καὶ ταῦτα ὀργάνῳ) ἀφανεστέρω, πῶς κτλ.* Assumption of homoioteleuton (*ὀργάνῳ* - - - *ὀργάνῳ*) can explain the absence of the intervening words in the rest of the tradition. Arabic نوع elsewhere translates *εἶδος* (see pp. 304 and 334 of Lyons' index), and *غير مفارق* renders *ἀχώριστος* on 192. 2 (= 105. 28 of the Greek) and on 197. 18 (= 108. 30).

32. 7-9 *ἴδιον δέ, ὅτι κινουσι τὸ ζῶον ὑπ' ἀριθμοῦ, καθάπερ καὶ Δημόκριτον ἔφαμεν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ τῶν σφαιρῶν.*

For the clause *ὅτι κινουσι τὸ ζῶον ὑπ' ἀριθμοῦ*, Ar reads

أنهم يقولون إن الحيوان إنما يتحرك عن عدد

the fact that they say that the living creature is moved by number (27. 5-6; literally "... that it is by number that the living creature is moved": see above, on 27. 38-39).

Examination of the Arabic readily suggests that *κινουσι* should be emended to *κιν(εῖσθαι λέγ)ουσι*; cf. especially the similar phrase *τοῖς . . . κινεῖσθαι λέγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν* below in line 35, rendered by Ar as

لمن قال بأن النفس تتحرك

to whoever holds that the soul is moved (28. 14-15). Cf. also below, on 87. 23-25.

33. 9 οὐ γὰρ δήπου τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν ἵππῳ τὸν ἔξω ἵππον (sc. ὁπώπαμεν: cf. 33. 7).

Here Ar shows that its *Vorlage* had a clause absent in the rest of the tradition. From the translation,

فإنه ليس يتيّا أن يقال أنا رأينا الإنسان الخارج بالإنسان الذي فينا ولا الفرس  
الخارج بالفرس الذي فينا

for it is not possible for it to be said that we have seen the external man by means of the man who is within us, nor the external horse by means of the horse that is within us, (29. 7–8)

we may restore the *Vorlage* as οὐ γὰρ δήπου <τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπῳ τὸν ἔξω ἄνθρωπον οὐδὲ> τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν ἵππῳ τὸν ἔξω ἵππον. The extra material could have dropped out of the manuscripts used by Heinze through homoiarchon. As now reconstructed on the basis of the Arabic, the passage reflects the man–horse typology that appears in Aristotle, *Cat.* 1b4–5 and 2a13–14: οἶον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ τὶς ἵππος.

33. 22–25 τὰ δὲ γένη καὶ τὰ καθόλου πῶς γνωριεῖ, ἃ διηρίθμῃται ἐν κατηγορίαις, οἶον οὐσίαν, ποσὸν καὶ πρὸς τι καὶ τὰ ἐφεξῆς; οὐ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὰ γένη στοιχεῖα, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πλείω τῶνδε καὶ πόρρω παντάπασι τοῦ καὶ νομισθῆναι στοιχεῖα. . . .

The vigilant reader will look in vain for a correlative to the phrase ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πλείω τῶνδε. The Arabic shows that the passage in question is corrupt; it reads

لكن الأشياء التي من الاسطقات أكثر من عشرة والأجناس بعيدة جدًا من  
أن يتوهم فيها أنها اسطقات

but the things that consist of elements are more than ten, and the genera are very far from being considered to be elements. (30. 8–10)

This interpretative translation permits us to emend the text in Heinze: ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πλείω τῶν <δέκα, τὰ> δὲ καὶ πόρρω παντάπασι τοῦ καὶ νομισθῆναι στοιχεῖα. Themistius is of course referring to the ten categories of predication specified by Aristotle in the fourth chapter of *Categories*. Note that there is a similar reference in Themistius on 42. 17–18: πολλαχῶς δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἔν εἶναι (δεκαχῶς γάρ). Visual similarity between δέκα and δὲ καὶ was probably responsible for the loss of δέκα, τὰ in the manuscripts utilized by Heinze.

34. 22–24 κρεῖττον δὲ αἰεὶ τὸ συνέχον τοῦ σκεδαννυμένου. οἱ δὲ οὐκ αἰσχύνονται καὶ τοῦ νοῦ τὰ στοιχεῖα ποιοῦντες στοιχεῖα [τὸ γὰρ βέλτιον αἰεὶ ποιεῖ]. . . .

In his apparatus Heinze writes “στοιχεῖα (alt.) suspectum | τὸ - - ποιεῖ seclusi, fort. collocanda post σκεδαννυμένου.” Beginning with οἱ δὲ οὐκ αἰσχύνονται, the Arabic version is as follows:

لكن هؤلاء لا يستحيون أيضا أن يجعلوا الاسطقات أفضل من العقل  
فإنّ الفاعل أبدا هو الأفضل

but these are not embarrassed either in that they make the elements better than the mind, for the maker always is better. (32. 9–10)

Ar's *Vorlage* was free of the defects that troubled Heinze; I reconstruct it as οἱ δὲ οὐκ αἰσχύνονται καὶ τοῦ νοῦ τὰ στοιχεῖα ποιούντες βελτίονα, τὸ γὰρ βέλτιον αἰεὶ <δ> ποιεῖ. . . . The appropriateness of reading ποιούντες βελτίονα is also apparent from the next clause, where similar phraseology is clearly to be understood: ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ καὶ τοῦ τεχνίτου τὴν ὕλην (sc. ποιοῖεν βελτίονα) (34. 24–35). Ar here makes the text explicit:

ومجراهم في ذلك مجرى من يفضل الهولي على الصانع

and in that they are like one who prefers the material to the craftsman. (32. 10–11)

**34. 25–26** καίτοι γε εὐλογον τὸ βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ προγενέστατον καὶ κυριώτατον, οὐ τὰ στοιχεῖα.

This clause continues from the passage discussed in the last note. Here Ar has

على أنّ الواجب أن يكون هو الأفضل وأقدم ما ينتمى إليه والأشرف لا  
الاسطقات

however, it is proper that *it* be the best and the oldest of what is related to it and the most distinguished, not the elements. (32. 11–12)

The use of the emphatic pronoun **هو** suggests that Ar's *Vorlage* should be reconstructed as καίτοι γε εὐλογον <αὐτόν> τὸ βέλτιον εἶναι κτλ.; αὐτόν, referring to νοῦς, seems required, in order to give οὐ τὰ στοιχεῖα something to balance, and the word could have dropped out through homoioteleuton with εὐλογον. Compare Aristotle 410b14–15 εὐλογον γὰρ τοῦτον εἶναι προγενέστατον καὶ κύριον κατὰ φύσιν (without οὐ τὰ στοιχεῖα). For the structure of the sentence cf. e.g. 40. 28–29 καὶ εἰς τὸ ποσὸν συντελέσει τῷ ζῳῷ ἢ ψυχῇ, οὐκ εἰς τὸ ποῖον.

**43. 18–19** πάλιν δὲ ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ὁ πρίων, ὅτε σίδηρος ἦν καὶ τὸ τοιονδὶ σχῆμα ὁμοῦ. . . .

Regarding ὅτε Heinze notes: “fort. delendum,” but clearly we are

to articulate as ὃ τε (comparable to the structure in the clauses following: ἡ τε κόρη καὶ ἡ ὄψις - - ἡ τε ψυχὴ ὁμοῦ καὶ τὸ σῶμα). The Arabic translator correctly understood the passage:

وأيضا كما أن هناك المنشار كان الحديد والشكل المشار إليه معا

and also, just as there the saw was the iron and such-and-such a shape at the same time. . . . (53. 6-7).<sup>7</sup>

43. 28-29 οὐπω γὰρ δῆλον, εἰ καὶ οὗτος σώματός τινος ἐντελέχεια ἄρα τοιαύτη ὥστε ἀχώριστος εἶναι. . . .

The particle ἄρα is surprisingly late in its clause. From the Arabic we see that the text printed in Heinze requires emendation:

لأنه لم يبين بعد أنه استكمال لجسم ما فإن كان استكمالا فهل هو استكمال  
يعجز مجرى ما لا يفارق

because it is not yet clear whether it is a completion of some body, and if it is a completion, whether it is a completion like what is inseparable. . . . (53. 16-17)

We should alter ἄρα to ἄρα and add a short protasis: οὐπω γὰρ δῆλον εἰ καὶ οὗτος σώματός τινος ἐντελέχεια <καὶ εἰ ἐντελέχεια,> ἄρα τοιαύτη ὥστε ἀχώριστος εἶναι. . . . For the general structure cf. 45. 25-27 . . . εἰ πρότερον διακρίναιμεν πότερον ἐκάστη τούτων τῶν προειρημένων δυνάμεων ἐστι ψυχὴ καθ' ἐαυτὴν ἢ μόριόν τι ψυχῆς, καὶ εἰ μόριον, πότερον οὕτως. . . . Note also that, although it lacks the equivalent of καὶ εἰ ἐντελέχεια, the Medieval Latin translation of William of Moerbeke here has *utrum*,<sup>8</sup> reflecting ἄρα, which is also found in the *editio princeps* of the Greek text (see below, note 14).

47. 2-4 καὶ ἔστιν ἀπλῶς οἰκεία ὅλη ἐκάστῳ εἶδει, οἰκεία μὲν ἡδί, κοινὴ δὲ ἡδί, καὶ ζῶν μὲν ἀπλῶς τὸ φυσικὸν σῶμα ὀργανικόν, τοιῶδε δὲ ζῶν τὸ τοιόνδε ὀργανον. (ante ὀργανικὸν add. καὶ αὖ)

Here the Greek text underlying the Arabic is somewhat different from what Heinze prints; Ar reads:

<sup>7</sup> Note incidentally that in the same section (43. 19) Heinze's ὀφθαλμός should be corrected to <ὁ> ὀφθαλμός: it is parallel to ὁ πρίων (in the passage quoted in the text); Ar reads العين (53. 7) and shows that ὁ ὀφθαλμός stood in its *Vorlage*.

<sup>8</sup> G. Verbeke, *Thémistius, Commentaire sur le traité de l'âme d'Aristote: Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke, Corpus latinum commentariorum in Aristotelem graecorum* 1 (Louvain/Paris 1957), 102. 41.

وبالجملة فلكلّ خلقه هيولى ملائمة لها أمّا للبيت فكذا وأمّا للسّرير فكذا  
 وأمّا للحى المطلق فالجسم الطبيعى الآلى وأمّا للحى المشار إليه فالآلة

المشار إليها

and in general to each form there is matter suitable to it: to the house, this (matter); and to the bed, this; and to the animal in general, the natural and organic body; and to such-and-such an animal, such-and-such an organ. (61. 14-16)

Ar's *Vorlage* I assume ran as follows: καὶ ἔστιν ἀπλῶς οἰκεία ὅλη ἐκάστω εἶδει, οἰκία μὲν ἡδί, κλίνη δὲ ἡδί, καὶ ζῶω μὲν ἀπλῶ τὸ φυσικὸν σῶμα ὀργανικόν, τοιῷδε δὲ ζῶω τὸ τοιόνδε ὀργανον. I suspect that οἰκία - - κλίνη is what Themistius wrote: first οἰκία became οἰκεία through assimilation to the preceding οἰκεία, and κλίνη was "emended" to κοινή to provide balance with the corrupt οἰκεία; note that in 41. 28 κλίνη is rendered by سرير (49. 1), the same word employed in the present passage. The assumption that Ar's *Vorlage* had ζῶω μὲν ἀπλῶ instead of ζῶω μὲν ἀπλῶς proceeds from the use of the adjective مطلق. If the Greek had been ἀπλῶς, we might expect a prepositional phrase like على الإطلاق, which renders ἀπλῶς in 39. 33 (Ar: 45. 1). There is no way of ascertaining whether the Arabic translated a manuscript which had καὶ before ὀργανικόν (see the apparatus in the passage quoted above), but the conjunction is not needed: cf. 42. 15 σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ (rendered in Ar as 50. 13-14).

48. 30-31 καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴδὲ οὗτός γε τέλειος ἀπάσης ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ κοινότατός γε ἀπάντων τῶν νῦν λεγομένων.

Heinze emended τελείως, the reading of his manuscripts, to τέλειος. Ar shows that its *Vorlage* is to be reconstructed as οὗτος <κοινός> γε τελείως:

وذلك أنه وإن لم يكن هذا الحدّ عامّاً على مثال واحد لكلّ نفس فإنه أعمّ  
 الحدود لهذه التى تذكر فى [هذا] الوقت كلّها

for even if this definition is not common in the manner of one for each soul, it is the most common definition for all these things that are now mentioned. (65. 7-9)

Note the symmetry of the passage as now emended: <κοινός> γε - - - κοινότατός γε.

48. 36 - 49. 2 τὸν δὲ μέλλοντα ἀκριβέστερον ὀριεῖσθαι ἀποδοτέον ἰδίᾳ, τίς ἐστι λόγος ἐκάστης ψυχῆς, οἷον τῆς φυτοῦ, ὅτι ἐντελέχεια τοῦ πρὸς



τροφήν ὀργανικοῦ, καὶ αὖ πάλιν τῆς θηρίου, ὅτι ἐντελέχεια τοῦ πρὸς τροφήν τε καὶ ὄρεξιν ὀργανικοῦ.

The Arabic that translates this passage is badly lacunose in Lyons' manuscript, but its phrase

استكمال للجسم الآلى المدّ للغذاء والنمو

a completion of the organic body intended for nurture and growth  
(65. 16)

corresponds to ἐντελέχεια τοῦ πρὸς τροφήν ὀργανικοῦ and shows that in the *Vorlage* this segment should be reconstructed as ἐντελέχεια τοῦ πρὸς τροφήν <τε καὶ αὔξησιν> ὀργανικοῦ, exactly balanced by the following ἐντελέχεια τοῦ πρὸς τροφήν τε καὶ ὄρεξιν ὀργανικοῦ; cf. 39. 31 τὴν - - - τροφήν τε καὶ αὔξησιν, which Ar renders as التغذى والنمو "nurture and growth" (44. 13-14).

55. 34-35 ὥστε ἐκεῖ μὲν φθορὰ τῆς προϋπόσεως ποιότητος, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τελείωσις μᾶλλον.

Ar's wording reflects a slightly different text; it reads:

فتكون حال ذاك حال مبيد للكيفية المتقدمة فيه وحال هذا حال مكمل للطبيعة التي هي فيه

and so the condition of that is a condition of destruction for the quality that precedes in its case, and the condition of this is a condition of completion for the nature that is in it. (81. 7-8)

I believe that the *Vorlage* ran as follows: ὥστε ἐκεῖ μὲν φθορὰ τῆς προϋπόσεως ποιότητος, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τελείωσις <τῆς ἐνούσης φύσεως>. In the course of transmission, we may assume that τῆς ἐνούσης φύσεως dropped out through homoioteleuton (τελείωσις - - - φύσεως) and that μᾶλλον was added to obtain at least a semblance of balance to the preceding φθορὰ τῆς προϋπόσεως ποιότητος. For the phrase τελείωσις τῆς - - - φύσεως cf. 56. 12 τὴν τῆς φύσεως τελειότητα, rendered in Ar as كمال الطبع "the completion of the nature" (82. 6).

58. 5-11 κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ λέγεται αἰσθητὰ ἃ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθητά, τῷ δὲ συμβεβηκέναι τοῖς ἀπλῶς αἰσθητοῖς· αἰσθητὸς γὰρ ὁ Διάρους υἱὸς ἢ ὁ Διάρης οὐχ ἢ Διάρης, ἀλλ' ὅτι συμβέβηκε τῷ Διάρει καὶ λευκῷ εἶναι. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθητὰ οὕτως ἐρμηνεύει· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ τούτου αἰσθάνεται, διότι τῷ λευκῷ τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν οὐδ' αἰσθάνεται, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ λέγοι ὅτι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τοῦ Διάρους αἰσθάνεται, ὅτι τῷ λευκῷ συμβέβηκε Διάρει εἶναι.

In his apparatus to τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν οὐ αἰσθάνεται, Heinze notes: "scripsi ex Arist.: οὐ αἰσθάνεται<sup>9</sup> τοῦτο συμβ." For the passage in question, the Arabic version is based on a text that deviates from Heinze's emendation and from the reading of his manuscripts; it reads:

من قبل أنه عرض للابيض الذي يحس أنه كان هذا<sup>10</sup>

because it has befallen the white which he senses that it be this. (87. 5-6)

Ar's *Vorlage* may be reconstructed as διότι τῷ λευκῷ οὐ αἰσθάνεται τούτῳ <εἶναι> συμβέβηκεν. The replacement of τούτῳ εἶναι by τοῦτο may have arisen through a desire to bring the text closer to that of Aristotle, which, as Heinze notes, here reads ὅτι τῷ λευκῷ συμβέβηκε τοῦτο οὐ αἰσθάνεται (418a22-23<sup>11</sup>); with Heinze's reading, the passage is brought still nearer to Aristotle's, but, as the Arabic suggests, it is probably not what Themistius wrote. In order to show the appropriateness of the proposed διότι τῷ λευκῷ οὐ αἰσθάνεται τούτῳ <εἶναι> συμβέβηκεν, I have quoted the entire context at the beginning of this section. Note in particular the balancing effect of καὶ λευκῷ εἶναι - - - τούτῳ <εἶναι> - - - Διάρει εἶναι.

63. 25 εὐθρυπτος γὰρ (sc. ὁ ἀήρ ἐστι) καὶ εὐόλισθος. . .

Here Ar reads

وذلك أنه سريع التشتت والترب والتفت

for it is quick in dispersion and dissolution and slipping away. (100. 6-7)

Since this translation does not characteristically use two Arabic words to render a single word in Greek, Themistius may have written εὐθρυπτος γὰρ <καὶ εὐδιάχυτος> καὶ εὐόλισθος, and the second term could have dropped out through a combination of homoiarchon and homoioteleuton. For the triadic structure cf. e.g. 64. 23-24 εὐθρυπτος καὶ εὐδιαίρετος καὶ εὐεικτος, which Ar translates as

<sup>9</sup> Note that αἰσθάνεται in Heinze's apparatus, both in the lemma and in the citation, is a misprint.

<sup>10</sup> هذا is added by the scribe in his capacity as reviser (see Lyons' introduction, pp. viii and xviii).

<sup>11</sup> In his critical edition, *Aristotelis Tractatus de anima graece et latine* (Rome 1965), P. Siwek lists some variant readings for the passage: τῷ λευκῷ] τὸ λευκόν, οὐ] ὅ, αἰσθάνεται] αἰσθάνεσθαι (see his apparatus for details).

سريع التشتت والتفرق سهل الانخزال

quick in dispersion and scattering and easy to curtail. (102. 13-14)

Themistius does not elsewhere employ the adjective εὐδιάχυτος (for which see LSJ),<sup>12</sup> but of similar formation to εὐθρυπτος - - - εὐδιάχυτος is the phrase θρύπτεσθαι καὶ διαχεῖσθαι in 64. 24, rendered in Ar as

التشتت والانتشار

dispersion and diffusion, (102. 14)

as well as 65. 12 θρύπτεσθαι - - - καὶ διαχεῖσθαι, which Ar turns as يتسرب ويتشر "being dissolved and diffused" (104. 4). It is on the basis of these doublets that I propose εὐθρυπτος γὰρ <καὶ εὐδιάχυτος>, but it is also possible that the text should be restored as εὐθρυπτος γὰρ <καὶ εὐδιαίρετος>, as in 64. 23-24 quoted above.

63. 26-27 . . . εἰ καὶ τύμπανον τυμπάνῳ ἡρέμα προσάγοις, οὐ ποιήσεις ψόφον.

For this Ar offers the following translation:

إن قربت ما يضرب به الطبل من الطبل يرفق لم يحدث من ذلك صوت

if you gently bring that with which you strike a drum close to a drum, as a result of that it will not produce a sound. (100. 8-9)

I suspect that Ar's *Vorlage* read εἰ δι' οὗ τύπτεις τύμπανον τυμπάνῳ ἡρέμα προσάγοις κτλ. After τύπτεις dropped out (through homoiarchon), δι' οὗ, no longer construable, was altered to καί. The reconstruction provides a more reasonable text than Heinze's (since one does not characteristically bang two drums together) and may approximate what Themistius wrote. For τύπτειν cf. 63. 30-31 τὸν (sc. λόγον) τε τοῦ τυπτομένου σώματος καὶ τὸν τοῦ ἐν ᾧ τύπτεται, rendered in Ar as

معنى الجسم المضروب ومعنى الجسم الذى فيه يقع الضرب

the sense of the body that is struck and the sense of the body on which falls the blow. (100. 12-13)

<sup>12</sup> Note especially the collocation ἀέρα εὐδιάχυτον ὄντα in *Placita philosophorum* (ed. H. Diels, *Doxographi graeci* [Berlin 1879], 404), 4. 13. 11.

For  $\beta$  rendering  $\delta\iota\alpha$  + gen. cf. e.g. 122. 5 (Gr. 74. 3).

63. 36 ἀνακλᾶται μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ ὁ πληγεὶς εἰς ἄῃρ. . . .

Here Ar has

وذلك أنّ الهواء المقروع ينعكس أبدا

for the air that is struck is always reflected (100. 18)

and shows that we should emend the Greek to ὁ πληγεὶς {εἰς} ἄῃρ (dittography); cf. also 64. 7 ὁ πληγεὶς ἄῃρ, which Ar likewise translates as الهواء المقروع "the air that is struck" (101. 11).

65. 1-2 καὶ τοῦτο ἡ φύσις εὐλαβουμένη ἐν τῷ διὰ τῶν ὠτων πόρῳ τὰς ἑλικὰς ἐμηχανήσατο. . . .

This Ar renders as follows:

وهذا هو الذى حذرته الطبيعة فلطفت لأن جعلت ثقبى الأذنين لولبين

and this is that of which nature was wary, and so it became delicate because it made the holes of the ears spiral. . . . (103. 12-13)

The Arabic is rather free here, but it suggests that its *Vorlage* had a clause absent in Heinze's text: καὶ τοῦτο ἡ φύσις εὐλαβουμένη <καὶ λεπτὴ γινομένη> ἐν τῷ διὰ τῶν ὠτων πόρῳ τὰς ἑλικὰς ἐμηχανήσατο. Cf. 60. 24 λεπτότερον, which Ar renders with الطّف "more delicate" (92. 15). Assumption of homoioteleuton can explain the disappearance of καὶ λεπτὴ γινομένη in the manuscripts available to Heinze.

75. 10-14 μέσον μὲν οὖν τι εἶναι θετέον καὶ ταύτης τῆς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ μὴ κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν διαφορὰν τῆς ἀφῆς καὶ τῆς γεύσεως πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἐκείνο μᾶλλον ὅτι ἐπ' ἐκείνων μὲν οὐ τὸ μέσον αὐτὸ ἀλλοιοῦνται ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦ μέσου τὸ αἰσθητήριον (τὸ δὲ ὅπως ἀκουστέον τοῦ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι προερίηται).

The entire context has been quoted, so that the pertinence of the final parenthetical remark may be clear. In his apparatus, Heinze notes: "τοῦ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι suspectum." The Arabic translation shows that we must correct to τὸ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι:

وقد تقدّم قولنا كيف ينبغي أن تفهم معنى<sup>13</sup> الاستحالة

<sup>13</sup> To be read instead of the manuscript's  $\bar{\epsilon}\alpha$ ; see 83. 9 cited below.

and we have already said how one must understand the meaning of "changing." (125. 13-14)

For similar patterns of expressions, cf. 56. 30-31 τὸ δὲ δυνάμει ὅπως ἀκουστέον προείρηται, which Ar turns as

وقد تقدم قولنا كيف ينبغي أن تفهم معنى بالقوة

and we have previously said how one must understand the meaning of "in potential," (83. 8-9)

and also 56. 34 πῶς δὲ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τὸ πάσχειν ἀκουστέον . . . προείρηται, rendered as

وقد تقدم قولنا كيف [ينبغي] أن تفهم فيه قولنا [انفعل]

and we have previously said how one must understand concerning it our statement "he was affected." (83. 13)

Note further that the Latin version of William of Moerbeke also supports the reading τὸ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι: *hoc autem alterari qualiter sit intelligendum, praedictum est* (ed. Verbeke [see above, note 8] 172.99-00).

76. 5-10 ὥσπερ πλείους αἰσθήσεις ὄψις καὶ ἀκοή, δι' ἐνὸς δὲ τοῦ μεταξὺ ἐνεργούσιν, οὕτως οὐδὲν κωλύει πλείους μὲν εἶναι αἰσθήσεις καθ' ἐκάστην τῶν λεγομένων ἀπτῶν ἐναντιώσεων, ἐνὶ δὲ χρῆσθαι τῷ μεταξὺ, λέγω δὲ τῇ σαρκί. περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ μόριον οἶον τὴν γλῶτταν καὶ γεῦσις ἐστὶ καὶ ἀφή, καὶ ὅμως πλείους εἰσὶν αἱ αἰσθήσεις· οὐδὲν οὖν κωλύει καὶ περὶ πᾶσαν τὴν σάρκα ταῦτόν συμβαίνειν. . . . (ὅμως Q<sup>1</sup>: ὁμοίως PQ(?)C)

Ar translates the sentence beginning περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ μόριον as follows:

وكما أن في عضو واحد بعينه ومثال ذلك اللسان الذوق واللمس وعلى

هذا المثال الحواس فيه أكثر من واحدة فليس يمنع مانع من أن يكون

قد عرض ذلك بعينه في اللحم كله أيضا

and just as in the case of one and the same part, like the tongue, there are taste and touch, and in a similar way the senses involving it are more than one, nothing prevents that very thing from happening in the case of all flesh too. . . . (127. 9-11)

The Arabic suggests that its *Vorlage* read καὶ ὥσπερ before περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ μόριον and—along with some of Heinze's manuscripts (see the apparatus quoted above)—ὁμοίως instead of ὅμως. I believe that Themistius probably wrote καὶ ὥσπερ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ μόριον κτλ.: proximity of -περ and περ- could have caused the omission in the manuscripts



available to Heinze; after καὶ ὥσπερ dropped out, an οὖν was inserted between οὐδέν and κωλύει in order to establish some logical relation between the two clauses.

77. 17–20 ἄλλως οὖν μεσότης ἡ ἀφή καὶ ἄλλως αἱ ἄλλαι, ἐκείναι μὲν τῷ μηδὲν ἔχειν ὦν δέχονται, αὕτη δὲ τῷ ἔχειν ἤδη τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ τοῦ σκληροῦ καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ.

Beginning with αὕτη δὲ, Ar offers the following translation:

وهذا توسط من جهة أن فيه الأمر المتوسط بين الحار والبارد وبين الرطب

والابس وبين الصلب واللين حاصل

and this is an intermediary because in it exists the intermediary between hot and cold, and between wet and dry, and between hard and soft. (130. 12–13)

Its *Vorlage* can be reconstructed as αὕτη δὲ τῷ ἔχειν ἤδη τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ <τοῦ> ψυχροῦ <καὶ τοῦ ὑγροῦ καὶ τοῦ ξηροῦ> καὶ τοῦ σκληροῦ καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ. For the triplet of opposites, each opposite having the article, cf. 72. 30–31 οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ἔχει τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν, καὶ τὸ σκληρόν καὶ τὸ μαλακόν, καὶ τὸ βαρὺ καὶ τὸ κοῦφον, and for the sequence hot-cold and wet-dry cf. 76. 34–35 τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων θερμότης ψυχρότης, ὑγρότης ξηρότης, rendered in Ar as

حرارة الاسطقات الاول وبرودتها ورطوبتها ويوبتها

the heat of the first elements and their coldness, and their wetness and their dryness. (129. 2–3)

78. 12 ὁ λόγος μέντοι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα καὶ λόγον κρίνει. . . .

For this segment of text, Ar translates

فأما المعنى فإنه يميز سائر الأشياء غير المعنى ويميز المعنى

now as for the concept, it distinguishes the rest of the things without concept, and it distinguishes the concept. (132. 9–10)

This readily suggests that Ar's *Vorlage* read as follows: ὁ λόγος μέντοι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα <ἄλογα> καὶ λόγον κρίνει. . . . For a similar expression (though with ἄλογος in a different sense) cf. 67. 10 τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων, which Ar turns as

الحيوان غير الناطق

of the animals without the faculty of speech. (108. 12)

80. 25–27 . . . τῶν μὲν ἀπλῶν αἰσθητηρίων οὐδὲν ἂν ἡμῖν ἐλλείποι· ἔχομεν δὲ καὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἐκ πλειόνων.

Ar shows that its *Vorlage* should be reconstructed as τῶν μὲν ἀπλῶν αἰσθητηρίων <καὶ τῶν συνθέτων> οὐδὲν κτλ.:

ليس نقصنا شيء من الحواس البسيطة والمركبة

we do not lack any of the simple sense organs and the compound ones.  
(138. 1–2)

Examination of the context makes it plausible that καὶ τῶν συνθέτων goes back to the author's autograph: μὲν with τῶν . . . ἀπλῶν αἰσθητηρίων implies a contrast, and καὶ preceding τὸ σύνθετον ἐκ πλειόνων, which Ar renders as

أيضا ما هو مركب من أكثر من واحدة

also what is compounded of more than one, (138. 2–3)

suggests a previous mention of the compound sense organs. Cf. also 80. 17 ἐκ τῶν ἀπλῶν καὶ ἐκ τῶν συνθέτων (sc. σωματίων), translated by Ar as

من الأجسام البسيطة ومن المركبة

from the simple bodies and from the compound ones. (137. 8)

83. 7–8 ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν χρῶμα τὸ ἄχρουν (sc. ἐστίν), πρὸς δὲ ψόφους τὸ ἄψοφον.

The Greek has a needless lack of balance: χρῶμα . . . ψόφους. The Arabic translation shows that its *Vorlage* had the harmonious χρώματα . . . ψόφους, corrupted in the manuscripts available to Heinze:

لكن بالقياس إلى الألوان ما لا لون له وبالقياص إلى الأصوات ما لا صوت له

but in relation to colors there is that which has no color, and in relation to sounds there is that which has no sound. (143. 10–11)

83. 22 φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεται τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι.

This sentence is modelled on the following in Aristotle: φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐχ ἐν τῷ τῇ ὁψει αἰσθάνεσθαι (425b20). The Arabic translator's *Vorlage* also had τῇ ὁψει, which seems necessary for the sense of the passage:

فَنَقُولُ اِنْ مِنْ الْبَيِّنِ اَنْ اِلْحَاسَ بِالْبَصَرِ لَيْسَ يُقَالُ عَلَى طَرِيقِ الْاِطْلَاقِ

and so we say that it is clear that perception by sight is not spoken of in an unrestricted way. (144. 7–8)

83. 22–23 καὶ γὰρ ὅταν μὴ ὁρῶμεν, τῇ ὁψεί κρίνομεν. . . .

This duplicates a sentence in Aristotle (425b20–21), but the Arabic version has an extra clause:

وذلك أنا قد نحكم بالبصر ولا نبصر فضلا عنا ونحن نبصر

for we judge by sight when we do not see, to say nothing of when we do see. (144. 8–9)

I believe that Ar's *Vorlage* should be restored as καὶ γὰρ ὅταν μὴ ὁρῶμεν <καὶ ὅταν ὁρῶμεν>, τῇ ὁψεί κρίνομεν.

85. 8–10 προῖων γὰρ ὁ λόγος εὐρήσει μὴ περὶ τὴν σάρκα τοῦτο μόνον συμβεβηκέναι ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰ λοιπὰ αἰσθητήρια, οἷον λέγω τὴν κόρη καὶ τοὺς διὰ τῶν ὠτων πόρους.

For the clause beginning with οἷον, Ar provides the following translation:

أعنى في الناظر مثلا وفي ثقبى المنخرين وفي ثقبى الأذنين

I mean in the case of the eye, for example, and the passages of the nostrils and the passages of the ears. (147. 23 – 148. 1)

The underlying Greek is to be reconstructed as οἷον λέγω τὴν κόρη <καὶ τοὺς διὰ τῶν μυκτήρων πόρους> καὶ τοὺς διὰ τῶν ὠτων πόρους. Cf. 62. 23–24 οἷον τῷ πόρῳ τῶν ὠτων ἢ τῷ πόρῳ τῶν μυκτήρων, which Ar turns as

مجرى الأذنين أو مجرى المنخرين

the passage of the ears or the passage of the nostrils, (97. 14)

and 75. 23–24 τῷ πόρῳ τῷ διὰ τῶν μυκτήρων, translated as

مجرى المنخرين

the passage of the nostrils. (126. 5–6)

In both places Ar renders πόρος by مجرى, while in 147. 18 it translates the plural πόροι by the construct dual ثقبى.

87. 23-25 καὶ Ὅμηρος δὲ συντρέπεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ὑπολαμβάνων καὶ συναλλοιούσθαι τῷ περιέχοντι σωματικὴν οἶεται τὴν φύσιν τοῦ λόγου. . .

The words τῷ περιέχοντι seem strangely unspecific. Thanks to Ar we can see that the passage is corrupt in the manuscripts utilized by Heinze:

واویرش أيضا في ظنه أن العقل يتبدل ويستحيل مع البدن المحيط به  
وأن طبيعة النطق تتحرك

and Homer too is of the opinion that the mind is changed and altered with the body that encompasses it, and that the nature of the rational faculty is moved. (152. 16-17)

We should emend the Greek to the following: Ὅμηρος δὲ συντρέπεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ὑπολαμβάνων καὶ συναλλοιούσθαι τῷ περιέχοντι σώματι, κιν(είσθαι) οἶεται τὴν φύσιν τοῦ λόγου. . . Cf. above, on 32. 7-9.

90. 5-8 ἔπειτα αἰσθησις μὲν πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζώοις, φαντασία δὲ τοῖς μὲν τοῖς δὲ οὐ, μύρμηκι μὲν ἴσως καὶ μελίττῃ καὶ πολλῶ μᾶλλον κυνὶ καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ ὅσα μετέχει αἰσθήσεως, σκώληκι δὲ οὐ.

Regarding αἰσθήσεως Heinze sagely notes "falsum." Ar renders the clause in question as

كُلّ ما يقال انّ له شركة في التمييز

everything that is said to have a share in discernment. (158. 1-2)

Elsewhere Ar uses تمييز "discernment" to translate διάνοια (see Lyons 298), and presumably its *Vorlage* here read διανοίας instead of αἰσθήσεως.

90. 28-29 φανερόν οὖν ὅτι οὔτε δόξα μετ' αἰσθήσεως, οὔτε συμπλοκὴ δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως ἢ φαντασία. (οὖν] δὲ Qs)

For this segment of text, Ar provides the following translation:

ومن البين أنّ التخيل ليس هو أيضا ظنا مع حسّ كما يقول فلاطن ولا ظنّ  
بحسّ ولا تركيب ظنّ وحسّ

and it is clear that imagination is not itself also opinion together with sensation, as Plato says, nor opinion by means of sensation, nor a composition of opinion and sensation. (159. 1-2)

Ar's *Vorlage* should be reconstructed as φανερόν δὲ (cf. app.) ὅτι οὔτε δόξα μετ' αἰσθήσεως, <ὡς λέγει Πλάτων, οὔτε δόξα δι' αἰσθήσεως,> οὔτε συμπλοκὴ δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως ἢ φαντασία. As now restored, Themistius' text faithfully adheres to the Aristotelian original: φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι

οὐδὲ δόξα μετ' αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ δι' αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ συμπλοκὴ δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως φαντασία ἂν εἴη (428a24–26). The restored clause was lost through homoioteleuton in the manuscripts available to Heinze.

98. 4 . . . ὥστε εἰκότως νοεῖται μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, νοεῖ δὲ οὐ.

Here again the Arabic version reveals additional material:

فتكون بالواجب هذه الأشياء تعقل ولا تعقل وكل واحد منها معقول وليس  
كل واحد منها عقلا

and so obligatorily these things are thought, but they do not think;  
and each one of them is an object of thought, but each one of them  
is not mind. (167. 13–14)

After νοεῖ δὲ οὐ, I suggest that Ar's *Vorlage* had the following clause:  
καὶ νοητὸν μὲν ἕκαστον, νοῦς δὲ οὐ. The loss of this material in the  
manuscripts used by Heinze is due to homoioteleuton (δὲ οὐ . . . δὲ  
οὐ); the content is similar to what Themistius writes a few lines later:  
οὗτος αἰεὶ καὶ νοῦς ἅμα καὶ νοητός (98. 8–9), rendered in Ar as

ذلك هو دائما عقل ومعقول معا

that is continually mind and an object of thought at the same time.  
(168. 2)

99. 13–15 οὐ γὰρ ἔξωθεν τῆς ὕλης ἢ τέχνη, ὥσπερ χαλκευτικὴ τοῦ χαλκοῦ  
καὶ τεκτονικὴ τοῦ ξύλου, ἀλλ' ἐνδύεται ὄλω τῷ δυνάμει νῦν ὁ ποιητικός. . .

Ar shows that its *Vorlage* contained a clause lost in Heinze's manuscripts:

بأنّ العقل الفعّال ليس هو خارجا عن العقل بالقوة كما أنّ الصناعة

خارجة عن الهيولى مثال ذلك أنّ صناعة الصّقارين خارجة عن الصفر

والنجارة خارجة عن الخشب بل العقل الفعّال يداخل العقل بالقوة بأسره

because the active mind is not outside of the mind in potential, as art  
is outside of matter, as, for example, the smith's art is outside of brass  
and carpentry is outside of wood, but the active mind penetrates the  
mind in potential entirely. . . (179. 11–14)

This suggests the following reconstruction for the Greek: οὐ γὰρ  
ἔξωθεν <τοῦ δυνάμει νοῦ ὁ ποιητικός, ὥσπερ ἔξωθεν> τῆς ὕλης ἢ τέχνη κτλ.

99. 34–35 καὶ οὕτως ὁ νοῦς, ὅπερ ἤδη καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, χωριστὸς καὶ  
ἀπαθής καὶ ἀμιγής. . .



The clause ὅπερ ἤδη καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται refers to 98. 30–31: καὶ ἔστιν οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστός τε καὶ ἀπαθής καὶ ἀμιγής, and accordingly we should emend οὕτως ὁ νοῦς to οὗτος ὁ νοῦς. Themistius is contrasting two types of νοῦς: one in potential (δυνάμει), the other in actuality (ἐνεργείᾳ), and οὗτος ὁ νοῦς refers to the latter. Ar's *Vorlage* had the correct reading:

وهذا العقل كما قلنا آتفا مفارق غير منفعل وغير مختلط

and this mind, as we said before, is separate, unaffected and unmixed.  
(180. 17 – 181. 1)

**107. 12–15** διόπερ οὐ γίνεται ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις ἀλλ' ἡδονὴ μόνη καὶ λύπη ἐπὶ παροῦσι τοῖς ἡδέσιν ἢ λυπηροῖς, καὶ ταῦτα παντάπασιν ἀνεπαίσθητα λόγου καὶ νοῦ· ἐν ἀνθρώποις δὲ οὕτως ἄρα καὶ τὰ πάθη μέτοχα λόγου. . . .

For the last clause Ar has

وليس الأمر في الناس كذلك لكنّ عوارض النفس منهم أيضا مشاركة للنطق

and the matter is not thus in the case of men, but the affects of their soul too share in reason. . . . (194. 20 – 195. 1)

The Arabic version suggests that its *Vorlage* should be reconstructed as ἐν ἀνθρώποις δὲ <οὐχ> οὕτως ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ πάθη μέτοχα λόγου. This suits the context better than what Heinze prints and may be what Themistius wrote.

**107. 31–35** ὁ δὲ νοῦς πῶς ποτε ἐξωθεν ὦν καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπίθετος ὅμως συμφυής; καὶ τίς ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν εἶναι κατ' ἐνέργειαν, δυνάμει δὲ πάντα, καλῶς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ αἰσθησις. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ληπτέον ὥς οὐδὲ αὐτός (ἐριστικὸν γάρ) ἀλλ' ὥς ὑποκειμένην τινὰ δύναμιν καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν.

This is part of a quotation from Theophrastus which Themistius introduces into his discussion of the mind. Concerning the words ὥς οὐδὲ αὐτός Heinze writes: "scil. ὁ 'Αριστοτέλης ἔλαβεν." This is possible though somewhat strained: the context suggests that αὐτός refers to νοῦς, not to Aristotle. Here the Arabic can be of help; for the passage beginning with οὐ γὰρ οὕτως it provides the following translation:

فإنه ليس ينبغي أن نعتقد فيه أنه في نفسه ليس بشيء أصلا فإنّ هذا

مكابرة

for it is not necessary for us to believe about it that in itself it is nothing at all (for this is contentious). . . . (196. 1–2)

Instead of ὥς οὐδὲ αὐτός, Ar's *Vorlage* appears to have offered ὥς οὐδὲν αὐτός, a clause which clearly refers to the preceding τὸ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν εἶναι and is much more appropriate to the argument than is the reading of Heinze's manuscripts.

108. 25–27 εἰ μὲν οὖν σύμφυτος ὁ κινῶν, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐχρῆν καὶ αἰεὶ εἰ δὲ ὕστερον, μετὰ τίνος καὶ πῶς ἢ γένεσις; ἔοικε δ' οὖν ὥς ἀγέννητος, εἶπερ καὶ ἀφθαρτος. ἐνυπάρχων δ' οὖν διὰ τί οὐκ αἰεὶ;

According to Heinze's apparatus, the *editio princeps*, followed by Spengel,<sup>14</sup> emended δ' οὖν ὥς to οὖν καὶ, presumably to allow the argument to proceed more smoothly than it does with the sequence δ' οὖν . . . δ' οὖν. Another approach to removing the textual difficulties emerges from study of the Arabic, which translates the sentence beginning with ἔοικε as follows:

ويشبه أن يكون جوهرًا غير متكوّنٍ إن كان غير فاسد

and it seems to be substance without genesis, if it is imperishable. (197. 14–15)

The presence of جوهر "substance" suggests that Ar's *Vorlage* read ἔοικε δ' οὐσία ἀγέννητος, which was corrupted to ἔοικε δ' οὖν ὥς ἀγέννητος in the rest of the tradition. Our Arabic translator regularly employs جوهر to render οὐσία (see Lyons' index, pp. 242 and 363), and the correspondence is well established in other Arabic versions of philosophical Greek: see G. Endress, *Proclus Arabus: Zwanzig Abschnitte aus der Institutio Theologica in arabischer Übersetzung* (Beirut 1973), 78, 89 and 262 n. 1.

112. 30–32 οὕτως καὶ ἡ τοῦ νοῦ πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ ἐπιβολὴ [οὐδὲ] ἡ τοῦ τὴν ἔξιν ἔχοντος ἤδη, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐπιστήμονος ἡ περὶ τὰ ἐπιστητὰ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἐπιβολὴ οὐ κίνησις ἀλλ' ἐνέργεια. . . .

Heinze deletes οὐδέ, but Ar shows that more drastic surgery is in order:

كذلك وقوع العقل على المعقولات فإنه ليس فعل من [قد] حصلت له الملكة

كَأَنَّكَ قَلْتَ الْعَالَمَ فِي الْمَعْلُومَاتِ وَقُوعَهُ عَلَيْهَا لَيْسَ حَرَكَةً بَلْ فِعْلٌ

so the mind's encounter with thoughts is not the activity of one to

<sup>14</sup> V. Trincavellus, *Omnia Themistii opera, hoc est paraphrases et orationes; Alexandri Aphrodisiensis libri duo de anima et de fato unus* (Venice [Aldine] 1534), 64–95<sup>v</sup>; L. Spengel, *Themistii paraphrases Aristotelis librorum quae supersunt* (Leipzig [Teubner] 1866), 2. 1–231.

whom accrues the natural disposition, as you would say the scholar's encounter with data is not movement but activity. (205. 16–18)

The Arabic text is not free of corruption, for Lyons has had to add ليس before حركة, but it allows us to get closer to the original reading, which I reconstruct as follows: οὕτως καὶ ἡ τοῦ νοῦ πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ ἐπιβολὴ οὐχ ἡ τοῦ τὴν ἔξιν ἔχοντος ἥδη <ἐνέργεια>, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐπιστήμονος ἡ περὶ τὰ ἐπιστητὰ {ἐνέργεια καὶ} ἐπιβολὴ οὐ κίνησις ἀλλ' ἐνέργεια. If this reconstruction is correct, it would seem that for some reason or other ἐνέργεια had been inadvertently transposed at an early stage of transmission, and that this transposition led to the somewhat garbled rewriting of the passage that Heinze's manuscripts display.

**113. 14–16** τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ μὲν φαντάσματα πρόκειται ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ αἰσθήματα τῇ αἰσθήσει, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν ὥσπερ ἐκείνη τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν.

The clause running from τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν to the end of the quotation is defective: something must balance ἐκείνη. Themistius may have written τῇ δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν ὥσπερ ἐκείνη τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν, which can also be postulated as the reading of Ar's *Vorlage*: here Ar reads

والخير والشرّ تلك كما لهذا اللذيق والمؤذى

and the good and the evil are to that as the sweet and the painful are to this. (207. 2)

**115. 6–7** ὃς γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἔνυλα εἶδη χωρίζων τῆς ὕλης νοεῖ, δηλονότι πέφυκε μᾶλλον τὰ κεχωρισμένα νοεῖν. . . .

Here Ar reads:

فكما يعقل الصور المخالطة للهوى بأن [يفرقها] من الهوى فمن البين أنه

أخرى بأن يكون من شأنه أن يعقل الأشياء المفارقة

for, just as it thinks of the forms involved in matter by its separating them from matter, it is clearly more apt to be its inclination to think of the things that are separate. (210. 6–8)

Instead of ὃς, contextually hard to justify, Ar's *Vorlage* read ὥς, which suits the logic of the passage and is surely what Themistius intended.

**118. 8–11** ἐπεὶ γὰρ διττὸς ὁ νοῦς, ὁ μὲν θεωρητικὸς οὐδὲν θεωρεῖ τῶν πρακτῶν οὐδὲ περὶ φευκτοῦ καὶ ὀρεκτοῦ διανοεῖται, ἡ κίνησις δὲ ἡ κατὰ τόπον ἢ φεύγοντος ἢ διώκοντος· ὁ δὲ πρακτικὸς νοεῖ μὲν τι περὶ τούτων, κύριος δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τῆς κινήσεως.

For this section Ar reads

فإنّ العقل ضربان أحدهما نظريّ والآخر علىّ فأما النظرىّ فليس ينظر في  
المعولات ولا يميز شيئا من أمر المهروب منه والمطلوب

for the mind is of two sorts, of which one is contemplative and the other practical; now as for the contemplative, it does not contemplate practical things nor does it distinguish anything that is avoided and pursued. . . . (217. 10–12)

Ar's *Vorlage* had a segment of text missing in the rest of the tradition: *ἐπεὶ γὰρ διττὸς ὁ νοῦς, ὁ μὲν θεωρητικὸς <ὁ δὲ πρακτικὸς, ὁ μὲν θεωρητικὸς> οὐδὲν θεωρεῖ τῶν πρακτῶν κτλ.*

120. 17–21 . . . ὥστε καὶ ποιητὴν εἰπὼν τοῦ χρόνου τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὁ ἐξηγητὴς Ἀλέξανδρος οὐκ οἶται φαύλως εἰρηκέναι, ἄντικρυς ἐπίνοιαν ἡμετέραν ποιῶν τὸν χρόνον, ὑπόστασιν δὲ οἰκείαν αὐτῷ μὴ διδούς· οὐκ ὀρθῶς οὐδὲ ἐπομένως Ἀριστοτέλει, εἴπερ τι δεῖ προσέχειν τοῖς ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει.

Here is Ar's translation:

حتى أنّ المفسّر الاسكندر قال انّ الإنسان هو الفاعل للزمان أيضا فلم  
يظنّ أنّه بئس ما قال فإنّه بتصويره صراحا الزمان تخّرصا من عقولنا وتركه  
أن يجعل له قواما ما يخصّه لم يصب في ذلك ولم يلزم مذهب ارسطوطاليس  
[إن كان] قد ينبغي أن يصفى إلى ما قاله [فيه] في السماع الطبيعيّ

so that the commentator Alexander said that man is the maker of time as well, and what he said does not seem to be wrong, but in his making time to be purely a fabrication of our minds and in his neglecting to give it a state that characterizes it, in that he was not right, nor did he follow the school of Aristotle, if it is necessary to pay attention to what he said about it in the lecture on Physics. (221. 19 – 222. 4)

Ar's archetype did not have the asyndeton evidenced in Heinze's text (. . . διδούς· οὐκ ὀρθῶς . . .) but instead should be reconstructed as follows: . . . οὐκ οἶται φαύλως εἰρηκέναι, <ἀλλ'> ἄντικρυς ἐπίνοιαν ἡμετέραν ποιῶν τὸν χρόνον, ὑπόστασιν δὲ οἰκείαν αὐτῷ μὴ διδούς, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οὐδὲ ἐπομένως Ἀριστοτέλει κτλ. For ف rendering ἀλλά cf. e.g. 85. 17 ἀλλὰ . . . δεῖ, which Ar turns as فقد يجب "but it is necessary . . ." (148. 8).

120. 24–26 ἔν μὲν οὖν εἶδαι τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, ἔν δὲ καὶ τὸ πρὸ τούτου τὸ ὀρεκτόν, ὅπερ ἤδη κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενον τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι.

Ar translates the first clause, ἔν μὲν οὖν εἶδαι τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, as follows:

فقد ينبغي أن يكون المنشوق واحدا بالصورة

and so it is necessary that the desired be one in form. (222. 7–8)

The *Vorlage* should probably be reconstructed as ἔν μὲν οὖν εἶδαι <εἶναι δεῖ> τὸ ὀρεκτικόν. The words εἶναι δεῖ, which could have been lost through homoioteleuton in the manuscripts available to Heinze, may go back to Themistius himself, for they clearly reflect the modal ἄν εἴη in the Aristotelian original: εἶδαι μὲν ἔν ἄν εἴη τὸ κινεῖν τὸ ὀρεκτικόν (433b10–11). For قد ينبغي corresponding to δεῖ cf. e.g. 222. 3–4 = Greek 120. 21; both passages are quoted above, in the note to 120. 17–21.

123. 5–7 οὐ γὰρ ἐγγύθεν ἔχει (sc. τὰ ζῶα τὰ πορευτικά καὶ γενητὰ καὶ φθαρτά) τὴν τροφὴν ἐπὶρρέουσιν οὐδὲ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ἐν οἷς ἐσπάρη καὶ ἐφυτεύθη, ἀλλὰ δεῖ πορίζεσθαι αὐτὰ καὶ μετιέναι.

It is disquieting to read that self-propelled animals are associated with elements ἐν οἷς ἐσπάρη καὶ ἐφυτεύθη, and we suspect that something may have dropped out of the text. Ar here confirms our suspicions; it translates the sentence thus:

وذلك أنه ليس شيء من هذه للغذاء جاذبا من قرب ولا من الاسطقات

كما يجذبه النبات من قرب ومن الاسطقات التي فيها بذر وغرس بل

يحتاج إلى التماسه والسعي إليه

for none of these attracts nutriment from nearby or from the elements, as plants attract it from nearby and from the elements in which they are sowed and planted, but they need to proceed and move to it. (227. 10–12)

Ar's *Vorlage* can be reconstructed thus: οὐ γὰρ ἐγγύθεν ἔχει τὴν τροφὴν ἐπὶρρέουσιν οὐδὲ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων, <ὥσπερ τὰ φυτὰ ἐγγύθεν ἔχει καὶ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων> ἐν οἷς ἐσπάρη καὶ ἐφυτεύθη κτλ. Homoioteleuton occasioned the omission in the manuscripts that Heinze used.

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# 15

## Two Views of Soul: Aristotle and Descartes\*

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In the fourth century B.C. Aristotle rejected the tripartite psychology of Plato in favor of his own hylomorphic theory of the body-soul relationship. In the seventeenth century A.D. René Descartes rejected the prevailing Aristotelian psychology in favor of what he considered a more scientific notion of body controlled by an immortal, spiritual soul or mind. Comparisons between the Platonic and Aristotelian views of soul, their similarities and differences, are commonplace, going back to the works of Aristotle himself. Comparisons between the Aristotelian and Cartesian views are perhaps not so commonplace. In this paper I should like to draw attention to a few of their similarities and differences. I cannot claim to add anything new to our knowledge of either Aristotle's or Descartes' views of soul. But perhaps the juxtaposition of the two may highlight some interesting features of both.

What first attracted my interest to a possible comparison was the realization that, unlike Plato, both Aristotle and Descartes shared the view that, first, there is but a *single* soul and, second, that this soul operates principally through a single specific bodily organ. Given his own understanding, I believe Descartes could agree totally with Aristotle's statement that the soul's "essential nature cannot be

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corporeal; yet it is also clear that soul is present in a particular bodily part, and this one of the parts having control over the rest":<sup>1</sup>

ὅηλον ὅτι οὐχ οἶδν τ' εἶναι σῶμα τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' ὁμως ὅτι γ' ἐν τινι τοῦ σώματος ὑπάρχει μορίῳ φανερόν, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τινὶ τῶν ἐχόντων δύναμιν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις. (*Parva Naturalia* 467b13–16)

For Aristotle, as we know, that particular controlling organ is the heart. In his treatise *On Memory*, for example, Aristotle declares that in blooded animals, including man, "the source and control center (ἀρχή)<sup>2</sup> of both the sensitive and nutritive soul must be in the heart":

ἀνάγκη καὶ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς καὶ τῆς θρεπτικῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι. (*PN* 469a5–7)

Again, in the *De Partibus Animalium*, the heart is designated as the control center of sense perception and emotional response: "For it is in the front and center of the body that the heart is situated, in which we say is the source and control center of life and of all motion and sensation":

ἡ μὲν γὰρ καρδία ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ἐν μέσῳ κέται, ἐν ᾗ τὴν ἀρχὴν φαμεν τῆς ζωῆς καὶ πάσης κινήσεως τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως. (*De Partibus Animalium* 665a11–13)

Later, Aristotle adds: "Moreover, the motions of pain and pleasure, and generally of all sensation, plainly have their source in the heart, and find in it their ultimate termination":

ἐτι δ' αἱ κινήσεις τῶν ἡδέων καὶ τῶν λυπηρῶν καὶ ὅλης πάσης αἰσθήσεως ἐντεῦθεν ἀρχόμεναι φαίνονται καὶ πρὸς ταύτην περαίνουσαι. (666a12–13)

In the *De Anima*, in a context emphasizing the bodily aspects of psychic states, Aristotle specifies: ". . . We may regard anger or fear

<sup>1</sup> The following are the sources for the text of the Greek, French and Latin passages quoted. From Aristotle: *De Anima*, edited with introduction and commentary by Sir David Ross (Oxford 1961); *Parva Naturalia*, edited with introduction and commentary by Sir David Ross (Oxford 1957); *De Generatione Animalium* (*Generation of Animals*, with an English translation, by A. L. Peck [Cambridge, Mass. 1953]); *De Partibus Animalium* (*Parts of Animals*, with an English translation, by A. L. Peck [Cambridge, Mass. 1955]); *De Motu Animalium*, with translation, commentary, and essays by Martha Craven Nussbaum (Princeton 1978). From Descartes: *Oeuvres de Descartes*, publiées par Charles Adam et Paul Tannery (Paris 1899) (= A-T).

The translations from Aristotle are adapted from Ross, Peck and Nussbaum, and in the case of the *De Anima* from R. D. Hicks, *Aristotle: De Anima* (Cambridge 1907). The translations from Descartes are from *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, rendered into English by E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, 2 vols. (Cambridge 1967) (= H-R).

<sup>2</sup> On the notion of ἡ ἀρχή as "source and control center," see *Metaphysics* 1012b34–1013a14.

as such and such movements of the heart, and thinking (διανοεῖσθαι) as such and such another movement of that organ. . . .<sup>3</sup>

. . . οὖν τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι τὸ τὴν καρδίαν ὡδὶ κινεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἴσως ἢ ἕτερόν τι. . . . (408b8–9).

Clearly, then, for Aristotle the psychic functions of sense perception, consciousness of pleasure and pain, emotional response, initiation of external movement, even thinking or reasoning (διανοεῖσθαι) are centered in the heart, the control center of the human organism.

For Descartes, the soul is principally present in, and operates through, the *pineal gland*, which he situates inside the cavity of the brain. In his treatise *On the Passions of the Soul*, for example, describing how soul and body act on one another, Descartes begins: “Let us then conceive here that the soul has its principal seat (*son siège principal*) in the little gland which exists in the middle of the brain” (“Concevons donc icy que l’ame a son siège principal dans la petite glande qui est au milieu du cerveau . . .”, *Passions*, Art. XXIV; H-R I, 347; A-T XI, 354). Again, he refers to the pineal as “the small gland which is the main seat of the soul” (“. . . la petite glande qui est le principal siège de l’ame, . . .” *ibid.*) and maintains that “the soul cannot have any other seat in all the body than this gland wherein to exercise its functions immediately” (“. . . l’ame ne peut avoir en tout le corps aucun autre lieu que cette glande, où elle exerce immédiatement ses fonctions, . . .” *Passions*, Art. XXXII; H-R I, 346; A-T XI, 352).

A closer examination of the psychology of both Aristotle and Descartes reveals, of course, that neither conceived the soul as locally confined to a single organ, but united with the *entire* body. In the *De Anima*, you recall, Aristotle defines soul as “the first actuality of a natural body furnished with organs.”

ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ (412b5–6).

Then, after comparing the unity of soul and body to that of eyesight and eye, he continues: “What has been said of the part must be understood to apply to the whole living body; for as sensation of a part of the body is to that part, so is sensation as a whole to the whole sentient body as such”:

δεῖ δὴ λαβεῖν τὸ ἐπὶ μέρους ἐφ’ ὅλου τοῦ ζῶντος σώματος. ἀνάλογον γὰρ ἔχει ὡς τὸ μέρος πρὸς τὸ μέρος, οὕτως ἡ ὅλη αἰσθησις πρὸς τὸ ὅλον σῶμα τὸ αἰσθητικόν, ᾧ τοιοῦτον. (412b22–25; cf. 414a14–19)

Since the soul is the first actuality of a natural body *furnished with*

<sup>3</sup> Oxford translation, and cf. Hicks, p. 274 *ad* b9; also 403a31, 432b31.

organs, however, it can be conceived to be especially present and operating in a *principal* or controlling organ of the body, as is the case for the heart in Aristotle's psychology.

Likewise, Descartes maintains clearly that

the soul is really joined to the whole body, and . . . we cannot, properly speaking, say that it exists in any one of its parts to the exclusion of the others, because it is one and in some manner indivisible.

. . . l'ame est veritablement jointe à tout le corps, & . . . on ne peut pas proprement dire qu'elle soit en quelcune de ses parties, à l'exclusion des autres, à cause qu'il est un, & en quelque façon indivisible . . . (*Passions*, Art. XXX; H-R I, 345; A-T XI, 351).

However, he also maintains:

It is likewise necessary to know that although the soul is joined to the whole body, there is yet in that a certain part in which it exercises its functions more particularly than in all the others. . . .

Il est besoin aussi de sçavoir que, bien que l'ame soit jointe à tout le corps, il y a neantmoins en luy quelque partie, en laquelle elle exerce ses fonctions plus particulièrement qu'en toutes les autres. (*Passions*, Art. XXXI; H-R I, 345; A-T XI, 351-52)

That part is, of course, the pineal gland.

How do Aristotle and Descartes conceive the soul as operating especially in or through this central organ? The process is, of course, far too complex for detailed description here. However, the sensory-motor mechanism in Descartes can be summarized broadly in his own words as follows:

Let us then conceive here that the soul has its principal seat in the little gland which exists in the middle of the brain, from whence it radiates forth through all the remainder of the body by means of the animal spirits, nerves, and even the blood. . . .

Concevons donc icy que l'ame a son siège principal dans la petite glande qui est au milieu du cerveau, d'où elle rayonne en tout le reste du corps par l'entremise des esprits, des nerfs, & mesme du sang. . . . (*Passions*, Art. XXXIV; H-R I, 347; A-T XI, 354)

This gives us the general structure. He then provides for reflex or instinctive reaction as follows:

And recollecting what has been said about the machine of our body, i.e., that the little filaments of our nerves are so distributed in all its parts that on the occasion of the diverse movements which are there excited by sensible objects, they open in diverse ways the pores of the brain, which causes the animal spirits contained in these cavities to enter in diverse ways into the muscles. . . .



Et nous souvenant de ce qui a esté dit cy-dessus de la machine de nostre corps, à sçavoir que les petits filets de nos nerfs sont tellement distribuez en toutes se parties, qu'à l'occasion des divers mouvemens qui y sont excitez par les objets sensibles, ils ouvrent diversement les pores du cerveau, ce qui fait que les esprits animaux contenus en ses cavitez entrent diversement dans les muscles. . . . (*Pass.* XXXIV; H-R I, 347; A-T XI, 354)

Sense perceptions from external and internal stimuli are accounted for thus:

. . . let us here add that the small gland which is the main seat of the soul is so suspended between the cavities [of the brain] which contain the [animal] spirits that it can be moved by them in as many different ways as there are sensible diversities in the object; but that it may also be moved in diverse ways by the soul whose nature is such that it receives in itself as many diverse impressions,—that is to say, that it possesses as many diverse *perceptions* as there are diverse movements in this gland.

Adjoustrons icy que la petite glande qui est le principal siège de l'ame, est tellement suspenduë entre les cavitez qui contiennent ces esprits, qu'elle peut estre meuë par eux en autant de diverses façons, qu'il y a de diversitez sensibles dans les objets; mais qu'elle peut aussi estre diversement meuë par l'ame, laquelle est de telle nature qu'elle recoit autant de diverses impressions en elle, c'est à dire, qu'elle a autant de diverses perceptions, qu'il arrive de divers mouvemens en cette glande. (*Pass.* XXXIV; H-R I, 347; A-T XI, 254–55)

Motor responses are provided for as follows:

Reciprocally, likewise, the machine of the body is so formed that from the simple fact that this gland is diversely moved by the soul . . . it thrusts the [animal] spirits which surround it towards the pores of the brain, which conduct them by the nerves into the muscles, by which means it causes them to move the limbs.

Comme aussi reciproquement la machine du corps est tellement composée, que de cela seul que cette glande est diversement meuë par l'ame . . . elle pousse les esprits qui l'entourent vers les pores du cerveau, qui les conduisent par les nerfs dans les muscles, au moyen de quoy elle leur fait mouvoir les membres. (*Pass.* XXXIV; H-R I, 347; A-T XI, 355)

The process is that sense impulses, transmitted through the nerves, are mediated by "animal spirits" to the pineal gland, where they cause the conscious experience of sense perception in the soul. Likewise, the soul can move the pineal gland, setting up movement of the surrounding "animal spirits" which is thus transmitted to nerves and muscles as motor impulses.

In this the critical role of the pineal gland and what Descartes calls "animal spirits" must be evident. He goes on to describe how the visual perception of an object takes place through images in the optic nerves ultimately transmitted by the animal spirits in the surrounding brain cavities to the pineal gland which, he says, "acting immediately upon the soul, causes it to see" ("agissant immediatement contre l'ame, luy fait voir. . .," *Passions*, Art. XXXV; H-R I, 347-48; A-T XI, 356). Awareness of interior passion also, —fear, for example— comes about by reaction of the animal spirits "to give movement to the gland by which fear is placed in the soul" ("donner le mouvement à la glande, par lequel la peur est mise dans l'ame . . .," *Passions*, Art. XXXVIII; H-R I, 349; A-T XI, 358).

Descartes conceives these animal spirits as "a certain very subtle air or wind" (" . . . un certain air ou vent tres-subtil, qu'on nomme les esprits animaux . . .," *Passions*, Art. VII; H-R I, 334; A-T XI, 332); and again, "material bodies of extreme minuteness. . . they move very quickly like the particles of the flame which issues from a torch" (" . . . ce sont des corps tres-petits, & qui se meuvent tres-viste, ainsi que les parties de la flame qui sort d'un flambeau . . .," *Passions*, Art. X; H-R I, 336; A-T XI, 335); elsewhere, "a very subtle wind, or rather a flame which is very pure and very vivid" (" . . . un vent tres subtil, ou plutost comme une flame tres pure & tres vive . . .," *Discourse on Method* V; H-R I, 115; A-T VI, 54). He explains that animal spirits are the product of "the most animated and subtle portions of the blood which the heat has rarefied in the heart" (" . . . les plus vives & plus subtiles parties du sang, que la chaleur a rarefiées dans le coeur . . .") and sent up to fill the cavities of the brain (*Passions*, Art. X; H-R I, 335; A-T XI, 334). Incidentally, Descartes, like Aristotle, considers the heart to be the center of vital heat in the body. He says that

so long as we live there is a continual heat in our heart . . . a species of fire which the blood of the veins maintains, and . . . this fire is the corporeal principle of all the movements of our members.

. . . pendant que nous vivons, il y a une chaleur continuelle en nostre coeur, . . . une espece de feu que le sang des venes y entretient, & . . . ce feu est le principe corporel de tous le mouvemens de nos membres. (*Passions*, Art. VIII; H-R I, 335; A-T XI, 333)

Descartes' "animal spirits" reminds us immediately of the mysterious *σύμφυτον πνεῦμα*—the "connate spirit" or "breath"—which is for Aristotle the principal medium by which the soul present in the heart is affected by sensory impulses and emotional reactions, and by which it initiates external response. Like Descartes' "animal spirits,"

the *σύμφυτον πνεῦμα*, as the term implies, is a kind of breath or *air*; but *warm* air, involving an element of heat that is, as Aristotle says, “analogous to the element of the stars” (*ἀνάλογον οὐσα τῷ τῶν ἄστρων στοιχείῳ*, *De Gen. Animalium* 736b38–737a1), giving it special capacities for the communication of life and vital functions (*ibid.* 736b30 ff.).<sup>4</sup>

As Descartes’ animal spirits surround the pineal gland, so Aristotle’s *σύμφυτον πνεῦμα* operates within and around the heart especially, which at one point he calls the “pneumatic member” (*ἐπὶ τῷ πνευματικῷ μορίῳ*, *De Gen. An.* 781a31). The *σύμφυτον πνεῦμα* mediates sensory impulses coming from the sense organ to the soul present in the heart (e.g., *De Gen. An.* 781a21–33); and mediates motor impulses from the soul in the heart to the joints and sinews. Aristotle says:

All animals both possess *symphyton pneuma* and derive their strength from this. . . . This [*pneuma*] seems to bear a relation to the soul-source similar to that which the point in the joints,—the one which imparts movement and is itself moved—has to the unmoved. And since the soul-source is . . . situated in the heart, it is clear that the *symphyton pneuma* is also there” (*De Motu An.* 703a9–16 Nussbaum, adapted).

πάντα δὲ φαίνεται τὰ ζῶα καὶ ἔχοντα πνεῦμα σύμφυτον καὶ ἰσχύοντα τούτῳ. . . . τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς τὴ ἀρχὴν τὴν ψυχικὴν ἔοικεν ὁμοίως ἔχειν ὥσπερ τὸ ἐν ταῖς καμπαῖς σημεῖον, τὸ κινεῖν καὶ κινούμενον, πρὸς τὸ ἀκίνητον. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῖς μὲν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ . . . διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ σύμφυτον ἐνταῦθα φαίνεται ὄν.

Thus in Aristotle the *σύμφυτον πνεῦμα* functions as immediate agent of the life processes originating in the soul operating through the heart. The details can be found summarized elsewhere.<sup>5</sup> I only mean to suggest here that there seems to be a close analogy between Descartes’ “animal spirits” and Aristotle’s *σύμφυτον πνεῦμα* with relation to the central organ (pineal gland or heart) through which soul principally operates. Although Descartes’ knowledge of anatomy and physiology, especially that of the central nervous system, represents a considerable advance over Aristotle, when it comes to explaining the body-soul relationship he is still left with Aristotle’s basic model: soul operating in a central organ through the medium of a

<sup>4</sup> M. Nussbaum, *Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium* (Princeton 1978), p. 162: “We can only say that *pneuma* is, apparently, air with a special kind of heat in it that makes it behave unlike ordinary air, more like a different element.”

<sup>5</sup> See A. L. Peck’s *De. Gen. An.* in the Loeb Series (1953), Appendix B, 576–93; F. Solmsen, *J. of Hellenic Studies* 77 (1957), 119–23; M. Nussbaum, 143–164 (Essay 3).

special subtle kind of matter (a warm air). He sums up the process as follows:

Hence in our very selves the mind [or soul] by no means moves the external limbs immediately, but merely directs the subtle fluid, styled the animal spirits, that passes from the heart through the brain toward the muscles, and determines this fluid to perform definite motions, these animal spirits being in their own nature capable of being utilized with equal facility for many distinct actions.

. . . adeo ut nequidem in nobis ipsis mens immediate moveat membra externa, sed dirigat tantum spiritus a corde per cerebrum in musculos fluentes eosque ad certos motus determinet, cum ex se isti spiritus ad multas actiones diversas aeque facile applicentur. (*Reply to Objections* IV, H-R II, 103; A-T VII, 229)

Despite these superficial similarities in their psychology, however, Descartes' view of soul differs radically from that of Aristotle. There is little need to remind this audience of the implications of Aristotle's hylomorphic view of soul and body as developed in the *De Anima* especially, where the relationship is that of form to matter in constituting the living individual organism; where soul is "the first actuation (ἐντελέχεια) of a natural body furnished with organs" (ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικῶν ὀργανικοῦ, *De An.* 412b5), and where all second actuations (even some noetic) are adequately described only as events of the body-soul compound, having both psychic and somatic aspects. As Aristotle explains, when the person experiences anger, tenderness, fear, pity, courage, joy, loving, hating, even thought ". . . simultaneously with these the body is modified in some way" (ἅμα γὰρ τοῦτοις πάσχει τι τὸ σῶμα, *De An.* 403a18). The unity between body and soul, matter and form, is as close in the living compound as that of wax and the impression in the wax; the axe and axeness; the eye and the power of sight (*ibid.* 412b6–413a3). A material eye without sight is no more an eye than a corpse is a man (*De Gen. An.* 735a7–8; and cf. 734b25–27, 726b23–25).<sup>6</sup> Body and soul are simply two inseparable aspects of the living organism.

The same kind of unity exists, by implication, between the psychic and somatic aspects of all second actuations as well. For Aristotle maintains that it is as inadequate to describe the experience of anger simply as "the desire for retaliation" (ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὄρεξιν ἀντιλυπήσεως, its formal aspect) as it would be to describe it simply as "a boiling of the blood around the heart" (ὁ δὲ ζέειν τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος, its

<sup>6</sup> "No part of the body will be such in more than name unless it has some Soul in it (e.g. the eye of a dead person)" (οὔτε μόνον ἔσται μὴ μετέχον [ψυχῆς] ἀλλ' ἢ ὁμνύμωζ, ὥσπερ τεθνεώτος ὀφθαλμός). A. L. Peck, *De Gen. An.* 735a7–8.



But Aristotle goes beyond this, as you recall, to describe the soul, once implanted and joined to appropriate matter, also as *efficient* cause in the development and maintenance of organs and life functions in the individual. The *De Generatione Animalium* details the process by which the implanted soul forms the *heart* first, and thereafter the rest of the organs as outgrowths and extensions from the heart (742a16 ff.). The *De Anima* generalizes on this:

Moreover, the soul is also the origin of motion from place to place. . . . Qualitative change also, and growth are due to soul. For sensation is supposed to be a sort of qualitative change. . . . The same holds of growth and decay. . . .

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὅθεν πρῶτον ἢ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις, ψυχὴ. . . ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀλλοίωσις καὶ αὐξησις κατὰ ψυχὴν. ἢ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθησις ἀλλοίωσις τις εἶναι δοκεῖ. . . ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ αὐξησέως τε καὶ φθίσεως ἔχει. (*De An.* 415b21–26)

In the *De Anima* and elsewhere Aristotle describes both psychic and somatic aspects of the nutritive, sentient, movent, and desiderative functions in man. But when he comes to grips with the problem of man's highest function, the intellectual, his hylomorphic account breaks down,—at least to the extent that one so-called “part” of the soul, the intellect (*νοῦς*: the power of comprehending non-material reality), is denied a specific bodily organ:

If the entire soul holds together the whole body, then each of its “parts” ought properly to hold together some part of the body. But this seems impossible. For it is difficult to conjecture what part the intellect will hold together or how it can hold any part together.

εἰ γὰρ ἡ ὅλη ψυχὴ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα συνέχει, προσήκει καὶ τῶν μορίων ἕκαστον συνέχειν τι τοῦ σώματος. τοῦτο δ' ὅκειν ἀδυνάτω· ποῖον γὰρ μόριον ἢ πῶς ὁ νοῦς συνέξει, χαλεπὸν καὶ πλάσαι. (*De An.* 411b15–18)

When he comes to analyze the intellectual function closely, however (*De An.* 429a10 ff.), Aristotle distinguishes two “parts” of intellect: (1) the *receptive* intellect, the potentiality for receiving the intelligible forms transmitted in the phantasms, and (2) the *activating* or *agent* intellect, which actuates this potency “as light brings out the colors present in a darkened room” (*τρόπον γὰρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργείᾳ χρώματα*, *De An.* 430a15–17). The receptive intellect is apparently closely involved with those faculties of soul that inform and operate through a material organ, namely, the central sense power, *φαντασία*, and memory, operating in the heart. The agent intellect alone seems to actuate no material organ, which implies for Aristotle that it actuates *itself* as pure form or act. Consequently it is capable of separate existence, for any “part” of



heart. The agent intellect alone seems to actuate no material organ, which implies for Aristotle that it actuates *itself* as pure form or act. Consequently it is capable of separate existence, for any "part" of soul not actuating material body is *separable* (*De An.* 413a3-6). Aristotle must have this aspect of *νοῦς* in mind when he says:

It would seem to be a distinct species of soul, alone capable of separate existence, something eternal (*αἰδίων*), as it were, distinct from the perishable.

ἀλλ' ἔοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχασθαι χωρίζεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ αἰδίων τοῦ φθαρτοῦ. (*De An.* 413b25-27)

If this "part" of the intellectual soul is eternal, it must have preexisted before the individual human organism was conceived. Aristotle seems to have accepted this consequence, but is vague about the manner of its joining the compound, explaining that while the nutritive and sentient "souls" with potentiality for the rational are supplied by the parents,

the *nous* alone enters, in addition, from outside and is alone divine; for bodily activity has no share in its activity.

λείπεται δὴ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισέναι καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον. οὐθέν γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεῖ σωματικῇ ἐνεργείᾳ. (*De Gen. An.* 736b27-29)

Likewise, since this activating *νοῦς* is eternal, it must survive the dissolution of the compound at death.

But *nous* seems to be engendered in us as a self-existing substance, and to be imperishable.

ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἔοικεν ἐγγίνεσθαι οὐσία τις οὐσα, καὶ οὐ φθείρεσθαι. (*De An.* 408b18-19)

Hence Aristotle does affirm the immortality of this part of soul. But this seems in no way to constitute *personal* immortality. For Aristotle asserts that

reasoning, love, and hatred are not attributes of the *nous* but of its individual possessor. . . . Hence, when this possessor perishes, there is neither memory or love; for these never did belong to the *nous* but to the composite whole which has perished; while the *nous* is doubtless a thing more divine and impassive.

τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν ἢ μισεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκείνου [νοῦ] πάθη, ἀλλὰ τουτοῦ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐκείνο. . . . διὸ καὶ τούτου φθειρομένου οὔτε μνημονεύει οὔτε φιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ ἐκείνου ἦν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κοινού, ὃ ἀπόλλωλεν. ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἴσως θεϊότερόν τι καὶ ἀπαθές ἐστιν. (*De An.* 408b25-29)

Even the receptive *nous* perishes with memory:

... τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδίον (οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός): καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ. (*ibid.* 430a23–25)

The surviving soul is pure act, independent of matter and self-existent, without memory of previous existence, without acquired knowledge or modification of any sort (ἀπαθές) resulting from its operation in the living individual. This is hardly personal immortality.

On the other hand, one of the propositions that Descartes considers most important to establish is precisely the proposition that the personal soul is immortal. His *Discourse on the Method* indicates that his whole discussion of the human soul is linked with the problem of its origin and destiny. He claims to have shown that the rational soul "could not be in any way derived from the power of matter . . . but that it must be expressly created" (" . . . ne peut aucunement estre tirée de la puissance de la matiere, . . . mais qu'elle doit expressement estre créée" . . . , *Disc.* V; H-R I, 118; A-T VI, 59–60). And again, "that our soul is in its nature entirely independent of body, and in consequence that it is not liable to die with it" (" . . . la nostre [ame] est d'une nature entierement independante du cors, & par consequent, qu'elle n'est point sujette a mourir avec luy . . . , *Disc.* V, end; H-R I, 118; A-T VI, 59–60; cf. dedication to the *Meditations*, H-R I, 333–34; *Med.* II).

Descartes begins his search for truth, as you recall, not with Aristotle's attempt at objective analysis of the external universe, of living beings, and of man in the total scheme of things, but *modo geometrico*, with a clear, distinct, and undeniable proposition drawn from inner experience: *cogito; ergo sum*—"I am thinking; therefore I exist." In the *Discourse on the Method* (Pt. IV) he reasons that it is *inconceivable* that he, the "thinking thing," does not exist. But, he continues,

I saw that I *could* conceive (1) that I had no body, and (2) that there was no world nor place where I might be. . . . From that I knew that I was a *substance* the whole essence or nature of which is *to think*; and that for its existence there is no need of any place, nor does it depend on any material thing; so that this "me," that is to say, the *soul* by which I am what I am, is *entirely distinct from body*, and even more easy to know than the latter; and even if body *were not*, the soul would not cease to be what it is. . . .

. . . voyant que je pouvois feindre que je n'avois aucun cors, & qu'il n'y avoit aucun monde, ny aucun lieu ou je fusse . . . je connû de la que j'estois une substance dont toute l'essence ou la nature n'est que de penser, & qui, pour estre, n'a besoin d'aucun lieu, ny ne depend d'aucune chose materielle. En sorte que ce Moy, c'est a dire, l'Ame

par laquelle je suis ce que je suis, est entierement distincte du cors, & mesme qu'elle est plus aisée a connoistre que luy, & qu'encore qu'il ne fust point, elle ne lairroit pas d'estre tout ce qu'elle est. (*Disc. IV*; H-R I, 101; A-T VI, 32-33)

There we have the essence of the Cartesian logico-introspective method; his identification of the thinking subject with the soul; and the basic reason for soul's complete independence of body and consequent immortality.

The same line of reasoning is found in *Meditations* VI:

And although . . . I possess a body with which I am intimately conjoined, yet because, on the one side, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the other, I possess a distinct idea of body, inasmuch as it is only an extended and unthinking thing, it is certain that this I is entirely and absolutely distinct from my body, and can exist without it.

Et quamvis . . . habeam corpus, quod mihi valde arcte conjunctum est, quia tamen ex unâ parte claram & distinctam habeo ideam mei ipsius, quatenus sum tantum res cogitans, non extensa, & ex aliâ parte distinctam ideam corporis, quatenus est tantum res extensa, non cogitans, certum est me a corpore meo revera esse distinctum, & absque illo posse existere. (*Med. VI*; H-R I, 190; A-T VII, 78)

Soul, then, is for Descartes the "thinking thing" (*res cogitans*) with which I, the person, am identified. It is a *substance*, "a thinking and unextended thing . . . entirely and absolutely distinct from my body," which is another substance, "an extended and unthinking thing," as he describes them. The consequence is for him that this "I," that is, my soul, since it is entirely and absolutely distinct from my body, can exist without it. The same reasoning in extended form appears in *Meditations* II (H-R I, 149-151).

Descartes identifies soul also as "mind," or "understanding" or "reason" ("sum igitur praecise tantum res cogitans, id est, mens, sive animus, sive intellectus, sive ratio . . .," *Med. II*; H-R I, 152; A-T VII, 27). And "thinking" includes for him a range of psychic events far beyond what Aristotle would classify as functions of the rational soul, i.e., as "thought." "What is a thing that thinks?" he asks. "It is a thing which doubts, understands, conceives, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels."

*Res cogitans*. Quid est hoc? Nempe dubitans, intelligens, affirmans, negans, volens, nolens, imaginans quoque, & sentiens. (*Med. II*; H-R I, 153; A-T VII, 28)

In his *Principles of Philosophy* Descartes summarizes his position on what thought (*cogitatio*) is:

By the word *Thought* I understand all that of which we are conscious as operating in us. And that is why not alone understanding, willing, imagining, but also feeling, are here the same as thought. For if I say I see, or I walk, I therefore am, and if by seeing and walking I mean the action of my eyes or my legs, which is the work of my body, my conclusion is not absolutely certain; because it may be that, as often happens in dreams, I think I see or walk, although I never open my eyes or move from my place. . . . But if I mean only to talk of my *sensation* (*sensu*) or my consciously seeming to see or to walk, it becomes quite true, because my assertion now refers only to my mind, which alone is concerned with my feeling or thinking that I see and I walk.

Cogitationis nomine, intelligo illa omnia, quae nobis consciis in nobis fiunt, quatenus eorum in nobis conscientia est. Atque ita non modo intelligere, velle, imaginari, sed etiam sentire, idem est hîc quod cogitare. Nam si dicam, ego video, vel ego ambulo, ergo sum; & hoc intelligam de visione, aut ambulatione, quae corpore peragitur, conclusio non est absolute certa; quia, ut saepe fit in somnis, possum putare me videre, vel ambulare, quamvis oculos non aperiâ, & loco non movear. . . . Sed si intelligam de ipso sensu sive conscientia videndi aut ambulandi, quia tunc refertur ad mentem, quae sola sentit sive cogitat se videre aut ambulare, est plane certa. (*Princ.* Part I, IX; H-R I, 222; A-T VIII, 7-8)

Descartes considers all the data of consciousness, then, as "thought" belonging to the soul, assuring the conscious subject of his existence.

What of the *body*? And the external world? Descartes is assured of their existence only through the veracity of God, the Creator, whose existence is known with a certainty second only to that of his own existence. For Descartes discovers within his consciousness the "idea of a Being who is omniscient, omnipotent, and absolutely perfect" (" . . . unam [ideam] esse entis summe intelligentis, summe potentis & summe perfecti . . .", *Princ.* Part I, XIV; H-R I, 224; A-T VIII, 10). And from the fact that his mind "perceives that necessary and eternal existence is comprised in the idea which it has of an absolutely perfect Being, it has clearly to conclude that this absolutely perfect Being exists" (" . . . ita ex eo solo quod percipiat existentiam necessariam & aeternam in entis summe perfecti ideâ contineri, plane concludere debet ens summe perfectum existere," *Princ.* Pt. I, XIV; H-R, I, 225; A-T VIII, 10). Now the first of the Creator's attributes is that He is "absolutely true and the source of all light, so that it is evidently a contradiction that He should deceive us" (" . . . summe verax, & dator omnis luminis: adeo ut plane repugnet ut nos fal-



lat . . . ,” *Princ.* Pt. I, XXIX; H-R I, 231; A-T VIII, 16). Hence it follows that “the faculty of knowledge which God has given us can never disclose to us any object which is not true, inasmuch as it comprehends it . . . clearly and distinctly” (“Atque hinc sequitur . . . cognoscendi facultatem a Deo nobis datam, nullum unquam objectum posse attingere, quod non sit verum, quatenus ab ipsâ attingitur, hoc est, quatenus clare & distincte percipitur,” *Princ.* Pt. I, XXX; H-R I, 231; A-T VIII, 16). Again, “because God is no deceiver, the faculty of knowledge that He has given us cannot be fallacious” in assenting “to things that we clearly perceive” (“. . . cum Deus non sit fallax, facultas percipiendi quam nobis dedit, non potest tendere in falsum . . . cum tantum ad ea quae clare percipiuntur se extendit,” *Princ.* Pt. I, XLIII; H-R I, 236; A-T VIII, 21). What are some of these things “we clearly perceive”? Descartes replies: “Of this nature are mathematical demonstrations, the knowledge that material things exist, and the evidence of all clear reasoning . . . about them” (“Tales sunt Mathematicae demonstrationes; talis est cognitio quod res materiales existant; & talia sunt evidentia omnia ratiocinia, quae de ipsis fiunt,” *Princ.* Pt. IV, CCVI; H-R I, 302; A-T VIII, 328). (This is obviously a world apart from what has been called Aristotle’s “naïve realism.”)

Descartes asserts the existence of only two created substances<sup>7</sup> (*Princ.* Pt. I, XLVIII; H-R I, 238; A-T VIII, 23): “. . . the one is intellectual things . . . pertaining to the mind or to thinking substance; the other is material things, or that pertaining to extended substance, i.e., to body” (“. . . unum est rerum intellectualium . . . ad mentem sive ad substantiam cogitantem pertinentium; aliud rerum materialium, sive quae pertinent ad substantiam extensam, hoc est, ad corpus”); for we have “two clear and distinct ideas, the one of created substance that thinks, the other of corporeal substance” (“. . . possumus duas claras & distinctas habere notiones, sive ideas, unum substantiae cogitantis creatae, aliam substantiae corporeae . . . ,” *Princ.* Pt. I, LIV; H-R I, 241; A-T VIII, 25). Each has its principal attribute: “. . . extension in length, breadth, and depth constitutes the nature of corporeal substance; and thought constitutes the nature of thinking substance” (“Nempe extensio in longum, latum & profundum, substantiae corporeae naturam constituit; & cogitatio constituit naturam substantiae cogitantis,” *Princ.* Pt. I, LIII; H-R I, 240; A-T VIII, 25).

<sup>7</sup> “By substance we can understand nothing else than a thing which so exists that it needs no other thing in order to exist” (“Per substantiam nihil aliud intelligere possumus, quam rem quae ita existit, ut nullâ aliâ re indigeat ad existendum,” *Princ.* Pt. I, LI, H-R I, 239; A-T VIII, 24). Descartes clearly understands that this definition cannot be applied univocally to God and created substances.



Functions of the soul, of the body, and of the compound are described thus (*Princ.* Pt. I, XLVIII; H-R I, 238; A-T VIII, 23):

Perception, volition, and every mode of knowing and willing pertain to thinking substance; while to extended substance pertain magnitude, or extension in length, breadth, and depth, figure, movement, situation, divisibility into parts themselves divisible, and such. Besides these there are, however, certain things we experience . . . which should be attributed neither to mind nor body alone but to the close and intimate union that exists between the body and mind. . . . Such are the appetites of hunger, thirst, etc., and also the emotions or passions of the mind which do not subsist in mind or thought alone, as the emotions of anger, joy, sadness, love, etc.; and finally all the sensations such as pain, pleasure, light and color, sounds, odors, tastes, heat, hardness, and all other tactile qualities.

Perceptio, volitio, omnesque modi tam percipiendi quam volendi, ad substantiam cogitantem referuntur; ad extensam autem, magnitudo, sive ipsamet extensio in longum, latum & profundum, figura, motus, situs, partium ipsarum divisibilitas, & talia. Sed & alia quaedam in nobis experimur, quae nec ad solam mentem, nec etiam ad solum corpus referri debent, quaeque . . . ab arc̄tā & intimā mentis nostrae cum corpore unione profiscuntur; nempe appetitus famis, sitis, &c.; itemque, commotiones, sive animi pathemata, quae non in sola cogitatione consistunt, ut commotio ad iram, ad hilaritatem, ad tristitiam, ad amorem, &c.; ac denique sensus omnes, ut doloris, titillationis, lucis & colorum, sonorum, odorum, saporum, caloris, duritiei, aliarumque tactilium qualitarum.

We have already seen the broad outline of Descartes' physiological psychology by which soul and body were described as interacting through the nervous system, the animal spirits, and the pineal gland, the "principal seat" of the soul, where soul receives and reacts to material impulses from inside and outside the organism, and sets up physical changes relayed to the muscles that control bodily motion. What we now appreciate, however, is that soul and body are conceived basically as two *completely distinct and independent substances* which somehow join to cooperate in this manner.

The body is, in fact, conceived by Descartes as a *machine*, created in such a way that it could exist independently of soul, operating by purely mechanical principles, principally through the vital heat centered in the heart. Descartes considered all material substances, even heat, to be composed of minute bodies or corpuscles having only those attributes he mentions,—extension in length, breadth, depth, figure or shape, movement, situation, and divisibility. The sole type of change or motion is mechanical—by impact or collision of particles,

by pushing or pulling in larger structures. Descartes compares the body specifically to "a watch or other automaton (i.e., a machine that moves itself)" which is "wound up and contains in itself the corporeal principle of those movements for which it is designed along with all that is requisite for its action" ("... une montre, ou autre automate (c'est à dire, autre machine qui se meut de soy-mesme) ... est montée, & ... a en soy le principe corporel des mouvemens pour lesquels elle est instituée, avec tout ce que est requis pour son action ...," *Passions of the Soul* Pt. I, Art. VI; H-R I, 333; A-T XI, 331). Unlike Aristotle, Descartes does not consider soul to be cause of the ordinary life-processes of the body "since they do not depend on thought at all" ("... en tant qu'ils ne dépendent point de la pensée ...," *Pass.*, Pt. I, Art. IV; H-R I, 332; A-T XI, 329).

... I consider the body of a man as being a sort of machine so built up and composed of nerves, muscles, veins, blood and skin that though there were no mind in it at all, it would not cease to have the same motions as at present, exception being made of those movements which are due to the direction of the will, and in consequence depend upon the mind. ...

... si considerem hominis corpus, quatenus machinamentum quoddam est ex ossibus, nervis, musculis, venis, sanguine & pellibus ita aptum & compositum, ut, etiamsi nulla in eo mens existeret, eosdem tamen haberet omnes motus qui nunc in eo non ab imperio voluntatis nec proinde a mente procedunt. ... (*Meditations* VI; H-R I, 195; A-T VII, 84)

Death of the body is not caused by departure of the soul; rather, the soul departs because the body breaks down, as "a watch or other machine when it is broken and when the principle of its movement ceases to act" ("... montre, ou autre machine, lors qu'elle est rompuë & que le principe de son mouvement cesse d'agir," *Passions* Art. VI; H-R I, 333; A-T XI, 331).

Soul and body chiefly interact, as we have seen, through the pineal gland, which Descartes specifies as "the portion of the brain by which the mind is immediately affected" ("... in eā parte cerebri quae immediate mentem afficit ...," *Med.* VI; H-R I, 197; A-T VII, 87); it receives the mechanical reactions of the body and itself acts, in Descartes words, "immediately upon the soul" ("... immediatement contre l'ame ...," *Passions*, Art. XXXV; H-R I, 348; A-T XI, 356). Of pain perception he says "... the movement [of the nerves] passing ... to the inmost parts of the brain, gives a sign to the mind, which makes it feel somewhat, to wit, pain" ("... ille eorum motus ... ad intima cerebri pertingens, ibi menti signum dat ad

passing . . . to the inmost parts of the brain, gives a sign to the mind, which makes it feel somewhat, to wit, pain" (" . . . ille eorum motus . . . ad intima cerebri pertingens, ibi menti signum dat ad aliquid sentiendum, nempe dolorem . . .," *Med.* VI, H-R I, 197; A-T VII, 88). Conversely, he says that when the soul "desires something, it causes the little gland to which it is closely united to move in the way requisite . . ." (" . . . veut quelque chose, elle fait que la petite glande, à qui elle est estroitement jointe, se meut en la façon qui est requisite . . .," *Passions*, Art. XLI; H-R I, 350; A-T XI, 360).

But how does Descartes conceive these two separate and distinct substances to be "closely united"? As far as I know, his best response is contained in *Meditation* VI where he declares that nature, through the sensations of pain, hunger, and thirst, teaches

that I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel, but that I am closely united with it, and, so to speak, so intermingled with it that I seem to compose with it one whole . . . these sensations of hunger, thirst, pain, etc. are in truth none other than certain confused modes of thought which are produced by the union and apparent intermingling of mind and body.

. . . me non tantum adesse meo corpori ut nauta adest navigio, sed illi arctissime esse conjunctum & quasi permixtum, adeo ut unum quid cum illo componam. . . . Nam certe isti sensus sitis, famis, doloris, &c., nihil aliud sunt quam confusi quidam cogitandi modi ab unione & quasi permixtione mentis cum corpore exorti. (*Med.* VI; H-R I, 192; A-T VII, 81)

"Intermingling" can be easily understood of two different *material* substances; but what does it mean when applied to the union of a material with a completely non-material substance, one incapable of physical contact or location in place? When one of his critics (Arnauld) accuses Descartes of conceiving man as "a spirit that makes use of a body" (" . . . animum utentem corpore. . .," *Objections* IV; H-R II, 84; A-T VII, 203), Descartes claims that his argument from the consciousness of pain, hunger, and thirst have "proved that mind was substantially united with the body" ("Nam in eâdem sextâ Meditatione, in quâ egi de distinctione mentis a corpore, simul etiam probavi substantialiter illi esse unitam . . .," *Reply to Objections* IV; H-R II, 102; A-T VII, 227-28). Though he uses the expression "substantial union" of mind and body, it cannot be understood in the Aristotelian sense of form and matter uniting to constitute a single substance, since Descartes has rejected the notion of substantial form. Another critic (Gassendi) continues to press him on the point. "For there is

sine partibus commiscibilibus utrique. . . . Quaenam vero corporeae cum incorporeā intelligi potest?" *Objections V*: H-R II, 201; A-T VII, 344). Descartes replies testily: "At no place do you bring an objection to my arguments; you only set forth the doubts you think follow from my conclusions" ("Nihil ullibi in meas rationes objicis, sed tantum dubia proponis, quae tibi ex meis conclusionibus sequi videntur," *Reply to Obj. V*; H-R II, 232; A-T VII, 389-90). Finally, when his friend Princess Elizabeth asks the same questions, — how a thinking soul could move the animal spirits — Descartes can only answer: "I may truly say that what your Highness proposes seems to me to be the question people have most right to ask me in view of my published works" ("Et je puis dire, avec verité, que la question que votre Altesse propose, me semble estre celle qu'on me peut demander avec le plus de raison, en suite des escrits que j'ay publiez," A-T III, 663; A. Kenny, *Descartes*, 1968, p. 226).

There we have it, then. Two models of human nature, soul and body, — Aristotle's hylomorphism and Descartes' dualism. Each has its problems: If body and soul are united as matter and form, how do we account for the soul's apparent power to transcend matter in conceiving the non-material, the universal? How satisfy man's almost universal longing for personal survival after death? On the other hand, if soul is a thinking substance entirely independent of matter, and body a mere machine of well-coordinated material parts, how can they possibly be united and interact in a single composite organism? We can, of course, go a step further, as did La Mettrie a century after Descartes, and discard the notion of soul altogether, settling for the bleak view that all living beings, including man, are merely quasi-machines. But that view also has its problems. Perhaps most important is that we continue to search, to think about the problem of body and soul. Or at least that we continue to think. For, as Descartes points out in the second Meditation (H-R I, 151; A-T VII, 27), "it might possibly be the case that — if I ceased entirely to think — I should likewise cease altogether to exist" (" . . . nam forte etiam fieri posset, si cessarem ab omni cogitatione, ut illico totus esse desinerem").

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## Plato and Stoa in Hippolytus' Theology

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In his masterpiece, *Refutatio omnium haeresium* (written in Rome, between A.D. 222 and 235), Hippolytus stresses the significance of his own Theology, as opposed to countless heretical doctrines, and especially to the Patripassianism of his archrival, Pope Callistus (Proem 6; X. 4; X. 5. 1 & 2; X. 31. 6 & 34. 1). He calls his own doctrine *Truth*, and I think the term has a special meaning for him. In my opinion, it stands for the Holy Ghost as the conveyer of God's truth to man, as Spirit of truth, in one word, as Truth itself.<sup>1</sup> The suggested interpretation seems to find support in Hippolytus himself.

Consider such expressions as these. (1) By *simply appearing*, Truth will refute any heresy (X. 5. 1 *μόνον φανείς ἐλέγξει τὴν πλάνην*).<sup>2</sup> (2) Hippolytus' statement (Proem 7), "we proclaim whatever Truth has ministered to men, after receiving it from the grace of the Father (*ὅσα ἡ ἀλήθεια ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς χάριτος παραλαβοῦσα ἀνθρώποις διηκόνησε, ταῦτα . . . κηρύσσομεν*), is only a synonym for his preceding expression (Proem 6), "we generously communicate to all whatever has been offered by the Holy Ghost" (*ὅσα παρέχει τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα πᾶσιν ἀφθόνως κοινωνοῦντες*).

Hippolytus' True Doctrine comprises the three closing chapters of his *magnum opus* (X. 32–34), as its *κορωνίς* (X. 5. 2). His Theology

<sup>1</sup> Cf. G. W. H. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon* (Oxford 1961), s.v. *ἀλήθεια*, B, 4, and *αὐτοαλήθεια*, 4.

<sup>2</sup> The text is quoted from my edition of Hippolytus: *Patristische Texte und Studien*, im Auftrage der Patristischen Kommission der Akademien der Wissenschaften in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland herausgegeben von K. Aland und E. Mühlenberg, Band 25 (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter 1986).



is highly elaborate, learned, and peculiar enough.<sup>3</sup> In this philosophical volume of *ICS*, we shall limit ourselves to pointing out the main philosophical sources of Hippolytus' inspiration. They are two—Plato and Stoa.

*Plato.* According to Hippolytus, prior to the Creation, God first conceives in his mind the ideas or forms of the future beings—αἱ ἐν τῷ πατρικῷ <νῷ> ἐννοηθεῖσαι ἰδέαι (X. 33. 2). This act is called "the Father's mental conception" (ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐννοια). Now leaving apart Greek antecedents of the term ἐννοια, I think the most likely sources of Hippolytus' inspiration are Justin Martyr (1 *Apology* 64. 3 ἐννοηθέντα τὸν θεὸν διὰ Λόγου τὸν κόσμον ποιῆσαι) and especially the Valentinian Gnostic Ptolemy, who is quoted by Hippolytus at *Ref.* VI. 38. 5. According to Ptolemy, the Father (or Bythos) has two consorts, dispositions or powers—Ἐννοίαν καὶ Θέλησιν· πρῶτον γὰρ ἐνενοήθη τι προβαλεῖν, ἔπειτα ἠθέλησε. Notice that both acts of the God creator—Conception and Will—recur in Hippolytus' own Theology—ὅτε <αὐτὸς> ἠθέλησε ποιεῖν (X. 32. 1); ὅσα γοῦν ἠθέλησεν ποιεῖν ὁ θεός . . . ; ὅτε δὲ <ὅσα> ἠθέλησεν ὡς ἠθέλησε καὶ ἐποίησεν . . . (X. 33. 6–7); Λόγος ἐν ἑαυτῷ φέρων τὸ θέλειν τοῦ γεγεννηκότος (X. 33. 2); τὸ ἀρέσκον θεῷ (*ibid.*).

As the next step, God creates the four basic principles (ἀρχαί) or first substances (αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι) for the future beings—fire and spirit (πνεῦμα, not air), water and earth (X. 32. 2 and 33. 4). According to Hippolytus, beings are made either out of a single substance (τὰ μονοούσια) or a combination of the four elements. This process of combination is called "binding a living organism together" (σύνδεσμος, X. 32. 2), and is most probably Platonic in origin (compare, e.g., *Tim.* 73 b 3 ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι συνδουμένη; *Symp.* 202 e 6 ὥστε τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸ αὐτῷ συνδεδέσθαι).

Following this theory of "fastening the elements in a whole (an organism)," Hippolytus concludes that only the beings made out of one single substance are imperishable, since they cannot be "undone"—καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἐνὸς ἀθάνατα ἦν (λύσις γὰρ <αὐτοῖς> οὐ παρακολουθεῖ· τὸ γὰρ ἐν οὐ λυθήσεται πώποτε), τὰ δὲ ἐκ δύο ἢ τριῶν ἢ τεσσάρων λυτά. διὸ καὶ θνητὰ ὀνομάζεται· θάνατος γὰρ τοῦτο κέκληται, ἡ τῶν δεδεμένων λύσις (X. 32. 3).

Now, the idea that all which has been fastened together may be undone and perish, is Platonic. Compare, e.g., *Tim.* 41 a 7 τὸ μὲν οὖν δὴ δεθὲν πᾶν λυτόν. I need not engage here in the discussion about

<sup>3</sup> On Hippolytus' Theology compare M. Richard, in *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité*, 44–45 (Paris 1968), s.v. Hippolyte de Rome, pp. 545–571; L. Bertsch, *Die Botschaft vom Christus und unserer Erlösung bei Hippolyt von Rom* (Augsburg 1966).

whether Hippolytus is consistent in his theory. Briefly stated, I think he is consistent but elliptical (ἱκανὸν οὖν νῦν <ἐστι ταῦτα> τοῖς εὐφρονούσιν ἀποκεκρίσθαι . . . τὸ δὲ νῦν ἱκανὸν <δοκεῖ> εἶναι ἐκθέσθαι τὰς αἰτίας, X. 32. 4–5). Presumably, the only being composed of one single substance is the Holy Ghost (Πνεῦμα). Jesus, the Logos, consists of the divine substance of the Father (οὐσία ὑπάρχων θεοῦ, X. 33. 8). Sun, moon and the stars are made of fire and spirit, thus perishable. So is the world (ὁ δὲ κόσμος . . . ἐπιδέχεται καὶ λύσιν, X. 33. 8). If my restoration of the corrupt text is correct, the angels *too* are made of fire and spirit (compare OT Psalm 103:4 and Gregory Naz. *Orat. theol.* 28. 31 and 31. 15). Consequently, they *too* are potentially perishable. Finally, when Hippolytus states that fish and birds are made of water, while reptiles, beasts and other animals are made of earth, I think we should understand, “*primarily* of water or earth, respectively.” For, evidently, the animals are not τὰ μονοούσια and thus imperishable.

Man is created out of all four elements—ἐκ πασῶν σύνθετος οὐσιῶν (X. 33. 7). This idea *too* is Platonic. Compare *Tim.* 42 e – 43 a, and Albinus clearly states, οἱ δὲ θεοὶ ἔπλασαν μὲν προηγουμένως τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ γῆς καὶ πυρὸς καὶ ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος (*Epitome* 17. 1, ed. Hermann, Plato vol. VI, p. 172).

A third encounter of Hippolytus with Platonism seems to occur in his reinterpretation of the Delphic injunction, Γνῶθι σεαυτόν (quoted at I. 18), in the sense of, “Man, recognize that thou art *godlike*”—<καὶ> τοῦτ’ ἐστι τὸ “γνῶθι σεαυτόν,” ἐπιγνοὺς <ἐν σεαυτῷ> τὸν πεποιηκότα θεόν (X. 34. 4). Doubtless, Hippolytus is building upon OT Genesis 1:26 (referred to at X. 34. 5)—Man is made in God’s image and likeness. But there is no injunction, “Know thyself,” in the Old Testament. On the other hand, a reinterpretation of the Γνῶθι σεαυτόν in the sense of Γνῶθι τὸ θεῖον ἐν σεαυτῷ is to be found in the first *Alcibiades* 133 c 4—“Then this part of the soul resembles God, and he who looks at this part, having realized all things divine, will be most likely to know himself” (Τῷ θεῷ ὅρα τοῦτ’ ἔοικεν αὐτῆς, καὶ τις εἰς τοῦτο βλέπων καὶ πᾶν τὸ θεῖον γνούς, . . . οὕτω καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἂν γνοίῃ μάλιστα).

In conclusion, throughout the *Elenchos*, Hippolytus dismisses Plato’s pagan philosophy—and he calls Valentinus Πλατωνικός, οὐ Χριστιανός (VI. 29. 1)—only to succumb to the Platonic spell in his own Theology, as did Athenagoras half a century before him.

*Stoa.* Hippolytus’ Christology displays a peculiar blend of Stoic and Christian ideas. Contrary to the doctrine of Noetus and Callistus, according to Hippolytus the Son does not coexist with the Father,

but is being first mentally conceived and then born by the Father as any other being—Οὗτος οὖν <ὁ> μόνος . . . θεὸς Λόγον πρῶτον ἐννοηθεὶς ἀπογεννᾷ (X. 33. 1). The only difference of significance between the “first-born” son (NT Col. 1:15) and the rest of the creatures is in the fact that the Son consists of pure being, i.e., of the same substance as the Father (τοῦτον <οὖν> μόνον ἐξ ὄντων ἐγέννα· τὸ γὰρ ὄν αὐτὸς ὁ πατὴρ ἦν, ἐξ οὗ τὸ γεννηθέν, X. 33. 1; ὁ Λόγος . . . οὐσία ὑπάρχων θεοῦ, X. 33. 8), while the rest of the beings are made out of one or more of the four basic elements.

The “first-born” Son exists in the Father as his *immanent reasoning* about the universe (οὗ <δὲ> Λόγον ὡς φωνήν, ἀλλ’ ἐνδιάθετον τοῦ παντὸς λογισμόν, X. 33. 1). When the Father decides to create the world, presumably, he opens his mouth, and his *immanent reasoning* (ἐνδιάθετος λόγος) becomes at once an *uttered Word* (προφορικὸς λόγος). It is this uttered Word that becomes the Father’s only *agent of Creation*—καὶ αἴτιον τοῖς γινομένοις Λόγος ἦν (X. 33. 2); ἵνα Λόγος ὑπουργῇ (33. 4); ὅσα γοῦν ἠθέλησεν ποιεῖν ὁ θεός, ταῦτα Λόγῳ ἐδημιούργει (33. 6); τα<ὕτα> δὲ πάντα διώκει ὁ Λόγος ὁ θεοῦ (33. 11). Hippolytus’ elliptic account is perhaps best illustrated by the Christology of Theophilus of Antioch (*Ad Autolycum* II. 10 & 22): Ἐχων οὖν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἐαυτοῦ λόγον ἐνδιάθετον ἐν τοῖς ἰδίῳις σπλάγχνοις (cf. OT Psalm 109:3), ἐγέννησεν αὐτόν . . . ; ὁπότε δὲ ἠθέλησεν ὁ θεὸς ποιῆσαι ὅσα ἐβουλεύσατο, τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐγέννησεν προφορικόν, “πρωτότοκον πάσης κτίσεως . . .” (NT Col. 1:15).

Now, the distinction between the two kinds of Logos—“mental reasoning” (ἐνδιάθετος) and “uttered word” (προφορικὸς)—is clearly Stoic,<sup>4</sup> with possible antecedents in Plato (*Sophist* 263 e) and Aristotle (e.g., *Anal. Post.* A 10, p. 76 b 25). But, as the examples of Theophilus, Irenaeus (*Adv. haer.* II. 12. 5), or Origen (*Contra Celsum* VI. 65) show, it was well established in the time of Hippolytus.<sup>5</sup>

The problem, however, is in the function of the Logos as a *Voice* (φωνή). We can understand that a Stoic *προφορικὸς λόγος* is no other thing but an uttered *voice*, or, as Hippolytus puts it,—ὁ Λόγος ὁ θεοῦ . . . , ἡ πρὸ ἐωσφόρου φωσφόρος φωνή (X. 33. 11); (Χάος) ὑπὸ Λόγου φωνῆς μὴ καταλαμφθέν (X. 34. 2); φωνὴν φθεγγόμενος καὶ φῶς ἐκ φωτὸς γεννῶν προῆκεν τῇ κτίσει κύριον τὸν ἴδιον νοῦν (*Contra Noetum* 10, p. 253. 5 Nautin; cf. NT II Petri 1:19).

We can also understand that Logos serves as a “voice of God” to men (Adam, the prophets and others). Consider, e.g., X. 33. 13 καὶ

<sup>4</sup> Cf., e.g., Max Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*<sup>2</sup> I (Göttingen 1959), pp. 39; 185; 373 ff.; 412; 435; 451.—II (Göttingen 1955), Erläuterungen.

<sup>5</sup> It suffices here to refer to M. Mühl, in *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* (Bonn, Bouvier), VII (1962), 7–56.

ταῦτα <δὲ> ὁ θεὸς ἐκέλευε Λόγω, ὁ δὲ Λόγος ἐφθέγγετο λέγων <τοῖς προφήταις> . . . , or Theophilus (II. 22) 'Ο δὲ λόγος αὐτοῦ, δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα πεποίηκεν, . . . ἀναλαμβάνων τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ πατρός, . . . οὗτος ὡμίλει τῷ Ἀδάμ. . . φωνὴ δὲ τί ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἄλλ' ἢ ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὃς ἐστὶν καὶ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ;


What is peculiar in Hippolytus' Christology is the fact that Logos bears in himself the Father's ideas *as a voice*—ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ἐκ τοῦ γεννησαντος προελθεῖν . . . <ὡς> φωνὴν εἶχεν ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰς ἐν τῷ πατρικῷ <νῷ> ἐννοηθείσας ιδέας (X. 33. 2). If I understand Hippolytus correctly, he is trying to tell us that Logos is fulfilling his Demiurgical duty by *transforming* the Father's *immanent ideas* into *uttered words*. How can we explain such a function of Logos? Certainly we are not dealing here with the folkloric motif of the creation of the world by a Demiurge's sound of music. Nor is it likely that Logos brings beings into existence simply by naming them, by giving them a name (in the sense of Basilides' *ὀνόματι μορφοῦν*, *Ref.* VII. 18. 1). For we learn from Hippolytus himself that the naming of the beings did not coincide with their very creation—ὅτε δὲ <ὅσα> ἡ<θέλησεν> ὡς ἡθέλησε καὶ ἐποίησεν, ὀνόμασιν <αὐτὰ> καλέσας ἐσήμηνεν (X. 33. 7).

Since no Stoic theory of language seems to be of avail in our case, the only suggestion I am at present able to offer is that Logos transforms the Father's ideas into voice in his role of the traditional Old Testament "*voice of God*." Compare, e.g., OT Genesis 1:3 καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεός· Γενηθήτω φῶς. καὶ ἐγένετο φῶς, with Basilides' interpretation (*Ref.* VII. 22. 3), οὐ γὰρ γέγραπται πόθεν γέγονε τὸ φῶς, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ μόνον <τὸ γενόμενον> ἐκ τῆς φωνῆς τοῦ λέγοντος. . . . Or Hippolytus (*Contra Noetum* 10) Θεὸς μόνος ὑπάρχων καὶ μηδὲν ἔχων ἑαυτῷ σύγχρονον ἐβουλήθη κόσμον κτίσαι· ὃς κόσμον ἐννοηθεὶς θελήσας τε καὶ φθεγξάμενος ἐποίησεν.


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